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This is a critique of the principal claims made within Ludwig 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It traces the develop-
ment of his thought from the time he dictated the pre-Tractarian "Notes 
on Logic" to Russell up until about 1932 when he began work on the 
Philosophical Grammar. The influence exercised upon him by Frege, 
Russell and Moore are considered at length. Chapter one examines 
Moore's relational theory of judgment which Wittgenstein apparently ac-
cepted upon his arrival at Cambridge in 1911. From Moore Wittgenstein 
would inherit one of the fundamental metaphysical theses of the 
Tractatus, namely, that the world consists of facts rather than things. 
Wittgenstein's attempt to overcome the relational theory's inability to 
account for falsehood, negation, and the possibility of truly ascribing 
false beliefs to others would herald some of the principal theses of 
Tractarian semantics: that propositional signs must exhibit bipolarity, 
that a distinction must be drawn between Sinn and Bedeutung, and that a 
distinction holds between what can be said and what can only be shown. 
Chapter Two examines how these theses are sharpened by considering the 
influence of Frege and the manner in which Wittgenstein disposes of 
Russell's Paradox. considerable attention is given to the issue of 
whether Frege is to be interpreted as a semantic Platonist. It is ar-
gued that he is not, and that Tractarian semantics shores up the prob-
lematic features of Frege's philosophy which make it susceptible to the 
paradox. From Frege Wittgenstein derives the idea that all representa-
tion requires a structured medium. The chapter concludes by considering 
how this entails the falsehood of semantic Platonism. Chapter Three 
studies Wittgenstein's argument for logical atomism and gives it a fa-
vorable assessment. The influence of Russell's conception of logical 
analysis is considered. The chapter concludes by showing the way 
Wittgenstein's thesis that there must be simple subsistent objects de-
pends upon the truth of his Grundgedanke, i.e., the claim that the logi-
cal constants are not referring terms. Chapter Four examines the argu-
ment for the Grundgedanke, and defends it against criticism based upon 
phenomenological considerations for objectifying negativity. It is 
demonstrated that Wittgenstein's view entails that a distinction must be 
drawn between propositions possessing sense and those that are senseless 
but no less a part of our language. Chapter Five examines 
Wittgenstein's claim that the essence of a proposition consists in a 
propositional sign's projective relation to the world, and it considers 
the Tractarian analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions. It is 
argued that the analysis of these sorts of sentences forms the principal 
problem with the Tractatus. The chapter includes a discussion of why 
the Color Exclusion Problem need not be considered problematic for the 
author of the Tractatus, and it defends the realistic interpretation 
given of the Tractatus throughout the dissertation against criticisms 
arising from a consideration of Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism. 
V 
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NOMENCLATURE 
Throughout this dissertation the following conventions will be 
observed: 
(l) References to linguistic expressions of natural language will 
always appear within quotation marks. Hence, noesdemona loves 
Cassio" is a linguistic expression made true by the fact that 
Desdemona loves Cassio. 
(2) Like the expressions mentioned in (1), formulae such as P, 
Fa, (Bx) Fx, (x) Fx, F(FAb), etc., belong to the meta-language. 
P and »Desdemona loves Cassio" belong to the same level of 
language (as do "Pis true" and n•oesdemona loves Cassio' is 
true") in that each refers to (or ranges over) sentence tokens of 
the object-language. Because the use of variables plays a similar 
role to the quotation marks in (l), I have omitted placing 
quotation marks around them (or outer brackets as is often the 
custom in logic texts). This practice is justified on the 
grounds that were quotation marks placed around formal 
expressions, consistency with (1) would produce a nearly endless 
number of use/mention fallacies: rather than using formulae to 
refer to sentences, formulae would merely be mentioned. 
Furthermore, this convention is designed to make the text less 
cumbersome to the reader. 
(3) By not putting quotation marks around formal expressions, a 
difficulty arises regarding the manner in which to refer to what 
makes a formula like P true. Technically speaking, Pis true if 
and only if the sentence it is interpreted as representing is 
true. But we need to be able to refer to the fact which makes a 
formula P under whatever interpretation true. A bold character 
will be used in this instance. Thus: Pis true of P. If Pis 
synonymous with noesdemona loves Cassio," then P just is the fact 
that Desdemona loves Cassio. Expressions that contain a 
combination of natural and formal elements--like: »a is F"--will 
be treated in the same way. Thus: what makes ua is F" true is 
the fact that a is r. In Appendix I small Greek letters, a, p, 
x, etc. are used in a manner similar to a, b, c, etc. 
(4) Italics are reserved for foreign words which have not been 
assimilated into English, and they are also used for emphasis. 
Furthermore, italics are typically used in the translation of such 
sentences from Frege as, "The concept horse is not a concept." I 
have resisted the temptation to tamper with the translations so as 
to comply with (3) above. Nevertheless, the reader should bear in 
mind that they play a similar role to the boldface characters used 
in discussing Russell's Paradox. 
(5) Wittgenstein, Moore, Russell and Frege often move from the 
formal to the material mode without a change of symbolism. 
Quotations will not be modified to accord with the above 
conventions (except for the that mentioned in (6)). Any ambiguity 
which results will be dealt with in the text or in a footnote. 
(6) In Chapter Three it is necessary to represent the pictorial 
elements of such representations as occur in pictographs, 
hieroglyphics, photographs, and the like, which play a role within 
a pictorial language Symbols such as Q¥6 will be used for this 
purpose; details of their usage will be contained in the text. A 
similar function is played by the circle figure in the Appendix: 
0. 
(7) Various logical symbols are used throughout: 
(a) P, Q, R, etc. are propositional variables; 
(b.) (Bx) is the existential quantifier; 
(c) (x) is the universal quantifier; 
(d) x, y, z, etc are variables for which names or 
singular terms in general may be substituted; 
(e) F, G, H, are variables for which predicative 
expressions may be substituted; 
(f) ◊ is the modal operator for possibility; 
(9) v, &, -, -, -, and~ are the symbols for disjunction, 
conjunction, negation, biconditionality, material. 
implication and strict implication; 
(h) i is the Sheffer stroke corresponding to joint 
negation; 
(i) The carat within FAx functions as a Lambda operator, 
as in A(Fx). In most books the carat appears above 
the variable x, but due to production problems it is 
here being placed between the two symbols. The 
presence of the carat turns the function Fx into a 
singular term. What singular term the function 
becomes, in a given text, depends largely on the 
purpose to which the symbolism shall be put and 
whether it is to be deployed within an intensional or 
extensional system. Typical candidates for 
intensional systems include "the function Fx" or "the 
class of F's." In the intensional predicate calculus 
developed by Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990) the 
occurrence of any A-operator will have within its 
scope a well-formed formula, "l', such that AX['lj.'] may 
be interpreted as "the property of being an x such 
that "l'" (1990, p. 319). Within an extensional 
system the singular term might be interpreted as "the 
members of the class of F's," provided one is 
prepared to argue that the embedded phrase (" ••• the 
class of F's") is to be interpreted instrumentally. 
Although the Tractatus is essentially an 
extensionalist work with respect to what can be said 
(which means, among other things, that it does not 
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countenance properties as belonging to the ultimate 
furniture of the world), its author's use of the carat 
differs from that just mentioned. Wittgenstein always uses 
A 
F x to denote the tact that xis F. we should note that he 
does not think its use is legitimate, since it purports to 
be the name of a fact, and, for him, facts cannot be named. 
For Wittgenstein it is impossible to represent the 
essential semantic properties of a propositional sign by 
means of another propositional sign; it is only possible to 
present the semantic properties of a propositional sign 
through its use. 
ix 
1. General Purposes. 
INTRODUCTION 
The way in which language signifies 
is mirrored in i ta use. 
Notebooks 1914-1916 
This dissertation is designed to offer a critique of the principal 
semantic and meta-semantic claims found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922b). 1 In particular, I want to show 
the way in which the Tractatus is consistent with certain aspects of 
Wittgenstein's.later Philosophical Investigations (1958). The great ex-
tent to which there is continuity between the early and later philoso-
phies has not generally been appreciated by commentators. Even those 
scholars who do lay stress upon what continuity there is often misinter-
pret what is essential. Stenius (19601 1981), for example, looks upon 
the Investigations as posing little challenge to the prospects of there 
being an adequate truth-functional semantics. In contrast, I hold the 
Tractatus to be commensurate with the Philosophical Investigations pre-
cisely because the most important thesis of the Tractatus is that no 
purely truth-functional semantics is possible. That is a thesis to 
which the later Wittgenstein would readily agree; in fact, it is one 
whose implications are played out definitively in the later 
Wittgenstein's philosophy. Furthermore, the Tractatus holds that no 
such theory is possible tor propositional attitude ascriptions. Like 
1 Meta-semantic theory seeks to clarify and articulate the methods 
and the ultimate research goals of semantic theory. Typical meta-seman-
tic questions are: Is a theory of reference (truth, consistency, etc.) 
possible? Must an adequate semantic theory contain an account of how 
communication is possible? Are the goals of theory construction in lin-
guistics explanatory or merely predictive? Semantic theory, in con-
trast, seeks to answer such questions as: Bow is reference accom-
plished? Are meanings (or senses) entities? Is the meaning of a lin-
guistic expression identical to its truth-conditions? And so forth. 
1 
the more general thesis, this is an idea consonant with the later phi-
losophy. The criteria! behaviorism of the Philosophical Investi-
gations is a form of Instrumentalism, and, so, treats our discourse 
about the mind as not having a truth stating function at all. These 
theses are defensible ones1 and, I believe, the early Wittgenstein of-
fers a strong argument on their behalf, although that argument remains 
obscure within the pages of the Tractatus. To appreciate its strength, 
one must examine, not only the Tractatus, but some of the pre-Tractarian 
writings. This dissertation attmnpts to reconstruct the argument of the 
Tractatus in l~eu of these other writings. It also attempts to clarify 
the respective influences exercised by Moore, Russell and Frege upon 
Wittgenstein. 
We proceed in the following way. Chapter I examines Wittgen-
stein's pre-Tractarian views concerning the nature of judgment and the 
ultimate eme~gence of his thesis of the bipolarity of the proposition. 
The views he expressed during the Winter of 1911 in his conversations 
with Russell show the deep influence upon him of Moore's relational the-
ory of judgment. That theory is fraught with many problems: it cannot 
explain the nature of negation (particularly negative existential judg-
ments), the nature of falsehood (indeed it appears to be committed to 
the idea that falsehood is impossible), nor can it explain how it is 
possible to truly ascribe to another person a false belief. The view 
later becomes Wittgenstein's foil as he begins to formulate the princi-
pal semantic theses of the Tractatus. The first section of the chapter 
discusses Moore's rejection of Idealism, and his own unique attempt at 
resolving these probleJllS by assimilating the conditions for existence to 
the conditions of individuation. The solution, we shall see, does not 
sufficiently resolve the problems, and Moore was not inclined to pursue 
the strategy in his later writings (presumably because it would have 
committed him to a doctrine of internal relations, something he would 
2 
have regarded as the earmark of Idealism). Little of the early theory 
of judgment is retained in the Tractatus, although I would venture to 
say that the Tractarian claim that M[t)he world is the totality of 
facts, not of things" (1922b, 1.1) stems from Moore. The absurdities to 
which Moore's theory of judgment lead would eventually occasion 
Wittgenstein's adoption of the thesis of the bipolarity of the proposi-
tion. This thesis--namely, that all propositions with a sense must be 
possibly true and possibly false (that is to say, contingent)--is the 
first principal thesis of Tractarian semantics to emerge in his writ-
ings. It is also the thesis that underpins his own distinction between 
sense (Sinn) and meaning (Bedeutung). This distinction is easily misun-
derstood, especially if interpreted along Fregean lines (or at least 
along what are thought to be Fregean lines). Some attention will be 
given toward the end of the chapter to demonstrating that such an inter-
pretation does not enjoy the textual support often claimed for it. That 
it cannot do justice to what we know about the historical development of 
Wittgenstein's thought should become apparent throughout the course of 
the chapter. 
Once Wittgenstein embraces the bipolarity of the proposition and 
the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung the stage is set for his ini-
tial characterization of the difference between showing and saying. 
Chapter II is devoted to examining the way the distinction between show-
ing and saying allows Wittgenstein to to circumvent the class and seman-
tic paradoxes introduced against Frege by Russell. In an important way 
we can see Wittgenstein as shoring up elements of Frege's philosophy 
against Russell's threat. Russell believed that the paradoxes could 
only be avoided by means of a theory of types that proscribes the forma-
tion of certain sentences. Wittgenstein, in contrast, maintains that an 
adequate theory of types is neither possible nor necessary. Its impos-
sibility is a result of the incompleteness engendered by introducing 
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such proscriptions as the Vicious Circle Principle. (These worries 
occur to Wittgenstein, we might note, some seventeen years prior to 
Godel's famous presentation to the Vienna Circle of his discovery of the 
incompleteness of arithmetic. 2 ) That a theory of types is not necessary 
stems from the fact that an illogical language (a term that will require 
considerable unpacking) is impossible. The very nature of language it-
self makes a theory of types unnecessary, and this is so partly because 
representation requires the sub-sentential components of any formula or 
propositional sign to have a structure which makes it impossible for the 
paradoxes to arise. This idea, crucial to the Picture Theory, has its 
origin in Frege's distinction between concept-word (or function) and 
name (or argument). The chapter will give us an opportunity to look at 
Frege's philosophy in some depth in order to determine just what 
Wittgenstein takes from him in the course of formulating the semantic 
theory of the Tractatus. I suggested above that it is a mistake to in-
terpret Wittgenstein's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung in too 
Fregean a manner. That usually involves treating Frege as a proponent 
of linguistic Platonism. But in fact Frege was no Platonist, as I go to 
great lengths to argue. It is a mistake to construe Fregean senses as 
abstract, mind-independent entities. Be is rather to be understood as a 
systematic philosopher in the Kantian tradition for whom senses are in-
tersubjective and binding upon all rational agents. Furthermore, Frege 
should be understood as advancing a minimal semantic theory, that is to 
say, one which holds that it is impossible for there to be a theory of 
reference or of truth (at least if truth is construed as involving a re-
lation--e.g., correspondence--to something external to language). For 
Frege, semantic theory totally subserves the theory of inference. 
Frege's views are extremely problematic, but not because they en-
2 See G<Sdel (1931). It was Carnap who later saw the connection be-
tween Wittgenstein's and Godel's philosophies1 cf. Coffa (1993), partic-
ularly Chapter Fifteen, -The Road to syntax,n pp. 272ff. 
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gender Russell's Paradox. Wittgenstein does indeed circumvent the para-
dox. What is problematic is how a distinction between Sinn and 
Bedeutung can be maintained--indeed, how objectivity can be claimed for 
language and thought--once one has renounced the possibility of conduct-
ing ontology. One possibility would be to collapse the distinction in 
such a way as to treat the Bedeutungen of propositional signs as objec-
tive and make the objectivity of Sinne somehow parasitic upon that of 
the Bedeutungen. That is precisely what Wittgenstein's Picture Theory 
of the Proposition does; ultimately it overcomes Frege's problems by 
means of a semantic theory whose essence is summed up by saying language 
and world share a common logical form (1922b, 4.12). In the process, 
Frege's minimal semantics is replaced by a robust semantic theory that 
enjoins us to accept an ontology of simple objects, facts, and states of 
affairs. In the end it is the realism of Moore and Russell that wins 
out over the minimalism (or internalism) of Frege. The metaphysics of 
the Tractatus, however, is the topic of a later chapter. 
our examination of Frege allows us to see the advantages 
Tractarian semantics has over one very powerful alternative view. It 
enables us to see just what Wittgenstein does and does not take from 
Frege. In particular it lets us see just how far removed Wittgenstein's 
semantics is from any form of linguistic Platonism. The fact is that 
the distinction between showing and saying that emerges undermines 
Platonism, due to the fact that that distinction requires representa-
tion--whether in thought or language--to be conducted in a concrete 
medium: there can be neither meaning nor sense apart from a concrete 
medium containing elements whose constituents stand in contingent rela-
tions to one another. 
It is at this stage of the dissertation that we begin to see the 
roots of what might be called a token theory of meaning. Such a theory 
is 'token' in two respects. First, the requirement that representation 
5 
must occur in a concrete, structured medium makes linguistic tokens--ac-
tual utterances, inscriptions, signings, etc.--the locus of meaning. At 
the very least it makes these tokens a necessary condition for the pos-
sibility of representation, which is a far cry from what the Platonist 
would be willing to accept. A Platonist, e.g., Katz (1990), would main-
tain that semantic properties (like meaningfulness) and semantic rela-
tions (like synonymy, antonymy, superordination, subordination and the 
like) are capable of existing independently of any concrete instantia-
tion. Second, what becomes evident in the treatment of Russell's 
Paradox, especially in the rejection of the the possibility of a theory 
of types, is that the form (not the structure) of a propositional sign 
cannot be the subject of a discursive meta-language. One cannot say 
what the form of a propositional sign shows. This should not be con-
fused with the minimal semantics advocated by Frege. In Frege•s case, 
one cannot explain the relations of reference and truth that obtain be-
tween language and world, but one supposedly can draw inferences about 
one level of language by means of another. (Frege treats quantifiers, 
for example, as second order predicative expressions.) In contrast, 
Wittgenstein's semantics is robust in the sense that it does provide an 
ontology, but it denies the possibility of a hierarchy of forms (indeed 
he treats quantifiers as eliminable from a logically perspicuous lan-
guage). So the Token Theory is token to the extent that it embodies the 
meta-semantic claim that nothing about the semantic properties of a lan-
guage is sayable. In other words, the sentences that comprise these-
mantic theory of the Tractatus cannot be included within the domain of 
that very theory. Yhis, as we noted earlier, occasions the need to pos-
tulate nonsensical expressions within a language. The semantics of the 
Tractatus is only a token theory, because unlike the theories of natural 
science it cannot claim for itself any genuine explanatory power. 
Although it hardly sounds like a compliment to say so, the Tractatus es-
6 
capes Frege's minimalism by virtue of the nonsense it contains. It will 
not be until a later chapter, Chapter v, that the nature of nonsense can 
be laid out in any detail. 
By the end of Chapter II we have an account of the bipolarity of 
the proposition and an initial characterization of the distinction be-
tween showing and saying~ together these comprise the general lines of 
the Picture Theory of the Proposition. Chapters III, IV, and V elabo-
rate upon the Picture Theory. They bring its details into focus by con-
sidering three sorts of counter-examples to the thesis that the number 
of pictorial or propositional elements must be isomorphic to the number 
of objects thus represented. The initial theory must be augmented so as 
to accommodate sentences containing names of non-existent objects 
(Chapter III), sentences containing logical constants, i.e., sentence-
forming operators and quantifiers (Chapter IV), and sentences that ap-
pear to contain an intensional or non-truth-functional element as found 
in propositional attitude ascriptions and oratio obliqua (Chapter V). 
In each case we find it is Russell, rather than Moore or Frege, who 
serves as Wittgenstein's greatest influence. 
Chapter III begins by considering the problem of reference fail-
ure. We will see how Russell's Theory of Descriptions provides 
Wittgenstein with the tool necessary for dealing with this matter. 
Although Russell's Theory of Descriptions receives little explicit 
treatment in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein is clearly sympathetic with the 
manner in which it is used to eliminate ontological commitments to such 
unwanted entities as the golden mountain and the present King of France. 
As we will see, by distinguishing between the "apparent logical form of 
a proposition ••• [and] its real one" (1922b, 4.0031), Wittgenstein is 
able to expand his idea of pictorial form in such a way as to accommo-
date problematic cases in which the structures of sentences do not ap-
proximate the structures of pictures. This expansion requires a commit-
7 
ment to the existence (or subsistence) of simple objects that constitute 
the substance of the world. Russell and Wittgenstein would both become 
logical atomists, but as we shall see, their respective atomisms differ 
in important respects. 
As it turns out, Russell's argument for atomism would remain 
largely epistemological (baaed upon his distinction between knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge by description), whereas Wittgenstein's would 
stem purely from semantic considerations (that is, from a consideration 
of what makes sense possible). The two philosophers also differ with 
regard to the degree to which they allow themselves to be committed on-
tologically to the existence of simple objects. For Wittgenstein they 
are the substance of the world; for Russell they are primarily the 
residue of analysis, a residue that might be eliminated by means of 
ugreater logical skill" (1924, p. 173) Finally, both differ in terms of 
their ontologies, although neither•s discussion of the matter is unam-
biguous. Russell's ontology stays closely tied to his epistemology, so 
that he eventually identifies simple objects with particulars with which 
one may be acquainted. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, adopts a much 
more agnostic stance after a lengthy soliloquy (reproduced in his 
Notebooks) in which he attempts to reconcile his belief that there must 
be simple objects with his apparent inability to characterize them. 
The strength and the real weakness of Wittgenstein's argument for 
simple objects has generally gone unappreciated by commentators. Most 
commentators view the argument as one that calls for the existence of 
simple objects in order to block one or another infinite regress. Black 
(1964, pp. 58ff), for example, suggests that Wittgenstein maintains 
there must be a terminus for analysis if anyone is to know the meaning 
of a proposition. Unless there were such a terminus, a person would 
have to know the meaning of an infinite number of propositions in order 
to know the meaning of even one. However, it will be demonstrated that 
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this sort of epistemological regress flies in the face of a considerable 
quantity of the text. Another possibility is that suggested by Weinberg 
(1935). According to Weinberg, unless simple objects serve as the ter-
minus for analysis, propositions would never refer to an extra-linguis-
tic reality (1935, p. 80). Propositions would be related to one another 
and to nothing else. This construal of his argument at least does jus-
tice to Wittgenstein's dissatisfaction with Frege•s minimalist semantics 
in which semantic theory is reduced to the theory of inference. But, 
for reasons discussed below, the argument presented by Weinberg is so 
obviously invalid that it hardly warrants consideration. Black's and 
Weinberg's interpretations are now considered standard. Perhaps the 
greatest virtue of Chapter III lies in the fact that it exploits the 
texts (including those of the pre-Tractarian writings) in such a way as 
to provide a considerably more charitable interpretation of Wittgen-
stein's argument than has heretofore been offered. My interpretation 
construes it as a valid deductive argument that has as one of its major 
premises the thesis of the bipolarity of the proposition. That there is 
a link between bipolarity and logical atomism has not gone unnoticed, 
for example by White (1974), but the exact way in which one moves from 
premises concerning bipolarity to a conclusion concerning the existence 
of simple objects has never been made explicit. 
The weaknesses commentators attribute to Wittgenstein's argument 
for atomism typically depend upon assigning him an overly weak argument. 
If one accepts the usual interpretations of the argument, one cannot 
help but notice their invalidity. This leaves one with the opinion that 
if one must accept the argument for logical atomism in order to accept 
the rest of Tractarian se111antics, then one may as well give the whole 
of Tractarian semantics up. But this opinion is not justified. The 
Tractatus is stronger than that, as my rendition of the argument is de-
signed to show. If the argument has any major flaw, it resides in the 
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unmet need to explain how complex objects could consist of objects that 
are not composite. I maintain that Wittgenstein has an answer to this 
question in his ontological distinction between facts (Tatsachen) and 
states of affairs (Sachverhalten). In order for the distinction between 
facts and states of affairs to assist in the resolution of the metaphys-
ical problem of how complex objects can consist of non-composite ob-
jects, it is necessary to show that the Grundgedanke of the Tractatus is 
true. Thus the analysis the Picture Theory provides for elementary 
propositions depends upon that which can be given for molecular proposi-
tions. The defense of this thesis is what distinguishes this particular 
account of the semantics of the Tractatus from all others offered thus-
far. 
Chapter IV presents Wittgenstein's argument for the Grundgedanke. 
We begin in that chapter by considering Russell's position on the sub-
ject. Although Russell does not want to admit molecular facts, he is 
willing to countenance negative facts. Furthermore, we consider 
Sartre's phenomenological reasons for admitting negative facts 
(negatites) into his ontology. The argument for the Grundgedanke must 
answer to these considerations. 
Normally the thesis that the logical constants do not refer is 
presented as an assumption that must be made if the account of molecular 
propositions is to consistent with the Picture Theory's requirement that 
there be an isomorphism between referring terms within language and ob-
jects within the world. Where scholars do interpret Wittgenstein as 
having an argument, the argument is readily seen as begging the ques-
tion. Chapter IV seeks to remedy this by providing a strong (though not 
deductively valid) argument for the Grundgedanke. I argue that this 
claim can be defended on the basis of bipolarity without begging the 
question. To my knowledge only one scholar has noted the historical tie 
between the Grundgedanke and Wittgenstein's earlier thoughts concerning 
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the bipolarity of the proposition, namely, McGuiness (1974); but none 
have demonstrated the way in which the one serves as premise in an argu-
ment for the other. This I seek to do. The task requires unpacking 
Wittgenstein's comments concerning what he calls the general form of 
the proposition. It is argued that the general form of the proposition 
is to be identified with what is expressed by what I call the minimal 
truth table. That this truth table can be construed as expressively 
complete, whereas that countenanced by Wittgenstein's would-be adversary 
cannot be considered as such, establishes the truth of the Grundgedanke. 
The Grundgedanke carries with it two major implications. The 
first is that the logical propositions--tautologies and contradictions--
must be considered senseless (sinnlos). What chapter IV attempts to do 
is explain how the semantics of the Tractatus must be expanded to in-
clude senseless as well as sensical propositions. The other major im-
plication is ontological. It is necessary to distinguish between facts 
(Tatsachen) and states of affairs (Sachverhalten) such that the former 
are not reducible to the latter. This sort of metaphysics displaces 
concerns raised in the previous chapter over the intelligibility of 
there being complex objects or states of affairs that have as heir con-
stituents other objects that in no way can be considered complex. 
Whereas Chapter III takes up the question of sentences containing 
names of non-existent objects (thereby bringing to completion the ac-
count of sense), and Chapter IV considers sentences containing sentence-
forming operators (thus introducing the category of what is senseless), 
Chapter v takes up the issue of how to interpret sentences that appear 
to contain an intensional or non-truth-functional element as found in 
propositional attitude ascriptions and oratio obliqua, and, indeed, as 
found in the very sentences that make up the Tractatus itself. 
Chapter v turns to those sentences that perhaps pose the most sig-
nificant challenge to the principal theses constituting the Picture 
1 1 
Theory of the Proposition. Propositional attitude ascriptions, and 
oratio obliqua, attempt to say something about the projective relation 
that holds between a proposition or a propositional sign and the state 
of affairs of which it is true or false., Considerations of the sort 
that led Wittgenstein to reject Russell's Paradox lead him, in the 
Tractatus, to conclude that one sentence cannot say what another sen-
tence does or does not say--indeed, that a sentence cannot say of it-
self what it does or does not say. The argument is not entirely evident 
in the Tractatus, but it becomes so if the relation between the class 
and semantic paradoxes is born in mind. Nevertheless, it is necessary 
for there to be a projective relation between proposition and fact if 
the one is to be a model (Bild) of the other. Sentences of proposition-
al attitude attempt to convey something about this relation. Since this 
relation must be a necessary condition for the possibility of represen-
tation, and since only propositions about what is contingent have sense, 
it follows that sentences of propositional attitude should have no 
sense. Yet clearly a sentence of the form us believes (says, etc.) pn 
is neither a tautology nor a contradiction. Thus it would not be accu-
rate to label such sentences as senseless. Wittgenstein's solution re-
quires viewing all sentences of propositional attitude as containing two 
distinct semantic components. 
Consider us believes P." Let us distinguish between the ascrip-
tive clause (us believes ••• ") which assigns a particular kind of propo-
sitional attitude to a particular subject and the content clause 
(u ••• P") which specifies what is believed by the subject. On 
Wittgenstein's view the ascriptive clause must be regarded as nonsensi-
cal (unsinnig). In a manner to be described in detail below, it is that 
aspect of the ascription which attempts to convey something of the pro-
3 In what follows I will speak only of propositional attitude ascrip-
tions and not of oratio obliqua. Clearly Wittgenstein does not draw any 
crucial distinction between the two. 
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jective relation that makes representation possible. This does not mean 
one cannot say anything about propositional attitudes and other mental 
states, even though Wittgenstein's sparse remarks on the subject tempt 
one to adopt such an interpretation. Certain remarks in the Tractatus 
suggest, in fact, that much can be said about psychological states, but 
that that is not a matter of importance to its author. What is impor-
tant is that the existence of propositional attitudes presupposes that 
there is a metaphysical subject whose willing forms the ground for all 
representation whatsoever. Because the subject and its will constitute 
a necessary condition for the possibility of representation, it cannot 
be the subject matter of any proposition with sense. Instead, its pres-
ence is shown in the very act of believing, hoping, asserting (etc.) 
that a given proposition with sense is true. When one attempts to say 
something about the willing subject (or about anything that constitutes 
a necessary condition for the possibility of representation, as all the 
sentences of the Tractatus attempt to do) what results is nonsense. As 
I understand that term, a sentence can be nonsensical without its indi-
vidual terms failing to refer. Sentences are nonsensical, not because 
they lack semantic properties like reference, but because they are sys-
tematically misleading: since all saying pertains to what is contin-
gent, and since the existence of the willing subject cannot (on 
Wittgenstein's view) be contingent, any attempt to say something about 
it will inevitably distort its nature. Anyhow, it is that feature of 
sentences which produces such nonsense that constitutes the second major 
extension of Wittgenstein's conception of showing. As we shall see 
below, many of Wittgenstein's principal theses and the arguments upon 
which they are based are highly contentious. 
The preceding remarks pertain only to the ascriptive clause within 
us believes that P." The content clause upn receives separate treat-
ment. It is regarded as having the very same semantic properties it 
13 
would have if it were asserted and not merely ascribed to some subject. 
Thus npn (i) can have a sense, provided it expresses a contingent truth, 
or (ii) can be senseless, if it corresponds to a logical proposition, 
i.e., a tautology or a contradiction, or (iii) it can be in part nonsen-
sical, if upw is itself a sentence of propositional attitude. As we 
will see, this third possibility raises serious problems for the 
Tractarian account of propositional attitudes as well as for Tractarian 
semantics in general. As mentioned earlier, the Tractatus can provide 
no adequate account for second-order propositional attitude ascriptions. 
Once this is acknowledged, the dominoes begin to fall. The final domino 
is the syntacticist or structuralist assumption concerning the roles 
logical structure and form play within a semantic theory. That is to 
say, the presumption of an isomorphism between language and world, so 
central to the Picture Theory, must be relinquished. 
2. Limitations. 
The five chapters that comprise this work are limited to a discus-
sion of the strengths and weaknesses of Tractarian semantics. With few 
exceptions do I deal with any texts other than the pre-Tractarian writ-
ings, the Tractatus itself, and some of the material from his Cambridge 
lectures of 1929-1930. Nevertheless the unraveling of the Tractatus, as 
recorded in the Philosophical Remarks (1930) and the Philosophical 
Grammar (1932), and its ultimate replacement by what is contained in the 
Philosophical Investigations (1958), is an intriguing topic. 
Unfortunately, an adequate treatment of the historical development of 
Wittgenstein's thought following the Tractatus and of the adequacy and 
inadequacy of the arguments it contains would comprise a work many times 
longer than the present one. I would, however, like to conclude this 
Introduction by giving some indication of how the principal claims at-
tributed to Wittgenstein in this dissertation happened to evolve in his 
later work. 
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As I mentioned above, the principal thesis of the Tractatus is 
that there can be no purely truth-functional semantic theory. A truth-
functional semantic theory is one which maintains that an account of the 
essence of language (and perhaps of thought) is to be cashed out in 
terms of an account of what makes uttered sentences (and occasioned 
thoughts) true or false. The Tractatus presents three exceptions to any 
theory that attempts to make truth its corverstone. Bach falls under 
the rubric of what cannot be said (i.e., evaluated as true or false) but 
only shown1 there is (i) what is shown by a propositional sign that is 
meaningful (namely, its sense), (ii) what is shown by a senseless propo-
sitional sign that is tautologous or contradictory (viz., something 
Wittgenstein calls the form of language and the world, plus a certain 
kind of know-how concerning how to operate with symbols), and (iii) what 
is shown by nonsensical propositional signs (namely, the necessary con-
ditions for the possibility of representation itself, including, most 
importantly, what Wittgenstein refers to as the will which effects the 
projective relation between propositional sign and world). Underlying 
each of these conceptions of showing (particularly the last two) is a 
view of language as a human accomplishment. This idea comes to fruition 
in the later philosophy where the use of linguistic tokens is deemed the 
most essential feature of language. 
Even though the later philosophy shares none of the atomistic 
metaphysics of the Tractatus, there exists considerable continuity in 
the perpetuation of a semantic distinction between saying and showing. 
In the early philosophy, the capacity of a propositional sign to say or 
to show anything whatsoever is dependent upon it having both a structure 
and form isomorphic to actual and possible states of affairs in the 
world that constitute the meaning (Bedeutung) and sense (Sinn) of the 
sign. Both ways in which language function, by saying and showing, de-
pend upon what is actual and possible in the world. Once shorn of its 
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metaphysical underpinnings the first of the three conceptions of showing 
goes by the wayside, but the shadowy dimensions of the second and third-
-what is expressed in the senseless and nonsensical--takes on such sub-
stance as to make them the centerpiece of the new semantics. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of senseless tau-
tologies and contradictions. In the early philosophy, propositional 
signs that share these structures cannot be regarded as making state-
ments capable of truth or falsehood. If they are informative at all, it 
is by virtue of displaying the limits of language and the world, i.e., 
the limits of what can be said, and said of, the world. Yet they do not 
do this by virtue of being discursive elements of a meta-language. (As 
we shall see in the course of the chapters below, according to Wittgen-
stein, a propositional sign with one structure cannot say what a propo-
sitional sign with another structure says.) Rather they provide speak-
ers with prototypes or linguistic exemplars of what can be said. They 
serve as rules of inference or transformational rules, although refer-
ring to them as such can be misleading if one has an overly rationalis-
tic or cognitivistic conception of rules. They are expressions of one's 
know-how, and one may be said to understand them without ever having 
consciously entertained them. When they are uttered they constitute a 
sort of demonstration (commentators often refer to them as presentations 
rather than representations). In the hands of the author of the 
Philosophical Investigations and the Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics the so-called logical propositions become transformed into 
the grammatical propositions of the later semantics. These have a simi-
lar function to fulfill in that they determine what constitutes a mean-
ingful utterance within a language~ they are the rules of language 
games. Like the earlier rules they do not need to be consciously enter-
tained. Unlike the earlier rules, no particular grammatical proposition 
lies implicit within the very nature of language itself~ their status is 
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much more a matter of convention. Whereas the employment of the earlier 
rules could be said to reflect a reality having a crystalline logical 
structure, the grammatical propositions of the later philosophy struc-
ture what is to count as possibly true and real. Considered in them-
selves, they are neither true nor false but antecedent to truth. They 
provide their viewers with prototypical instances of linguistic behavior 
that can be mimicked by those who are disposed to find in them a use. 
Instructing someone in the use of signs by uttering a grammatical propo-
sition can be likened to teaching a person how to shovel by pantomiming 
the movements one makes with a shovel. 
The fate of the nonsensical expressions is no less interesting. 
In the Tractatus the semantic category of nonsense is introduced to ac-
commodate statements, like those that make up the Tractatus itself, that 
pertain to the essence of language. This third semantic category is ne-
cessitated by the fact that these statements seem to be neither contin-
gent (as are all sentences with a sense), nor do they seem tautologous 
or contradictory (as are senseless sentences). What is interesting is 
that sentences that express propositional attitude ascriptions--e.g., •s 
believes that P"--fall into this category, because the ascriptive clause 
(us believes ••• ") refers to something that essentially involves the 
will. It is the will that effects the projective relation that is es-
sential to making the propositional sign into a proposition; that is to 
say, it is the will that accomplishes representation by means of the 
sign that serves as medium As I suggested above, we will see that the 
Tractarian account of the semantics of propositional attitude ascrip-
tions turns out to be extremely problematic. The problems that arise 
here are more significant, and perhaps have more to do with why 
Tractarian semantics ought to be abandoned, than the traditional prob-
lems (like the supposition that the world possesses a substance of sim-
ple immutable objects or the color exclusion problem) that are attribut-
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ed to the Tractatus. The problems are two-fold. First, the whole con-
ception of what is nonsensical rests on an untenable account of necessi-
ty (and of law-like statements) and of what is and is not necessarily 
so. Indeed, the Tractatus cannot provide any account whatsoever of sec-
ond-order propositional attitude ascriptions (like MJohn believes Mary 
loves him") without relinquishing its conception of the nonsensical. 
But this produces a series of irresolvable problems for the author of 
the Tractatus. Once we remove the need to see the psychological as be-
longing to the ineffable, one of the main threads of Tractarian seman-
tics begins to unravel and with it the last barrier to a thorough-going 
naturalistic account of the ascriptive clause in which one may say or 
state what is essential to the projective relation itself. Here the 
dominoes begin to fall: the de re necessity that constitutes the form 
(but not the actual structure) of the world is lost, and with it is lost 
the conditions of the world which fix the senses of the sentences of our 
language. Ultimately what would have to be abandoned would be what 
Wittgenstein later disparagingly refers to as the conception of the 
world as having a crystalline logical form and of sense as determinate. 
What is retained in the later philosophy is something of the 
Tractarian account given of the content clause of the propositional at-
titude ascription. The Tractatus gives the content clause a disquota-
tional analysis which, as I suggested earlier, reemerges as the logical 
(or criterial) behaviorism of the Philosophical Investigation, a doc-
trine that I take to be compatible with instrumentalism in the philoso-
phy of mind. Here the role played by showing looms large. To borrow a 
phrase from a contemporary advocate of the disquotational analysis, the 
utterance of a propositional attitude ascription constitutes a kind of 
uplay-acting," a uskit or demonstration" (Stich, 1983, pp. 83-84). The 
fact is that it is difficult not to assimilate belief and other proposi-
tional attitude ascriptions to the grammatical propositions mentioned 
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earlier. So what we see as the later philosophy develops is the col-
lapse of the distinction between the nonsensical and the senseless; and 
when the latter is stripped of its ontological underpinnings, the result 
is a certain form of Instrumentalism. 
Instrumentalism and other forms of skepticism concerning the 
reification of intentional and semantic properties have recently come 
under attack as upragmatically incoherent• (Baker (1987), pp. 134ff). 
In uThe Wittgensteinian Consistency of scepticism: An Antiseptic for 
the Anti-Sceptic" (Levvis, 1992) I have argued that the incoherence at-
tributed to Instrumentalism can be avoided by wedding Instrumentalism to 
a Wittgensteinian account of grammatical propositions. 
Although Criterial Behaviorism is a form of Instrumentalism, it 
should not be assimilated to the Instrumentalism currently advanced in 
the philosophy of mind. While its principal proponent, Dennett (1978; 
1989), is correct in saying that our talk of the mental plays no ex-
planatory role, he is wrong to treat it merely as playing a predictive 
role. There is much more going on when we talk about the mental. And 
it is, I believe, to Wittgenstein's credit that he recognized that using 
and understanding psychological predicates involve a hermeneutical ele-
ment not required of statements that are purely predictive or hypotheti-
cal. It is in fact the distinguishing mark of Wittgenstein's hermeneu-
tics that what we call understanding anothers' words or deeds requires 
treating others' behavior as variable and unpredictable. There is a 
threshold beyond which behavior that is too predictable ceases to be be-
havior. Levvis (1991) seeks to explain this by unpacking the seemingly 
obscure passage in the Philosophical Investigations that u[i]f a lion 
could talk, we could not understand him" (1958, p. 223). (Bad 
Wittgenstein been writing in a later time period, he probably would have 
said that if computers could talk (which, of course, they can), we would 
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not understand them.)• Such a view stands in utter contrast to the 
structuralist or syntacticist philosophy of the Tractatus. It is ates-
timony to the genius that inspired that work that what is best in it 
should support what is most contentious in the Philosophical 
Investigations. 
4 Both of the articles referred to above were originally intended to 
be chapters of this dissertation. There inclusion became less practical 




PRE-TRACTARIAN SEMANTICS (I): 
FROM MOORE'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT TO THE BIPOLARITY OF THE PROPOSITION 
1. Historical Background. 
Wittgenstein suggests in the Preface to his Philosophical 
Investigations that the ideas contained within that work are best under-
stood in "contrast with and against the background of" the views he had 
espoused in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1958, p. vi). This 
chapter and the next take Wittgenstein's advice one step further by ex-
amining the development of his thought prior to writing the Tractatus 
and indeed even prior to writing the world war I Notebooks. The pro-
gression of Wittgenstein's views during this time period offers an in-
valuable backdrop for our examination of Tractarian semantics. His ear-
liest views were expressed in conversations with Russell that took place 
in Cambridge during the winter of 1911. If Russell's description of 
these conversations is to be trusted, then it appears that Wittgenstein 
at the time advocated a relational theory of judgment similar to that 
held by G. E. Moore in "The Nature of Judgment" (1899).' What is most 
significant about such a theory is that it treats truth as a property of 
facts or states of affairs that are judged rather than as a property of 
the act or even the content of judgment. In its unwillingness to coun-
tenance the existence of mental contents the theory stands diametrically 
opposed to any any form of correspondence theory. As will become clear-
er below, the theory is fraught with numerous difficulties, not the 
least among which is its inability to adequately account for false 
propositions and negative existential judgments. During the two years 
5 Baldwin (1993, p. vii) points out that this article originally ap-
peared as a chapter in Moore's 1898 Fellowship dissertation for Trinity 
College entitled, "The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics." 
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following these conversations with Russell we find Wittgenstein 
wrestling with these issues and with problems that he thinks are inher-
ent in Russell's Theory of Types. Bis -Notes on LogicH (1913b), uNotes 
Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway" (1914a), and various letters penned to 
Russell prior to 1914 show us the direction in which his thought W"-S 
moving. we find him embracing the claim, for example, that there only 
exist true propositions, i..e., that in a certain respect there are no 
false propositions--or, as at least no false empirical propositions.• 
Some of the oddity of this claim goes away when it is viewed in the con-
text of a relational theory of judgment which equates propositions and 
facts. Nevertheless, the theory winds up with an untenable account of 
false empirical judgments. Furthermore, like Moore and like the Russell 
of The Principles of Mathematics (1903), we find him willing to counte-
nance the existence of negative facts in order to account for the possi-
bility of negative existential judgments. Finally, and most important-
ly, we find in his criticism of Russell's Theory of Types and his de-
fense of certain Fregean doctrines the Tractarian distinction between 
showing and saying in its embryonic form. Needless to say, the influ-
ence of Frege upon Wittgenstein during this time is enormous. In fact, 
in certain respects, the distinction between showing and saying (which 
to Wittgenstein's mind makes a theory of types unnecessary) is prefig-
ured in that philosopher's writings. 
This period of Wittgenstein's thinking comes to a close (no later 
than June of 1913) when he raises certain objections to Russell's multi-
ple object theory of judgment consonant with the principal semantic 
themes of the Tractatus. As is well known, these criticisms forced 
Russell to abandon all work on his 1913 epistemological manuscript which 
6 For Moore, we shall see, when one asserts a false statements, one's 
utterance is about something (or about some set of things, namely, a 
group of properties that fail to be concatenated) that has Being but not 
existence. What is tenuous about his position is that when one makes a 
false statement, one is not making a statement about empirical reality. 
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would have provided an extensive explication of various theses presented 
all too briefly in Problems of Philosophy (1912). 7 It is in this year 
that the famous Grundgedanke of the Tractatus would occur to 
Wittgenstein: the idea that the logical constants do not serve as re-
ferring expressions. The Grundgedanke, along with his theses concerning 
the bipolarity of the proposition and (most importantly) the distinction 
between showing and saying, constitute the three principal semantic doc-
trines of the Tractatus. They are the essential doctrines of the 
Picture Theory of the Proposition. Of these three doctrines the dis-
tinction between showing and saying is, as mentioned earler, the most 
important. It would, indeed, continue to play a central role in his 
later writings, only in that context it would serve the interests of a 
deflationary semantic theory. 
These first three chapters are devoted to Wittgenstein's theses 
concerning the bipolarity of the proposition and the distinction between 
showing and saying. It would be accurate to say that the principal the-
sis concerning the bipolarity of the proposition emerges from concerns 
over the inadequacy of Moore's theory of judgment, whereas the distinc-
tion between showing and saying emerges from concerns over Frege's vul-
nerability to Russell's Class Paradox. Section Two below examines the 
problems posed by Moore's theory of judgment. Section Three is con-
cerned to show why it is necessary to countenance the bipolarity of the 
proposition in order to overcome these problems. One of the important 
features of that section is that it enables us to see the uniqueness of 
Wittgenstein's distinction between sense (Sinn) and meaning (Bedeutung). 
Contrary to many commentators, I do not construe the sense of a proposi-
tion as a (that is to say, one) possible fact or state of affairs which 
either obtains or fails to obtain. Rather, I view the sense of a propo-
7 Russell's manuscript was published posthumously as Theory of 
Knowledge (1913). 
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sition as a set of possible facts or states of affairs. In contrast, 
the meaning of a proposition is the member of this set which actually 
makes the proposition true or false. This view of sense and meaning 
carries important implications for how we are to understand 
Wittgenstein's conception of truth conditions within the Tractatus. If 
one considers only the Tractatus, and neglects the Pre-Tractarian writ-
ings and some of the works written immediately after the Tractatus, one 
is likely to think that Wittgenstein regarded falsehood merely as the 
non-occurrence of a fact or state of affairs that is asserted by someone 
to be the case. one might be tempted, in other words, that Wittgenstein 
countenances truth conditions but not falsifying conditions. This, I 
shall argue, is an incorrect interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus. 
The first section of the next chapter examines Russell's Theory of 
Types and Wittgenstein's initial reaction to it. To fully appreciate 
the force of Wittgenstein's views it will be necessary to examine 
Frege's own views at some length. In an important respect Wittgenstein 
can be understood as retrieving aspects of Frege's semantic theory from 
the threat posed by Russell's Class Paradox; yet his view is markedly 
dissimilar from Frege's. Like Frege, Wittgenstein would hold that the 
semantic features of a language must be reflected in its syntactic or 
logical form; unlike Frege, Wittgenstein would not be willing to regard 
sentences and formulae as functioning like names. Why that cannot be 
the case will turn out to be the key to why he believes an illogical 
language is impossible, and that, in turn, is the key to why he believes 
a theory of types is not necessary. 
It is only in this light that the distinction between showing and 
saying may be appreciated--not merely as a conventional alternative to 
Russell's Theory of Types--but as a necessary semantic distinction. An 
examination of the Grundgedanke of the Tractatus, which rounds out the 
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principal semantic theses of the Tractatus, will be put off until 
Chapter IV. It, and the Picture Theory of the proposition as a whole, 
will be treated as a consequence of the bipolarity of the proposition 
and the distinction between showing and saying.• 
2. Moore's Relational Theory Qt Judgment. 
Wittgenstein's earliest views bear the stamp of G. E. Moore. This 
much is evident from numerous conversations held between Wittgenstein 
and Russell in the early winter months of 1911. The contents of these 
conversations were recorded on a nearly daily basis by Russell in his 
letters to Lady Ottoline Morrell (reprinted in Monk, 1990, pp. 39-40): 
My German engineer very argumentative & tiresome. 
He wouldn't admit that it was certain that there was 
not a rhinoceros in the room. (l November 1911) 
My German engineer, I think, is a fool. He thinks noth-
ing empirical is knowable--! asked him to admit that there 
was not a rhinoceros in the room, but he wouldn't. 
(2 November 1911) 
[Wittgenstein] was refusing to admit the existence 
of anything except asserted propositions. 
(7 November 1911) 
My German ex-engineer, as usual, maintained his thesis 
that there is nothing in the world except asserted prop-
ositions ••• (13 November 1911) 
Later in life Russell would mention that his own assessment of 
Wittgenstein's intelligence was made difficult by the views he espoused 
at the time: 
He maintained, for example, at one time that all exist-
tential propositions are meaningless ••• I invited him to 
consider the proposition: 'There is no hippopotamus in 
this room at present.' When he refused to believe this, 
I looked under all the desks without finding one: but he 
remained unconvinced (1951, p. 297: as quoted in McGuiness, 
8 Let me point out that the title of this chapter is somewhat a mis-
nomer. Themes that emerge prior to, but continue to play a major role 
within, the Tractatus will be explicated with reference to passages from 
that text. 
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1988, p. 89).' 
The set of theses to which Russell refers constitute a relational 
theory of judgment such as that advocated by Moore in the 1899 article, 
uThe Nature of Judgment.n This article is one of several in which Moore 
disputes the idealism of F. e. Bradley by calling attention to an ambi-
guity in that author's use of the word Midea,n viz., that the word is 
used to denote both the act of consciousness or judgment, as well as the 
object of consciousness or judgment.•• In the Principles of Logic (1883) 
Bradley had attacked the empiricist claim that an individual's ideas are 
reducible to ~ollections of introspectable experiences. Against this 
reductivist claim Bradley had argued that the contents of consciousness 
or judgment must be construed as possessing an irreducibly universal 
character (1883, p. 4). In saying this he intended not only to deny the 
epistemological thesis that the contents of consciousness and judgment 
are arrived at or produced by such mental operations as association and 
abstraction, but to affirm the ontological thesis that the objects of 
these states just are universals, i.e., abstract entities that are mind-
independent. 
9 Although Russell attributes to Wittgenstein the view that all exis-
tential propositions are meaningless, his example is a negative existen-
tial proposition. I think we can say confidently that the issue between 
them at least pertained to negative existentials. That would be a sup-
position consistent with the letters to Ottoline Morrell. Whether the 
the topic concerned all existential judgments we are not in a position 
to say. one of the earlier letters does, however, assign to him the be-
lief that nothing empirical is knowable. Nothing in the chapters ahead 
really hangs on this issue. Clearly, by the time Wittgenstein wrote the 
Tractatus he believed that existential propositions were not needed at 
the atomic level, since at that level of analysis all names are assumed 
to have reference to simple, subsistent objects. At any level other 
than the atomic level existential propositions are to be construed as 
assertions that some fact obtains. 
10 one good indication that Wittgenstein was on board with those op-
posed to Idealism is his 1913 review of P. Coffey's The Science of 
Logic (1913). Wittgenstein criticizes Coffey (perhaps unjustly) for be-
lieving #that reality is changed by becoming the object of our thoughts" 
(1913a, p. 3). 
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Bradley's use of the term uidea" to denote the objects of con-
sciousness and judgment did not worry Moore. For example, Moore would 
have no difficulty with uses of a phrase such as uMy idea of green-
ness ••• " when the phrase is construed as being about greenness itself. 
However, Bradley would also describe the meanings of signs or symbols as 
universal in character (1883, p. 5), and often he would use the term 
"idea" to denote a type of sign albeit one that is mental in nature 
(1883, p. 5). But the very idea of a sign is that of a representational 
medium. Thus Bradley had used the word to designate both that which is 
represented a~ well as that which represents. In this way he was com-
mitted to there being mental representations that occupy an intermediate 
position between subjects and the objects concerning which judgments are 
formed. It was this commitment to mental representations that Moore 
found objectionable. 
The thrust of Moore's objection is epistemological. on Bradley's 
view the truth or falsehood of judgments is dependent upon the relations 
that obtain between one's ideas (construed as mental representations) 
and reality (1883, p. 2). The relating of the mental representation to 
reality, for Bradley, is an accomplishment on the part of the mind. In 
judgment a particular content is "cut off, fixed by the mind, and con-
sidered apart from the existence of the sign" (1883, p. 4). But, coun-
ters Moore, in order for the mind to fix or determine some content that 
is attributable to reality, it must have some idea of the reality to 
which the content shall be affixed. Forming true judgments would re-
quire of subjects a capacity to transcend the representation-world rela-
tion in order to determine whether the two correspond, indeed, in order 
to determine which mental representation corresponds to reality. From 
Moore's point of view, this entails an infinite regress: not only would 
one have to form a secondary judgment about one's primary judgment, but 
a tertiary judgment about one's secondary judgment, and so on. Moore 
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concludes, 
[t]he theory would ••• seem to demand the completion 
of an infinite number of psychological judgments before 
any judgment can be made at all. But such a completion 
is impossible~ and therefore all judgment is likewise 
impossible. It follows, therefore, if we are to avoid 
this absurdity, that the 'idea used in judgment' must be 
something other than a part of the content of any idea 
of mine (1899, p. 178). 
For our purposes it matters little whether the infinite regress which 
Moore attributes to Bradley can be blocked. (To be sure, Moore greatly 
underestimates the role assigned to intuition by Bradley and the extent 
to which reality itself fixes the meanings of mental representations~ 
cf. 1883, p. 44ff.) What is important is that if, as Moore believes, 
one is unable to form a true judgment without first possessing both an 
idea of the meaning of one's mental representation as well as an idea 
of the reality thus represented, then it is superfluous to posit the ex-
istence of mental representations. Mental representations are supposed 
to make judgments about reality possible, yet their ability to do so 
presupposes (on pain of infinite regress) a direct awareness of the re-
ality which allegedly stands in need of such representation. 
For Moore, then, the immediate objects of consciousness and judg-
ment must be mind-independent realities rather than mere representations 
of such realities. To think otherwise would be to confuse the object of 
consciousness with something subjective, that is, with something which 
is more appropriately viewed as belonging to the act of consciousness. 
Ideas (construed as contents or meanings) must not be confused with any-
thing psychological. Attempting to avoid the ambiguities inherent in 
the word "idea," Moore chooses to use the word uconcept" to designate 
the objects of consciousness. For him there is nothing psychological 
about concepts~ they are not, for example, mere products of a mental act 
of conceiving. "A concept," Moore tells us, "is not a mental fact, nor 
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any part of a mental factw (1899, p. 179). 
Concepts, for Moore, are universals. They are abstract entities 
which exist independent of any mind. Moore is a metaphysical realist 
(or Platonist) concerning the existence of universals: being aware of a 
red object involves a relation to an entity which is the redness of the 
object, and this very same entity is a term of any relation involving an 
awareness of some particular object to which the property of redness is 
attributed. Moore's theory should be distinguished from nominalistic 
approaches which countenance the possibility of two objects possessing 
similar but not identical properties. Nominalistic accounts typically 
view the nature of a property as being contingent in some manner or 
other upon the particular object to which it is attributed. But, for 
Moore, concepts (properties) are in no way dependent upon the objects to 
which they are assigned. If they were, then it would not be possible to 
form awarenesses or judgments about concepts themselves. But it is pos-
sible, for example, to simply be aware of redness or to form a judgment 
that red is a color, and in neither case does one's mental act involve a 
relation to any particular object to which redness or coloredness is at-
tributed. Such awarenesses can occur at different times and different 
places. Since the objects of such awarenesses are not to be identified 
with anything subjective, they too must persist from time to time and 
from place to place. Bence, like Plato's Forms, Moore's concepts are 
immutable and eternal. 
Typically realists describe the relation between particular ob-
jects and the properties attributable to them as one of the former par-
ticipating in, partaking of, exemplifying, or instantiating the latter. 
None of these phrases are accurate·in this case, since for Moore there 
are no particulars truly distinguishable from universals. Moore asserts 
at one place that the world consists of nothing but concepts (1899, p. 
182). A particular object, on this view, is nothing more than a com.bi-
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nation (perhaps a unique combination) of concepts. Put another way, an 
object is but a certain concrescence of immutable (1899, p. 180) proper-
ties at a particular time and in a particular place. 11 This being so, 
the question we should consider is: what distinguishes concepts which 
appear to be instantiated in space and time from those which are not? 
After all, the concept of a unicorn is just as much a concept of a phys-
ical thing as is the concept of a horse. Both are complex concepts 
which would be analyzed in terms of their components. (It should be 
noted that Moore's model of analysis involves treating a complex concept 
as a kind of object whose parts are to be enumerated: it does not in-
volve defining a concept in terms of its genus and differentia.) Since 
both concepts are concepts of things which have physical parts, given 
Moore's conception of analysis, both the concept of a unicorn and the 
concept of a horse must be analyzed as physical things, even though the 
latter exist but the former do not. Allow me to bring the problem into 
greater focus. Suppose one perceives an actual horse. At that instant 
one stands in a relation to the concept of a horse. But then suppose 
one imagines a unicorn or, better, a unicorn that exists. 12 In each case 
the objects of one's awareness are alike in terms of being physical. 
One cannot say of the unicorn that its physicalness merely resides uin 
the mind" of the person imagining it. Clearly, for Moore, no recourse 
11 Here we must be cautious not to inadvertently smuggle into our ac-
count of Moore's view entities that play the role of particulars that 
may be instantiated. Above we spoke of the concatenation of concepts 
at a particular time and at a particular place. This wording is forced 
upon us, but it should not be taken to mean that times and places are 
particulars of a peculiar sort. If the universe, for Moore, consists of 
nothing but concepts (properties), then times and places are concepts 
too. As we proceed we shall see just how problematic this is for Moore. 
Once particulars are eliminated from an ontology, it becomes impossible 
to devise a relation among concepts that can play the same role as in-
stantiation. The problem then becomes one of how to distinguish what 
merely possesses Being from what possesses existence. 
12 I presume this is no more problematic than imagining that one's 
great-great-great-great grandparents are still alive. 
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can be made to entities Min# the mind. so, how, on Moore's view, shall 
we distinquish what is merely imaginary from what is actually perceiv-
able? If there is no way for Moore to draw this distinction, we have a 
reductio of his view. Moore's problem comes to thisa how can a unicorn 
be a physical object but not be located in physical space? or, more 
generally: how can there be physical obiects which possess no physical 
properties? 
As we shall see, Moore does offer a solution to this problem by 
assigning a special role to the concept of existence and to temporality. 
Before examining his solution, however, let me dispel any worry the 
reader might have that the problem introduced above is in some way 
trite. I want to do this because I think that although Moore may very 
well be able to circumvent the particular problem just posed (namely as 
to how there could be, external to the mind, something with physical 
properties that is not located in physical space), once his solution is 
on the table the very same kind of problem reoccurs. If the reader be-
lieves that this kind of problem amounts to nothing more than an attack 
upon a straw man, little of what follows may seem philosophically rele-
vant. 
The reason one might be tempted to regard this kind of problem as 
an attack upon a straw man is that one is inclined to think it is a mis-
take to regard the concept of a physical thing as, itself, a physical 
thing. Although it is not possible for Moore to resolve the question by 
treating the concept of a physical thing as a representational entity, 13 
one might want to argue on Moore's behalf that we are failing to distin-
guish between concepts (or properties) and their instantiation. If con-
13 This would resolve the problem by permitting a sentence such as 
"John imagines that a unicorn is eating his slippers" to be construed 
intensionally (i.e., by assigning a de dicto interpretation to the em-
bedded noun clause). Someone could thus conceive of a unicorn while re-
siding in a universe in which there are no actual unicorns, just 
unicornness itself. 
31 
cepts may be instantiated, then there is no reason to regard the concept 
of being physical as a physical thinq. Furthermore, goes the objection, 
it there is no distinction between a concept and a physical thing, then 
given what we said earlier about obiects (namely that they are immutable 
and eternal), it would follow that objects would have to be immutable 
and eternal. Moore, one wants to say, ought to be interpreted in a more 
charitable light.a 
I will defer discussion of the would-be reductio until later. 
Moore is not the first Platonist to be saddled with the difficulty of 
explaining how change is possible. Suffice it here to say that he 
thinks he can overcome this problem by making temporality the essence of 
existence. Regarding the suggestion, though, that we have constructed a 
straw man by ignoring the possibility of instantiation, let me remind 
the reader that, for Moore, there are no particulars to instantiate con-
cepts. Moore's world consists completely of concepts (properties) and 
nothing else (1899, p. 182). What is typically regarded as a particular 
object is nothing more than a concatenation of concepts or properties 
(1899, p. 183) or, as he sometimes says, it is nothing more than a com-
plex concept (1899, p. 183). A fact (or, in Moore's terminology, a 
proposition) is nothing but an even more complex concept (1899, p. 180). 
Because Moore cannot appeal to particulars, he will have to find some-
thing that plays the same role as instantiation. To be sure, he has a 
proposal, but before examining it we should be perfectly clear on why 
this is a difficult goal to achieve. Part of the reason why it is dif-
ficult to imagine physicalness (external to the mind) belonging to no 
physical thing is that we commonly take the distinguishing mark of a 
physical thing to be the possession of physical properties (or the prop-
erty of being physical. The point is that the external occurrence of 
physicalness is commonly taken to be the basis for our saying that there 
14 For this criticism I am indebted to John Nolt. 
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is a physical thing external to ourselves. What we are being asked to 
consider is the possibility of there being external physicalness but no 
external thinq to which physicalness may be ascribed. Trying to take 
this possibility seriously immediately gets one into hot water with the 
usual philosophical distinction between universals and particulars. 
Ordinarily, universals are distinguished from particulars on the grounds 
that particulars may only have properties predicated of them, whereas 
universals may either be the objects of predication or be predicated of 
other objects. The classical conception of universals treats a property 
as a kind of thing in its own right. But if there are no thinqs that 
are physical--that is, if there are no things to which physicalness may 
be predicated--then we cannot even consider physicalness itself as a 
thing to which physicalness may be attributed. But how is it possible 
that physicalness cannot be predicated ot physicalness? If anything, we 
would think that physicalness is identical to physicalness. 
These considerations proceed from what I referred to as an ordi-
nary conception of physical things. That conception may be wrong, but 
it does serve as a starting point. That is, it shows us why an argument 
is needed here in support of the claim that there are nothing but prop-
erties or concepts. A major part of that burden consists in providing 
an account of some relation among concepts that can play the same role 
as instantiation. What we want from Moore is some account of how ab-
stract entities can come together to form an existent object. 
Moore's solution is to treat existence itself as a concept, so 
that existent objects are complex concepts composed of one or more con-
cepts (such as physicalness) which stands in a logical relation (presum-
ably that of inclusion) to the concept of existence. Existence itself 
can be a concept, since it, like redness, can be an object of awareness 
or judgment (1899, p. 180). Thus all properties (including the property 
of being a unicorn) are mind-independent and enjoy a kind of being, but 
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only some properties have existence. MAn existent,n Moore tells us, Mis 
seen to be nothing but a concept or complex of concepts standing in a 
unique relation to the concept of existence" (1899, p. 183). 
Here an implication of the utmost importance arises. Moore's view 
implies that there are no simple, unanalyzable existents. Since what 
exists necessarily involves relations among the objects of consciousness 
(at a bare minimum it requires a relation between the property of exis-
tence and some other property), it is really more appropriate to say 
that what exist are facts or states of affairs." Or, to use Moore's 
terminology at the time, what exist are propositions. This may sound 
peculiar, but, as Moore explains, 
[T)he description of an existent as a proposition 
seems to lose its strangeness, when it is remembered 
that a proposition is here to be understood, not as any-
thing subjective--an assertion or affirmation of some-
thing--but as the combination of concepts which is 
affirmed (1899, p. 183). 
The object of judgment (even, as we shall see, when the judgment is 
false) is always a proposition or fact. Indeed, perceptual belief (as 
when one perceives that this rose is red) is defined by Moore as being 
the cognition of an existential proposition {1889, p. 183). This prima-
cy given to facts as the objects of judgment serves to distinguish 
Moore's view from Russell's multiple object theory of judgment (1912; 
1913). We will examine Russell's view extensively in a later chapter. 
15 One of the opening remarks in the Tractatus is MThe world is the 
totality of facts, not of things" (1922b, 1.1). Although Wittgenstein's 
ontology differs from Moore's, it is in Moore's philosophy that 
Wittgenstein first encountered the idea that the world consists of 
facts. Even though Moore's view eventually comes under criticism by 
Wittgenstein, this particular thesis would never be relinquished by 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's retention of the thesis also owes much to 
the influence of Frege, particularly Frege's context principle, accord-
ing to which a word only has meaning in the context of a sentence. We 
will have a chance in a later chapter to see how far the influence of 
Frege extends. I think it is fair to say that Wittgenstein accepts 
Frege's distinction between singular and predicative expressions for all 
analyzable propositions but not for atomic propositions. 
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Here suffice it to say that for Russell a judgment is the product of a 
set of discrete mental acts (acquaintance with a universal, another ac-
quaintance with a particular, etc.) whose objects are knit together into 
a unified whole (that is, into a proposition) by the act of judgment. 
On Moore's view, in contrast, perception begins with the proposition. 
The facts presented to the perceiving subject are already combinations 
of concepts. This gives Moore's theory of judgment a certain advantage 
over Russell's, given the difficulty Russell has in explaining how judg-
ment knits together the objects of awareness into a unified whole. 11 
Returning to the issue posed above, it might appear to be a mere 
evasion of the issue to claim that what distinguishes instantiated con-
cepts of physical objects (like that of a horse) from uninstantiated 
concepts of physical objects (like that of a unicorn) is that the former 
do, but the latter do not, have existence. It hardly seems adequate to 
answer the question of how there can be physicalness external to the 
mind which is not itself physical by saying that some physicalness has 
existence and some has not. How the latter could be so is precisely the 
issue. 
For Moore, however, the essence of existence is temporality (1899, 
p. 188). The possession of temporal properties is precisely what dis-
tinguishes an existent object from a non-existent one. The point may be 
expressed by saying that existence occurs at times, so that for a uni-
corn to exist, it would be necessary for the properties that make up a 
unicorn to come together with the property of existence at some time. 
What is meant in saying that a unicorn does not exist is that the prop-
erties that make up a unicorn do not now form a union with the property 
of existence. 
18 Russell (1913) even goes so far as to regard logical forms as being 
among the objects of acquaintance. This, we will see in Chapter Five, 
simply multiplies the problem. By giving metaphysical primacy to facts 
and states of affairs, Wittgenstein, like Moore, avoids Russell's prob-
lem. 
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He arrives at this conclusion through a consideration of Kant's 
distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Moore desires 
very much to preserve Kant's distinction between a priori and a poste-
riori judgments, and to preserve it in such a way that the former but 
not latter might be characterized as necessarily true or false. 
Consistent with his criticism of Bradley, Moore objects to Kant's way of 
drawing the distinction in terms of the mental acts required. Rather, 
such judgments must be individuated in terms of the types of concepts 
which occur in them. Since the objects of consciousness, concepts, are 
immutable (and thus lay claim to a certain kind of necessary existence), 
it must be possible for there to be contingent relations among concepts; 
and this, he believes, is possible only if these relations are not them-
selves immutable." These relations must therefore have a temporal qual-
ity. Thus, while all propositions consist in a certain concatenation of 
concepts, those which are a posteriori in nature involve relations 
which, conceivably, might not obtain. For Moore, this means that empir-
ical propositions must relate concatenations of concepts to times. 
(This should not be taken to mean that the sentences speakers use for 
stating propositions must contain an explicitly temporal element; rela-
tions to times must here be regarded as belonging to the ontology of em-
pirical judgments. Nor should the presence of tense within a sentence 
be regarded as any sort of evidence that the sentence somehow expresses 
17 Like many philosophers, the most notable perhaps being Aquinas and 
Plato, Moore conflates immutability and necessity. This is not to say 
that such a view is unwarranted, but only that it stands in need of an 
argument. (It has been remarked to me by Mary Sirridge in conversation 
that this commits Moore to the modal language S4; of this I am dubious, 
but this is not the place to pursue the issue.) 
on the question of the relations among concepts, Moore is not consis-
tent. Clearly if he is to account for change and consistency, he cannot 
exclude the possibility that the relation among concepts change from 
time to time. Yet he says, #(a) proposition is a synthesis of concepts1 
and just as concepts are themselves immutably what they are, so they 
stand in finite relations to one another equally immutable~ (1899, p. 
180). 
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an empirical judgment.) What makes a judgment empirical is that it is 
about objects with temporal properties. 
One might suspect that the question which nagged Moore earlier 
(namely, the question of how there could be physicalness external to the 
mind that is not physical) might reappear in new garbs is it not pos-
sible to have a thought about some particular object with certain tem-
poral qualities which nevertheless does not exist? Are we to be commit-
ted to the existence of the Martians who, according to the Orson Wells' 
broadcast, invaded the Barth in 1938? Clearly here is a case in which 
something which never existed is given a temporal characterization. Is 
it not possible to imagine a unicorn that exists at a given place and 
time? As noted earlier, this would seem to be no less possible than 
imagining having a conversation (now) with one's currently deceased an-
cestors. How does a relation to the concept of existence (now under-
stood as having an essentially temporal character) accomplish the pas-
sage from mere Being to existence? The role played by instantiation has 
not been captured in the process. 
I believe Moore has a better solution to this problem. But before 
we can bring it into focus, it will be necessary to consider his account 
of truth and falsehood. 
Consistent with his disavowal of mental representations, we find 
Moore shunning any form of correspondence theory of truth. Truth, for 
Moore, is a property of the propositions towards which judgments are di-
rected. Since propositions, on this view, are facts, truth is a prop-
erty of facts. But what kind of property? Is it a property of a fact 
in the sense that it is one of its constituents (so that truth is inter-
nally related to the proposition as a whole), or shall we say that 
propositions can occur independently of their truth (so that truth is 
externally related, i.e., an accidental property of) a proposition? 
Moore's answer is ambiguous. Indeed, the ambiguity may be traced to his 
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vacillation over whether truth is an analyzable property or an unanalyz-
able property. If it turns out that truth is analyzable, then it is in-
ternally related to the proposition to which it is ascribed and, as 
such, is one of its components. If truth is a simple, unanalyzable 
property, then it is only externally related to the proposition to which 
it is ascribed and is, therefore, not one of its components. 
On the one hand, Moore tells us that the truth of a proposition is 
a simple, unanalyzable property which "cannot be further defined, but 
must be immediately recognized" (1899, p. 180). Be even goes so far as 
to suggest that knowledge of the existence of a particular state of af-
fairs is inferred from an awareness of the truth of a proposition. Thus 
he maintains, "existence is logically subordinate to truth; that truth 
cannot be defined by a reference to existence, but existence only by a 
reference to truth" (1899, p. 180). In this respect his account of 
truth in "The Nature of Judgment" appears to parallel the sort of ac-
count he gave of goodness in Principia Bthica. In that work goodness is 
defined as a non-natural property; that is to say, it is a property 
which has Being but not existence (1903, p. 110). In the scanty remarks 
concerning truth as simple and unanalyzable in "The Nature of Judgment" 
we have the first traces of a conception of truth to emerge more fully 
in Principia Bthica where Moore asserts, "[n)o truth does, in fact, 
exist" (1903, p. 111). This view of truth is largely motivated by a 
concern for accommodating the possibility of truth for a priori proposi-
tions--particularly, mathematical propositions which refer to non-exis-
tent entities such as Two (1899, p. 180; 1903, p. 111). 11 
On this view, truth is that self-same property whether it is as-
cribed to a priori or a posteriori propositions. It is unique in the 
sense that there is only one such property, but it can belong to diverse 
18 In Moore (1903) existent objects are again distinguished from non-
existent ones by virtue of existing in time (1903, p. 111). 
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propositions. This rules out the possibility of truth being the compo-
nent of any proposition. Since the fact that this rose is red shares 
none of the components of the fact that two plus two is four, yet truth 
may be ascribed to both, it follows that truth cannot be a component of 
these facts. Mit is ••• impossible," we are told, Mthat truth should de-
pend on a relation to existents, or to an existent ••• " (1899, p. 181). 
On this view, falsehood consists in the non-obtaining of the fact 
that is asserted. That is to say, it consists in the failure of the 
properties in question to come together with the property of existence 
at some time. He says, 
[i]f the judgment is false, that is not because my 
ideas do not correspond to reality, but because such a 
conjunction of concepts is not to be found among existents 
(1899, p. 179)." 
But falsehood on this view (and indeed even on the alternative view 
which we will examine below) is more than the mere failure of a certain 
concatenation of concepts to occur. Just as truth requires a relation 
of inclusion or union with the concept of existence, so too does false-
hood require some sort of relation among the non-existent concepts: 
A proposition is constituted by any number of concepts, 
together with a specific relation between them; and accord-
ing to the nature of this relation the proposition may be 
either true or false. What kind of relation makes a propo-
sition true, what false, cannot be further defined, but must 
be innnediately recognized (1899, p. 180). 
Although he maintains that truth and falsehood cannot be further de-
fined, he is willing to characterize these relations as logical rela-
tions (1899, p. 183), and he suggests at least that these relations are 
objective (in that they have Being) even though they do not exist. The 
19 Moore's reference to judgments rather than propositions as false 
should not be taken to indicate that he regarded falsehood as the ob-
taining of a special kind of judging relation. Judgment (whether true 
or false) always involves the very same kind of relation to whatever 
happens to be its object. Two mental acts of the same mode (judging, 
believing, perceiving, etc.) can only be differentiated in terms of 
their objects. In any event the objects are propositions. 
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particular passage with which we are concerned pertains primarily to the 
nature of inference; the relation of a premise to a conclusion validly 
drawn from it is an objective though non-existent relation. However, 
existence, too, requires that concepts ustand in a certain logical rela-
tion" (1899, p. 183). Earlier I suggested this might be the logical re-
lation of inclusion (relative to a time) or that of union. (As a 
heuristic it is useful to imagine Moore's view in terms of Venn 
Diagrams; an existent would be represented by the region that is the 
union of the class symbols; when the proposition is false this region is 
darkened.) I can think of no other way to characterize the falsehood of 
a proposition (i.e., the disunion of its properties) other than my say-
ing that the concepts are excluded from the concept of existence (rela-
tive to a time). 
This view is, however, very problematic. For one thing, it ap-
pears to imply that there can be no such thing as a false empirical 
proposition. Whenever one forms a judgment there will be some fact 
(proposition) that is the object of one's judgment. Recall that for 
Moore a proposition is made true or false by the kind of relation that 
holds between the concepts in question (1899, p. 180). To judge falsely 
that unicorns e~ist involves a ~elation to the concepts of e~istence, 
unicorn, and the relation of e~clusion. The fact that unicorns are ex-
cluded from existence (at a given time) makes the judgment false. This 
is of the utmost importance, and it is a point that one may easily over-
look if one thinks that falsehood for Moore is merely the non-concatena-
tion of concepts. In point of fact, he says: 
(t]ruth ••• would certainly seem to involve at least two 
terms, and some relation between them; falsehood involves 
the same; and hence it would seem to remain, that we regard 
truth and falsehood as properties of certain concepts, to-
gether with their relations--a whole to which we give the 
name proposition (1899, p. 181). 
Moore is clearly asserting that there is some fact (albeit a non-exis-
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tent one) that .makes one one's judgment false. 
But now what is the object of one's belief when one believes 
falsely that unicorns exist? What is the fact to which one is related 
when one believes that unicorns exist? The only fact there is here is 
the one that makes the judgment false, namely, the fact that unicorns 
are excluded from existence (at a given time). 20 But that fact is sol 
The proposition that unicorns are excluded from existence (at a given 
time) is truel The point is that all false empirical propositions must 
be construed as true non-empirical propositions. The implication is 
that judgment can never be related to anything but what is true. The 
notion of a false empirical judgment collapses under the weight of 
Being. Moore acknowledges this implication (although not without trepi-
dation). If there cannot be false empirical propositions, then all em-
pirical propositions must be true: u[t]he simplest existential proposi-
tions are then to be regarded as necessary propositions of a peculiar 
sort" (1899, p. 191). To be sure, his article closes on just this note. 
Our result then is as follows: That a judgment is uni-
versally a necessary combination of concepts, equally neces-
sary whether it be true or false. 
At bottom, Moore's problem comes down to the fact that the act of judg-
ment effects a relation between a subject and something, but once this 
object is identified, nothing remains that can be false. Therefore, 
Moore's theory cannot explain the nature of falsehood. 21 
It is tempting to try to get Moore off the hook by finding some-
thing else besides the object of Moore's belief to be false. one is 
tempted to say that the act of judgment is untrue, like an arrow that 
strays from its true course. But this will not suffice, as the arrow 
20 He proceeds to say, u ••• existential propositions which are false, 
as well as those which are true, involve the same propositions about 
s~ace and"timew (1899, p. 191). 
21 Passmore (1966, p. 205) notes that a concern for this very issue 
forced Moore to abandon his position by 1~11. His lectures at that time 
are reprinted in Moore (1953). 
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simile, when thought through, suggests: for the arrow lands somewhere 
even if it does not land at its intended target. That is the object it 
strikes. Notice indeed that the analogy requires drawing a distinction 
between the arrow's actual mark and its intended one. I suspect this 
attempt to get Moore off the hook owes its initially compelling appear-
ance to the fact that it covertly introduces mental contents (the in-
tended mark). If one is willing to countenance mental contents, the 
problem will not arise in the first place; of course, this is not a 
strategy open to Moore. 
employ it as a strategy: 
Nor, we should note, was Moore ever tempted to 
he always refers to truth and falsehood as 
properties of concepts or propositions, never as properties of mental 
acts. 
In the end Moore's only suggestion, consistent with the idea that 
one cannot form false empirical judgments, is to say that were it possi-
ble for false empirical propostions to occur, they would be the sorts of 
things in which one could take no interest (1899, pp. 180-181). It 
would be a little like hybridizing a rose to smell like a skunk; not 
many persons would want to buy one. He seems to think no one would be 
interested in asserting what is not true. (This may be the key to 
Wittgenstein's claim, reported in Moore's letters to Ottoline Morrell, 
that only asserted propositions exist.) But Moore is mistaken here. 
False beliefs can be immensely important. That it is false that water 
boils at soc is an important fact, particularly if one is cooking pasta. 
And if it were false that water boils at lOOc, that would be important 
too, particularly to persons who design coolant for engines. Moore's 
strategy of trying to playdown the importance of falsehood simply does 
not ring true. We can also take an interest in the false beliefs of 
other persons, which brings us to the next criticism. 
Not only does his theory of judgment fail to account for falsehood 
and for the contingency of (some) empirical propositions, it leaves ut-
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terly mysterious how we could ever truly ascribe a false belief to an-
other person. Suppose I assert as believes P, but Pis false." This 
would have to be regarded as a certain kind of nonsense. If Pis false, 
then it (i.e., P) cannot be that to which sis related. Rather, the ob-
ject of S's belief would have to be -P. Since the verb Hbelieves# is 
logically transparent according to a relational theory of judgment (so 
that its subordinate clause is interpreted de re), I would be required 
to characterize whats believes as -P. That is to say, the object of 
the believing relation would be the true but non-existent proposition 
-P. Hence, the occurrence of Pin the first conjunct of "S believes P, 
but Pis false" is illegitimate. This is something that just cannot be 
said. 
The problems we have examined up to this point stem from Moore's 
conception of truth as a simple, unanalyzable property that is not a 
component of the facts to which it is ascribed. 22 Yet there is an alter-
native account hinted at in "The Nature of Judgment." The fact is that 
immediately upon pronouncing truth to be an unanalyzable property, Moore 
provides us with just such an analysis. The analysis does require truth 
and falsehood to be components of facts, and it involves a strategy that 
requires the distinction between identity and existence to be collapsed. 
Consider what he says concerning the judgment that a particular 
rose is red (expressed by the sentence, "This rose is red"): 
What I am asserting is a specific connexion of certain 
concepts forming the total concept "rose" with the con-
cepts "this" and "now" and "red"~ and the judgment is 
true if such a connexion is existent (1899, p. 179). 
This passage can be interpreted in accordance with the interpretation of 
Moore's view described above. But bear in mind that, even though truth 
was presented as unanalyzable, it was still capable of being character-
22 Here I say conception of truth rather than of truth and falsehood, 
since on this view there is little room left for a conception of false-
hood. 
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ized to some extent. The characterization of truth in terms of one or 
more concepts standing in a logical relation to the concept of existence 
is not intended to define truth~ it is only intended to be an account of 
the conditions under which truth may be ascribed to a proposition. 
Nevertheless, once the problem of accounting for falsehood is exposed, 
it is difficult to distinguish this sort of characterization of the 
truth of empirical propositions from a definition in terms of the occur-
rence of such a relation. It begins to look as if being an empirical 
proposition and being a true empirical proposition amount to the same 
thing--namely, being a proposition in which there occurs some relation 
between one or more concepts and the concept of truth. If empirical 
truth always involves that very relation, then it would have to be 
regarded as a component of any fact to which it is predicated. Against 
this suggestion one would want to argue that, for Moore, truth remains 
the very same thing regardless of the specific proposition to which it 
is ascribed~ thus the view under proposal is incompatible with Moore's 
view, provided we accept the assumption that the fact that this rose is 
red shares no common components with the fact that that water is boil-
ing. 
We will not concern ourselves with the latter assumption. 
However, doubts can be raised concerning the claim that truth is the 
very same property when ascribed to different true propositions. If the 
distinction between being an empirical proposition and being a true em-
pirical proposition collapses, such that the property of being true 
amounts (in the case of empirical propositions) to nothing other than a 
relation between a set of concepts and the concept of existence, then 
what is referred to as the property of truth will vary among distinct 
propositions. This is because the particular relation to the concept of 
existence will vary for distinct propositions. 
It appears that the temporal nature of existence effects for any 
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particular existent a certain uniqueness. In the following passages 
note the use of words like "specific" and "unique." Consider: 
When I say "This paper exists," ••• the concepts, which 
are combined in specific relations in the concept of this 
paper, are also combined in a specific manner with the con-
cept of existence. That specific manner is something 
immediately known, like red or two •••• All that exists is 
thus composed of concepts related to one another in 
specific manners, and likewise to the concept of exist-
ence (1899, pp. 180-1811 emphasis added). 
[A}n existent is seen to be nothing but a concept or com-
plex of concepts standing in a unique relation to the 
concept of existence (1899, p. 1831 emphasis added). 
When we consider that being an existent involves a relation among con-
cepts to specific times, it becomes apparent that being an existent and 
being individuated from all other entities (i.e., all other Beings and 
existents) amounts to the very same thing. By the time all of the prop-
erties of an existent object have been enumerated4 one has an account of 
what distinguishes the object from all other objects as well as an ac-
count of what makes the object an existent. This is obviously consis-
tent with Leibniz Law that no two individuals can share all of their 
properties in common. By the time one has stated that a given kind of 
object occupies a certain location at a particular time, one has stated, 
in effect, the conditions which actually exclude other entities from 
that location at that time. 
Any existent must possess a unique combination of properties. The 
uniqueness of an object (which would have to be specified through a com-
plete enumeration of the object's properties and the relations among 
them) is itself a property, one which no other object has. What distin-
guishes things which are real but non-existent (like Goodness and Two) 
from things which are both real and existent is that the latter have a 
unique set of relational properties which cannot be predicated of any 
other particular object, whereas the former consists of one or more 
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properties which can be predicated of others. The point here is not 
merely that it is impossible for two existents to share all their prop-
erties in colD11lOn (though that is true), rather that the possibility of 
them not sharing all their properties in common is precisely what makes 
them existents. This fact has not been fully appreciated by Moore 
scholars. Ryle (1970), for example, recognizes that the earmark of ex-
istence is temporality for Moore, but he fails to see how having tempo-
ral properties engenders uniqueness and thus particularity among the ob-
jects of awareness; and so he fails to recognize that being particular 
in precisely this way is just what makes an object existent. 
To be aware of an existent horse, then, is to stand in relation to 
a unique concatenation of properties: no other object could have this 
combination of properties (including spatial location) at this particu-
lar time. It is unique in this respect. And this just is the solution 
to how a relation among concepts can serve the same function as instan-
tiation. 
Indeed the identity of an object over time would be accommodated 
by extending the time-particularization of the object as well as the 
enumeration of properties and the relations among them. It should be 
remembered that existent objects for Moore are always facts, so to form 
a judgment about a given horse which exists (or has existed) over ape-
riod of time is simply to stand in relation to a more complex fact than 
when one has, for example, an instantaneous awareness of a horse; the 
latter fact would simply be a constituent of the former. 
To be aware of a non-existent object, like a unicorn, is to stand 
in relation to a set of propertieswhich are indeed mind-independent, 
but which do not coalesce into a unique combination of properties: 
there are no particular unicorns. This does not mean that it is impos-
sible for unicorns to exist, since their existence remains a possibility 
of the properties which would be their constituents; it does mean that 
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the relations requisite for making this possibility an actuality do not 
obtain. That, though, is the answer to the question concerning how 
there could be non-existent objects: such objects remain possibilities 
of real, mind-independent properties. Just as it belongs to the very 
nature of the property of redness that it be combinable with the proper-
ty of squareness in particular red squares, so too the property of being 
a horse is, by its very nature, combinable with the property of having a 
horn. It is, therefore, to the combinatorial possibilities of concepts 
that one must turn in seeking an account of awarenesses of and judgments 
about non-existent objects. 
Before we turn to the account of truth and falsehood engendered by 
this view, let us consider what recommends our attributing this inter-
pretation to Moore. Certainly the passages cited above, in which Moore 
speaks of specific relations, specific manners of being related, unique 
properties, and so forth, provide little more than a thumbnail upon 
which to hang our interpretation. That by itself is hardly convincing, 
since these terms--particularly unigue--arise within the context of what 
would become the central strain of Moore's thinking over the next five 
years. (Most obvious is the characterization of the property of truth 
as a unique property in Principia Bthica, where truth remains the self-
same property regardless of the proposition to which it is ascribed. 23 ) 
Nevertheless, I have three reasons for thinking this view, undeveloped 
as it is, is implicit within the early relational theory of judgment. 
First, it is implied by the theory. The relation of concepts to 
times does indeed effect a unique concatenation of objects. 
Second, when Moore's view is described in this manner, it accom-
plishes precisely what it is supposed to accomplishz it explains how a 
relation among concepts can play the same role as instantiation. 
23 Yet consider the pluralism of goods introduced in (1903), pp. 147. 
Each of these is said to be uniquely good. 
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Finally, this interpretation of Moore's view comports well with 
his account of perception. Perception, you will recall, is nothing more 
than the cognition of an existential proposition (1899, p. 183). If the 
relation between a set of concepts and the concept of existence were not 
in each instance a unique relation (individuated by its terms, of which 
one is a time), we would expect Moore to characterize perception in a 
much more Russellian manner. That is, we would expect him to distin-
guish between various mental acts within the perceptual judgment in ac-
cordance with the different kinds of components within the proposition. 
For example, perceiving that a red rose exists would need to be regarded 
as consisting (at least) of an act of sensing (for which redness is an 
object) and (presumably) an act of intuiting (for which the unique logi-
cal relation is an object.) Yet Moore does not do this. Be presents 
perception as a unified act to which is .made known the specific manner 
in which objects are related (vis a vis) the proposition (1899, p. 180-
181). 
we may now ask whether the concept of truth implied by this inter-
pretation fares any better than its alternative with respect to these-
mantic puzzles mentioned earlier. According to this interpretation, how 
must truth be conceived? The account of perception just given provides 
the key. It was said that perception, for Moore, is a unified act to 
which is made known the specific manner in which objects are related 
(vis a vis) the proposition (1899, p. 180-181). The italicized phrase 
bears consideration. Even though Moore says, u ••• existence is logically 
subordinated to truth~ that truth cannot be defined by a reference to 
existence, but existence only by a reference to truth" (1899, p. 180), 
such a claim does not square with his account of perception. Clearly 
Moore wants existence to presuppose truth, because he holds that the 
class of true propositions is greater than the class of true empirical 
propositions. Hence, truth would have to be construed as a non-natural 
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property. But in that case, once again, we would expect perception to 
contain an intuitive component. But it does not. The full passage 
reads: 
When I say •This paper exists," I must require that this 
proposition is true. If it is not true, it is unimportant 
and I can have no interest in it. But if it is true, it 
means only that the concepts, which are combined in specific 
relations in the concept of this paper, are also combined in 
a specific manner with the concept of existence. That spe-
cific manner is something immediately known, like red or two 
(1899, pp. 180-181). 
It is through perception that the truth of these propositions can be 
known~ indeed, by means of perception they can be known immediately 
(1899, p. 181). We would not expect Moore to use this terminology if 
truth happened to be an unanalyzable property. In that case we would 
expect Moore to say that intuition (or some other mental act), in addi-
tion to perception, is needed to judge whether an existential proposi-
tion is true. Instead, he says that perception affords us such knowl-
edge. so, like the pluralism of goods (of Principia Ethica) which are 
uniquely good (and which stand in contrast to the unique property of 
Goodness), we arrive at a pluralism of truths. That is to say, the 
truth of any empirical proposition will differ from the truth of anoth-
er, because the specific relations that constitute the existence of the 
complex object or fact to which truth is ascribed will differ. 
The truth of a proposition amounts to nothing more than the ob-
taining of the fact in question. What makes the judgment that this rose 
is red true is that a particular rose is red, and what makes a particu-
lar rose red is a unique concatenation of properties at a particular 
time and place. By this account, the truth of an empirical proposition 
is indeed to be analyzed in terms of the existence of a particular state 
of affairs, where existence (or the property of being existent) is to be 
analyzed as the obtaining of a unique set of relational properties. so, 
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while Moore explicitly denies that truth is a component of propositions 
(1899, p. 181), it is difficult to see how he could fail to be committed 
to just such a view. 
As we noted earlier, the interpretation which runs in the direc-
tion of treating truth as a component of propositions fares much better 
than its alternative with respect to the metaphysical issue with which 
we opened. The earlier view was simply unable to explain how relations 
among concepts can play the same role as instantiation. Our second ap-
proach, in contrast, deals with that problem handily by collapsing the 
distinction between having existence and having an identity. In that 
way it explains what a particular is. The question before us now is 
whether it can also avoid the undesirable semantic puzzles with which 
the earlier view was frought. 
Although the second approach contains considerable resilience in 
dealing with the metaphysical issue, its facility with the semantic is-
sues is worsel 
First of all, it fares no better in accounting for the possibility 
of false empirical propositions. If a proposition is false, then the 
unique relationship among the constituents will not obtain, and the ob-
ject of consciousness will be something (or a set of things) that have 
Being but not existence. There will be no particular which is the ob-
ject of consciousness, at least for those classes of empirical proposi-
tions with which Moore is mainly concerned (viz., existential proposi-
tions and propositions in which the grammatical subject fails to 
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refer).•• 
Will it fare any better when it comes to our capacity to truly as-
cribe false beliefs to others? I do not see how it could. If I assert 
that "S believes P, but Pis false,w I have still uttered a nonsensical 
construction. If Pis uunicorns exist," then I am asserting that no re-
lation (a fortiori no unique relation) between unicorns and existence 
obtains at a given time. So, if my use of ubelieves" is transparent, I 
cannot assert of s any relation (of believing) to the proposition (or 
fact) that unicorns exist. 
But things get worse. Consider what happens when someone believes 
that a proposition of the form-Pis true. Suppose, for example, that 
someone believes that horses (currently) do not exist. 
The question concerns how the negation sign is to be interpreted. 
Does it represent something that is in some way the object of a mental 
act, or does it characterize the mental act itself? If the latter is 
the case, then us believes -P" is more perspicuously rendered "S disbe-
lieves (or denies) P." This is problematic, however, since it repre-
sents s as standing in the disbelieving (or denying) relation to the 
proposition P. Since the verb ("believing" or "denying") is logically 
transparent for adherents of relational theories of judgment, if it is 
true that S believes P, it follows that Pis true. But that just is 
whats denies. Here our problem is not the earlier one in which we were 
2~ It seems to this writer that certain empirical propositions do es-
cape the criticism presented above. Suppose I believe "This cow is 
blue" is true, and there happens to exist a cow of whom I falsely be-
lieve that it is blue. In this instance the grammatical subject of my 
sentence would manage to refer to an existent, but the predicate would 
refer to what merely has Being. I suspect that Moore did not consider 
these cases problematic precisely because he equated propositions with 
complex concepts. This in effect turns any proposition into a kind of 
definition, so that it does not matter whether the subject or predicate 
happens to fail to occur. To entertain the proposition that this cow is 
blue is indistinguishable, on Moore's view, from conceiving of some ob-
ject that is this blue cow. The idea that a proposition is a name for a 
complex would eventually come under attack by Wittgenstein. 
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unable to truly ascribe a false belief to another person; rather, the 
problem is one of not being able to truly ascribe a disbelief. If the 
negation sign does not represent something on the object side of the be-
lieving relation, this problem is unavoidable. 
In fact, Moore is committed to the objectivity of negation, since 
negativity, like existence and truth, is something of which we can con-
ceive. So the question is how-Pis to be interpreted, when the nega-
tion sign designates something objective. Here everything hangs on 
whether-Pis true, and upon what makes it true when it is true. 
Assume, first, that-Pis false. In that case S stands in a believing 
relation to P. So, here we have a case, like that discussed earlier, 
where we cannot truly ascribe a false belief to s. Assume, though, that 
-Pis true. What makes it true? It cannot simply be made true by the 
fact that the set of constituent properties of P (e.g., the constituent 
properties of an existent horse) have Being but not existence, since 
presumably S's belief is about more than merely a set of objects. sis 
not merely asserting the Being of a set of properties. This construal 
of the object of S's belief does not do justice to the fact that nega-
tion sign refers to some component of S's belief; that is, it does not 
do justice to the relation among the members of the set to which Being 
but not existence is ascribed. If Pis •eorses do not exist," then it 
consists in the properties typically assigned to horses standing in the 
negative relation of exclusion to one another. 
Is this an adequate solution? The fact is that it remains prob-
lematic. According to our newer version of the relational theory of 
judgment, one of the constituent concepts of Pis the truth ot P. There 
is indeed something right about this. In a certain manner of speaking, 
when one believes -P, one believes something about P. One affirms that 
the existence or truth of P does not occur. Needless to say it is this 
fact that the act of affirming-Pis really the act of denying or disbe-
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lieving P. (This particular phenomenological feature of the act of af-
firming-Pis manifest in the propositional or sentential logic by the 
fact that the negation sign serves as an operator for propositions or 
sentences as a whole.) But once the truth of Pis admitted to the ob-
ject side of the believing relation, the cat is out of the bag. To be-
lieve -P (when-Pis true) involves believing something about the truth 
of P. But even if one believes that the truth of P does not occur, the 
fact remains that the truth of Pis among the objects of one's belief. 
How, then, can it not be so? Short of positing mental representations, 
how are we to avoid the inevitable conclusion that believing -P requires 
the objectivity of P? 25 Hence, believing -P entails believing (or stand-
ing in some relation to) P. Given the logical transparency of the 
verbs, this entails both -P and Pare true. The reasoning is as fol-
lows. Assume the following sentence is true: 
(1) "S believes -P" 
Given the logical transparency of the verb (and consistent with our in-
ability to truly ascribe a false belief), this entails the truth of: 
(2) -P 
However, (1), in some manner or other presupposes a relation to (believ-
ing that ••• , countenancing the objectivity of ••• ) P; hence the truth of: 
(3) "S believes (etc.) P" 
However, again given the logical transparency of the verb, this entails 
the truth of: 
( 4) p 
The particular relational theory of truth which treats truth as a compo-
nent of a fact thereby commits its adherents to the truth of: 
~ It will not suffice to respond that S stands in some relation to P, 
only not one of believing or affirming. That strategy, as we saw be-
fore, still requires Pas as a term of the relation. 
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The augmented relational theory of judgment can only resolve the meta-
physical problem (of instantiation) at great cost. Surely the undesir-
able implications of either form of relational theory considered so far 
call for their complete and utter rejection. 
When Wittgenstein arrived on the scene at Cambridge in 1911 Moore 
had already abandoned his earlier theory. Nevertheless it is precisely 
such a theory that we hear Wittgenstein expressing (according to 
Russell's letters to Ottoline Morrell). If Wittgenstein did in fact say 
that only asserted propositions exist, then we are given a picture of 
him embracing, not only the thesis that propositions are facts, but 
Moore's attempt to play down the relevance of false believe. As we 
noted earlier, for Moore, a false belief (if one could occur) would be 
something in which no one would take an interest. Why would one want to 
assert a false proposition? We saw that this is a ludicrous position, 
but it is easy to see why Wittgenstein might have found it compelling, 
given his particular personality. Wittgenstein exhibited complete and 
open honesty with all those with whom he was intimate. This led to the 
break-up of his friendship with Russell, and it laid great stress upon 
anyone with whom he was associated. Needless to say this does not jus-
tify the position that only asserted propositions exists; it only sug-
gests a possible explanation of why he held it. 
It is curious that Russell would express such dismay over 
Wittgenstein's views, since they are views which he himself had vehe-
mently defended only ten years earlier in The Principles of Mathematics 
(1903). Russell's letters to Lady Ottoline speak, not of Wittgenstein's 
28 It will not suffice for the proponent of this view to respond by 
saying what is represented on line (5) has Being but not existence, 
since the conjunct P asserts the existence of something. Nor can the 
problem be avoided by saying that a use/mention fallacy is involved by 
treating Pas being asserted; at least that is not an avenue available 
to the proponent of this theory, since even conceiving of P requires P's 
objectivity. 
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views as simply being false, but as being rather absurd. Yet in The 
Principles of Mathematics he acknowledges his own indebtedness to Moore. 
In the Preface to that work he says: 
On fundamental questions of philosophy, my position, in 
all its chief features, is derived from Mr. G. E. Moore. I 
have accepted from him the non-existential nature of propo-
sitions ••• and their independence of any knowing mind; also 
the pluralism which regards the world, both that of exist-
ents and that of entities, as composed of an infinite num-
ber of mutually independent entities, with relations which 
are ultimate, and not reducible to adjectives of their terms 
or of the whole which these compose (1903, p. xviii) . 
. Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to 
every possible object of thought--in short to everything 
that can possibly occur in any proposition, true or false, 
and to all such propositions themselves. Being belongs to 
whatever can be counted. If A be any term that can be 
counted as one, it is plain that A is something, and there-
fore that A is. "A is not" must always be either false or 
meaningless. For if A were nothing, it would not be said 
to be; "A is not" implies there is a term A whose being is 
denied, and hence that A is. Thus unless "A is not" be an 
empty sound, it must be false--whatever A may be, it cer-
tainly is. Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras, 
and four-dimensional spaces all have being, for if they were 
not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about 
them. Thus being is a general attribute of everything, and 
to mention anything is to show that it is (1903, p. 449; 
cited in urmson, 1969, pp. 2-3). 
Existence ••• is the prerogative of some only amongst beings. 
To exist is to have a specific relation to existence ••• 
(1903, p. 449). 
Although Russell would adopt his multiple object theory of judgment by 
1911, in this earlier work he stands behind the objective and irre-
ducible status of propositions. Furthermore, the relations which obtain 
among the constituents of propositions are not reducible to the con-
stituents which are their terms. In other words, such relations as ob-
tain among the constituents of propositions (i.e., among the concepts or 
properties which are their constituents) are themselves genuine proper-
ties. so, for example, if one is aware that red is different from blue, 
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then the difference of which one is aware is as much a genuine object of 
awareness as the redness and blueness which are its terms. Like Moore, 
Russell avoids any sort of nominalism with respect to properties or re-
lations. The pluralism to which he refers is the consequence of there 
being infinitely many kinds of entities, due to the fact that each enti-
ty possesses a unique set of relations. Clearly Russell adopts a dis-
tinction between Being and existence, and he holds (as the last passage 
indicates) that a relation to the concept of existence is precisely what 
makes a mere being into an existent being. 
What makes Russell's comments to Lady Ottoline all the more pecu-
liar, from a historical standpoint, is that even in the Autumn of 1911 
Russell had not traveled very far from his earlier views. In October of 
1911 he had read his "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars" 
(reprinted in Russell, 1971) before the Aristotelian Society, and in 
January of 1912 his The Problems of Philosophy (Russell, 1912) was pub-
lished. While it is true that by this time he had adopted his multiple-
object theory of judgment, he still adhered to a relational theory of 
judgment. Although Russell's ontology at the time allows for acquain-
tance with particulars, he remains a realist concerning properties as 
well as relations (1912, p. 98). In fact, he even refers to properties 
or universals in a rather Moore-like fashion as concepts (1912, p. 52). 
There is nothing in Russell's view at the time which would lead him to 
reject Moore's claim that concepts are among the constituents of the 
world, even if he would reject the view that they are the only con-
stituents of the world. Nevertheless, as we have already had the oppor-
tunity to note, by 1911 Russell does part company with Moore, and pre-
sumably Wittgenstein, over whether the objects of judgment are proposi-
tions. 
If I may speculate, the source of Russell's dismay over 
Wittgenstein's remarks--and perhaps the source of his misunderstanding 
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of Wittgenstein's character--resides in the latter's unwillingness to 
assert that there is no rhinoceros (or hippopotamus, according to the 
later account) in the room. Wittgenstein was retraining from asserting 
the negative existential. we are seeing a tendency to which he would 
eventually give expression at Tractatus, 7: 
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent 
(1922a, 7). 
I believe this is the precursor of Wittgenstein's conception of non-
sense. we have already noted the semantic puzzles faced by relational 
theories of judgment such as those held by Moore (or possibly held by 
Moore). we saw how the attempt to ascribe a false belief to another 
person results in something somewhat nonsensical: one cannot say "S be-
lieves P," if one also wants to say "Pis false." Given the logical 
transparency of the verb, it would be illegitimate to insert " ••• P" 
after "S believes ••• ". Negative existential judgments turn out to be 
problematic for a somewhat different reason: the attempt to assert -P 
(or to deny P) leads invariably to paradox (i.e., to the claim that one 
cannot believe -P without believing or countenancing the objectivity of 
P) and to contradiction (in that if "S believes P" is true, then "P and 
-P" is true). Although the Tractatus does not regard contradictions as 
nonsensical, it does hold that they are senseless and, so, among the 
unsayable. 
Wittgenstein's writings, from 1913 on, would always exhibit a dis-
tinction between what can and cannot be said. When we examine these 
early writings we find Wittgenstein wrestling with the problems inherent 
in the relational theories of judgment. we find him in search of a the-
ory of judgment that would escape the semantic puzzles described. In 
particular, we find him engaged in the task of defining the nature of a 
proposition (Satz) such that believing a proposition does not entail be-
lieving its logical opposite as well. Wittgenstein's solution, as we 
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are about to see, is to countenance the bipolarity of the proposition. 
From the thesis concerning bipolarity there follows a number of crucial 
distinctions that lie at the heart of Tractarian semantics: structure 
and form, meaning and sense, the sayable and the unsayable (or what can 
be said and what can only be shown). Although Wittgenstein would fall 
under Russell's influence, that final distinction--between what can be 
said and what can only be shown--would always remain the focal point of 
their greatest philosophical differences. 
3. The Bipolarity of the Proposition. 
It does not matter which interpretation we are willing accept of 
Moore's theory--the one which construes truth as a simple unanalyzable 
property that is in no way a component of the proposition to which it is 
ascribed or the one which construes truth as capable of analysis and as 
a component within propositions--both views are incapable of accounting 
for the possibility of falsehood. Although Moore does provide a defini-
tion of falsehood in terms of the failure of a group of concepts to form 
a certain concatenation or conjunction, when the theory is thought 
through to its logical consequences it becomes evident that it leaves no 
room for falsehood at all. A proposition that is empirically false 
winds up being a proposition true within the realm of Being: the con-
cepts that comprise the proposition stand in a certain logical relation 
to one another (presumably exclusion) in that very realm. It is that 
that is the object of S's (supposedly false) belief, but it is not in 
any way false. So, the concept of falsehood collapses. 
As of 1913 Wittgenstein was prepared to war against this kind of 
view. Against Moore (and his own earlier view) Wittgenstein defends 
what we now call the Thesis of the Bipolarity of the Proposition. This 
is the thesis that all sentences (or propositional signs) having the po-
tential to be used in a truth-stating manner must be capable of being 
possibly true and possibly false. In other words, all sentences capable 
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of stating or saying or picturing anything at all must be contingent. 21 
In the 1913 "Notes on Logic" we are told: 
..• a proposition has two poles, corresponding to the case 
of its truth and the case of its falsehood (1913b, pp. 98-
99). 
This point is expressed in the Tractatus most clearly on those occasions 
where Wittgenstein denies that significant propositions can ever be a 
priori true: 
In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we 
must compare it with reality (1922b, 2.223). 
It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether 
it is true or false (1922b, 2.224). 
There are no pictures that are true a priori (1922b, 
2.225). 28 
Whether a proposition is true depends on how things are within what 
Wittgenstein refers to above as reality. This immediately serves to 
distinguish the position under construction from that held by Moore. In 
a certain sense, for Moore, all propositions are a priori true. This 
follows from the fact that, for the particular relational theories of 
judgment that we considered, the concept of falsehood collapses. All 
propositions are true by virtue of being existing facts or facts within 
the realm of Being." Against this, Wittgenstein urges that truth must 
always be contingent. This point is readily acknowledged by commenta-
tors. Von Wright, for example, mentions: 
27 Throughout this dissertation I will refer to sentences or proposi-
tional signs that fulfill this function as statements or propositions. 
Wittgenstein's own preference was to use the latter term. Genuine 
propositions may be described as stating or saying something. Sentences 
that have this property may be called significant. Significant sen-
tences are also meaningful and sensical. The nature of this last dis-
tinction will be explained in the text. 
28 This claim is also made at Tractatus, 4. 05. 
29 I am here using the term a priori solely in an epistemological 
fashion. Nothing is meant to be implied concerning the ontological sta-
tus of what is known a priori, i.e., whether it belongs to existence or 
merely to Being. 
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In the Tractatus ••• every significant proposition has a 
characteristic bipolarity in relation to truth and false-
hood. A significant proposition can be true and it can be 
false (cf. 2.21, 2.23, and 2.24). Whether it is the one or 
the other has to be determined on the basis of a comparison 
between the proposition and reality (2.223, 4.05). There 
are no significant propositions that are true (or false) a 
priori (1982b, p. 192). 30 
we must take care to distinguish bipolarity from bivalence. For a 
proposition to be bivalent, it must either be true or false. 
Consequently, tautologies and contradictions, which are true and false 
respectively under all occasions, are bivalent but lack bipolarity. 
According to Wittgenstein, tautologies and propositions say nothing; 
they are senseless (sinnlos), even though they are an important part of 
our language. we will postpone our discussion of them until after con-
sidering the Grundgedanke in Chapter Four, where their role as rules of 
inference (or as syntactic transformation rules) will be considered. 
Here it will suffice to make the reader aware of the fact that we are 
concerned with only a particular class of sentences within language, 
namely, those which are significant. 
If significant sentences must exhibit bipolarity (we have yet to 
consider the argument for this claim), a major implication may immedi-
ately be noted: since one and the same fact cannot be both possibly 
true and possibly false (facts just being what they are), a proposition 
must be some sort of entity other than the fact which may be the object 
of the judgment in question. The bipolarity of the proposition is in-
compatible with the kind of direct realism advanced by Moore's relation-
al theory of judgment. However, this does not mean that propositions 
are mental contents. As we shall see, one of the most interesting 
things about Wittgenstein's view is that it posits a representational 
medium, but this medium does not become, as it were, the immediate ob-
30 Von Wright's first set of citations is mistaken, since there is no 
2.23, and 2.24. Presumably he means 2.223 and 2.224. 
60 
ject of awareness and judgment. The medium turns out to be that 
through which sense and meaning is accomplished. Thus Wittgenstein's 
view retains an element of realism and avoids Idealism or phenomenalism. 
It thereby accomplishes Moore's and Russell's goal of countering 
Bradley's idealism without the direct realism of the relational theo-
ries. These are topics for a later chapter. 31 
What argument can be given in favor of bipolarity? Why should we 
not simply accept Moore's view, and bite the bullet with respect to its 
rotten implications? Wittgenstein's argument revolves around our very 
idea of what it is for something to be a proposition and around our idea 
of what it is to understand a proposition. Before proceeding to the ar-
gument it is worth noting that the argument is an a priori one. It's 
conclusion, like all of the statements that make up the Tractatus (and 
the body of philosophy in general, according to Wittgenstein) share in 
an a priori status. This, in effect, excludes them from significant or 
sensical discourse. This does not mean that they are not a part of lan-
guage, just that they (like senseless tautologies and contradictions) 
have a different semantic status. In this case, the sentences in ques-
tion are said to be nonsensical. This is not intended in any way to be 
perjorative. In Chapter Five we shall consider the nature of nonsense 
in great detail, and we will introduce a distinction between good non-
sense and bad nonsense (or gibberish). 
The argument for bipolarity may be called the Argument from the 
Priority of Understanding over Knowledge. Whatever else a proposition 
is, it is something with the potential to be understood. This fact is 
31 It is important to note that what has been asserted up to this 
point remains entirely neutral concerning the nature of propositions. 
It is an open question whether propositions are to be identified with 
Platonic, psychological, linguistic or quasi-linguistic entities, at 
least nothing along these lines is being presupposed wi~h regards to the 
argument which follows. It also remains an open question whether false-
hood can be accommodated by some other relational theory of judgment be-
sides Moore's. 
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manifest in the language we use ev~ry day. we say we understand a sen-
tence that has been uttered or a proposition that has been asserted or a 
statement that has been made. This is a trivial observation concerning 
the language we use. This is evidence to the effect that we conceive of 
propositions as the sorts of things that get understood (or fail to get 
understood). 
Now what is it to understand a proposition? In order to under-
stand a proposition it does not suffice simply to know what would be the 
case if the proposition were to be true. One must also be able to say 
under what conditions the proposition would be false. If Othello is able 
to ascertain that it is true that Desdemona loves Cassio under the ap-
propriate conditions but unable to ascertain the falsehood of that 
proposition under other conditions (for example, when Desdemona's words 
and deeds speak to the contrary), then we would not say that Othello 
understands (or perhaps that he does not completely understand) the 
proposition in question. Understanding a proposition is, therefore, in-
dependent of, and in an important respect epistemologically prior to, 
knowledge of whether the proposition is true. Thus Wittgenstein urges 
against Moore, for whom it is only possible to assert true propositions: 
What corresponds in reality to a proposition depends on 
whether it is true or false. But we must be able to under-
stand a proposition without knowing whether it is true or 
false. 
What we know when we understand a proposition is this: 
we know what is the case if the proposition is true, and 
what is the case if it is false. But we do not know (neces-
sarily) whether it is true or false (1913b, p. 98). 
Wittgenstein reiterates this point on numerous occasions: 
Every proposition is essentially true-false: to under-
stand it, we must know both what is the case if it is true, 
and what must be the case if it is false (1913b, p. 98). 
Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say: we understand 
the proposition P when we know that 'Pis true'• P~ for 
this would naturally always be the case if accidentally the 
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propositions to right and left of the symbol '•' were both 
true or both false (1913b, p. 104). 
The point is also made in his letters to Russell during this time: 
••• What I mean to say is that we only then understand a 
proposition if we know both what would be the case if it was 
false and what if it was true (1912, p. 124). 
The world war II Notebooks also take note of the fact that if something 
is to be called a proposition, then it must be the sort of thing of 
which we may ask: under what conditions is it true and under what con-
ditions is it false? 
In connexion with any proposition it could really be 
asked: what does it come to for it to be true? What does 
it come to for it to be false?" (1914b, p. 59). 
I believe the most significant of these passages is that from the "Notes 
on Logic" which asserts "it is incorrect to say: we understand the prop-
osition P when we know that 'Pis true'• P" (1913b, p. 113). His point 
is that we do not ascribe understanding to someone merely because they 
utter P when (or even when and only when) Pis true. That is not suffi-
cient for ascribing understanding, because it may accidentally be the 
case that the two events, i.e., the uttering of P and P's being true, 
occur. A child, never having been exposed to snow, may mimic an adult's 
speech by uttering "Snow is white," but that is no indication that the 
child understands the sentence. A fortiori, a child who has grasped the 
concepts of sentence and truth who utters "'Snow is white' is true if 
and only if snow is white" has not provided evidence of understanding 
the sentence at all. What counts as evidence of someone's being able to 
understand a sentence is that the person in question uses the sentence 
in the appropriate way. At the very least this involves being able to 
assert that it is true under the appropriate conditions and being able 
to assert that it is false under the appropriate conditions. The point 
is that understanding involves a capacity to discriminate between those 
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conditions that make the sentence true and those conditions that make it 
false. 32 In other words one must be able to identify the truth condi-
tions for the sentence in question. 
Before we turn to the metaphysical issue concerning the nature of 
truth conditions, let me point out two things. First this argument is 
quite convincing and is subject to empirical verification. If we exam-
ine the conditions under which we ascribe an understanding of declara-
tive sentences to others, we find matters pretty much as Wittgenstein 
says. we do not say that a person understands a sentence merely on the 
basis of that person being able to mimic or parrot the utterance of an-
other person." The reader is invited to look for counter-examples. 
Second, this argument nowhere appears in the Tractatus. The 
Tractatus is a condensation of the many remarks that make up the pre-
tractarian writings. Nevertheless, this argument is introduced to jus-
tify the thesis of bipolarity, and that thesis is introduced in the 
"Notes on Logic" and the "Notes Dictated to Moore" to explain the nature 
of Wittgenstein's special ab-notation. This ab-notation is retained in 
the Tractatus (at 6.1203), and it presupposes that bipolarity holds for 
32 This argument parallels epistemological arguments for treating 
knowledge as more than merely true belief. One may believe, for exam-
ple, that a felon is guilty of a crime, and it may be true that the 
felon is guilty of the crime, but one's reason for believing so may be 
inadequate (for example, the felon's worst enemy tells you he is 
guilty). In this instance we would not say one possesses knowledge. 
This sort of argument has been offered by philosophers as diverse as 
Plato, Russell, Gettier, etc. It is interesting that at bottom such a 
priori arguments always depend on the purportedly common conception of 
knowledge. That raises the question of whether such a priori arguments 
are really nothing more than ad populum arguments. This question can be 
raised with regard to Wittgenstein's argument regarding understanding as 
well. I suppose Wittgenstein would have to respond: but this is the 
only language I understand; if you understand something else by the word 
"understanding," what is it? How is one to take this question seriously 
without accepting the very view Wittgenstein is advancing? 
33 An exception might be someone who has been 'coached' to respond a 
certain way on a game show. If we are tempted to ascribe understanding 
under those conditions, the person's actions (including her utterances) 
in a larger context serve a corrective function. 
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all significant sentences. Thus I find no problem whatsoever in at-
tributing this view to the author of the Tractatus. 
our next concern is with the nature of truth conditions. It would 
be a mistake to interpret Wittgenstein as advancing the thesis, for ex-
ample, that there are conditions that make a sentence true, but that 
there are no conditions that make it false. Such would be the case if 
the falsehood of a proposition were to consist .merely in the non-obtain-
ing of some fact or state of affairs that would make the proposition 
true. One might be tempted to misinterpret Wittgenstein this way by a 
cursory reading of Tractatus 4.25: 
If an elementary proposition is true, the state of af-
fairs exists~ if an elementary proposition is false, the 
state of affairs does not exist (1922b, 4.24). 
We can ignore for the time being what Wittgenstein means by elementary 
proposition and state of affairs. The important thing is that one might 
take the second half of this passage to indicate that Wittgenstein ad-
hered to a conception of falsehood similar to that advocated by Moore. 
It sounds as if falsehood consists in some fact's not occurring and 
nothing else. This interpretation involves •reading into' the passage 
the "and nothing else" clause. such a reading is unjustified however. 
The pre-tractarian writings make it abundantly clear that there must be 
something that makes a proposition false. Wittgenstein refers to these 
falsifying condition as negative facts. That falsifying conditions are 
said to be negative, turns out to be problematic given the Grundgedanke 
of the Tractatus; but that is a topic that will be taken up later. Here 
what is important is that Wittgenstein makes reference to facts (of some 
sort or another) that makes a sentence true. Thus, we read: 
There are positive and negative facts: if the proposi-
tion "this rose is not red" is true, then what it signifies 
is negative (1913b, p. 97). 
Positive and negative facts there are, but not true or 
false facts (1913b, p. 97). 
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This terminology is retained, as I noted above, in the Tractatus: 
The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is 
reality. 
(We also call the existence of states of affairs a posi-
tive fact, and their non-existence a negative fact (1922b, 
2.06). 
An analogy to illustrate the concept of truth: imagine a 
black spot on white paper: you can describe the shape of 
the spot by saying, for each point on the sheet, whether 
it is black or white. To the fact that a point is black 
there corresponds a positive fact, and to the fact that a 
point is white, a negative fact. If I designate a point on 
the sheet ••• then this corresponds to the supposition that is 
put forward for judgement, etc. etc. (1922b, 4.063). 
I do not believe he would have used the term "fact" in either the pre-
tractarian writings or in the Tractatus, had he meant to identify the 
conditions under which an elementary proposition is false with the mere 
occurrence or existence of objects that are unrelated to one another. 
In fact, Tractatus 2.013 denies the possibility of conceiving of objects 
apart from their capacity for being related to other objects, i.e., as 
being in some relation or other. There he says, 
Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states 
of affairs. This space I can imagine empty, but I cannot 
imagine the thing without the space (1922b, 2.013). 
A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (a 
spatial point is an argument-place.) 
A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, 
must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by 
colour-space. Notes must have some pitch, objects of the 
sense some degree of hardness, and so on (1922b, 2.0131). 
To say that a space can be imagined empty means that it is possible to 
conceive of a property or relation as uninstantiated. To say that the 
thing cannot be imagined without the space means that it is impossible 
to imagine an object apart from imagining it as having one or another 
property or as being involved in one or another relation. Nothing can 
be said about an object in isolation, even though, as Tractatus 2.0232 
maintains, objects in themselves are propertyless and relationless (a 
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claim I take to be consistent with the thesis that whatever can be said 
of an object is contingent). 
Nevertheless, we should consider is whether Tractatus 2.06 and 
4.063 raise anew the possibility that a proposition's falsehood consists 
in the nonoccurrence of a fact or state of affairs rather than the oc-
currence of some other fact incompatible with that asserted in the 
proposition. After all, Tractatus 2.06 appears to define negative facts 
in precisely those terms. And 4.063 does not present the white field as 
another object which excludes and takes the place of the black object; 
rather it is presented as the absence of blackness.•• There is, in fact, 
a very good reason for holding such a view, and it is an epistemological 
one. Often one may know that a proposition is false without knowing why 
it is false. Suppose I believe that I am about to buy a particular car 
on a dealer's lot. The dealer tells me that I will not be able to pur-
chase it, and I come to believe that what the dealer says is true. In 
this case I know (or can presume) my former belief was false, but I do 
not know why it is false. The fact that this is an epistemological mat-
ter also plays into the hands of a conceptual analysis of the concept of 
falsehood, for one may use it as a basis for saying that under these 
conditions one says one's belief is false or this is how we conceive of 
falsehood. 
I believe that if Wittgenstein thought (in writing the Tractatus) 
that he was committed to nothing more than the nonoccurrence of a state 
of affairs when it comes to explaining falsehood, that he was gravely 
mistaken. (I am fairly certain that he did not think this, as I shall 
explain momentarily.) The fact is that semantic theory, no less than 
nature, deplores a vacuum (and for pretty much the same reason). When 
we set aside the epistemological issue in order to consider the meta-
physical basis for falsehood, we find that even if we do not know why a 
34 I am indebted to John Nolt for raising this criticism. 
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belief we happened to hold is false, we know that there is a reason it 
is false. I may not know why I am not to buy that car, but there is 
something about that car that precludes its being bought by me: it has 
already been sold, it requires repair before it is placed on the market, 
the owner of the dealership wants to use it for a while and sell it 
later, etc." If my belief was false, I may not know which proposition 
it is that happens to be incompatible with what I believed is true (that 
is to say, I may not know what alternative fact ruled out the possibili-
ty of my buying that car), and, so, I speak of the negative fact that I 
am not going to buy the car or of the nonoccurrence of my buying the 
car. But surely that is just a manner of speaking! Assuming there is 
an object of my belief (a car), that object is in some state other than 
that of being owned by me at the time at which I thought I would own it. 
This is what makes my belief false. The mere nonoccurence of something-
-a nothing--cannot make anything. In regards to Tractatus 4.063, I 
would suggest we take the metaphor more literally than Wittgenstein per-
haps may have intended (or more literally than Wittgenstein is thought 
to have intended), since obviously the background is not colorless; it 
is white, and being white excludes the possibility of being black. If 
Wittgenstein did not believe this in the Tractatus, it is fairly ludi-
crous that he did not, since it is indeed a fact that the actual physi-
cal world does not contain nonoccurrences of states of affair: the ac-
tual physical world is a plenum. I know of no counter-examples to this 
claim, except those which introduce suspicious phenomenal or phenomeno-
logical factors, and, so, provide for an alternative explanation. For 
35 The assumption here is that there is at least some object that is 
the object of my false belief. If my belief is about something non-ex-
istent the issue changes dramatically. we will see in a later chapter 
that in those cases where the object of belief is non-existent, 
Wittgenstein employs Russell's Theory of Descriptions to replace the 
non-referring terms with one or more referring terms. The argument 
above really pertains to atomic propositions where reference is guaran-
teed for all terms. That will be the topic of Chapter Three. 
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example, the fact that I discover that Pierre is not in the cafe can be 
explained in terms of my expectations; the physical description of the 
cafe from which Pierre is absent will not contain this negative fact. 
The sentence that makes apparent reference to a negative fact simply 
goes proxy for some other state description ... 
As I said before, if Wittgenstein really did believe that the full 
story concerning falsehood is that it consists merely in the nonoccur-
rence of a state of affairs, then this would be fairly ludicrous. I do, 
in fact, believe that Wittgenstein can and must be interpreted in a more 
charitable light. It happens that in the writings authored prior to the 
Tractatus, as well as in those written immediately afterwards, he does 
explicitly assert the alternative view (of which I have only given a 
thumbnail sketch so far). we have already noted it somewhat in the pas-
sages already cited. For example, when Wittgenstein talks about the un-
derstanding of a proposition he talks about what would be the case if 
the proposition is false (1912, p. 124). More explicitly yet is his 
claim that: 
[a)t a pinch, one is tempted to interpret "not-P" as 
"everything else only not P" (1913b, p. 100). 
This remains for him only a temptation here, because he is still willing 
to countenance negative facts; but the point here is just that there is 
something--either a negative fact or something else--that would be the 
case in the event that a proposition is false. 
The most convincing evidence comes from a 5 June 1915 entry in the 
Notebooks: 
••• There are certainly propositions that allow Pas well as 
-P but none that assert Pas well as -P. 
-p p -p 
-g Q -g 
38 A greater consideration will be given to phenomenological data, in-
cluding this example from Sartre, in Chapter Four. 
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-r R -r 
-s s -s 
The possibility of MP v Q" when #P" is given, is a possi-
bility in a different dimension from the impossibility of 
"-P". 
"P v -P" is A QUITE SPECIAL CASE of "P v 0" (1914b, P• 
56). 
The point here is that if a sentence of the form P v -P could be used as 
an assertion, then it would have to be the case that -P goes proxy for 
some other alternative sentence that is incompatible with P. In fact, P 
v -P cannot be used to make an assertion due to its tautologous form. 
(It is actually a rule, and its actual form, according to Wittgenstein, 
is (P) P v -P--which, in effect, makes it about possible utterances of 
sentences.) 
After Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus he met with members of the 
Vienna Circle to try to explain its key ideas. At that time he tells 
the members that he was confused in the Tractatus over what should be 
called the sense of a proposition. (As we shall shortly see, the issue 
of the nature of falsehood bears greatly upon how Wittgenstein's dis-
tinction between sense and meaning is to be understood.) In these dis-
cussions he attempts to articulate what he should have said in the 
Tractatus: 
I once wrote: 'A proposition is laid like a yardstick 
against reality. Only the outermost tips of the graduation 
marks touch the object to be measured.' I should now prefer 
to say: a system of propositions is laid like a yardstick 
against reality. What I mean by this is: when I lay a 
yardstick against a spatial object, I apply all the gradua-
tion marks simultaneously. It's not the individual gradua-
tion marks that are applied, it's the whole scale. If I 
know that the object reaches up to the tenth graduation 
mark, I also know immediately that it doesn't reach the 
eleventh, twelfth, etc. The assertions telling me the 
length of an object form a system, a system of propositions. 
It's such a whole system which is compared with reality, not 
a single proposition. If, for instance, such and such a 
point in the visual field is blue, I not only know that the 
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point isn't green, isn't red, isn't yellow etc. I have 
simultaneously applied the whole colour scale. This is also 
the reason why a point can't have different colours 
simultaneously; why there is a syntactical rule against fx 
being true for more than one value of x. For if I apply a 
system of propositions to reality, that of itself already 
implies--as in the spatial case--that in every case only 
one state of affairs can obtain, never several. 
When I was working on my book I was still unaware of all 
this and thought then that every inference depended on the 
form of a tautology (1930, p. 317). 
Syntax prohibits a construction such as 'A is green and A 
is red' (one's first feeling is that it's almost as if this 
proposition had been done an injustice; as though it had 
been cheated of its rights as a proposition), but for 'A is 
green', the proposition 'A is red' is not, so to speak, an 
other proposition--and that strictly is what the syntax 
fixes--but another (aspect of the] form of the same proposi-
tion (1930, p. 86). 
You could say that the colors have an elementary affinity 
with one another (1930, p. 105). 37 
The references in these passages to sense shall be discussed below. 
Here what is important is that being of one color is precisely what ex-
cludes the possibility of being another color. Thus, the falsification 
conditions for "This is red" include the truth conditions for "This is 
green," "This is yellow," "This is blue," etc. 
I think that view does not contradict anything of importance in 
the Tractatus. In fact, it is the only view compatible with some of the 
central claims of that work. One might, however, be tempted to point to 
Tractatus 2.061, which appears altogether incompatible with the views 
expressed here: 
States of affairs are independent of one another (1922b, 
2.061). 
Before we hastily interpret this to be incompatible with what I have ar-
gued above, it should be born in mind that a corollary of 2.061 is: 
••• Two elementary propositions cannot contradict one another 
(1930, p. 109). 
37 These passages provide the key to the so-called Color Exclusion 
Problem. we shall return to them in Chapter Five. 
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The latter passage, however, hails directly from the Philosophical 
RP.marks. (Tn fact it occurs in close proximity to one of the passages 
cited above.) This should raise suspicions as to t.hA mAaning of 
Trar.t:at:us ,.061. Row r.ould it be compatible with both views? I suspect 
that the word •independent" in 2.061 is vague: w:hArARA t.hA t.rnt.h anci 
RP.nRP. of two Aimnlt.Anfmnsly assertable elementary propositional signs is 
indepAndent of one another (e.g., •ThiA iR rAci" anci •rrhiA iA ronnci"): 
there are elementary propositional signs that cannot. hA aAAArt-.Aci Aimnl-
tAneoni:;Jy (A.g., "This is red" and •This is blue") due to their shared 
sense. I think, too, that the wrong thing iA maciA of ,.061 anrl relat.eci 
pAAAAgP.A (e.g., 1922b, 2.062 and 4.211), due to a failure to distinguish 
between a sentence or propositional Aign (whir.h may hP. ciP.Ar.riheci t-hnr-
onghly in terms of its syntax) and a proposition or statement (which 
must be characterized in term.R of it.A fnnr.t-.ion). One of t.he prinr.ipal 
theses of the Tractatus, I take it, is that concrete nt.t.eranr.eA ;mci in-
Ar.ri pt: i onR ( 1 i ngn i At:i r. t.o'keni:; th.at: are actually used for stating what is 
t:rue or false) are the basic semantic units of a language. One r.Annot. 
assert both P and Q at the same time if they are incompatible and one 
refers to the falsification condition of the other. YAt. hot.h Are AignA: 
i.e., sentences that could be used separat.Aly: 
".Not-P" and "P" contradict each other, both cannot be 
true~ but I can surely expreAA hot.h, oot:h pir.t:nrP.R P.~ist:. 
They are to be found side by side (1914b, p. 28). 
I also said that the view: I have exprARAP.ci r.onr.erning falAifir.A-
Hon r.onnit.ions is the only view compatible with certain key theses of 
the Tractatus. Here I will mention only one1 otheri:; will becomA ;tppar-
ent. in RnhRP.(!nAnt. r.hApt.erA. 'T'hA i ciAA t:hat. fAl sehood consists merely in 
the non-obtaining of a state of affairs is incompatible with t.hA 
c;r11nrigP.rianlcP. of t:hP. Trar.t:at:us. Wittgenstein maintains that his most 
fundamental idea is that the logical constant.A (inr.lnciing t:he nAg-'lt.ion 
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sign) do not serve as referring terms, that there are no logical ob-
jects. What is the nanoccurrence of a state of affairs? It cannot con-
sist in the non-existence of the object(s) to which a sentence does 
re£er; remember that we are assuming there is some object about which 
one has a belief. Are we to say that some sort 0£ negative relation 
holds among the constituents of the would-be state of affairs? One of 
the implications of Wittgenstein's Grundgedanke just is that there is no 
such thing as a nonoccurrence of a state of affairs. So, how is one to 
characterize the relation among the elements of the would-be state of 
affairs? I conclude that if Wittgenstein did not hold the view I am at-
tributing to him, he should have. Perhaps there is some confusion about 
this point in the Tractatus; the Pre-Tractatns and thA Pnst:-'T'rar.tat:ns 
WittgAnstein knew better. 
In the end, thA view of falsehood t:hat: T a.m att-.ribut:ing t:n him 
produces a very charitable interpretation of t:hA 'T'rilct:nt11R~ it-. r.P.rt-.ainly 
produces one according to which the arguments of the Tractatus take on 
greater force than is usually attributed to them. 'T'hP. argmnent:s agninst 
Russell's Theory of Descriptions, for logical atomism and for the 
r.r11nrigP.riilnkP., for AxamplA, r.an hP. SP.P.n in A much stronger light than is 
customary among commentators. FurthermorP., t:hP. dist:inct:ions hP.tWP.P.n 
sP.nsP. And mP.Aning, form and structure, and showing and saying can be 
brought into alignment in such a way as to produce a consist:P.nt: and pow-
erful set of core concepts for a semantic theory. 
4. S.inn anri RP.rlP.11t:11na. 
We shAll nssn111P. thP. viAw of falsehood defAndP.d ahovA is correct:. 
Tt: r.ArriP.s with it: a mAjor implication: namely, that a distinction must 
be drawn between the sense ( Sinn) and meanin.g ( RedP.ut:ung) nf a proposi-
tional sign. The distinction comes to this. The Sinn of a proposition-
.,,., sign r.nnsist-.s in its truth r.nnditinns (intArprAtP.d broadly so as to 
include its falsification conditions). The senAe is t-tn.1A " RP.t: nf pns-
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sible facts or states of affairs. The Bedeutung of a propositional sign 
consists in the member of this set that actually obtains, and which ren-
ders the propositional sign true or false. It is to note that both the 
Sinn and the Bedeutung are independent of what the speaker asserts. 
consider the following passages: 
The Bedeutung of a proposition is the fact that corre-
sponds to it, e.g., if our proposition be 'aRb', if it's 
true, the corresponding fact would be the fact aRb, if 
false, the fact -aRb (1913b, p. 112). 
That a proposition has a relation (in (a) wide sense) to 
Reality, other than that of Bedeutung, is shown by the fact 
that you can understand it when you don't know its 
Bedeutung, i.e., don't know whether it is true or false. 
Let us express this by saying 'It has sense' (Sinn) (1913b, 
p. 112). 
Every proposition is essentially true-false: to under-
stand it, we must know both what must be the case if it is 
true, and what must be the case if it is false. Thus a 
proposition has two poles, corresponding to the case of its 
truth and the case of its falsehood. We call this the 
sense of a proposition (1913b, p. 99). 
It is clear that we understand propositions without 
knowing whether they are true or false. But we can only 
know the meaning (Bedeutung) of a proposition when we know 
if it is true or false. What we understand is the sense 
(Sinn) of the proposition (1913b, p. 103) • 
••• In analysing Bedeutung, you come upon Sinn as follows: 
We want to explain the relation of propositions to reality. 
The relation is as follows: Its simples have meaning= are 
names of simples~ and its relations have a quite different 
relation to relations~ and these two facts already establish 
a sort of correspondence between a proposition that contains 
these and only these, and reality: i.e., if all the simples 
of a proposition are known, we already know that we CAN de-
scribe reality by saying that it behaves in a certain way to 
the whole proposition. (This amounts to saying that we can 
compare reality with the proposition. In the case of two 
lines we can compare them with respect of their length with-
out any convention: the comparison is automatic. But in 
our case the possibility of comparison depends upon the con-
ventions by which we have given meanings to our simples 
(names and relations). 
It only remains to fix the method of comparison by saying 
what about our simples is to say what about reality. E.g., 
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suppose we take two lines of unequal length; and say that 
the fact that the shorter is of the length it is is to mean 
that the longer is of the length it is. we should then have 
established a convention as to the meaning of the shorter, 
of the sort we are now to give. 
From this it results that 'True' and 'False' are not ac-
cidental properties of a proposition, such t.hat:: whA.n it has 
meaning: WA can say .it is alAo trne or fa.lee: on the con-
trary: to have meaning means to be true or false: the being 
true or false actually constitutes the relation of the 
proposition to reality, which we mean by saying that it has 
meaning (Sinn) (1913b, pp. 112-113). 
The first two passages are definitions of Bedeutung and Sinn respective-
ly. The reference to Reality in the wide sense in the first bears 
noticing. Reality, for Wittgenstein, is more than any one actual fact, 
and it is more than the sum of all actual facts (past, present, and fu-
ture). Rather, Reality is the set of all possible wor1riR. Jn t:he case 
of an individual propositional sign, the sign stands in relation to the 
complete set of truth conditions that. comprises the sense of a proposi-
tion. This carries a significant implication concerning language anci 
thought. It means that language and thought are to be regarded as al-
wayR heing ahout: more t.ha.n jnst actual states of affairs. The implica-
t.inn is not. Rimply that. what. an individual Rays or thinks may or may not: 
happen to be about actual states of affairs. Rather, it: is that lan-
guage and thought necessarily always involve more than a relation to 
what is actual, and this is so regardless of whether what one says is 
true or what one says is false. This means that when one believes or 
asserts the proposition P, even if Pis true, the sense of P must con-
tain the possibility of -P. Or if one believes or asserts the proposi-
tion -P, even if-Pis true, the sense of the proposition must contain 
the possibility of --P (or P). (This point will be articulated in 
greater detail when we consider the argument for the Grundgedanke.) 
When one's belief or assertion that-Pis true, then the positive fact 
that makes P true is the Bedeutung of the propositional sign. When 
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one's belief or assertion that Pis false, then the negative fact (to 
use Wittgenstein's terminology) that makes P false (i.e., that makes the 
propositional sign P false) is the Bedeutung of the propositional sign. 
The distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung enables us to speak of 
two very different ways in which propositions (or propositional signs) 
may be about: something. 3' This is particularly important in the case of 
false propositions. When S judges (falsely) that P, we want to say that 
in one respect S's judgment is about P, since that is whats believes to 
hA trnA; yet: WA w;iint to say that in another respect S's judgment is 
about -P (or some fact which is incompatible with P), since-Pis the 
object, i.e., the actual fact, about which S has a false opin:ion. For 
this rAason Wittgenstein maintains: "[_i]n my t:heory P has t:hA samA 
meaning as not-P" (1913b, p. 95). Although the nistinr.rion between the 
ways a proposition may be about something may not be felt to hA ai:1 ur-
gent :in those cases where one's belief is true, nevertheless it iR. On 
pain of committing ourselves to the absurd idea that we do not (ever) 
understand those with whom we disagree, such must be the case. If com-
munication is to be possible (hence, if genuine disagreement is to be 
possible), then S's true belief that P must be related in some way to 
the falsehood of -P. In other words, in some respect S's helief must be 
about -P (viz., about its being false), and that does require a d:ist:inc-
tion between Sinn and Bedeutung. 
Let it be perfectly clear that nothing said up to this point con-
cerns what propositions must be like in order for them to exhibit bipo-
larity and for there to be a distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung. 
Wittgenstein's answer to the question of what propositions must be like 
38 These correspond to the distinction between showing and saying 
which we shall examine in greater detail in the next two chapters. 
Briefly, a propositional sign has both a structure and a form; the 
structure represents (says or depicts) what would be the case if it is 
true, whereas the form represents (shows) the sense of the proposition. 
Wittgenstein is not always consistent in his use of the terms form and 
structure, but this is the view that shines through. 
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would be the Picture Theory of the Proposition. What has been said thus 
far, however, is not neutral with respect to the nature of the senses 
of propositions. The sense of a proposition is a set of possible facts 
of which only one will be actual. The senses of all propositions, taken 
collectively, would be the set of all possible worlds. This is what 
Wittgenstein refers to as reality (1914a, p. 112), and it is to be dis-
tinguished from the actual world which .is to be identified with the 
Bedeutungen of all propositions taken collectively. Thus the relation 
between the Sinn and Bedeutung of a proposition is to be understood as 
that of a set to one of its members. 
We have been discussing the first two passages from "Notes on 
Logic" cited at the beginning of this section. The nP.xt t-.wo passagAs 
(1913b, pp. 99 and 103) draw out the relation between sense and under-
standing. What is understood is the sense of a proposition. These pas-
sages are significant because they tie the views that Wittgenstein held 
in 1913 to those (quoted from the Philosophical Remarks earlier) that he 
heJd in 1929. To understand a proposition and to understand its sense 
amounts to one and the same thing. In the later writings we see 
Wittg~mstein maintaining that a proposjtion is morP. than a propositional 
sign in relation to the actual fact that makes it true or false. The 
whole set. of SP.ntences that describe the truth conditions (for a given 
sentence within that set) is more accurately regarded as representing 
the proposition. This leaves little doubt that the Wittgenstein of 1929 
was retrieving some of his fundamental insights of 1913. 
The final, lengthy, passage with which we began (1913b, pp. 112-
113) begins the business of explaining what features a sentence must 
possess if it is to have both a sense and a meaning. The most striking 
thing is that a sentence's singular terms must refer. We noted this 
earlier. On those occasions when an apparent singular term dOP.s not 
refer (as when one speaks of the present King of France), the term in 
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question is to be subjected to an analysis similar to that contained in 
Russell's Theory of Descriptions. We shall see in Chapter Three the ex-
tent to which Wittgenstein accepts Russell's view. 
The next crucial point that is made concerns the fact that these 
singular terms must be the subject of syntactic rules that permit them 
to enter into various constructions in such a way as to be able to as-
sert various relations among their referents. (This provides, by the 
way, further abductive confirmation that Wittgenstein held the views I 
havA At-.t:rihut:Ac'I t-.o h.im r.onr.erning sAnse and meaning.) This lays the 
groundwork for the distinction between structure and form. Any sentence 
that someone utters has an actual structure; it can be described syntac-
tically. But other possible sentences may be constructed using the very 
same terms. The set of structures that results (which of course cannot 
be asserted at once) is the form of a propositional sign. This thesis 
is stated more fully in the Tractatus: 
Form is the possibility of structure (1922b, 2.033). 
The fact that the elements of a picture are related to 
one another in a determinate way represents that things are 
related to one another in the same way. 
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure 
of the picture, and let us call the posA i hi l i t:y of t-.h is 
Atructure the pictorial form of the picture ( 1922b, 2 .15). 
Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related 
to one another in the same way as the elements of the pic-
ture (1922b, 2.151). 
Form and structure will be taken up in greater detail in the next chap-
ter. What I want to emphasize here is simply the fact that rules for 
the construction of particular structures play an essential role in rep-
resentation. At the end of the next chapter we shall see that this en-
tails the falsehood of semantic Platonism. 
Let me close this section by briefly considering a misinterpreta-
tion of the distinction between meaning and sense. The distinction is 
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easily misunderstood: indeed it is easily ignored. In one recent work 
Carruthers (1989) appears unwilling to acknowledge any significant dis-
tinction at all. He argues that the Sinn of a proposition (or of a 
propositional sign) is a type of Bedeutung. This does not mean: as one 
might think: that he takes the sense of a proposition to be an actual: 
mind-independent fact: on the contrary, he holds that the Bedeutung of a 
proposition (or even of a name) need not involve any existent object or 
fact at all. so, when he collapses the distinction, he collapses it 
into what we have been calling "sense". He then reserves the word 
"sense" to ta~k about the Bedeutung of sentences. we shall digress long 
enough to unravel this confusion, since if Carruthers is correct, then 
our own interpretation of the distinction would be radically mistaken. 
Carruthers correctly maintains that the sense of a propositional 
sign is that which is understood and communicated by speakers of a lan-
guage. He also correctly holds that the sense of a sign is not to be 
limited to the fact that determines its truth value. Re i.s incorrect, 
however: in believing that its Bedeutung need not exist in the actual 
world as well. His argument i.s based on the fact that Wittgenstein 
speaks of various items besides propositional signs as having a 
Redeutung_. some of which can lay no claim to being about anything in the 
world. He appears to suggest that scholars have reached this misunder-
standing by placing too much emphasis on Tractatus 3.203 where 
Wittgenstein tells us that a name bedeutet (means) somP. ohjeC'!t .• " 
Carruthers objects to reading "bedeutet" here as "refers to" and thus to 
regarding the Bedeutung of a name as its referent. That would indeed 
entail that the Bedeutung of any propositional sign consists at least in 
part in some existent object, for while a name can only refer within the 
context of such a sign (for example, within the context of a sentence), 
39 The Pears and McGuinness translation of the noun "Dedeut:ung" as 
"meaning" and of the verb "bedeuten" as "to mean" can be misleading, 
since the nouns "meaning" and "sense" are often synonymous in English. 
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each propositional sign must contain names. Against this view 
Carruthers cites Tractatus 5.02 where Wittgenstein discusses Frege's 
failure to distinguish between the argument of a function and an affix 
of a name. In Carruthers' own words: 
[B]oth the argument 'P' in '-P', and the affix 'c' in 
'+c', enable us to recognize the Bedeutungen of '-P' and 
'+c' respectively. Yet it is extremely doubtful, to say the 
least, whether Wittgenstein would regard either a sentence 
or a plus sign as having reference (1989, p. 26). 
Obviously, though, it does not follow from the fact that these items 
help us recognize the Bedeutung of the respective propositional signs to 
which they beiong, that they themselves have a Bedeutung. Indeed the 
passage cited by Carruthers nowhere attributes Bedeutung to these items 
but rather to the propositional signs containing them. 
Carruthers is on a more solid footing, however, in citing 
Tract.at:11!'l 5.451 where Wittgenstein apparently refers to the Bedeutung of 
the negation sign, since the logical constants clearly play no referen-
tial role according to Wittgenstein (1989, pp. 26-27). In this passage 
Wittgenstein is concerned with Russell and Whitehead's (1910) practice 
of introducing logical primitives in a piecemeal fashion, such that the 
negation sign as it is used in the propositional logic might not have 
the same meaning as it has when used in the predicate logic. This does 
not appear to be consistent with the idea that the Bedeutung of some 
item is an existent object or fact. Nevertheless, the rest of the text 
makes it clear that he is really concerned with whether one and the same 
proposition could be expressed with different propositional signs, so 
that, for example, -(Ex) -Fx and (x) Fx may be about (bedeutet) the 
same fact (cf. 1922b, 5.4-5.441). So again, even though his wording is 
misleading, Wittgenstein's principal concern seems to be the 
Bedeutungen of sentences. In fact Tractatus 5.451 does hail, almost 
verbatim, from the "Notes on Logic" (1913, p. 105). At that time the 
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non-referential character of the logical constants was as yet unclear to 
him. When the passage was incorporated into the Tractatus it was proba-
bly a mere oversight on Wittgenstein's part that prevented him from not 
changing the wording in light of his new ideas. 
Carruthers' final counter-example stems from an analysis of 
Tractatus 6.232 where Wittgenstein asserts, contra Frege, that in a log-
ically perspicuous notation the equality sign of mathematic111 wnnlci hP. 
rendered superfluous, because it would be apparent from the notation 
alone that the propositions on either side of the equality sign share 
the same meaning (Bedeutung). But, a111 Carruthers points out, "it is 
snreJy part. of the import. of 6.02-6.03 and 6.2-6.241 that. Frege is wrong 
to believe numbers to be objects, and ••• that numerals ••• refer to them" 
(1989, p. 27). 
According t.o t.he Tractatus, mathematical eqn;tt-.inm::1, 1 ikP. t-.hP. t-.;m-
tnlogies of logic, are senseless (sinnlos) and, therefore, they are to 
be regarded as pseudo-propositions incapable even of expressing a 
t.hought. (19?2b, 6.2-6.21).'0 When Wittgenstein does speak of "mathemati-
cal propositions" (as in 6.21, 6.211, and 6.2321), it must always be re-
membered that he is speaking the language of his principal adversary in 
the philosophy of mathematics, Frege. The same holds true when he 
speaks of the sides of an equation as having meaning (Bedeutung), and 
indeed Tractatus 6.232, which Carruthers cites, is explicitly about 
Frege's doctrines. But in this and the surrounding passages 
Wittgenstein is interested in discovering the source of the confusion 
that leads persons to speak (erroneously) of "the meanings of mathemati-
cal propositions". His answer is to be found at 6.211 in a passage rem-
iniscent of his later philosophy in more than one way: 
Indeed in real life a mathematical proposition is never 
40 The distinction between what is senseless and what is nonsensical 
will receive greater treatment in Chapter IV. In a word, what is sense-
less serves as a prototype (Urbild) for what has sense, whereas what is 
nonsensical lacks even this potential. 
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what we want. Rather, we make use of mathematical proposi-
tions only in inferences from propositions that do not be-
long to mathematics to others that likewise do not belong to 
mathematics. (In philosophy the question, 'What do we actu-
ally use this word or proposition for?' repP.atedly leads t-.o 
vAl uable jnsights) ( 1922b, 6.211) • ., 
Mathematical equations, like logical tautologies, function as inferen-
tial or transformational rules for pairs of sentences that possess the 
forms of the respective sides of the equation. Equations are neither 
true nor false, rather they simply #mark the point of view from which I 
consider ••• two expressions" (1922b, 6.2323). The confusion concerning 
their meaningfulness arises from the fact that they are applied to 
propositions that are genuinely meaningful. Our talk of their meaning-
fulness is, as it we.re, borrowed from our talk of the meaningfulness of 
the sentences of which they are the forms. Unlike the propositions to 
which they are applied, however, they are mere forms devoid of empirical 
content. Thus they lack both Bedeutung and Sinn. So it is a bit sur-
prising to find Carruthers attributing to Wittgenstein the view that 
these expressions have any kind of Bedeutung, regardless of whether 
Bedeutung is to be understood as an existent object or fact or simply as 
the sense (Sjnn) of a sentence, as Carruthers thinks. 
We may conclude that Carruthers' attempt to collapse the 
Sinn/Bedeutung distinction does not enjoy the kind of textual support 
that he claims. Nevertheless he is prepared to argue that his view of 
RP.deutung as something other than an actual object or fact is the only 
view compatible with the Tractarian account of the semantics of names. 
Here let it be noted that for Carruthers the Bedeutung of an expression 
41 The passage cited is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's later philoso-
phy in a couple of ways. The emphasis placed upon examining the function 
of an expression would later become part of the methodology of the 
Phi1n~nphir.a1 Tnvestigations. That mathematical equations function as 
nothing more than transformational or inferential rnlei:i ii:i ~oni:ioni'tnt 
with the content of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Mathematics where 
mathematical equations are described as grammatical propositions belong-
ing to our frame of reference. 
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(whether the expression is a name, a sentence, a logical connective, 
etc.) is to be identified with its semantic content or its contribution 
to the semantic content of an expression of which it is a constituent. 
The semantic content of an expression is whatever it is that speakers of 
a language share in common in virtue of which they understand the ex-
pression in question (1989, pp. 28-29). Semantic content is that which 
is communicated by speakers of a language. As Carruthers sees matters, 
the dispute is over whether only names may be said to have Bedeutung 
(1989, p. 23). Obviously if this is taken merely as a question concern-
ing whether anything besides names contribute to the sense of sentences, 
there can be no dispute (in that case this would appear almost to be a 
verbal dispute), since for Wittgenstein a sentence cannot be said to be 
composed only of names (the exception in the Tractatus being elementary 
propositions), nor can it be considered a kind of name itself. But this 
is not merely a verbal dispute. What is at stake is whether the 
Tractatus is to be interpreted in a quasi-Fregean light (as Carruthers 
would have it) where the senses of propositions are to be construed as 
representations of possible facts in the world, or whether it should be 
interpreted in a more Russellian and Moorean light (as I would have it) 
where senses do not stop short of being actual possibilities within the 
world. When Carruthers says that only his reading of Bedeutung can ac-
commodate Wittgenstein's views concerning the semantics of names, he has 
in mind the fact that sentences containing singular expressions that do 
not refer will, on Wittgenstein's view, be nonsensical rather than 
false. For example, an atomic proposition containing a name for which 
there is no simple object as referent will be said, not merely to lack 
any sense, but to lack even the potential for sense and, therefore, 
meaning. This suggests to Carruthers that to speak of a sub-sentential 
expression as having a "Bedeutung" is to speak of nothing more than its 
having some role to play in the composition of a sentence's sense. But 
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surely what this suggests, especially in the absence of adequate 
counter-examples, is that the referent of the name (which must be an ex-
istent object) is what contributes to the sense of the sentence as a 
whole. So, what sense is there to be made out of Carruther's claim that 
the Bedeutung of a expression need not be some actual entity in the 
world? 
Aside from Carruther's difficulties, one further problem must be 
entertained. In a variety of places, Wittgenstein speaks of P and-Pas 
having the same meaning but opposite senses (1913b, p. 93; 1922b, 
4.0621), and he mentions that the introduction of the negation sign re-
verses the sense of a proposition 1922b, 5.2341). My thoughts on this 
are that a propositional sign is not neutral with respect to the set of 
possible facts that comprise its sense. In lieu of its structure, it 
asserts that one of the members of the set obtains. To speak of the 
negation sign as reversing the sense of a proposition means just that -P 
asserts the disjunction of P's falsification conditions. The set of 
disjuncts refers to the members of P's sense that are the complement to 
that member asserted to obtain. Reversing the sense means affirming one 
or more members of the complement. To speak of opposite senses is not 
to speak of different senses; again, the opposites are the complements 
within a set. Wittgenstein could have expressed this point better. 
My interpretation of these difficult passages is not uncommon 
among Wittgenstein scholars. For all our differences on other topics, 
McDonough (1986) views the matter in a similar light. McDonough'& view 
of sense differs from my own in that he accepts the idea that sense is 
to be identified with a possible fact. This he refers to as the sense1 
of a proposition. To account for the passages in which Wittgenstein 
speaks of negation as changing the direction of the sense, he counte-
nances what he refers to as a proposition's sense2 • This he defines 
(1986, p. 28) as an attitude toward the sense1• Thus he resolves the 
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problem by saying P and -P have the same sense1 •s but different sense-
2•s. This comes close to what I have in mind in saying that the struc-
ture of a proposition is not neutral with regard to the members of the 
set of truth conditions. The structure that is actually used expresses 
the speaker's preference to assert this rather than that. 
In closing, let me just point out that what has been introduced in 
this chapter really constitutes little more than a thumbnail sketch of 
of semantic theory to emerge in full in the Tractatus. Most of what we 
have examined stems from Wittgenstein's desire to extricate himself from 
the problems associated with Moore's relational theory(-ies) of judg-
ment, while yet retaining an element of realism. This he has done. To 
proceed now to the particular way in which the distinction between show-
ing and saying is developed, we must turn to the influences exerted upon 
him by Russell and Frege. The distinction between showing and saying 
receives its greatest impetus from his desire to resolve the logico-lin-
guistic difficulties confronting Frege in the face of Russell's Paradox. 
The focus of his attention is Russell's theory of types that was intro-
duced to resolve the logical and semantic paradoxes that arise when lan-
guage is used self-referentially. However, whereas Russell's Theory of 
Types seeks to secure the possibility of making assertions about lan-
guage without becoming entangled in the paradoxes, Wittgenstein's dis-
tinction between showing and saying is an attempt to demonstrate that it 
is not only impossible but unnecessary to make assertions about lan-
guage." 
42 Upon the completion of this dissertation I became aware of a seri-
ous flaw with the conception Sinn presented in this chapter. The reader 




PRE-TRACTARIAN SEMANTICS (II): 
THB INITIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN SHOWING AND SAYING 
1. Russell's Paradox. 
Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying emerges as 
an alternative to Russell's theory of types. The theory of types is 
offered as a remedy to Russell's Class Paradox and the Liar Paradox. 
Russell's Paradox is engendered by the fairly commonplace belief that a 
class may consist of any kind of combination of objects whatsoever. 
Members of a class need not belong to the same genus: {dogs, cats}. 
Nor do they need to be of the same level of abstraction: {Fido, cats}. 
Some classes can be members of themselves~ others cannot. For example, 
the class consisting of all objects that are not cats is not a cat, and 
so it is a member of itself. On the other hand, the class that consists 
of all cats is not a cat, and so it is not a member of itself. What 
shall we say, though, about the class of all classes that are not mem-
bers of themselves? Is it a member of itself, or not? Suppose it is a 
member of itself. In that case it would have to satisfy the condition 
of class membership, namely, that it not be a member of itself. So, on 
the supposition that it is a member of itself, it is not a member of it-
self. This in itself need not be construed as paradoxical, as one might 
simply conclude, consequentia mirabilis, that the class in question is 
not a member of itself ... Suppose, however, that the class in question 
is not a member of itself. That would be sufficient for belonging to 
the class. Hence, if it is not a member of itself, then it is a member 
of itself. Again we might infer, consequentia mirabilis, that it is a 
member of itself. But this conclusion conjoined to the earlier one gen-
43 This point parallels a similar one made by Sainsbury (1989, p. 115) 
concerning the Liar Paradox. We need not proceed all the way to the 
contradiction for the situation to be unacceptable. 
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erates the contradiction that it both is and is not a member of itself. 
Consider next the Liar Paradox. The Liar may occur in a variety 
of forms. The simplest version arises out of a consideration of a claim 
such as uThis sentence is falsew that involves reference to itself. Is 
this claim true, or false? Suppose it is true. In that case, what it 
asserts to hold true will be the case, but what it asserts is that it is 
false. So if it is true, then it is false. On the other hand, assume 
the claim in question is false. In that case, what it asserts as true 
will not be the case, but again, what it asserts is that it is false. 
So if it is false, then it is not false. Once again, a pair of infer-
ences analogous to those in the class paradox enables us to derive the 
two conjuncts of a contradiction. Consequently, the claim with which we 
began is both false and not false. 
Although it may be argued that the two paradoxes are essentially 
different in nature since the former employs the logical concept of a 
set, and the latter the semantic concept of truth (cf. Ramsey, 1925, pp. 
171-172), there are marked similarities between them; so much so that 
Russell regards them as springing from a common source ... The Class 
Paradox, it will be noted, can be reconstrued as a paradox about proper-
ties. we may speak of the conditions of class membership as the 
properties an object must possess in order to belong to that class. 
Thus being a cat is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a 
member of the class which consists of all and only cats. Earlier it was 
said that classes may or may not be members of themselves. Similarly, 
properties may or may not be ascribed to themselves. For example, the 
44 The discussion which follows is based primarily upon a reading of 
Russell (1910) and certain sections of Russell and Whitehead (1910). 
The terminology and the examples used by Wittgenstein in his 1913 •Notes 
on Logic" indicate an acquaintance with both. The account given of the 
Theory of Types, particularly its Vicious Circle Principle, borrows 
heavily from Sainsbury (1989) and Chihara (1973). 
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property of being a cat is not itself a cat." That is to say, being a 
cat is not ascribable to the property of being a cat. on the other 
hand, the property of being a non-cat (that is, of being anything that 
is not a cat) is itself not a cat. Thus being something other than a 
cat can be ascribed to the property of not being a cat. The Class 
Paradox can be restated as a paradox about properties, then, by substi-
tuting ,,the class of all classes that are not members of themselvesw 
with uthe property of being a property that cannot be ascribed to it-
self", and by asking whether this property can, or cannot, be ascribed 
to itself. In turn, the Liar Paradox appears to be analogous to (if not 
' a version of) this paradox about properties. In order for this to be 
seen, we will have to modify the original Liar so as to use the predi-
cate "is not true" in place of "is false". This is not problematic, 
since neither Russell nor Wittgenstein would have regarded sentences 
(propositional signs) as capable of being neither true nor false. 
(Indeed we could have begun with a consideration of ,,This sentence is 
not true" which would led us to the contradiction both that it is the 
case that it is not true and that it is not the case that it is not 
true.) Next, it should be born in mind that sentences like ,,This sen-
tence is falsen and ,,This sentence is not true" attribute to themselves 
certain properties~ in the latter case it is the property of not being 
true (or, better, of not being true of something). While an object-lan-
guage sentence like "This paper is white", if true, is true of an object 
to which it attributes the properties of being white and being made of 
paper, so the Liar, if true, is true of some object to which it ascribes 
the property of not being true, and that object happens to be itself. 
So if the Liar possesses the property of being true (or belongs to the 
class of objects that are true), then it must possess the property of 
45 Recall our earlier difficulty with Moore's apparent commitment to 
the the property (or concept of) physicalness itself being physical. 
The statement made above might not be acceptable to a bundle theorist. 
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being not true (or it must belong to the class of objects that are not 
true). So, it can possess the property of being not true, only if it 
possesses the property of being true (cf. Sainsbury, 1988, p. 133). 
Notice that both the Class Paradox and the Liar Paradox involve a 
reflexive element: the former involves self-inclusion or self-member-
ship within a class, whereas the latter involves self-reference. Their 
assimilation to a property paradox de1DOnstrates that the sentence which 
in each case gives rise to the paradox involves self-predication in some 
manner or other. Here is where Russell locates the source of the para-
doxes. In each case the sentence that gives rise to the paradox vio-
lates what he refers to as the Vicious Circle Principle. Russell formu-
lates the principle in a variety of ways (cf. Russell, (1908, pp. 63 and 
75), and (1910, pp. 215 and 219); Russell and Whitehead, (1910, pp. 31 
and 37)), but its guiding idea is that no finite set of objects can con-
tain members that would be defined in terms of the set itself. 0 The 
matter can be put formally as follows. Let Fx be a propositional func-
tion that takes Fa, Fb, Fe, ••• , etc. as values, so that (x)Fx implies Fa 
& Fb & Fe ••• , etc. According to Russell, the expression Fx ambiguously 
denotes Pa, Fb, Fe, ••• , etc (1910, p. 217). That is to say, the func-
tion denotes some one of {a, b, c, ••• , etc.} as being F, but not any 
definite one. The Vicious Circle Principle prohibits a function from 
being its own argument; consequently Fx could not have as one of its ar-
guments FAx, which supposedly denotes the function itself (however, as a 
later discussion shall make clear, this is not unproblematic, and it 
would be more appropriate to say that it denotes the fact that z ia P, 
' 8 This way of expressing the matter is closest to Russell (1910, p. 
215). 
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if it denotes anything at all)." Russell's argument stems from a con-
sideration of the fact that while Fx is indefinite in terms of its deno-
tation, it is nevertheless a determinate function (1910, p. 219) with a 
well-defined meaning (1910, p. 217). To say that Fx is a determinate 
function is to say, for some set of objects {a, b, c, .•. , etc.}, that 
Pa or Pb or Pc • •• , etc. In order for a function to be determinate, its 
set of possible values {Fa, Fb, Fe, ••• , etc.} must be determinate. This 
does not mean that in order to understand a function it is necessary to 
know each of its values. It is possible to understand the function "x 
is human" (or the sentence "Someone is human") without knowing that 
"Socrates is human" is one of its values (1910, p. 218). If such were 
not the case, it would be impossible to understand a function at all, 
since its values are potentially infinite in number. What it does mean, 
however, is that the arguments for Fx must fall determinately inside the 
range of its variable, so that each of the values of Fx (whether true or 
false) will be, as Russell says, definite or well-defined (1910, pp. 
217-218). What Russell has in mind is that the values for Fx, i.e., the 
members of the set consisting of {Fa, Fb, Fe, ••• , etc.}, must be deter-
minately true or false, if Fx (and sentences like "Someone is a human") 
are to be considered meaningful at all, that is to say, if they are to 
be considered capable of being true of, or false of, anything whatsoev-
er. 
This requirement can only be met, Russell supposes, by observing a 
hierarchy of types or orders and by restricting quantification to the 
47 Russell and Wittgenstein place the carat directly over the vari-
able: here I place it immediately to the variable's left. The carat 
might be described as an abstraction operator somewhat similar to the 
more contemporary Lamda-operator inasmuch as it provides a way to defi-
nitely denote that which denotes indefinitely. Russell describes the 
symbol, FAx, as a function: this is misleading because the symbol is ac-
tually the name of a function, as is evident from the fact that it 
serves as argument for Fx. For Wittgenstein, it appararently designates 
a fact: specifically, it designates the fact of which some propositional 
sign consists upon substitution of the variable. 
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order below that of the predicate. The lowest order would consist of 
names of objects. These and only these would serve as the arguments for 
first-order predicates. Second-order predicates may then take the names 
of first-order predicates as arguments. Third-order predicates may take 
the names of second-order predicates as arguments, etc. A function is 
termed predicative if it belongs to the order immediately above that of 
its argument (1910, 237). The principal violations of the Vicious 
Circle Principle occur when the argument is of an order equal to or 
higher than the function. For example, the subject of uThe color green 
is square" is the name of a first-order predicate and is at the same 
level in the hierarchy of types as the sentence's predicate. The sen-
tence "The property of being an uninstantiated property is blue" would 
likewise violate the rule, since its subject belongs (at least) to the 
third order, whereas its predicate belongs to the first: we may say 
that the property of being an uninstantiated property is many things, 
but we cannot say it is blue. To violate the Vicious Circle Principle 
is to fail to adhere to the Theory of Types in a very specific way. It 
was mentioned that this principle is violated when a function takes it-
self as argument. Less formally, the Vicious Circle Principle is vio-
lated when the subject of a sentence, not only operates at the same 
level as the predicate, but refers to the very property predicated by 
the predicate. The sorts of claims generated by the ontological com-
mitments of Moore's theory of judgment (claims like uThe physicalness of 
a unicorn is a physical thing") serve as prime examples. Moore, we have 
seen, affords an objective status to all properties, including, for ex-
ample, the property of being a unicorn. Since to conceive of a unicorn 
is to conceive of a physical thing, the physicalness of a unicorn must 
be afforded an objective status. As we saw, this gave rise to the prob-
lem of how there could be physicalness external to the mind that is not 
itself physical, and it launched Moore on an attempt to extricate him-
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self from such claims as that the physicalness of a unicorn is itself a 
physical thing. By forcing a distinction between a property and the ob-
ject of which it is predicated, the Theory of Types avoids this problem. 
While the Theory of Types would permit the ascription of physicalness to 
a particular thing, it would deem as meaningless the ascription of phys-
icalness to the property physicalness itself. Here the vicious circle 
is generated: to attribute physicalness to physicalness is not to pro-
vide information about anything at all. When subject and predicate 
(function and argument) are one and the same there is, at it were, no 
escape from the circle of language. 
The form of argument leading to the Class Paradox violates the 
Vicious Circle Principle precisely at that point at which it defines 
membership in the problematic class in terms of its not being a member 
of itself. Let c be the class of all classes that are not members of 
themselves. The question is whether c can be a member of itself. 
Since nothing can be a member of C unless it is a class that is not a 
member of itself, class membership in C may be defined thus: xis a 
member of c if and only if xis not a member of x. In consideration of 
whether c is a member of itself, we are given the paradoxical result 
that c is a member of c if and only if c is not a member of itself. 
This paradox can be avoided, according to Russell, if we do not permit 
ex (which corresponds to the function ux is a member of the class of all 
classes that are not members of themselves") to have as one of its val-
ues C(CAx). If we do not regard C(CAx) as a possible value of the func-
tion, then no sense can be attached to the supposition that c is a mem-
ber of itself or to its denial. 
The reasoning that leads to the Liar Paradox violates the Vicious 
Circle Principle in its assumption that it makes sense for a sentence to 
ascribe falsehood or the property of not being true to itself. Lets be 
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the sentence "This sentence is not true." When we consider whether sis 
true, we are led to the paradoxical claim thats is true if and only if 
sis not true. Here let Fx be the function corresponding to "xis not 
true". The paradox arises as a result of regarding Fs as a legitimate 
construction; whereas, in fact, it is illegitimate insofar ass names a 
value of that very function. That is to say, it presupposes F(Fx) which 
says, in effect, that "the function 'is not true' is not truen (or in 
Wittgenstein's terminology "something that is not true is not true"). 
But "no function," says Russell, "can have among its values anything 
which presupposes the function" (1910, p. 217, italics added). Just as 
classification and predication are essentially classification and predi-
cation of something other than the very act (or class or predicate) 
which does the classifying or predicating, so too the ascription of 
truth or falsehood essentially involves its ascription to something 
other than very act (or sentence token) that does the ascribing. The 
vicious circle can only be avoided by observing a semantic hierarchy 
comparable to the hierarchy of classes. Russell, to be sure, believes 
that the tendency to infringe upon the Vicious Circle Principle is, in 
this instance, largely due to the systematic ambiguity of the concepts 
of truth and falsehood as expressed in ordinary language (1910, p. 222), 
and he seeks to remedy the situation, in a manner similar to Tarski 
(1937; 1969), by countenancing orders of truth and falsehood and by re-
stricting the sorts of entities to which they may be ascribed. 
Accordingly, sentences like "Socrates is a philosopher," "Desdemona 
loves Cassio," etc. comprise an object language that, when true, are 
true of certain facts. Such sentences possess what Russell refers to as 
first truth (1910, p. 222). Sentences that are used to assert the truth 
or falsehood of these sentences, like "The sentence 'Socrates is a 
philosopher' is true" or The sentence "'Desdemona loves Cassio' is 
false" comprise the first level of a meta-language, and have what 
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Russell calls second truth ... A second level of meta-language would con-
sist of sentences--such as uThe sentence 'The sentence Socrates is a 
philosopher is true' is truen--that ascribe some semantic property (in 
this case the property of second truth) to a sentence of the first level 
of meta-language. Its own truth will be truth of the third order. Each 
of these sentences may be symbolized used the appropriate level of pred-
icative function. By allowing T1x, T2x, T3x, ••• , Tnx to be predicative 
functions of an ascending order, and p to be the object language sen-
tence "Socrates is a philosopher," we may symbolize the sentence de-
scribed above as T2 (T1p). Problems such as those associated with the 
Liar Paradox result from attempts to to ascribe a semantic property to 
an argument that does not belong to the order immediately below that of 
the function. The sentences uThis sentence is falsen and uThis sentence 
is not true" (which we will here regard as synonymous) ascribe to them-
selves a second-order semantic property, viz., second falsehood ... 
Although the latter was rendered earlier as Fs, it may be more perspicu-
ously rendered as F2s. Accordingly, the exact way in which the Vicious 
Circle Principle is violated can now be seen. Since s refers to some-
thing (namely itself) that ascribes second falsehood, F2s presupposes 
F2(F2x). However, in order to be meaningful at all, F2s would have to 
be a value of F2 (F1x). Only thus, with the variable ranging over object 
language sentences, is it possible to escape the circle of language. 
Wittgenstein's reaction to the Theory of Types forms the basis for 
his distinction between showing and saying. It is that distinction 
which he regarded as the cornerstone of his semantics; it is also that 
which drew the most fire from his critics (among the most stalwart of 
whom would be Russell). Wittgenstein's views on what cannot be said but 
48 Russell does not employ the terms uobject language" and umeta-lan-
guage" but it is only natural to use them in describing his position. 
Here I follow the practice of Brockhaus (1991), p. 182. 
49 It must be a second-order semantic property which is being as-
signed, because neither is an object language sentence. 
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only shown are of the utmost importance given our own ultimate goal, 
outlined earlier, of demonstrating the manner in which criterial behav-
iorism is a form of instrumentalism. The early and later Wittgenstein 
differ in many respects, but that there is a distinction between what 
can be said and what can only be shown is not one of them. Although the 
status of what cannot be said would undergo a major transition, that 
certain things cannot be meaningfully asserted would remain constant 
from his earliest days (recall Russell's attribution to him that all ex-
istential claims are meaningless) until the days of the Philosophical 
Investigations and on Certainty. In either event the effects upon the 
analysis of propositional attitude sentences are profound. As we shall 
see below, the doctrine of showing which emerges from the criticism of 
the Theory of Types forms the basis of an attack upon Russell's theory 
of judgment, an attack which leaves the subject of judgment incapable of 
being a term of a relation (as Russell's theory requires). Like our 
earlier examination of the bipolarity of the proposition, an examination 
of the distinction between showing and saying will carry us far into the 
heart of the Tractatus. It is worth noting that both the argument for 
the bipolarity of the proposition with its commitment to a particular 
Sinn/Bedeutung distinction, as well as the argument for a distinction 
between showing and saying are independent of the arguments for the 
Grundgedanke and the Picture Theory of the Proposition. 
According to Wittgenstein, it is neither possible nor necessary to 
construct a Theory of Types. The impossibility of a Theory of Types is 
related to the fact that it is necessary to introduce sentences of 
English (in the form of rules like the Vicious Circle Principle) into 
the supposedly logically perspicuous language of Principia. The intro-
duction of these rules makes English a meta-language for the language of 
Principia. But Principia, like Frege•s Begriffsschrift (1879), is a 
work that seeks to escape the vagueness and inconsistency inherent in 
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natural language. Bow is this goal to be achieved, if a logic must con-
tain a natural language as its meta-language? "Logic," Wittgenstein de-
clares, "must take care of itself" (1914b, p. 2; 1922b, 5.473). Just as 
an adequate theory of judgment must make it impossible to judge nonsense 
(1918, p. 95~ 1922b, 5.5422), so too in logic it must be "impossible for 
us to go wrong" (1914b, p. 2: 1922b, 5.473). The symbolism itself must 
exclude the possibility of error: it cannot be the case that restric-
tions are imposed upon logic from. without. In this instance the intro-
duction of English sentences is particularly grievous, because the rule 
says precisely what supposedly cannot be said. Whatever else a logical-
ly perspicuous language should be, it should be expressively complete. 
That is to say, it should be capable of expressing all and only those 
propositions that may be true or false. (That Wittgenstein is concerned 
with expressive completeness becomes most apparent in the "Notes 
Dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway" in 1914; see, for example, 1914a, 
p.108.) If some sense can be assigned the rule itself, that is, if it 
is possible to say what the rule proscribes, then the language for which 
it is a rule will have already exceeded its expressive capabilities by 
containing in its meta-language a proposition (i.e., a propositional 
sign) to which no sense may be attached. In effect, when the Vicious 
Circle Principle says that no function may take itself as argument it is 
saying the unsayable. It is impossible to either assert or deny that a 
function may be its own argument. Urging reticence in such matters, 
Wittgenstein says, "Ii]f logic can be completed without answering cer-
tain questions, then it must be completed without answering them" 
( 1914b, p. 3) • 
Similar problems beleaguer any attempt to speak of the semantic 
properties of a propositional sign. As Brockhaus (1991, p. 185) points 
out, any attempt to state the meaning of an atomic proposition (i.e., 
one whose truth is not a function of the truth of other propositions and 
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whose singular expressions do not refer to composite objects) will, like 
the proscription contained within the Vicious Circle Principle, simply 
generate another proposition to be accounted for (if it can be accounted 
for). Assuming that the meaning (Bedeutung) of a proposition is the 
fact to which it corresponds, how could the relation between proposition 
and fact be conveyed by means of another proposition without generating 
a regress? If "a is F" is a true atomic proposition, how would we go 
about describing the relation between it and the fact that makes it 
true? we might say "'a is F' is true of the fact that bis G", but this 
contains a noun clause that is, at most, a translation of the original 
propositional sign. Rather than revealing an interesting semantic fact 
about the sign •a is pn, we have merely demonstrated the rather pedes-
trian fact that the conventions we use for saying what "a is pn says 
might have been different. 
This argument, which Brockhaus attributes to Wittgenstein, is not 
to be found in any explicit form in either the Tractatus or any of the 
pre-Tractarian writings. Nevertheless, the claim that such a regress 
would occur does follow from the Picture Theory's thesis that proposi-
tional signs and the facts they represent share a common logical form. 
The noun clause in "'a is F' is true of the fact that (or means that) b 
is G" replicates the form common to "a is pn and the fact corresponding 
to it without saying anything about that form. The point is that any 
attempt to say what that form is will require another token of the very 
same form. (Of course, the same could not be said for non-elementary 
propositions that are susceptible to analysis~ it is worth repeating 
that here we are concerned solely with elementary or atomic proposi-
tions.) Any attempt to get outside of the nexus of propositional sign 
and fact to represent the relation of one to the other will be futile. 
Since we are concerned principally with pre-Tractarian semantic 
doctrines, it might be objected that it is improper to attribute to 
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be its own argument. The point is first made in a letter to Russell 
dated January of 1913 and is expanded upon in the uuotes on Logic" of 
the very same year. 
[T}here cannot be different Types of thingsl In other 
words whatever can be symbolized by a simple proper name 
must belong to one type. And further, every theory of 
types must be rendered superfluous by a proper theory of 
symbolism ••• What I am most certain of is not ••• the correct-
ness of my present way of analysis, but of the fact that 
all theory of types must be done away with by a theory of 
symbolism showing that what seem to be different kinds of 
things are symbolized by different kinds of symbols which 
cannot be substituted in one another's places (1912, p. 
122). 
Bo proposition can say anything about itself, because 
the symbol of the proposition cannot be contained in itself1 
this must be the basis of the theory of logical types (1913, 
p. 107; cf. 1913, p. 96 and 1922b, 3.332). 
Most striking about these passages is the fact that the symbolism of the 
language makes a Theory of Types unnecessary: a function cannot be its 
own argument, because a symbol cannot contain itself. The idea is fair-
ly simple actually. Symbols or signs are physical objects. Some sym-
bols are simple, like a, b, c, etc. which function as names; others are 
complex, like Fa, Fb, Fe, etc. which function as propositional signs. 
Inasmuch as propositional signs are complex, they may be regarded as 
facts of a certain sort. It is impossible for a function to be its own 
argument, because it is impossible for a fact (the propositional sign) 
to contain itself as one of its constituents. But what sense can be at-
tached to the idea of a fact being one of its own constituents? A fact 
that per impossibile is its own constituent would not be the fact it is. 
Suppose it is a fact that Desdemona loves Cassio. In that case we would 
have a fact whose constituents consist, at the very least, of Desdemona, 
Cassio, and the relation of loving. Bow could the fact that Desdemona 
loves Cassio be a constituent of that fact? If Desdemona's love for 
Cassio were to be a constituent of a fact, for example, of the fact that 
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Desdemona's love for Cassio is fleeting or the fact that Othello be-
lieves that Desdemona loves Cassio, then the fact of which it would be a 
constituent would have to be some fact other than itself. To be a con-
stituent of a fact just is to be something that possesses a property or 
that stands in relation to other things. Facts are essentially complex. 
The same is true of propositional signs, for they are facts (1913, 
p. 97). Each contains two necessary constituents: a subject and a pred-
icate (1913, pp. 96, 107.) That these are what Wittgenstein identifies 
as the constituents of a propositional sign is extremely important. In 
contrast to a view he attributes to Russell (1912, pp. 121-122), a 
propositional sign cannot be a mere concatenation of names. If, for ex-
ample, "Socrates is mortal" were to be analyzed merely as affirming the 
existence of a particular set of objects whose constituents happen to be 
Socrates and mortality, then nothing would prohibit the nonsensical con-
struction "mortality is Socrates" from being admissible. Wittgenstein 
explains, 
[I]f I treat 'mortality' as a proper name, there is nothing to 
prevent me to make the substitution the wrong way round. But if I 
analyse [it] into Socrates and (Bx) • xis mortal it becomes im-
possible to substitute the wrong way round because the two symbols 
are of a different kind themselves (1912, p. 122). 
The view expressed here is reminiscent of Frege and may well have been 
inspired by conversations the two had had only weeks before. For Frege, 
it is of the utmost importance not to treat the predicate of a sentence 
(in particular, the concept-words contained within the predicate) as 
having the same kind of meaning as (or as contributing to the meaning of 
the sentence as a whole in the same manner as) proper names. Although 
Wittgenstein would not accept Frege's conception of senses 
(Wittgenstein's own conception of senses as possible states of affairs 
belonging to the actual world makes them contingent upon the actual 
world), he would accept that the infrastructure of a sentence or of any 
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propositional sign plays an integral role in the representation of 
facts. A fact, he maintains, cannot be represented merely with a name 
(1913, pp. 96, 107), since names lack the structure required for saying 
how things are. To be a description of a fact, a propositional sign 
must not be a name, nor DIUSt its constituents merely be names: which is 
why neither "Othello" nor "Othello Desdemona# are capable of being 
propositional signs. Rather, sentences must have constituents that 
stand in relation to one another as subject and predicate. The subject 
and predicate (what Wittgenstein sometimes calls a form) function in es-
sentially different wayss names name objects, predicates predicate of 
objects certain properties or relations. It is thus the relation of 
subject to predicate that effects the representation (i.e., the descrip-
tion) of a fact. The precise physical arrangement of the symbols within 
a propositional sign is conventional and arbitrary (1913, pp. 97, 101). 
It matters not whether a one-place predicate occurs to the left or right 
of a proper name, nor whether a two-place predicate occurs to the left, 
to the right or between two proper names. What is not arbitrary is that 
there should be two kinds of symbols (ignoring for now sentences involv-
ing variables or sentence-forming operators) and that they should be re-
lated in some form or other to one another. "In 'aRb' it is not the 
complex that symbolises," explains Wittgenstein, "but the fact that the 
symbol 'a' stands in a certain relation to the symbol 'b'" (1913, p. 
96). The same will hold true for sentences of ordinary language with 
the myriad conventions governing their alternate forms and orders (as 
with "Desdemona loves Cassio" and "Cassio is loved by Desdemona"). In 
each case it must be possible to distinguish subject and predicate. 
What makes a theory of types unnecessary is the fact that the sym-
bols that serve as the constituents of sentences are different kinds of 
symbols. By this token we are able to recognize meaningful sentences 
for what they are. Provided we adopt such conventions as (i) letting F, 
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G, H, etc. function as predicates, (ii) letting a, b, c, etc. function 
as names, and (iii) allowing the positioning of a predicate letter imme-
diately to the left of a name to predicate of the bearer of that name a 
particular property, we should be able to tell straightaway whether a 
sentence (or formula) is well-formed and meaningful. Provided meanings 
have been assigned to the logical constants, all and only those sen-
tences that are well-formed will be meaningful. What a sentence says 
depends upon the meanings assigned to its constituents; that a sentence 
says something is shown by the fact that it possesses the type of con-
stituents it does. As Wittgenstein declares in the passage which was 
cited above, "different kinds of things are symbolized by different 
kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one another's 
places" (1912, p. 122). 
Consider, then, the function Fx. Russell regards such expressions 
as having indefinite reference to some unspecified member of a class. 
In contrast, Wittgenstein denies that the variable plays any referential 
role at all. Taking up a position to which even the much later Remarks 
on the Foundations of Mathematics (1937) would remain loyal, Wittgen-
stein declares that it is the role of the variable to serve as an 
Urbild or linguistic prototype (1914b, p. 33; 1922b, 3.333 and 5.522). 
Its function can be compared to that of a model home used by realtors: 
the model is not used as a home, but it is used to show prospective buy-
ers the physical characteristics and functional capabilities of a home 
they might purchase. Similarly, the character of the variable shows what 
sort of symbol may appear to the right of the predicate as a value. If 
it is our convention to let lower case letters from the alphabet serve 
as names, then that choice is reflected by the fact that Fx and x are 
not formally identical; it is that fact which shows that it is not pos-
sible for the former to replace the latter so as to be its own argument. 
The result would be a piece of nonsense. Just why it would be nonsensi-
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A 
cal turns upon the interpretation to be assigned to F(F x). 
Wittgenstein is not explicit concerning this matter. Ishiguro 
(1981, pp. 50-51) suggests that the alternatives amount either to treat-
ing the inner and outer F's as names (yielding, e.g., noesdemona 
Desdemona") or as predicates (hence, uis green is greenu). In neither 
case would the result be a well-formed sentence. Another interpretation 
is offered by Brockhaus (1991, p 187) who suggests that F(Fx) says pre-
cisely the same thing as Fx, thereby sharing the redundancy found in 
uThat which is green is green". This interpretation is appealing in 
light of our earlier consideration of the kind of regress that is gener-
ated in attempting to state the semantic properties of one proposition 
by means of another. However, neither analysis does justice to the fact 
that Russell employs a device (the carat above the variable) that, when 
embedded within Fx, turns the function expression into a singular term. 
Ishiguro's two-predicate account contains no singular term at all. On 
the other hand, although the interpretation offered by Brockhaus con-
A 
tains a singular term, it contains the wrong one. If F(F x) may be said 
to refer at all, it refers to the property (or function) of something 
being F~ whereas if F(Fx) refers to anything, it refers to some indefi-
nite thing which is F. The expressions F(FAx) and F(Fx) are not syn-
onymous. Strictly speaking, the issue is not whether a function can be 
its own argument, but whether the singular term FAx (which stands for 
the property of something being an F) may legitimately be a value of 
Fx. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding is facilitated by 
Wittgenstein's own misstatement of the problem at Tractatus 3.333 where 
he, too, neglects the singular expression which plays such a crucial 
role in Russell's formulation of the paradox. Technically speaking, the 
passage from the Tractatus is an attack upon a straw man. 
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However, similar arguments that do happen to hit their target are 
to be found within such Pre-Tractarian writings as the uNotes on Logic" 
and the "Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway" in which the distinc-
tion between showing and saying emerges in full force. There it becomes 
obvious that he is not concerned to show that the form suffers from a 
harmless redundancy; rather he is out to show that the form is nonsensi-
cal, i.e., that it is incapable of being true or false at all. He is 
not concerned with sentences like "That which is green is green• as 
might be suggested by the passage in the Tractatus. Instead he is con-
cerned to sh~ the nonsense contained in sentences such as •The property 
of being green is green" and "The property of not being green is not 
green" which are in an important respect analogous to •The property of 
being physical is physical" or uThe physicalness of a unicorn is itself 
something physical" that we described earlier as posing difficulties for 
Moore. The real issue is why are these sentences inadmissible? 
In a passage similar in spirit both to the 1913 letter to Russell 
(quoted above) and Tractatus 3.333 we read: 
The reason why uThe property of not being green is not 
green" is nonsense, is because we have only given meaning to 
the fact that ugreen" stands to the right of a name; and 
uthe property of not being green" is obviously not that. 
F cannot possibly stand to the left of (or in any rela-
tion to) the symbol of a property. For the symbol of a 
property, e.g., Gx is that G stands to the left of a name 
form, and another symbol F cannot possibly stand to the left 
of such a fact: if it could, we should have an illogical 
language, which is impossible (1914a, p. 116). 
Wittgenstein argues that expressions like "the property of not being 
green," "something's not being green,• "being green," etc. cannot possi-
bly serve as the subject of a propositional sign. This is a major break 
from the tradition in which Russell and Moore were operating, according 
to which expressions that refer to properties may occur either as predi-
cates or as subjects. Such a practice is thought to be legitimate in 
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light of the fact that properties can both be predicated of objects as 
well as be the objects of predication. If this is not possible, if ex-
pressions that refer to properties can only occur in the predicate posi-
tion, then Russell's Paradox cannot even be formulated. But what justi-
fication can be given for this claim? If the answer is simply that the 
conventions governing the symbolism do not permit it (i.e., Mwe have 
only given meaning to the fact Mgreen" stands to the right of a name"), 
then those conventions are in need of justification. 
I suspect that the answer lies in the very last remark concerning 
a notation in which a function is its own argument being an illogical 
language. our examination of Wittgenstein's Pre-Tractarian views clear-
ly suggests that he meant two things by an illogical language. First, 
an illogical language would be one that admits nonsense, i.e., one that 
permits the formulation of sentences incapable of having a sense. An 
adequate semantic theory, like a theory of judgment makes it impossible 
to judge nonsense, must restrict meaningful sentences to those that may 
possess a sense. Second, an illogical language would be one that per-
mits illegitimate inferences. we already know that Wittgenstein accept-
ed the bipolarity of the proposition and the thesis that logic must be 
concerned with unasserted propositions, because he thought that an ade-
quate account of language and judgment must sanction inferences from "P 
is true" to "Pis not false" and so forth. Clearly, too, the Tractatus 
requires of any adequate theory of meaning that it provide an account of 
the nature and limits of inference (1922b, 4.023, 5.13-5.14). Indeed, 
in the end it would be the inability of the Tractatus to provide a co-
herent account of the limits of inference (the so-called color exclusion 
problem) that would prove its undoing according to many scholars. (We 
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will have an occasion to examine that claim in the next chapter.'0 ) 
Although Wittgenstein would remain preoccupied with the nature of infer-
ence and proof throughout his career (indeed the greater portion of the 
Remarks on the Foundations ot Mathematics (1937) pertains to this sub-
ject), his concern with the subject first appears in letters written to 
Russell between January and July of 1913. 
The fact that Wittgenstein imposes these two conditions upon an 
adequate semantic theory and theory of judgment, when considered in the 
context of his claim that uditterent kinds ot things are symbolized by 
different kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one 
another's places" (1912, p. 122), suggests that Wittgenstein was deeply 
influenced by Frege in these matters. If we are to understand why 
Wittgenstein thinks that sentences like uThe property of being green is 
not green" are nonsensical, we must consider both his debt to Frege as 
well as the way in which his views diverge from those of Frege. Only 
then will the full argument for a distinction between showing and saying 
emerge. I would go so far as to suggest that Wittgenstein's distinction 
between showing and saying is introduced, in part, to shore up elements 
of Frege's philosophy against Russell's Paradox without appealing to the 
Vicious Circle Principle or, in the end, to Frege's own ontology. 
2. The Genesis of the Paradox and The Shape of Its Solution. 
In this section we continue to examine the development of 
Wittgenstein's views--but with special consideration to the influence of 
Frege: with those elements of his philosophy that give rise to the 
paradox and with the shape its solution might take were one inclined to 
accept some of Frege's basic insights into the nature of language. 
Wittgenstein was so inclined. Frege's thesis that a sentence's sub-sen-
50 It is my view that the color exclusion problem does not pose any 
sort of serious problem for the author of the Tractatus at all. The 
problem can be reconciled by bearing in mind the sense/meaning and 
form/structure (or form/content) distinctions Wittgenstein draws. 
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tential components perform. distinct logical and semantic roles, as well 
as his thesis that quantifiers function as second-order predicative ex-
pressions, are acknowledged by Wittgenstein as among the greatest ad-
vances of modern logic. To preserve these insights it would be neces-
sary for Wittgenstein to launch an attack along both a logical front as 
well as a metaphysical front. The logical front Frege would well ac-
knowledge; the metaphysical front (in spite of his own ontological as-
sumptions) he would not. Along the logical front Wittgenstein would 
launch his defense of the claim that an illogical language is impossi-
ble. The very nature of representation requires that a semantic dis-
tinction be drawn between what can be said and what can only be shown; 
such a distinction makes a theory of types neither necessary nor possi-
ble. Along the metaphysical front we are given the ontology of the 
Picture Theory. That ontology begins to emerge quite early in consider-
ation of the requirement (inherited from Frege but also derivable from 
the bipolarity of the proposition) that sense be determinate. The two 
lines of development in Wittgenstein's thought will be examined in the 
next section of this chapter and in the following chapter. Here I am 
concerned to show how those lines of development are shaped by Frege's 
influence. 
It is fair to say that Frege would be wholly unsympathetic to the 
direction taken by Wittgenstein's thought. His own initial response to 
Russell's Paradox, like his responses to so many other problems (for ex-
ample, the problem arising over the fact that the expression uthe con-
cept horse" does not denote a concept) would remain one-dimensional in 
its attempt to discern logically relevant features of syntax that might 
both resolve his own problems as well as deflate the claims of his crit-
ics. It is for this reason that Frege so often appears to be quibbling 
over the terminology used by his adversaries. Nevertheless, that fea-
ture of his philosophical style, along with his reasons for regarding 
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truth as an indefinable and primitive term, plus the influence upon him 
of Lotze•s conception of objectivity, all point to the fact that for 
Frege a semantic theory is wholly subservient to the theory of infer-
ence. This, in turn, creates a serious tension within Frege•s philoso-
phy that cannot be reconciled within that philosopher's own terms. If 
the only function of a semantic theory is to provide an account of the 
preservation of truth, then such a theory can say nothing informative 
concerning the nature of extra-linguistic entities (such as the 
Bedeutungen and Sinne of signs). Yet Frege•s writings are replete with 
what appear to be ontological distinctions. Not only JllUSt the 
Bedeutung of a linguistic expression be distinguished from its Sinn, 
among the Bedeutungen of expressions one must distinguish bet-ween con-
cepts, objects, relations and truth-values (which are a kind of object). 
Thus the principal task facing any student of Frege is to find an ade-
quate ontological interpretation of his remarks pertaining to those en-
tities (including senses) that are said to exist independent of the lin-
guistic expressions that either express them or refer to them. As I 
shall argue below, Frege's commitment to the Lotzean conception of ob-
jectivity and his own view concerning the function of a semantic theory 
preclude any possibility of interpreting his remarks about Sinn along 
customary Platonistic lines. However not being able to do so raises se-
rious problems concerning the objectivity of senses. Their objectivity 
could be secured, I suggest, if it were somehow dependent upon the 
Bedeutungen of expressions. In spite of Frege•s unwillingness to offer 
a substantive metaphysics, his writings contain numerous suggestions 
that the logical properties of language reflect logical features of the 
world. It would be left to Wittgenstein to unearth this potential and 
declare that language and world share the same logical form. That form 
cannot be described, but only shown by the structure of the signs which 
serve as representatives. So in an important respect both the Picture 
108 
Theory of the proposition as well as certain aspects of its ontology are 
foreshadowed in Frege's works. Since Frege would be amenable neither to 
a distinction between showing and saying nor to the prospect of develop-
ing a substantive ontology, it is not surprising to discover that 
philosopher's utter dismay over Wittgenstein's ideas upon being present-
ed with a manuscript of the Tractatus in 1919. That would be an event 
which would forever mark the divergence between these two philosophers' 
views." 
Russell's Paradox has its origin in the distinction between func-
tion (or conc~pt) and argument (or object) when no restriction (such as 
the Vicious Circle Principle) is placed upon the arguments for a given 
function. Here I would like to show that the liberal nature of the 
function/argument distinction, especially when conjoined with the lin-
guistic criteria introduced by Frege for calling something an object, 
produces a critical problem concerning the nature of truth. This prob-
lem Frege treats as irresolvable, but it is one that must be resolved if 
Russell's Paradox is not to be insurmountable. 
It was Frege (1891a; 1892a; 1892b) who had originally insisted 
upon applying the distinction between function and argument to sentences 
of natural language. Although Frege cannot be grouped with Moore, the 
very early Wittgenstein, Meinong and Russell as adhering to a relational 
theory of judgment (given his account of a sign's Sinn as its mode of 
presentation), he does belong to the Late Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth-Century reaction to Idealism and the subjectivism thought to 
be entailed by it. In The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884) he insists 
that sentences, rather than words, should be regarded as the fundamental 
11 An excellent discussion of Frege's reaction and how it affected 
Wittgenstein can be found in Monk (1990), pp. 163-165, 174-176, 189-191. 
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loci of meaning or sense.'2 If one considers it possible for a word to 
have a meaning apart from its context within a sentence, then -one is 
almost forced to take as the meanings of words mental pictures or acts 
of the individual mind" (1884, p. x). This, in turn, fails to do jus-
tice to the fact that the meaning (sense) of an expression is something 
objective and constant. The sense of an expression is what is grasped 
by all those who understand it. Since two individuals can apprehend the 
sense of an expression even though they differ in terms of the images or 
feelings they associate with its use, that which is merely psychological 
cannot constitute its sense (1892a, pp. 159-160). Frege thought that by 
treating the sentence as the locus of sense logic could avoid psycholo-
gism. The assumption, not unreasonable, underlying Frege's move is that 
connotation primarily attaches to words rather than sentences. By iden-
tifying the sense of a word with its contribution to the sense of a sen-
tence as a whole, one gains some measure of objectivity. Ultimately, 
though, Frege is motivated by his concern for logic, for whatever else 
the sense of an expression may be, besides that which is grasped by all 
those who understand it, it must be the sort of thing that supports 
valid inferences (1890, p. 5). Connotation fails to support valid in-
ference. Therefore, the sense of an expression cannot be identified 
with its connotation. Rather it is the cognitive content--the proposi-
tion or thought (Gedanke) expressed by a sentence--that serves as its 
u1ogical kernel" (1890, p. 6; 1897 p. 142) and thus as its sense. This 
way of construing Frege's argument is suggested by conjoining elements 
from •Logic" (1890), in which Frege claims that an account of sense must 
subserve a theory of inference by expunging all references to the psy-
chological, with elements from -on Sense and Meaningw (1892a) where the 
52 In this early work Frege used the terms meaning (Bedeutung) and 
sense (Sinn) interchangeably. It is clear from the context that here 
the word Bedeutung in this case refers to what he would later call Sinn 
or sense. He remarks upon his inconsistency in using these words in 
uconcept and Object" (1892b, p. 187). 
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connotations of expressions (i.e., the images and feelings associated 
with their use) are presented as the culprits to be expunged. A recent 
version of this argument has been presented by Jerrold Katz, who defends 
a Fregean account of senses (construed as Platonic entities) in The 
Metaphysics of Meaning (1990, pp. 40-41). As Katz points out, a token 
of the sentence •There is pee-pee on the floor" entails there is some 
kind of liquid on the floor, given the meaning or sense of the word 
"pee-pee" within the context of that sentence. The sentence connotes, 
but does not entail, that a child is speaking or that a child is being 
spoken to. 
The necessity of treating sentences as the loci of meaning or 
sense nevertheless poses a significant difficulty for Frege. For while 
sentences secure an element of objectivity and form the basis for valid 
inferences, traditional subject-predicate analyses fall short on both 
counts. That approach, prevalent among logicians as diverse as 
Aristotle and Leibniz, construes whatever happens to be the grammatical 
subject of a sentence as a kind of thing to which some property or char-
acteristic is assigned. Among its proponents we find Russell who argues 
in The Principles of Mathematics (1903, p. 77) that expressions such as 
"a man", 11every man", 11 some man" and "any man" denote different kinds of 
entities." Frege argues that in most instances such analyses are mis-
leading, since what counts as the grammatical subject (as opposed to the 
grammatical predicate) is merely a subjective matter. Criticizing a 
view reminiscent of Bradley, according to which a sentence is merely the 
expression of something "cut off (and] fixed by the mind'" (1883, p. 3), 
Frege maintains, 
[W]e can only say: "The subject is the concept with 
which the judgement is chiefly concerned." In (ordinary) 
language, the subject-place has the significance in the 
word-order of a special place where one puts what he wishes 
the listener to heed (1879b, p. 113.). ---.,-----------53 Russell (1903) is not consistent on these matters: compare p. 90. 
For a discussion of these inconsistencies, see Coffa (1993), p. 106-107. 
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That thoughts are expressed in a medium involving a subject and a predi-
cate thus belongs to those uaspects of [ordinary] language which re-
sult ••• from the interaction of speaker and listener" (1879b, p. 113). 
Consider, for example, the sentences uoesdemona loves Cassio" and 
ucassio is loved by Desdemonaw which differ in grammatical form but pos-
sess the same conceptual content. The traditional account would treat 
the first sentence as ascribing to Desdemona a particular property, 
namely, the property of loving Cassio. On the other hand, the second 
sentence ascribes to a different subject a quite different property, 
inasmuch as it attributes to Cassio the property of being loved by 
Desdemona. Even if we allow ourselves symbols for each of the subjects 
and predicates, we will not be able to find in their formalization any 
clue as to their semantic similarity. By laying too much stress upon 
the grammatical form, upon what is merely psychological according to 
Frege, what is essential to the semantics of the two sentences is lost. 
The examples drawn from Russell are even more severe. If any grammati-
cal difference entails a difference in semantics, then ua man" and usome 
man" can not be considered synonymous when used as subjects~ yet, they 
certainly appear to be so. Whatever differences attach to the uses of 
these expressions, Frege would say, can be accounted for in terms of in-
dividuals' linguistic preferences, which is a purely subjective matter. 
Their differences, therefore, cannot be regarded as semantic. 
I should point out thatthere is a certain ambiguity in my saying 
that the differences between these expressions cannot be semantic, given 
Frege's distinction between the Sinn and the Bedeutung of an expression. 
That ambiguity is matched in Frege's writings prior to the 1890'& when 
the distinction was explicitly drawn. In lieu of the theory that would 
emerge in that decade, it would be more appropriate to say that such ex-
pressions cannot differ in terms of their Bedeutung, i.e., their exten-
sion or (more accurately) their role in determining a truth-value. It 
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seems that Frege's later writings are ambivalent on whether these ex-
pressions could differ in terms of their Sinne. Clearly Frege would 
translate both •an and •some 8 using the existential quantifier which, 
for him, symbolizes a second-order function. Since formalization aims 
to reveal the thought (Gedanke) that is the sense of the sentence, one 
would expect the senses to be identical. Nevertheless, Frege (1892a, p. 
158) does suggest that differences in grammatical form betoken differ-
ences of sense. •Tom and Jerry• differs in sense from •Jerry and Tom8 
apparently solely in virtue of the grammatical ordering of the names. 
Their order would be relevant within the context of a function express-
ing an assymmetrical relationi in the passage cited such is not the 
case. There the terms appear as components within definite descrip-
tions, viz., "the intersection of a and b" and" the intersection of b 
and a" which Frege claims have different senses. 
As discussed above, for Frege, an adequate account of sense must 
not only avoid psychologism, it must provide the basis for an adequate 
theory of inference. The two conditions are closely related. Because 
traditional subject-predicate analyses of sentences cannot represent the 
sameness of sense shared, e.g., by "Desdemona loves Cassio" and •cassio 
is loved by Desdemona," they cannot do justice to the fact that the one 
may be logically inferred from the other. Similarly, one would expect 
the inferential roles of sentences whose only difference is the use of 
"a" rather than •some" to be identical, in spite of their possible con-
notative differences. For example, "Some man approached the door" may 
evoke an air of mystery which is not evoked by •A man approached the 
door"; nevertheless, neither entails that the situation is a mysterious 
one. These problems could, of course, be reconciled if the the sense of 
the sentences in question could be expressed in a common symbolism. 
Replacing overly restrictive subject-predicate analyses with more 
liberal analyses based upon the distinction between function and argu-
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ment offered Frege a way out of the dilemma with which he was faced. In 
mathematics, from which the distinction is drawn, a function effects a 
correlation anong members of diverse sets. For example, supposing num-
bers to be objects of a certain sort, multiplication would be a function 
by means of which 2 and 3 would be correlated with the number 6. We ex-
press this by saying that the function of multiplication yields a value 
of 6 for arguments 2 and 3. Frege believed that in any scientifically 
respectable language the predicates of sentences would behave logically 
like functions of mathematical formulae for which proper names and other 
singular terms serve as arguments. More accurately, any concept-word, 
whether it belongs to the grammatical subject or the grammatical predi-
cate, should be treated as such. A concept-word is any expression that 
serves a predicative function, that is, one that is not itself a singu-
lar term but which takes singular terms as arguments. The set of syn-
tactic criteria Frege offers for distinguishing between singular terms 
and concept-words provides the single most valuable clue as to why he 
felt a function could not be its own argument. Before turning to that 
topic, let me point out that the utility of function-argument analyses 
for semantic theory lies in the fact that different functions may share 
the same value ranges. For example, multiplication of 2 and 3, addition 
of 3 and 3, and the subtraction of 3 from 9 all yield the same value of 
6. The expressions u2 x 3w, •J + 3n, u9 - 3n and •6", Frege tells us, 
uall mean [bedeuten] the same thing" (1891, p. 139). When applied to 
sentences of natural language, Frege's analysis has an extensionalizing 
effect. By individuating the contents of judgments along grammatical 
lines traditional analyses in terms of subject, copula and predicate re-
mained intensional to such a degree that they could not accommodate the 
fact that uoesdemona loves Cassio" and ucassio is loved by Desdemona" 
entail each other. However, function-argument analyses can accommodate 
this fact precisely because different formulae can designate, i.e., can 
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be about, the very same thing. In such cases the different functions 
simply constitute different •modes of determination" (1879b, p.125). 
Precisely what is designated by a sentence (construed in this man-
ner} is controversial. In arithmetic the value range of a given func-
tion is comprised of numbers. For Frege, sentences refer to (bedeutet) 
a truth-value: when combined into sentences, concept-words and singular 
terms yield either the True or the False. What the True and the False 
are are objects named by sentences. That sentences are names of objects 
is a consequence of Frege's criteria for distinguishing singular terms 
and concept-words. One such criterion, the importance of which will be 
discussed below, is that singular terms (and only singular terms) may 
flank identity (or equality) signs. That sentences meet this criterion 
is a direct result of the set-theoretic model applied to them, inasmuch 
as a function that takes an argument occurs within the context of an 
equation. Thus, the "is" of sentences of the form "Fx is true" must be 
construed as expressing identity. And the word "true" in such contexts 
must be regarded as the name of an object (hence Frege's preference for 
"the True") rather than one that expresses or refers to a concept or 
property. But what kinds of objects are the True and the False, and is 
it not an unhappy consequence of this theory that all true sentences are 
about the very same thing? 
The issues here are immensely complex and cannot be adequately 
dealt with apart from a consideration of, among other things, Frege's 
views on second-order functions and his arguments for treating universal 
categorical statements as conditionals (cf. Sluga, 1980, p. 87ff~ Baker 
and Hacker, 1984, pp. lBlff), as well as his changing views on the rela-
tion between sentences of the form "Fx" and "Fx is true"(cf. Grossmann, 
1969, pp. 18lff). To do this would carry us much too far away from our 
central concern, which is to describe the manner in which Wittgenstein's 
doctrine of showing arises out of concerns over Frege's problems with 
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Russell's Paradox. Consequently, only enough of Frege's view as will 
suffice to draw the requisite contrast with Wittgenstein will be pre-
sented here. Much of the controversy concerns the need for abandoning 
one or more of the axioms of the Grundlagen (1884} or of their supple-
mentation, and whether Frege himself abandoned his so-called context 
principle, i.e., the thesis that a word has a meaning only within the 
context of a sentence (for a comparison of views cf. Dummett, 1978, pp. 
110-115; Sluga, 1980, pp. 133-134; Baker and Backer, 1984, pp. 194ff) 
Attention will primarily be given here to the views that he expressed 
prior to the late 1890's, that is, the period running from 
Begriffsschrift (1879a) to •Logic" (1897). (Later writings will be con-
sidered when we try to come to grips with the ontological status of 
Frege's senses.) 
Anyhow, Frege's answer to the first question is that uthe True" 
and "the False" are primitive terms that cannot be defined (1897, p. 
126). Be was led to this conclusion by considerations analogous to 
those which, as we saw earlier, led Moore (1889, p. 178) to reject cor-
respondence theories of truth: 
[I]t would be futile to employ a definition in order to 
make it clearer what is to be understood as 'true•. If, for 
example, we wished to say 'an idea is true if it agrees with 
reality' nothing would have been achieved, since in order to 
apply this definition we should have to decide whether some 
idea or other did agree with reality. Thus we would have to 
presuppose the very thing that is being defined. The same 
would hold for any definition of the form 'A is true if and 
only if it has such-and-such properties or stands in such-
and-such a relation to such-and-such a thing• (1897, pp. 
128-129). 
Against Bradley Moore had argued that correspondence theories of truth 
require an infinite number of mental acts to fix or determine the con-
tent of any one true judgment. Earlier it was suggested that Moore may 
not have done justice to the role afforded by Bradley to intuition in 
the determination of mental content. Frege's objection circumvents 
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questions concerning the determination of content. For him the problem 
lies in the fact that any attempt to define truth will necessarily re-
quire applying the very concept under consideration or at least one very 
much like it. This makes any attempt to define truth hopelessly circu-
lar. As in Moore's case, a regress is generated. To know whether pis 
true, one would have to know whether it is true that p corresponds with 
reality, that is, one would have to know whether it is true that th~t 
relation holds between p and the fact of which it is true. That, 
though, would require knowing whether the proposition expre~~ed by Mit 
is true that~ corresponds with reality" is true, and so on. Frege con-
cludes that it is not possible to define truth and, a fortiori, that it 
is not possible to define truth as correspondence." 
The argument is not particularly strong, especially if taken as an 
argument against the correspondence theory. one could hold that it is 
possible for one's thoughts to correspond with reality even if it is not 
possible to define what it is for them to correspond as such. 
Contemporary advocates of reliability theories of knowledge, for whom 
knowing p does not require that one know that one know that p, would 
argue as much." Indeed, Wittgenstein's own Picture Theory of the propo-
sition just is a form of correspondence theory that consigns the seman-
tic properties of a language to the unsayable. Nevertheless these prop-
erties may be exhibited in a certain manner~ and they may be recognized 
by speakers; even if they cannot be explicitly defined.'" Wittgenstein's 
own distinction between showing and saying entails that speakers' knowl-
54 This argument does not originate with Frege. Versions can be found 
in Spinoza and even Aristotle. Sluga (1980, p. 114) suggests that Frege 
inherited this argument from Kant via Lotze. 
55 On reliability theories of knowledge, see Armstrong (1973), Dretske 
(1981) and Goldman (1967). 
58 The fact that the rractatus says a great deal concerning what sup-
posedly can only be shown is, as Russell remarked in his Introduction to 
that work, a source of Mintellectual discomfort# (1922b, p. xxi). This 
problem shall be discussed in greater detail below. 
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edge of the semantic properties of a language is a form of know-how, 
i.e., as a kind of ability, rather than as a form of propositional 
knowledge. 
Even if Frege's argument does not undermine the possibility of a 
correspondence theory of truth, it should be recognized as posing a par-
ticular challenge to such theories. The challenge is to provide an ac-
count of what it is for speakers to be aware of the truth or falsehood 
of propositions if that does not involve applying a definition and cate-
gorizing propositions as belonging to one or the other class. It is at 
this juncture that we find one of the most striking differences between 
Frege and Wittgenstein. Frege admits the undefinability of the True and 
the False but then provides procedures (the axioms of the 
Begriffsschrift) by means of which one or the other value may be as-
signed to propositions. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, would not re-
gard as adequate a semantic theory that only accounts for the preserva-
tion of truth. An adequate semantic theory cannot be merely a theory of 
inference. Thus Wittgenstein writes to Russell around the time of his 
conversation with Frege in 1912, u1 believe that our problems can be 
traced down to the atomic propositionsn (1912, p. 121). For 
Wittgenstein, but not for Frege, it is essential to provide an account 
of the original truth that is preserved by means of valid inference. 
Now even if the True and the False are undefinable for Frege, is 
it not an undesirable consequence of the theory that all true proposi-
tions would have to be about the very same thing (just as all false 
propositions would have to be about the very same thing)? The proposi-
tions expressed, for example, by "Snow is white" and "The sky is blue" 
would have to be regarded as designating the same thing. The problem 
becomes even more acute when viewed in terms of the vocabulary of the 
Begriffsschrift, for there it is maintained that the assertion sign that 
precedes each judgment corresponds to the predicate uis a fact" (1879b, 
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p. 113). so it would seem that these propositions would have to desig-
nate the very same facts that, of course, they do not. 
There appear to be two possible ways to get Frege off the hook. 
One is for Frege to relinquish the idea that the relation of identity 
holds between a function which takes an argument and its value. 
Propositions regarded as functions need not be considered analogous to 
equations. Indeed, even within mathematics it is not clear that the 
equality sign should be taken to express identity. As Wittgenstein re-
marks in his 1914 Notebook, uif 2 x 2 were really the same as 4, then 
this proposit~on would say no more than a= a" (1914b, p. 4). We know 
that it was just such a concern that led Frege ultimately to distinguish 
between the sense and reference of sentences. That distinction never-
theless preserves the identity that obtains between a function taking an 
argument and a truth value, all of which happen to be Bedeutungen of ex-
pressions. One alternative would have been for Frege to regard the 
yielding of a truth value as something other than the establishing of an 
identity; perhaps the yielding of a truth value could be viewed as the 
assigning of a property. This manner of dealing with the problem would 
not run up against Frege's contention that truth is indefinable. One 
could, like Moore, regard truth as an indefinable property (even if, as 
I have argued, there is a sense in which Moore does provide an analysis 
of truth). What seems to prevent Frege from adopting this strategy is 
his adherence to certain linguistic criteria that determine when an ex-
pression functions as a singular term. 
A second way to get Frege off the hook is to interpret his work as 
a precursor to the semantic conception of truth advocated by Tarski 
(1937) and Davidson (1969). I intimated as much earlier in saying that, 
for Frege, nothing could be said about the True or the False over and 
above what is already said to the left of the equality sign. To say 
u'The sky is blue' is (identical to the) True" amounts to an explica-
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tion of what is meant by the term ntrue.n An adequate theory of infer-
ence provides a tool for the further explication of that term. If being 
blue entails having a color, then u'The sky has a color' is (identical 
to the) True" offers a further explication of what is meant by "true." 
The similarity to the semantic conception of truth follows from the fact 
that if the sky is blue is (identical to the) True, then the sky is blue 
is (identical to the) True if and only if the sky is blue. Put in the 
formal mode what is named by "The sky is bluen is (identical to the) 
True if and only if the sky is blue. The fact that a proposition of the 
form "pis true" entails a sentence of the same form as that required by 
the semantic conception's Convention T--viz., up is true if and only if 
P"--is not so remarkable, since the semantic conception is supposedly 
consistent with any theory of truth. What is remarkable is that for 
Frege, as for Tarski and Davidson, what appears on the right side of the 
biconditional (and what entails and is entailed by what is on the right 
side of the biconditional) serves to elucidate the concept of truth (or, 
in Frege's case, what is named by "the Truen) within a language. 57 This 
is not to say that there are not significant differences between Frege's 
view and the views of Tarski and Davidson. For the latter philosophers, 
what appears within quotation marks on the left side of the bicondition-
al serves as the name of a sentence to which truth is predicated. For 
Frege, what appears within the quotation marks is a name as well, but it 
57 For an interesting comparison of Frege's and Wittgenstein's use of 
explications or elucidations (Erlauterungen), see P. M. s. Backer 
(1975). Racker maintains that the explication of primitive terms, which 
often requires the use of simile and metaphor (as when, for example, an 
object is said to "satisfy," "fall under," or,, saturate" a concept) 
constitutes a necessary but unfortunate concession to ordinary language 
for Frege. Explications, accordingly, belong to the preamble or 
propaedeutic of a science (1975, p. 603). I disagree with Hacker that 
explication serves only this role for Frege, since the explication of 
the True by means of Begriffsschritt-sanctioned inferences just is a 
part of science. What is essential to the explication of a concept is 
its goal of locating the concept within a network or family of concepts. 
Designating a concept's inferential role, then, would be a form of ex-
plication. 
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is not the name of a sentence; rather the sentence itself is the name of 
some thing that happens to be identical to the True. In spite of these 
differences, Frege can be helped out of the difficulty described above 
by means of a device peculiar to the semantic conception of truth. Each 
T-sentence is said to constitute only a partial analysis of the concept 
of truth within a language. A complete analysis of the concept of 
truth, if such were possible, would correspond to the entire set of T-
sentences, and the right side of the biconditional for each member of 
the set would have to contain every proposition (or sentence) that en-
tails or is entailed by that which is named the left side. Whether or 
not there could be such an analysis for a language would depend upon 
whether the language is expressively incomplete, that is to say, on 
whether there can be novel meanings, and not merely novel notations for 
expressing meanings, within the language. If a language is expressively 
complete, then it would in principle be possible for such an account to 
be given. we do not have to decide whether Frege's distinction between 
sense and reference, and particularly his views concerning the nature of 
thoughts (Gedanken) support this thesis; certainly contemporary linguis-
tic Platonists, like Katz (1990), construe Frege in this light. 
However, on the assumption that Frege's views on sense are compatible 
with the possibility of language being expressively complete, we might 
say that "the True" designates the Bedeutungen of the entire set of sen-
tences which comprise a science in accordance with the Begritfsschritt." 
~Most relevant for the purposes of comparison is Davidson's state-
ment in "Truth and Meaningn that 
If sentences depend for their meaning on their structure, 
and we understand the meaning of each item in the 
structure only as an abstraction from the totality of 
sentences in which it features, then we can give the 
meaning of any sentence (or word) only by giving the 
meaning of every sentence (and word) in the language. 
Frege said that only in the context of a sentence does a 
word have meaning; in the same vein he might have added 
that only in the context of the language does a sentence 
(and therefore a word) have meaning (1967, p. 22). 
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On this view usnow is whiten and •The sky is blue- and, indeed, 
even "2 + 2 • 4" do designate the very same things they designate the 
entirety of that which Frege refers to as objective (1890, p. 7; 1897, 
pp. 137-148; 1906a, p.198) Objectivity may be ascribed to, and only to, 
those things that are not the products of an inner, psychological pro-
cesses but which may be apprehended by ("is exactly the same for") all 
rational beings (1890, p. 7). That which is objective includes that 
which is wirklich or capable of entering into causal relations but also 
whAt-.P.vP-r t.rnt-.hs there .may be concerning mathematical, logical and 
semantic objects and properties. 5• All a priori as well a.s all a post.e-
riori truths are thus to be included under the heading of what is objec-
tiw~. In spite of specific dj_fferences in ontology, Frege's inP.;t nf 
what is objective is similar to what Moore refers to as reality that in-
cludes not only what is actual (or wirk.1 ir.h) hnt-. whM· h-"A RP.ing. 'l'hP. 
point is that true sentences are about something that is 11exactly t.he 
same" for all rational beings, namely, reality itself. It is all of re-
ality which is identical to the True. This solution to the problem en-
compasses the earlier one to the extent that if "Snow is white" and "The 
sky is hJ nP." r'ln in fAr.t-. hAvP. RAtiP.nt-.nngRn of their own, then their rela-
tion to t:hem mnst ~ other than identity: what is designated by "The 
sky js hlue" must be constitutive of the True, and nothing more. In 
other words, '"The sky is blue' is (identical to the) True" tells us 
th;:it "ThP. R'ky i R hJ nA" mAn;:igeR t:o hA ahont-. Aome AR[>ACt-. or constituent of 
what is True. 
We have here the basis for a form of linguistic holism. It is 
language as a whole that refers to the True. Whether the individual 
components of the language take individual referents remains an open 
question, as well it should, since Frege's semantic theory, as mentioned 
59 Concerning Frege's use of the term wirklich, cf. Sluga (1980), pp. 
118 and 195. 
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earlier, is wholly subservient to the theory of inference and provides 
no account of original truth. 
The view described here is identir.al t.o what. Slnga (lQAO, pp. 
117ff) rP.fArs to as Frege's Lotzean notion of objectivity. Apparently, 
Lotze's Logik (1843) provides the source for three theses ar.r.P.pt:P.d hy 
Frege: (i) that what is objective must be capable of being grasped by 
more than one rational hP.ing, i.P.. 1 it-. mnAt-. hA int:P.r111nhjP.t'!t:ivP.; (ii) 
that what is objective is not the product of some psychological process 
(t-hn!'I mP.rP. i nt-.P.rRnhjectivity is not sufficient for objectivity, a point 
that will become important below) ; and ( iii) that what is objective must 
be distinguished from that which is wirklich (since the psychological is 
itself wirklich) (Sluga, 1980, pp. 117-118). There can be little ques-
tion of Lotze's influence on Frege; indeed, an examination of the texts 
reveals that Frege's argument against the correspondence theory occurs 
nearly verbatim in the former's Logik (Sluga, p. 114)., The historical 
connection between Frege and Lotze interests us because the Lotzean con-
r.Apt. of an object is an epistemological, rather than ontological one. 
This means that there is a certain pragmatic necessity that attaches to 
the notion of an object: one must assume that there is something that 
one's beliefs are about, if one's beliefs are about anything at all. 
unJes!'I then:i werP. t::rnth!'I v;:ilid (Lot-~e•s t.erm) for all rational beings, 
it would not be possible to form any judgment whatsoever. It jA impor-
tant to realize that Frege and Lotze do not provide any sort of proof 
that there is objective truth. It cannot even be said that objective 
truth is a necessary condition for the possibility of inference. All 
t-hat:. r.rin hP. F1r1in iR t:hat: it: is .nACARRary to talk about (talk as if there 
is) objective trnt:h if it: is poRsihlP. t:o R()'V'llc i.n. any infnrnv1t:i.VA way 
,11ho11t: i .. nfAr.P.nr.P.. 'T'h.is ciOP.A. not:. mP.an. t:hat. whAt: i.f.' r.onnt:A.rt as. ohjAr.t:ivAly 
t-.rnP. i A mP.rAly psychological: the True is conceived of as having objec-
tive, mind-independent existence. It simply means (and again this in-
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volves viewing Frege as a precursor to Tarski and Davidson) that there 
is no way to get outside of language to describe its relation to the 
world. This is not to say that. language cannot hP- seJ f-referent: ia 1. 
Qmmt:ifien expreRAionR 11nt1 propositional attitude ascriptions are con-
strued as forms of oratio obliqua. In the case of the former, a sen-
tence like "Dogs exist" is said to be synonymous with "There is some 
thing that falls under the concept dog" or »The concept dog is satis-
fied by at least one object" or "The concApt. ring ; A R1tt:nr11t:Rtf hy An nh-
ject." However, falling under, satisfying, and being saturated by are 
metaphors belonging to the elucidation nf FrAgA'R primitivA termR. Tn 
spite of belonging to Frege's meta-language, they play no part within a 
RPmAn·Hr. P.xpl;mAt-inn: i.P..r within A t:hAnry of reference and predica-
tion. We wi.11 see this theme played out in Wit.t.genst:ein' s unwillingness 
t-.n ARRi gn Any ,:,ixplanat.ory stat.us to a 1.11E!t:a-langullge and, more particu-
larly, in his disavowal of a theory of types and his own distinction be-
tw~~n what can be said and what can only be shown. 
What makes this interpretation of Frege philnRophir.Ally 1=1ignifi-
cant is that it minimizes his ontological commitments and allows us to 
make sense out of the fact that he offers merely linguistic criteria for 
something's being an object rather than A r.onr.P[lt- OnP wnnlrl nnt P.YpPr.t-
A philn1=1nphPr whn intends to draw a distinction between two broad meta-
physical r.ategori.es to draw that distinction in syntactir. ,u,nrl. VP.t, 
the distinction between an object on the one hand and a concept (or 
function) on the other is drawn by means of the distinction between a 
proper name and concept word. An exprP.AAion r.nnnt.R AR A prnpP.r nAmP 
(and therefore takes an object as its Bedeutung) if and only if 
(l) The expression does not begin with an indefinite arti-
cle; 
(2) The expression contains no free variAh1ARJ 
(3) The expression cannot occur as the predicate of a sen-
tence; 
(4) The expression can occur on the l~f~ Ano righ~ nf Rn 
identity sign (Sluga, 1980, 122). 
124 
Dummett makes a similar point in reference to an objection raised 
by Marshall "that 'Frege has taken a linguistic difference to be a rift 
in nature," (1955, p. 74). Be claims that Marshall has overlooked the 
f"'ct- t:hAt- FrPIJP'R prinr.iplP gn.<1] WAR t-n ]Ry nnt-. t-.hP .logical roles of 
proper names, concept-words, and quantifiers. That Frege slipped from 
the formal to the material mode makes it appAar t:hAt hP. WAR P.ngaqAd in A 
metaphysical enterprise, but this is not true. Even when he says that 
sentences that share the form of "Spot falls under the concept dogn and 
"'T'n hA A dog iR A property of Spot" are synonymous (1892b, p, 190), we 
should not take him to be asserting the metaphysical thesis that there 
are properties. In fact, the sentence -There are properties," while not 
ill-formed, must be construed, according to Frege, as involving second-
order quantification; it says, basically, that some concept falls with-
in that which is expressed by "is a property" (or alternately "is a con-
cept"}, Notice that even here the reference by one level of language to 
r1nnt-hP.r is characterized by means of metaphor. 
This brings us to why Frege believed that a function could not be 
its own argument and to what that entai]R. A fnnr.rion r.Annnt-. hP. it-.R own 
argument, because a concept (or property) cannot be an object. This, 
however, should not be taken as asserting a certa:i n rift-. in nAt-.nrP.. Tf 
Dummett (1955) and Sluga (1980) are correct, then the matter could be 
put purely formally: concept-words cannot be proper names (i.e., singn-
lar terms). Because concept-words play A prAdir.AtivP. fnnr.t-.ion, t-hP.y ATP. 
P.RRl'>nt-ir1lly inr.nmJ:)lP..tA expressions. The predicate of a sentence, e.g., 
" ____ is a man," contains a gap that must be filled by a propP.r nnmA 
(if the sentence is of the first order) or by a bound variable (if it is 
of the second order). That concept-words hAvP. no mARning in iRolr1t:ion 
is, as we saw earlier, necessitated by Frege's belief that psychologism 
~An only hP. 1tvoidP.ri hy t-.rARting RP.ntAnr-AA nr formnlaP. a11 -t.hA hasic units 
of meaning. And, as we saw, the replacement of subject-predir.ArA AnAly-
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ses with function-argument analyses extensionalizes the language in such 
a way as to sanction what seem intuitively to be valid inferences. 
Since concept-words and proper names are defined in terms of their func-
t-.jon;:il rolP.A rP.lat-.ivP. t-.n onP. ;:innt-.hP..r: ;:ind A;nr.A these ro.les are mutually 
exclusive within any given sentence, within any given sentence no con-
cept-word can be a proper name and vice versa. 
When the point is put in the material mode by saying that no con-
cept can be an object, what is essential to Frege•s view is lost. In 
that mode quandaries arise over how to explain the apparent truth of 
sentences like "The concept horse is not a conceptn or •The property of 
being blue is not a property" ( 1892b., p. 184). If Frege is interpreted 
as advancing metaphysical theses, then it is necessary to find (and it 
would have been necessary for Frege to argue that there exists) some 
characteristic possessed by objects but not by concepts, such that what 
is named by "The concept horse" cannot be a concept (a difficult task, 
given that the word uconcept" which is contained within the definite de-
scription appears to play the same predicative role as "red" in "Put it 
in the red barn") • •• In this vein, Dummett ( 1 967, p. 97) suggests that 
in the Grundlagen Frege holds that for every object there must be some 
"'criterion of identity' ••• for •recognizing the object as the same 
again'". To that kind of response it may be objected that it is entire-
ly possible to speak of concepts or properties as the same or different. 
or it may be objected that asserting there to be some criterion of iden-
tity is not the same thing as specifying some such criterion: and, 
therefore, Frege's conditions are incomplete. To overcome this problem 
Frege would need to advance substantive metaphysical claims, but that is 
precisely what is precluded by the undefinability of truth. 
Rather than view Frege as a bad metaphysician, one should construe 
80 0n the predicative nature of definite descriptions, cf. Donnellan 
(1966). 
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his work as belonging to the philosophy of logic. Commentators who have 
taken the distinction between concept and object to be ontological fail 
to take into account that Frege's responses to the problem, far from 
being metaphysical, are always formal in nature. That is to say, he al-
ways attempts to reconcile such difficulties by identifying logically 
relevant features of syntax. For example, as Dummett (1973, p. 245) 
points out, many difficulties of this kind are treated by Frege as re-
solvable if the problematic sentenc.es are translated as involving second 
order quantification. or, again, as Rusinoff (1992, p. 64) points out, 
in ucomments on sense and Meaningn (1892c, p. 118) Frege tries to arrive 
at a purely formal solution to the problem of the concept horse by sug-
gesting that 'what-phrases' (as in UJesus is what •man' refers to") may 
function both predicatively and as singularly. The point is that we 
would not expect Frege to pursue this sort of solution if his principal 
interest consisted in defending a metaphysical thesis. Frege•s concern, 
first and last, is with the theory of inference. 
This de-ontologized interpretation of Frege•s work carries major 
implications concerning the way that philosopher's distinction between 
Sinn and Bedeutung is to be understood. Frege introduces that distinc-
tion most explicitly in uon Sense and Meaning" (1892a) in order to ac-
commodate the apparent semantic difference between sentences of the form 
a= a and a= b. Whereas a sentence like uThe Morning Star is the 
Morning Star" is analytic and a priori true, uThe Morning Star is the 
Evening Star# is synthetic and true only a posteriori. Although the two 
sentences share the same reference (namely, Venus), they differ with re-
spect to their "cognitive value" (1892a, p. 157). That is to say, they 
express different uthoughts" (1892a, p. 162), where a thought is to be 
understood, not as anything subjective, but a something objective that 
can be grasped by more than one individual. It is this that Prege 
refers to as the sense of a sentence. The sense of a sentence is the 
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"mode of presentationn (1892a, p. 158) of whatever is designated by (is 
the Bedeutung of) the sentence. Although Frege maintains (in 1892b, p. 
187) that his distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung is fully compatible 
with his earlier views in The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), such is 
not the case. The reader will recall that Frege. was earlier described 
as maintaining (specifically in 1879b, but this characterization is no 
less applicable to Frege,. 1884) that what appears on the left side of 
the equality sign in "2 x 3 =- 6" and "3 + 3 • 6" is in each instance the 
"mode of determination" of. that which appears on the right side of the 
sign. It can be assumed that "mode of presentation" and "mode of deter-
mination" denote the very same thing. In that case, what is earlier re-
ferred to as the mode of determination belongs entirely to the 
Bedeutung of a sentence: the Bedeutung of a concept-word is a concept; 
the Bedeutung of a proper name (i.e., a singular term) is an object; and 
the Bedeutung of a sentence is the truth-value determined by the former 
taking the latter as argument. In an important respect it appears the 
early Frege can counted among those who accept a relational theory of 
judgment. The description of the judgment stroke in the 
Begrittsschritt (1879b, pp.111-112) as a predicate equivalent to "is a 
fact" and the corresponding view of judgment as the countenancing of a 
fact suggests as much. Judgment is not viewed as involving a relation 
to a mental content or sense. What Frege refers to as the assertable 
content of an expression appears then to be the fact thus countenanced. 
It seems as if what Frege calls the assertable content of an expression 
corresponds to what Wittgenstein refers to as the Bedeutung of a true 
propositional sign. Nevertheless, if the interpretation of Frege as ad-
hering to a Lotzean conception of objectivity is correct, then this way 
of reading Frege is inaccurate. Object-talk and concept-talk do not 
carry ontological commitments, but rather express a commitment to the 
sanctioning of certain inferences. 
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Frege's later reference to senses, consequently, appears to in-
volve the positing of an entity external to the act of assertion which 
mediates or determines the reference. of signs. But if the interpreta-
tion of Frege as adhering to a Lotzean conception of objectivity is cor-
rect, then the introduction of senses should not be construed as the in-
troduction of a new entity; rather, it is the introduction of terminolo-
gy necessary both for sanctioning and prohibiting certain inferences. 
In regard to the latter case, talk of senses does introduce an inten-
sional element into the language, but this should not be taken to mean 
that it involves positing intensions as objects. Thus, to say that 
oratio obliqua refers to the senses, rather than the referents, of ex-
pressions is just to say that inferences will not be sanctioned among 
sentences containing certain psychological verbs that take, as their ob-
ject, noun clauses in which there occur co-referential terms. It is to 
prohibit inferences, for example, from uJohn believes that Washington is 
president" to "John believes the husband of Martha is president." 
Nevertheless, a terminology that allows us to speak of senses as if they 
are objects does enable us to say (without ontological commitment) that 
there is something about which John has a belief. In this way the form 
of expression allows a certain type of quantification that appears most 
natural. 
Aquila (1977, p. 88) points out that a similar function is ful-
filled by David Kaplan's (1969) angle-bracket notation. That notation 
does permit a particular type of quantification within intensional con-
texts. Aquila, it should be noted, does assign an ontological interpre-
tation to Frege's senses according to which the sense of an expression 
11 is in some way an 'object' of the act whose content it is ••• something 
which is apprehended by that judgment or at least by the mind in making 
the judgment" (1977, p. 89). A useful antidote is Frege's remark that 
to speak of ugrasping" or "apprehending# the sense of an expression is 
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to speak metaphoricallys 
The expression Ngrasp" is as metaphorical as Hcontent of 
consciousness." The nature of language does not permit any 
thing else. What I hold in my hand can certainly be regard-
ed as the content of my hand; but all the same it is the 
content of my hand in quite another and more extraneous way 
than are the bones and muscles of which the hand consists or 
again the tension these undergo (1918, p. 368). 
As Sluga points out, this passage suggests that "Frege does not hold 
that thoughts are in the mind as the bird is in the hand, but rather as 
the muscles and bones are in the hand. The objective is not something 
alien or external to the mind, but constitutive of it" (1980, p. 121). 
The passage suggests that Frege should be regarded as an adherent, not 
of Platonism, but of what might best be called inter-subjectivism. Thus 
(in a passage not far removed from the analogy just sighted) Frege main-
tains: 
Neither logic nor mathematics has the task of investigat-
ing minds and contents of consciousness owned by individual 
men. Their task could perhaps be represented rather as the 
investigation of the mind; of the mind, not of minds (1918, 
pp. 368-369). 
Although acceptance of Sluga's non-Platonistic interpretation of 
Frege's senses has the advantages described above, it is not without its 
problems. Frege (in the very work just cited, which dates from 1918) 
argues that a thought, which is the sense of a sentence, is to be iden-
tified with an entity of a certain sort that "belongs neither to my 
inner world as an idea, nor yet to the external world, the world of 
things perceptible to the sensesn (1918, p. 369). Thoughts are de-
scribed as belonging to a third realm consisting of eternal, changeless 
things (1918, p. 370). Frege goes so far as to say that a thought would 
remain true even if there were no thinker to entertain it (1918, pp. 
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371-372).n This would entail that the senses of expressions would con-
tinue to exist, they would still be there to be grasped, even if there 
were no speakers to utter the expressions of which they are the senses. 
If credence is to be given to Sluga's position, it is necessary to give 
some account of this third realm that senses occupy, and this account 
must do justice to Frege's assertion that senses would exist even if 
there were no language-users to grasp them. It is difficult to see how 
inter-subjectivism--the Lotzean conception of objectivity--could fit the 
bill. Inter-subjectivity looks like a great deal of subjectivity. If 
by inter-subjective we mean (what Lotze may well have meant, given his 
Kantian bearings) transcendental or necessary features common to all ra-
tional agents, then the non-existence of rational agents would entail 
the non-existence of senses. 
The Platonistic interpretation, on the other hand, is saddled with 
what may be referred to as the problem of distinguishing the Sinn and 
the Bedeutung of a predicate, and I believe this problem proves to be 
considerably more intransigent than the problem facing proponents of the 
non-Platonistic interpretation which, as shall be explained below, iden-
tifies the senses of expressions with their inferential roles. If there 
is some sort of ontological distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, 
then--on pain of Leibniz's Law--the Sinn and the Bedeutung of an expres-
sion must differ with respect to one or more properties. How this can 
be achieved, if both the Sinn and the Bedeutung are abstract entities, 
remains utterly mysterious. A Platonist with respect to numbers would 
be in a position to distinguish between numbers by distinguishing their 
different roles within the number system, by describing their various 
properties (e.g., being prime), etc. Bow shall one carry out such a 
61 Whether thoughts or senses, construed Platonistically, can be true 
in the manner required by Wittgenstein and, hence, whether 
Wittgenstein's own semantic theory is compatible with semantic Platonism 
will be considered at the end of this chapter. 
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project when it comes to the Sinn and Bedeutung of a predicate? Suppose 
the Bedeutung of ured" is the concept or property redness. The Sinn of 
"red" would be abstract as well. It could not be distinguished from the 
Bedeutung in the way, for example, the Bedeutung "one" may be distin-
guished from the Bedeutung of "two." It is difficult to see what could 
serve to distinguish the two. 
Nor, in contrast with Frege's tendency to resolve philosophical 
disputes by introducing linguistic distinctions and criteria, can the 
property which distinguishes Sinn from Bedeutung merely be notional; 
that is, Sinn and Bedeutung cannot be distinguished solely on the 
grounds, for example, that the former is referred to by an embedded noun 
clause whereas the latter is not. That would be like Descartes distin-
guishing between mind and matter on the grounds that the former has, 
whereas the latter lacks, indubitable existence. Now of the various 
types of expressions said to have both Sinn and Bedeutung--i.e., sen-
tences, singular expressions and predicative expressions--it is most im-
portant to explain what distinguishes the Sinn of a predicative expres-
sion from its Bedeutung. This is due to the fact that there is acer-
tain semantic primacy to the sense of a predicative expression. The 
sense of a sentence is composed of the senses of its component expres-
sions. Concerning the components, the senses of predicative expressions 
or concept-words seem more important than those of singular expressions, 
because Frege appears to think that the senses of singular terms need to 
be explicated in terms of the senses of predicative expressions"' In "On 
Sense and Reference" he suggests that the sense of a proper name is to 
be identified with the sense of the definite description that the speak-
er associates with the name (1892a, p. 158n.). Thus for a given speaker 
82 Note that this does not mean that the referents of singular expres-
sions need or can be explicated in terms of the referents of predicative 
expressions. As noted earlier, what is designated by uthe concept 
'horse'" is not to be identified with a concept. 
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the sense of "Aristotlew may be that of "the student of Plato and teach-
er of Alexander the Great" or that of some other definite description 
uniquely satisfied by Aristotle. For Frege the sense of a singular ex-
pression is identical to the sense of some predicative expression that 
is uniquely satisfied. Using both Kaplanish hindsight concerning the 
potential of definite descriptions to function predicatively, as well as 
our own hindsight concerning Frege•s attempts at providing a logical 
link between singular and predicative expressions (as described, for ex-
ample, by Russinoff, 1992), it is clear that an account of the sense of 
a singular expression must include an account of the senses of predica-
tive expressions along with an account of what it is for such expres-
sions to be uniquely satisfiable. Consequently, much turns on the ac-
count to be provided of predicative expressions. The problem comes in 
discerning a Platonic entity to be the sense of a predicate. 
The traditional caricature of Frege's view, which I contend is in-
accurate, runs like this: (i) the sense of a sentence is a proposition 
or thought; its referent is a truth-value; (ii) the sense of a singular 
term consists in the cognitive content expressed by the definite de-
scription associated with it; its referent is an object; (iii) the sense 
of a predicative expression or concept-word is a concept; its referent 
is the extension of the concept. This caricature of Frege's position, 
particularly the attribution to Frege of (iii), is quite commonplace. 
We see it, for example, in Putnam (1975). Putnam, who in that article 
wants to attack the assumption that Sinn (or intension) determines 
Bedeutung (or extension), counts Frege among his adversaries. Regarding 
the first clause of (iii), Putnam says, 
Frege and more recently Carnap and his followers ••• re-
belled against ••• 'psychologism', as they termed it. Feeling 
that (senses) are public property--that the same (sense) can 
be 'grasped' by more than one person and by persons at dif-
ferent times--they identified concepts (and hence 'inten-
sions' or [senses)) with abstract entities rather than men-
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tal entities (1975, p. 218). 03 
And concerning its second clause: 
The e~tension of a term, in customary logical parlance, 
is simply the set of things the term is true of. Thus •rab-
bit', in its most common English sense, is true of all and 
only rabbits, so the extension of 'rabbit' is precisely the 
set of rabbits (1975, p. 216;)."' 
Customary logical parlance it may be, Frege (I shall argue below) it is 
not. Anyhow, it is precisely this sort of distinction that one must at-
tribute to Frege if one is to construe his concepts as Platonic enti-
ties. 
Once the· requisite Platonic status has been attributed to con-
cepts, the issue becomes defined as one of isolating the difference be-
tween concepts and their extensions. Concepts, it is maintained are es-
sentially incomplete and in need of saturation or satisfaction from ob-
jects. The objects that make up the extension of the concept, on the 
other hand, are in some sense complete, which (perhaps) means that they 
can undergo modifications regarding certain non-essential properties 
while yet retaining their identity. Any modification of a concept, how-
ever, would create a new concept, which is just to say that concepts 
cannot be modified. Consequently, claim proponents of this interpreta-
tion, particular objects are wirklich, concepts are not. 
I contend that this caricature of Frege's position is inaccurate 
and incoherent. It may be dismissed on the grounds of charity as well 
as fidelity to the text. 
First, with respect to fidelity to the text, Frege never says that 
83 I have substituted the word nsenses" for Putnam's •meanings," since 
it is clear from the context that that is what he means. One of 
Putnam's theses just is that the word •meaning• as traditionally used is 
ambiguous, i.e., in some occurrences it is synonymous with reference, 
Bedeutung, or extension but in other occurrences it is synonymous with 
sense, Sinn, or intension. 
64 That Frege' s senses are to be understood as Platonic entities is 
reiterated (1975, p. 222.). 
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the sense of a predicate is a concept1 on the contrary, a concept is al-
ways said to be the Bedeutung of a predicate! This view is expressed 
not only in such early writings as Begritfsschritt (1879a) and The 
Foundations ot Arithmetic (1884) but in many writings published around 
the same time as non sense and Meaning" (1892a) and •on Concept and 
Object" (1892b) in which the Sinn/Bedeutung distinction first appears in 
full force. That concepts are the Bedeutungen of concept-words is made 
abundantly clear by the chart contained in his May 1891 letter to 
Husserl (1891b, p. 118), as well as by his #Foundations of Geometry I 
(1903, p. 282) and nFoundations of Geometry II (1906b, p. 307). This 
flagrant misinterpretation is exacerbated by a misunderstanding of what 
Frege means by the extension of a concept. A careful examination of 
nFunction and Object" (1891a, pp. 146ff.) reveals that although the ex-
tension of a concept (or, more generally, of a function) is a set of ob-
jects, it is not the set of objects which fall under the concept (or the 
arguments of the function). The extension of a concept or function is 
identified with the value-range of the sentence or formula in which the 
concept-word or function-expression occurs. The extension of a concept 
is thus a set of truth-values (1891a, p. 146). The point is expressed 
perhaps most succinctly in his critique of Schr&ler. There he warns his 
readers u[t]he extension of a concept does not consist of objects 
falling under the concept" (1895, p. 228). Rather, "the extension of a 
concept is constituted in being, not by the individuals, but by the con-
cept itself; i.e. by what is said ot an object when it is brought under 
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a concept (1895, pp. 224-225, emphasis added).•' So if we let b denote 
some object that falls under the concept denoted by uis red," it would 
not be appropriate to say that bis within the extension of that con-
cept. Rather, the extension is what is true of b. we may state the 
point more accurately by saying that the set of truths (the value-range) 
designated by "is redn for a set of arguments, {a, b, c, ••• n}, are the 
extension of the concept. As will become clearer below, this is a mat-
ter of the utmost importance, if we are to understand what Frege thinks 
is problematic about Russell's Paradox and if we are to fully appreciate 
what Wittgenstein is up to in introducing his distinction between show-
ing and saying. Here it suffices to point out that it is the failure to 
distinguish the relation of falling under (or subsumption under) a con-
cept from that of being a member of the extension of a concept that lies 
at the heart of the Platonistic misinterpretation of Frege. The rela-
tion of falling under is, in fact, a relation that obtains among the 
Bedeutungen of a sentence's components: it is not, as the above inter-
pretation suggests, one that holds between the Sinn of a predicative ex-
pression and the Bedeutung of a proper name. The senses of predicative 
expressions must indeed be distinguished from their Bedeutungen (see es-
pecially the diagram he offers to Husserl in 1891b, p. 118), but now 
what those senses could be, on the Platonistic interpretation, poses an 
~ Here, I think, we should resist any temptation to interpret this 
passage so as to identify the extension of a predicate with the concept 
or function itself. Notice that Frege does not use the phrase "exten-
sion of a predicaten when articulating his view. Rather, he speaks of 
the extension of a concept. In order to even pose the alternative read-
ing of this passage, one must regard a concept and the extension of a 
concept as the very same thing. Surely this is unjustified; it certain-
ly involves treating Frege as speaking in as convoluted a fashion as 
possible. Needless to say, this leaves us with the question of what the 
extension of a concept is, if it is neither the objects that fall under 
the concept nor the concept itself. As noted above, this burden becomes 
relatively light in lieu of the discussion Frege gives the subject in 
"Function and Objectn (1891a). 
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insurmountable problem." 
There is also something incoherent in the Platonistic interpreta-
tion. It is quite ludicrous to attribute to Frege the view that the 
Bedeutungen of predicative expressions are to be identified with exten-
sions, since extensions of concepts are objects, and objects can never, 
for Frege, be considered the Bedeutungen of predicative expressions. 
This objection is even applicable to the view that identifies the exten-
sion of a concept with the set of objects that fall under it, since for 
Frege both classes and their members can be regarded as objects (1895, 
p. 224)." Because the extension of a concept is a kind of object, it 
must be designated by a singular term rather than a predicative expres-
sion. What makes the view being considered incoherent is that it breaks 
down the distinction between concept and object and fails to distinguish 
the logical roles of singular and predicative expressions, and these are 
the most fundamental distinctions in all of Frege's philosophy. This is 
not to deny that Frege's philosophy contains much that is problematic 
(perhaps incoherent); that it is susceptible to Russell's Paradox indi-
cates as much. The point here is rather that it is impossible to even 
begin to interpret Frege, let alone judge whether what he says is true 
or false, on the above interpretation. The above interpretation fails 
66 Passmore's (1966, p. 150) account of Frege also identifies concepts 
(and more generally functions) as the senses expressed by concept-words. 
Unlike Putnam, he resists identifying the Bedeutungen of predicates with 
sets of objects falling under the concept. In fact, he appears to deny 
they have any Bedeutung at all; quoting the Foundations of Arithmetic 
(1884) out of context, Passmore suggests this is a question which should 
not be raised. 
67 Frege maintains, against Schr5der, that classes must be considered 
objects in their own right and not merely collections of individuals. 
His argument is based on the premise that the identification of a class 
with the collection of its members would make discourse regarding empty 
classes impossible. Yet Frege is willing to permit the use of predica-
tive expressions under which no objects fall within an exact science; 
negative existentials such as uThere are no frictionless plains" are a 
case in point. What he is unwilling to permit is the use of singular 
expressions which designate no object (1895, p. 228). 
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to break Frege apart at the crucial joints. 
It is easier to overcome the charge that a Lotzean conception of 
objectivity entails the subjectivity of senses than it is to find 
Platonic entities to be the senses of predicates. The key is to make 
their objectivity somehow parasitic upon that of their Bedeutungen. 
Such a suggestion seems wildly problematic at first, given the fact that 
the Lotzean conception of objectivity makes the Bedeutungen of expres-
sions themselves merely inter-subjective. It seems highly unlikely that 
something so lacking of full-blooded ontological status could ground the 
objectivity of senses. It even appears that the interpretation of Frege 
as accepting the Lotzean conception of objectivity could crumble under 
the weight of this problem: after all, if Sinn and Bedeutung are both 
assigned the status of being merely inter-subjective, what could serve 
to distinguish them? Sluga's interpretation of Frege seems to flounder 
in a way not unlike the competing interpretation: it fails to do jus-
tice to a (the) crucial distinction operating in Frege's writings. 
Sluga's view is defensible, nonetheless. The Bedeutungen of ex-
pressions are not merely inter-subjective, even if one is restricted to 
describing them solely in terms of the logical properties of the terms 
that refer to them. It does not follow from the fact that one cannot, 
as it were, step outside of language to characterize the way in which 
language corresponds to reality, that there is no reality to which lan-
guage corresponds. It does not follow from the fact that there is no 
neutral observation point from which to characterize correspondence, 
that correspondence does not occur. It would clearly be wrong, for ex-
ample, to regard Frege as an Idealist."' What Frege has done is specify 
the formal conditions for truth. The three criteria for objectivity de-
scribed earlier--viz., that what is objective must at least be inter-
88 A letter dated 3 April 1920 from Frege to Wittgenstein makes the 
former's dissatisfaction with Idealism abundantly clear. 
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subjective, that it must not be the mere product of a psychological pro-
cess, and that it must not be identified merely with that which is 
wirklich--specify formal conditions for saying that something has objec-
tive existence. Such conditions apply to our talk of both the Sinn and 
the Bedeutung of linguistic expressions. But their objectivity does not 
consist in their mere satisfaction of these formal conditions. 
Language, for Frege is not a mere shuffling of empty symbols, as his 
numerous attacks upon Hilbert and his followers make clear (see, for ex-
ample, 1906b, pp. 326-327); language is not simply about language. 
Truth and its preservation require the satisfaction of material as well 
as formal conditions. The sciences (including the science of 
mathmatics••) provide this material. Thus I stand opposed to the assump-
tion which animates interpretations of Frege by Church (1956, pp. 24ff) 
and Davidson (1969, pp. 39-40 and 1990, pp. 303-304) according to which, 
in Davidson's words: 
The correct objection to correspondence theories is 
not ••• that they make truth something to which humans can 
never legitimately aspirei the real objection is that such 
theories fail to provide entities to which truth vehi-
cles ••• can be said to correspond. If this is right, and I 
am convinced it is, we ought also question the popular as-
sumption that sentences, or their spoken tokens, or sen-
tence-like entities or configurations in our brains, can 
properly be called urepresentations," since there is nothing 
for them to represent (1990, p. 304). 
The assumption is that if neither the relation nor the relatum of corre-
spondence can be characterized or described (an epistemological point), 
then there can be no such relation or relatum (a metaphysical point) and 
the very idea of language being a representational medium loses its 
force. We need not accept this assumption. The very purpose of 
Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying and the Picture 
Theory of the proposition is to provide an account of how linguistic ex-
88 Mathematics is to be included among the sciences, this is to be un-
derstood in light of the fact that not everything which is objective is 
wirchlich. 
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pressions may be related to the world in spite of the fact that nothing 
can be said about their relation. The seed from which Wittgenstein's 
theory would grow is contained, however, in Frege's philosophy. 
The Lotzean conception of objectivity does not rule out the possi-
bility of there being entities that correspond to linguistic expres-
sions. (In fact, Frege's criticism of formalism may well also hold 
against the sort of view, described above, attributed to him by Church 
and Davidson, since that view makes language self-contained in the man-
ner of a game~ see Frege, 1906b, p. 327.) But let us be quite clear 
here concerning what is at issue. What is not at issue is whether a 
semantic relation holds between the Sinn of an expression and its 
Bedeutung. In interpreting Frege this much is uncontroversial: (i) the 
senses of sub-sentential components determine or compose the sense of a 
sentence~ (ii) the sense of a sentence (a) determines the truth-value of 
the sentence that is used to express it, which is to say it picks out or 
accomplishes reference to the True (what is true) or the False (what is 
false), (b) determines in part the truth-value of molecular proposi-
tions into which it figures, and (c) serves as a necessary condition for 
the preservation of truth in valid inference, provided it designates 
what is true. What is more, it is uncontroversial that for Frege the 
sense of an expression, or rather the grasping of an expression's sense 
determines what a speaker is referring to. 
What is controversial is whether there exists an ontological rela-
tion between Sinn and Bedeutung, such that the nature of the former is 
determined by the nature of the latter. It is precisely the apparent 
absence of such a relation that enables Putnam (1975) to include Frege 
among those who incorrectly believe that intension determines extension. 
I contend that Frege's senses could not perform their semantic roles un-
less their structures and relations are determined by the structures and 
relations of their Bedeutung. I think there is in Frege a tendency to 
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accept the thesis which would remain undeveloped until Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus, namely, that the structure of a thought and the relations 
that obtain among thoughts are isomorphic to structures and relations 
among the referents of expressions. In other words: language and 
thought share the logical form of the world, and that it is by virtue of 
this shared form that the former perform their semantic roles. 
What evidence there is for this may be found in the fact that 
Frege always finds in the semantically and logically relevant features 
of language and thought features that the world must presumably share. 
Indeed, in reference to what he feels is his apparent good fortune in 
being a native· German speaker, Frege observes: "[i)t is here very much 
to my advantage that there is such good accord between the linguistic 
distinction and the real oneH (1892b, p. 185). Consider first the rela-
tion that holds between a predicative and singular expression. The 
predicative expression is essentially incomplete, having meaning only 
insofar as it modifies a proper name or some other singular expression. 
Thus it is with the Bedeutungen, the meanings, of predicative expres-
sions: concepts or functions have a "predicative nature" (1892b, p. 
187), i.e., are essentially incomplete and in need of "supplementation" 
(1892, p. 187n) by an object. Objects, on the other hand, are not only 
identified by the logical properties of the expressions that refer to 
them (particularly by the fact that expressions that refer to them are 
capable of flanking the identity sign), they are said to be be capable 
of sustaining their identity across changes in their mode of presenta-
tion. This cannot be said of concepts. Any change in their mode of 
presentation is a change in what is presented. The concepts that are 
designated by nis Plato's greatest pupil" and "is Alexander's greatest 
teacher" may be satisfied by one and the same individual, but what those 
predicative expressions designate are two different concepts. 
Presumably, then, objects are capable of retaining their identity under 
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one or another determination. 
Just as the senses of sub-sentential components determine or com-
pose the sense of a sentence, the referents of sub-sentential components 
comprise a sentence's truth-value~ which is to say they compose the 
Bedeutung of the sentence as a whole, i.e., they constitute •the circum-
stance that it is true or false" (1892a. p. 163). It is impossible to 
imagine that the senses of a sentence's sub-sentential components could 
determine the sense of the the sentence as a whole (whose function is to 
determine a truth value) unless the component senses stand in a logical 
relation to one another in a way that is analogous to the relations that 
obtain among the referents of the sentence's sub-sentential components. 
If the sense of a sentence is not structured so that the sense of a 
predicate, F, does not stand in relation to the sense of a singular 
term, a, then how would it be possible for the senses of the sub-senten-
tial components to comprise the sense of a sentence: that a is F? In 
fact, Frege does employ the metaphors •saturated" and •unsaturated" both 
to relations among the senses and to relations among the referents of a 
sentence's components (1892b, p. 193; also 1923, p. 390). 
It is difficult to see how the semantic function of a sentence's 
sense to determine a truth-value could be carried out unless there is 
some object (truth-values are objects for Frege), some circumstance, 
that makes the thought expressed by the sentence true or false. And 
that thought, the sentence's sense, must be structured in order to rep-
resent the fact that a is F. Indeed if Sinn and Bedeutung were not to 
share the same structure, it would be impossible to distinguish the True 
from the False. Since, for Frege, the singular terms of a science must 
refer (1892a, p. 169; 1895, p. 228), the only way the falsehood of an 
atomic sentence may arise is if a given object fails to fall under a 
concept. Given the reference of the singular term, a true and a false 
thought will be about the very same thing. What then distinguishes 
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them? Clearly the fact that the thought represents an object as stand-
ing in relation to a concept that in fact does not obtain is decisive. 
This point, implicit in Frege, becomes explicit in Wittgenstein's dictum 
that a propositional sign cannot be a name and that it must convey 
(show) by means of its structure the possibility of its falsehood. This 
will be discussed in greater detail below. 
The matter does not essentially change when we consider sentences 
containing quantifiers or connectives. Both quantifiers and connectives 
contribute to the sense of a sentencei they designate (bedeuten) rela-
tions. Quantifiers function as second-order predicative expressions 
that designate relations among concepts (1884, pp. 64-65~ 1892b, p. 
187ff) To say "Something is green" is to assert that the concept green 
falls within the concept not nought (or has the property not nought). 
To say "Everything is green" is tantamount to saying that the concept 
green falls within (or may be assigned the number) n, which is identi-
cal to the number of objects in the domain of discourse. To say 
"Nothing is green" is to assert that green falls within the concept 
zero or nought. 
Indeed "Something is not green" may be taken as meaning that not 
everything is green, i.e., that it does not fall within the concept (or 
may be assigned a number other than) n, which is identical to the num-
ber of objects in the domain of discourse. Categorical propositions may 
be dealt with in similar ways, for example: to say "All dogs are mam-
mals" is to assert that the concept dog falls within or is subordinate 
to the concept mammal. The point here is that quantifiers, like other 
sub-sentential components, have reference as well as sense. Their ref-
erents are relations among concepts, and it is crucial to note that 
these are logical relations. 
The other logical constants, the connectives, also have 
Bedeutungen, inasmuch as they designate relations among truth-values 
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(1892a, p. 173). For example, •Ifs, then P" asserts that for all val-
ues of S: ifs is true, then Pis not false. It is important to keep 
in mind that truth-values, for Frege, are objects, and, therefore, that 
the connectives designate logical relations among objects. 
It is fair to say that the other two functions assigned to the 
senses of atomic propositions--viz., to determine in part the truth-val-
ues of the molecular propositions in which they occur and to serve as a 
necessary condition for the preservation of truth across inferences--
could not be accomplished unless the requisite relations obtain among 
the concepts and among the truth-values to which quantifiers and connec-
tives refer. In the first instance, were there not logical relations 
among the truth-values of atomic propositions, molecular propositions 
could never be true. What molecular propositions assert simply could 
not obtain. But neither could they be false! What makes a proposition 
false is that what it denotes stands in a logical relation other than 
that which is asserted, but if there are no such relations, then there 
is nothing to falsify the propositions in question. Those propositions 
would then be, not true or false, but nonsensical. In that event the 
sense of the molecular proposition could not determine a truth-value 
(and a fortiori the sense of an atomic proposition could not contribute 
to the determination of the molecular proposition's truth-value) as 
there would be no such values to determine. 
One can see that this entails the impossibility of the preserva-
tion of truth through inference. A form of inference, such as modus 
ponens, can be sound if and only if it is possible for the conjunction 
of the formulae of which it consists to be true in at least one in-
stance. But that would be impossible, since that conjunction would be a 
molecular proposition that, as we have seen, could have no truth-value 
(i.e., could be assigned no value range) at all. To anticipate the ob-
vious objection that validity does not require consistency, let me point 
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out that for Frege it does (1906b, p. 335: 1923, p. 402). Thus Frege 
drops the distinction between validity and soundness (a practice found 
in some logic texts, e.g., Lemmon, 1978). 
To return to our question: how can senses be objective if they 
are not Platonic entities? Senses could not fulfill their essential 
functions if they happened not to stand in relation to, or to stand in 
relations to one another in ways analogous to, the Bedeutungen of a sen-
tence's components (including those of the logical constants). It is 
this sharing of logical form that bestows objectivity upon senses. This 
may sound contrary to the usual cliche', attributed to Frege, that sense 
determines reference, but such is not the case. It is the grasping of 
sense that makes it possible for a speaker to accomplish reference, and 
so forth. That says nothing at all about the ontological relation be-
tween Sinn and Bedeutung. ontologically, Sinn (the essential function 
of Sinn) is determined by Bedeutung. Because, on this view, the objec-
tivity of sense is determined by the isomorphism that exists between 
Sinn and Bedeutung, and because the principal determinant of that iso-
morphism are the logical relations that exist among (and partly com-
prise) the Bedeutungen, I can think of no better way to describe the 
sense of an expression than as its logical role. Actually, even this is 
somewhat misleading, since it locates the sense of an expression among 
expressions or signs themselves. To do so would be to give up too much 
to Hilbert and his followers: that is to say, we would not be able to 
adequately distinguish between the views of Frege and at least one of 
his principal adversaries. To rectify this I suggest that the sense of 
an expression is an aspect of what Frege refers to by the word "idea." 
Ideas, for Frege, clearly are subjective. But the text distinguishes 
between what is merely an idea and the sense of an expression #which is 
indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object it-
self" (1982a, p. 160, emphasis added). What distinguishes mere ideas 
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from senses, suggests Frege, is that the former are uwholly subjective" 
(1892a, p. 160, emphasis added). I suggest that senses are not wholly 
subjective, because their properties and relations mimic those of their 
Bedeutung. Senses are made out of the same material as ideas (whatever 
that might be), but they are to be distinguished from mere ideas (what 
is purely subjective) by this.feature (this isomorphism) that they pos-
sess. It is their link to the Bedeutung and to the relations among the 
Bedeutungen. Thus it would be more accurate to say that a sense is the 
cognitive content of an idea that is expressed by a sign, where #cogni-
tive content" must be understood as designating that aspect of the idea 
which plays a logical role. 
Because sense can be made out of the objectivity of Sinn without 
appealing to Platonic entities, and because the Platonistic version is 
incapable of accounting for the senses of predicates (something we can-
not imagine Frege leaving undone), the non-Platonistic version is to be 
preferred. 
Let it be noted that one does not need to accept the Lotzean con-
ception of objectivity, in order to accept this non-Platonistic account 
of senses. That Frege accepted it, that he would be content to venture 
only formal criteria for objectivity, reveals his unwillingness to ac-
knowledge the metaphysical dimensions of his problems (or of their solu-
tions), in spite of the implicit role this metaphysical dimension plays 
in securing the objectivity of senses. 
Russell's paradox is problematic for Frege, not so much because it 
raises ontological difficulties concerning classes as objects (even 
though it is true it does), but because it introduces an invidious in-
consistency. into a system that is to serve as a model for all valid in-
ference. The paradox produces inconsistent value-ranges, rendering the 
system as a whole useless to protect against invalid inference. Taking 
the name of the problematic class as argument(s), the Bedeutung of the 
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sentence is both the True and the False. It is for this reason that 
Frege wrote to Russell in 1902 ,,[y)our discovery of the contradiction 
has surprised me beyond words and, I should almost like to say, left me 
thunderstruck, because it has rocked the ground on which I meant to 
build arithmeticw (1902, p. 132). 
It is interesting to note that in his initial response to Russell 
Frege does attempt some semblance of a counter-argument. Frege notes 
what he perceives as Russell's inexact use of the expression "predicaten 
in "A predicate is predicated of itself," and responds, •ca] predicate 
is as a rule a first level function which requires an object as argument 
and which cannot therefore have itself as argument (subject) (1902, p. 
132). It sounds as if Frege is introducing a theory of types not unlike 
Russell's own. Although the way the objection is phrased is character-
istically Fregean (in that it attempts to undermine the intelligibility 
of the opponent's position by clarifying the meanings of certain key 
words), the message contained in it is not. It is true that Frege coun-
tenanced hierarchies of concepts, so that quantifiers are second-order 
predicates to which first-order predicates may be subordinated. 
However, the subordination does not extend all the way down to the rela-
tion that obtains between a first order concept and the object which 
falls under it. The expression ,,falls under" is misleading, because 
first-order concepts and objects are on the same level ontologically. 
When the term is applied to the subordination of first- to second-level 
concepts it is being used ambiguously. His letter to Russell aside, 
Frege is usually quite cautious in this matter~ for example, ,,Concept 
and Object" states: 
Second-level concepts, which concepts fall under, are 
essentially different from first-level concepts, which ob-
jects fall under. The relation of an object to a first 
level concept that it falls under is different from the (ad-
mittedly similar) relation of a first-level to a second-
level concept. (To do justice at once to the distinction 
and to the similarity, we might perhaps say: An object 
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falls under a first-level concept~ a concept falls within a 
second-level concept) (1892b, 190). 
Here we should note that the similarity to which Frege refers consists 
in the fact that correlated with any predicative expression there exists 
a singular expression which, in turn, may fall under higher-level pred-
icative expressions. 10 And that just is what permits the formation of 
the paradox: does the problematic class (i.e., the class of all classes 
not members of itself) now conceived as a kind of object fall under the 
concept to which "is a member of itself" refers? The paradox is cer-
tainly not blocked by the sort of consideration raised in his letter to 
Russell If Frege thought that it might be, he did not feel that way for 
long. 
Even if Frege did consider the possibility of developing a theory 
of types along the same lines as Russell, doing so would have taken him 
far from the center of his philosophy. Be would have had to engage in 
just the sort of metaphysical inquiry precluded by the Lotzean concep-
tion of objectivity he accepted. Be would have had to provide some 
metaphysical account of the distinction between what is referred to by 
proper names and by concept-words. The problem of the concept horse, 
for example, would have had to have been settled once and for all, and 
not by appealing to features of syntax whose logical role is to mediate 
the apparent referential gap between proper names and concept-words, but 
by an account of the referents of those terms. What would be required 
of Frege would be the sort of account offered by Russell in his numerous 
writings: of universals, particulars and forms as the objects of judg-
ment, of acquaintance as the way in which reference to objects is ef-
fected, and so forth. But for Frege an account of reference, of corre-
70 Again, it is hard to understand how it is possible for this corre-
lation to occur and the paradox to ensue while at the same time it is 
maintained that concepts cannot be named, unless one is willing toques-
tion the depth Frege attributes to the metaphysical waters in which the 
concept/object distinction floats. 
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spondence, is clearly out of the question. As we saw earlier, Frege re-
pudiates the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth. Terms 
like utruth" and #validity" must remain primitive and indefinable. They 
may be elucidated by way of metaphor or further explicated by listing 
the sentences or sets of sentences of which they may be predicated, but 
they cannot constitute the subject matter for a semantic theory, that 
is, one that goes beyond a theory of inference (the preservation of 
truth) to include an account of reference and correspondence (or origi-
nal truth). For Frege the sentences comprising such a theory would have 
to fall beyond the pale of the concept-script. That the coherence of 
logic and mathematics must depend upon saying the unsayable would surely 
have been regarded by him as undermining the whole project. It is this 
complaint which we see Wittgenstein registering against Russell's theory 
of types when he maintains that an adequate theory of types is impossi-
ble. 
It is to Wittgenstein's credit to have found a way to render a 
theory of types unnecessary. From Frege he retrieves the idea that 
primitive semantic terms can only be elucidated; only in Wittgenstein's 
hands this idea develops into a full-blown semantic distinction between 
what can be said and what can be shown. 
3. The Distinction Between Showing and Saying. 
we can view Wittgenstein's account of what is shown as the succes-
sor to Frege's notion of an elucidation (Brlauterung). In fact, well 
into the Tractatus Wittgenstein retains Frege's terminology: 
The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means 
of elucidations ••• (1922b, 3.262). 
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. 
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucida-
tions. 
Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical proposi-
tions,' but rather in the clarification of propositions ••• ( 
1922b, 4.112). 
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My propositions serve as elucidations in the 
following way: anyone who understands me event-
ually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has 
used them--as steps--to climb up beyond them ••• 
(1922b, 6.54). 
The account of showing also provides us with the predecessor to what in 
the later Wittgenstein's philosophy are called grammatical remarks or 
grammatical propositions, which are characterized as being neither true 
nor false but (in a sense to be explained in a later chapter) antecedent 
to truth. We see the later view already present in the Tractatus: 
The propositions of logic describe the scaffold-
ing of the world, or rather they represent [ste11en] 
it. They have no 'subject-matter'.(1922b, 6.124) 71 
The unavoidability of a distinction between what can be said and what 
can only be shown carries major implications concerning how we view the 
nature of language. A complete characterization of the view which is 
entailed will have to await a later chapter~ however, let me say here 
that the view entails: (i) that linguistic tokens (i.e., particular ut-
terances and inscriptions), rather than one or another sort of linguis-
tic type (e.g., propositions that are individuated in terms of their so-
called cognitive content or statements that are individuated in terms of 
their truth-conditions), can be said to be the bearers of meaning~" and 
(ii) that a radical conventionalism with respect to what we call true 
71 The verb stellen is perhaps more accurately rendered as uthey pre-
sent" as found in the Ogden (1922a) translation. That this is the case 
will become apparent below. 
72 I say "said to be the bearers of meaning" rather than "are the 
bearers of meaning," because on the later view, our talk of meanings 
must be understood instrumentally. on that view, there are no meanings 
(although on this Wittgenstein's early views concerning negative exis-
tentials would return to haunt him. What there is is our talk of mean-
ing. Tokens of such (which can be individuated along structural and 
functional lines) play a certain role in our discourse, but do not con-
stitute a meta-language. It would be more accurate to say that such re-
marks function as linguistic exemplars or prototypes. I am convinced, 
for reasons to be presented in this and a forthcoming chapter, that this 
idea originates in the Tractarian (and Pre-Tractarian) account of show-
ing. 
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and false and a certain conceptual relativism with respect to what we 
call rationality is possible. That possibility is already acknowledged 
in the Tractarian declaration that u[t]he world of the happy man is a 
different one from that of the unhappy man" (1922b, 6.43). What does 
not go unnoticed, even in the Tractatus, is that conceptual relativism 
requires what we might call, for lack of a better term, a token theory 
of meaning. That theory holds that the existence of language-users is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of there being sense or meaning 
at all. In the Tractatus the view is implicit in the claim that u[w]e 
use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a 
projection of a possible situation ••• a proposition is a propositional 
sign in its projective relation to the world" (1922b, 3.11-3.12). (What 
Wittgenstein means by projection, and how it differs from Russell's ac-
quaintance will be taken up in Chapter Three.) In Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy the point becomes explicit: an account of the meaning of an 
expression is exhausted by a description of the uses to which that ex-
pression is put by language-users. The point is that meaning something 
with symbols is a human activity--nothing more, nor less. Both the 
early and late Wittgenstein can be viewed as setting up positions op-
posed to the linguistic Platonism which is (rightly or wrongly) at-
tributed to Frege and which informs the work of philosophers from GBdel 
to Katz. Wittgenstein's pre-Tractarian attack upon the theory of types 
and upon meta-languages generally is the first leg of a life-long pro-
cess that would move him further and further in the direction of natu-
ralistic (and realistic) semantics. This naturalism is already present 
in the Tractatus: »[e]veryday language is a part of the human organism 
and is no less complicated than it" (1922b, 4.002). Anyhow, to under-
stand the way the distinction between showing and saying resolves 
Russell's and Frege's difficulties, it is necessary to appreciate how, 
for Wittgenstein, a sentence's meaning and sense (i.e., its relation to 
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reality uin [the) wide sensew 1914a, p. 112) are the product a human 
activity that shows or displays what .may be said. 
Wittgenstein's World war I Notebooks open with the observation 
that: 
If syntactical rules for functions can be set up at all, 
then the whole theory of things, properties, etc., is super-
fluous. It is also all too obvious that this theory isn't 
what is in question either in the Grundgesetze, or in 
Principia Hathematica. Once more: logic must take care of 
itself. A possible sign must also be capable of signifying. 
Everything that is possible at all, is also legitimate. Let 
us remember the explanation why usocrates is Plato" is non-
sense. That is, because we have not made an arbitrary spec-
ification, NOT because a sign is, shall we say, illegitimate 
irt itself (1914b, p. 2)1 
This entry, dated 22 August 1914, is followed about a week later by the 
following: 
Frege says: Every well formed sentence must make sense; 
and I say: Every possible sentence is well-formed, and if 
it does not make sense that can only come of our not having 
given any meaning to certain of its parts. Even when we be-
lieve we have done so (1914b, p. 2). 
These claims appear virtually unaltered in the Tractatus as 5.473 and 
5.4733 respectively. 73 They are also largely anticipated in the remarks 
found in his 1913 "Notes on Logic" and early letters to Russell regard-
ing the fact that different kinds of things must be symbolized by dif-
ferent kinds of symbols. Language users determine what type of symbol 
will represent what type of thing. Thus if it is specified as a matter 
of arbitrary convention (1913, 101) that small letters (a, b, c, etc.) 
shall function as names (and only these will function as names), and 
that capital letters (F, G, B, etc.) will function predicatively (and 
only these will function predicatively), then formulae of the form F(Fx) 
or F(FAx) will be patently nonsensical, since we will not have given 
73 One difference is that the example of "Socrates is Plato" in the 
first passage has been replaced by "Socrates is identical" at Tractatus 
5.473. 
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such a construction meaning. Hence, u[t)he reason why 'The property of 
not being green is not green' is nonsense is because we have only given 
meaning to the fact that •green' stands to the right of a name" (1914a, 
116). For formulae taking but one argument (hence for sentences con-
taining one-place predicates), the difference in syntactic type will 
suffice to show which expressions may be used singularly and which pred-
icatively. For formulae that take two or more arguments (and sentences 
containing two- (or more-) place predicates), the positioning of symbols 
will effect the appropriate ordering of arguments (cf., 1913, p. 104). 
In essence, the syntactic formation rules of the language would render a 
theory of types unnecessary: given conventions concerning legitimate 
syntactic types and their relations, the fact that F(F,.x) is nonsensical 
is shown by the symbolism itself. we have given this expression no 
meaning. 
Before Frege's views were examined, a question was posed concern-
,. 
ing the apparent arbitrariness of this view. If F(F x) is excluded by 
convention, what justifies the convention? we may now state this objec-
tion in a more succinct manner. According to Frege, a phrase like F"x 
functions as a singular expression precisely because it corresponds to a 
phrase which begins with a definite article. Any expression of the form 
"the so-and-so" functions for Frege as a name. Names name objects. The 
names of objects (and, for the later Frege, objects themselves) are the 
arguments of functions. Why should we prefer a set of linguistic con-
ventions that exclude the possibility of the problematic forms from 
arising over those criteria laid down by Frege for distinguishing singu-
lar and predicative expressions? And why should the Vicious Circle 
Principle not simply be viewed as a convention of the very sort envi-
sioned by Wittgenstein? Wittgenstein is faced with a dilemma. If the 
class and semantic paradoxes are to be avoided by adopting a particular 
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set of conventions, then he must explain why Frege's set of conventions 
(the liberality of which afford certain advantages over classical ac-
counts of inference that fail to heed the function/argument distinction) 
should be rejected. If his answer to this is that it is necessary to 
reject such conventions in order to avoid an illogical language, then he 
is left with the task of explaining what distinguishes the sorts of con-
ventions or rules he has in mind from those which are stated by Russell 
and Frege in their theory of types. Even if we attribute to Wittgen-
stein something like the view he would later express in the Philosoph-
ical Investigations, according to which uthere is a way of grasping a 
rule that is not an interpretation" (1958, sec 201), that is, even if we 
ascribe to him the view that language users can adopt conventions and 
abide by rules without consciously entertaining discursive sets of 
rules, the problem is not resolved, for it is Wittgenstein's contention 
that a theory of types is neither possible nor necessary. It seems as 
if the factors which make a theory of types unnecessary just are those 
which make one possible. To avoid this dilemma it is necessary for 
Wittgenstein to demonstrate that what can be shown cannot be said. 
The key is Wittgenstein's remark, cited earlier, concerning the 
impossibility of an illogical language. 
For the symbol of a property, e.g., Gx is that G stands 
to the left of a name form, and another symbol F cannot 
possibly stand to the left of such a fact: if it could, 
we should have an illogical language, which is impossible 
(1914a, p. 116). 
Clearly what distinguishes Wittgenstein from Russell and Frege is that 
the latter two believe that steps must be taken to insure language 
against the possibility of becoming illogical. Both Russell and Frege 
have as their goal the construction of a logically perspicuous language 
free of the vagueness and inconsistency supposedly inherent in natural 
language. Neither ever acknowledges that what guides the development of 
154 
their systems is a desire to accommodate the inferential intuitions of 
natural language users (particularly with respect to intensional con-
texts). Wittgenstein, on the other hand, believes that an illogical 
language is impossible. Bis view is that if language--any language, in-
cluding natural langueage--is capable of being a representational sys-
tem, then it must be logical. An illogical language would be incapable 
of representing anything at all. This is because no contradictory 
statement is capable of saying anything whatsoever, and so, in an impor-
tant sense, no such statement (although that term is a misnomer here) 
can belong to.the language. This theme echoes loudly in the Tractatus 
where Wittgenstein declares: 
It used to be said that God could create anything except 
what could be contrary to the laws of logic.--The truth is 
that we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look 
like (1922b, 3.031). 
The point is easy to miss. Using the hindsight afforded by the 
Tractatus, it is tempting to think that an illogical language is impos-
sible, since--on the Picture Theory of the Proposition--any proposition-
al sign must be capable of signifying, given the fact that its pictorial 
properties allow it to share the logical form of the possible states of 
affairs that it may picture. It is tempting, in other words, to see the 
picture theory of the proposition and its ontology as providing the 
grounds for the idea that an illogical language is impossible. Such an 
approach is taken by McGuiness who, in describing Wittgenstein's 1912-
1913 views, says: 
Signs go proxy for objects precisely because when proper-
ly constructed--or, what comes to the same thing, properly 
understood--they cannot be combined in ways which are impos-
sible for the objects. This guarantees that every possible 
proposition is well-constructed; that no nonsensical prop-
osition can be formulated; and consequently that no theory 
of types is necessary (1974, p. 56). 
The idea that signs go proxy for objects can be traced to a December 
155 
1914 entry into the Notebooks (1914b, p. 37). McGuiness, however, be-
lieves the thesis is implicit even in the 16 January 1913 letter to 
Russell (a portion of which was cited earlier): 
I now think that qualities, relations (like love) etc. 
are all copulael That means I for instance analyse a sub-
ject predicate proposition, say, usocrates is humann into 
usocratesw and usomething is human,n (which I think is not 
complex). The reason for this is a very fundamental one: I 
think there cannot be different Types of thingsl In other 
words whatever can be symbolized by a simple proper name 
must belong to one type ••• (1912, pp. 121-122). 
we can agree with McGuiness that the Tractarian idea that signs go proxy 
for objects p~ovides added detail as to why an illogical language is im-
possible. we can also agree that the Picture Theory of the Proposition 
owes much to the Fregean idea that different kinds of things are symbol-
ized by different kinds of symbols (which is remarked upon later in the 
very same letter). Wittgenstein's declaration that qualities and rela-
tions (or, rather, that the expressions which stand for them) are copu-
lae makes abundantly clear his acceptance of Frege's thesis that they 
(or the symbols which stand for them) are essentially incomplete. But 
this cannot be the complete answer. It was, after all, Frege's distinc-
tion between concept and object that permitted the construction of 
Russell's paradox in the first placel Later in that same letter he does 
mention that an adequate theory of symbolism must render a theory of 
types superfluous, but it should not be supposed that that has been ac-
complished in the mere reference to theses held in common with Frege. 
That the relations which may hold among syntactically different types of 
symbols make representation possible (i.e., make the possession of a 
sense possible), for Wittgenstein, cannot be doubted. But it does not 
explain why it is impossible for there to be an illogical language. 
The issue becomes all the more puzzling in light of the later 
Wittgenstein's views on inconsistency. In the Remarks on the 
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Foundations of Mathematics (1937) and elsewhere Wittgenstein maintains 
that illogical language games are perfectly possible, but that they 
would just be the sorts of things no one would take an interest in. 
Like measuring with a flexible ruler, such a procedure would get one 
nowhere (1937, p. 38). In a more radical vein he goes so far as to sug-
gest that we can °[i]magine being taught Frege•s calculus, contradiction 
and all. But the contradiction is not presented as a disease. It is 
rather an accepted part of the calculus, and we calculate with it. (The 
calculations do not serve the usual purpose of logical calculations)" 
(1937, pp. 209-210). (This author has no desire to speculate how the 
parenthetical remark could be true.) Surely, however, such sentiments 
are not shared by the early Wittgenstein. What is wanted is some ac-
count of why a contradiction must be assigned a degenerate status. As I 
mentioned above, what is distinctive about Wittgenstein's early view is 
that contradictions cannot say anything at all~ they lack significance 
or sense. His early view stands in contrast to his later view as well 
as to classical accounts of contradiction according to which contradic-
tions say too much. 
The traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein's response to the 
paradoxes, as found, for example, in Ishiguro (1981) and McGuiness 
(1974), has always placed emphasis upon Wittgenstein's similarities with 
Frege--as if Frege's view just needs to be tidied up a bit. However 
while it is clear that Wittgenstein's view is in much the same spirit as 
Frege's (in that the symbolism itself shows the nonsensical nature of 
the paradoxes), in his solution he diverges from Frege's view greatly. 
Frege is to be credited with the idea that different kinds of symbols 
play different logical roles. Names and concept-words play singular and 
predicative roles respectively. What Frege failed to realize is that 
sentences play a role different in nature from names. He believed that 
sentences are singular terms precisely because they are able to flank 
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the identity sign. The source of that assumption in the analogy between 
sentences and equations was discussed earlier. Wittgenstein questions 
that assul'llption. As early as 1913 he writes Russell that M[i]dentity is 
the very Devil and immensely important. It hangs ••• with the most funda-
mental questions, especially with the questions concerning the occur-
rence of the same argument in different places of a function" (1912, p. 
123). 
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the bipolarity of the proposition en-
tails that sentences cannot be names. Recall that, for Frege, sentences 
are themselve~ names of objects. It is that thesis which is the source 
of Frege's difficulties. Once the way in which propositional signs do 
refer is made clear, the superfluousness of a theory of types becomes 
apparent. 
Earlier the bipolarity of the proposition was presented as 
Wittgenstein's solution to (i) the problem of falsehood, (ii) the prob-
lem concerning the logical relationship of affirmative propositions to 
their denial, and (iii) the problem concerning counter-intuitive belief-
ascriptions when the subject of belief believes or asserts a falsehood. 
If one accepts the interpretation of Frege which imputes to his work on-
tological significance, then Wittgenstein's views concerning (i) are an-
tithetical to Frege's inasmuch as they deny the possibility of objective 
falsehoods. Of even greater significance is the difference that exists 
between Frege's and Wittgenstein's conception of sense, and this differ-
ence exists regardless of whether one interprets Frege's notion of ob-
jectivity ontologically or epistemologicallly. The ontological inter-
pretation construes Fregean senses as Platonic entities that are 
grasped by the mind: one understands (i.e., is able to pick out) the 
meaning (i.e., the Bedeutung) of an expression by grasping the sense 
(Sinn) expressed by its use within a particular context. The epistemo-
logical interpretation construes Frege's talk of senses as a ta9on de 
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parler made necessary by an adequate theory of inference. 
Wittgenstein's conception of sense, in contrast, is to be inter-
preted ontologically but not along Platonistic lines. His senses, as 
described earlier, are possible states of affairs. The Bedeutung of a 
given propositional sign is that actual state of affairs that renders 
the sign either true or false. Earlier, too, it was mentioned that, for 
the very early Wittgenstein, negative propositions are aaade true (and 
affirmative propositions are made false) by negative facts that are 
later replaced by the Sachverhalte of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein tries 
to express the relation of a propositional sign to its sense by way of 
his ab-notation. The proposition is represented as standing between 
poles: a--P--b. The signs a and b correspond to the two possible 
states of affairs that can render P either true or false and which con-
stitute the sign's sense (Sinn) (1913, pp. 98-99). 74 It is the sum of 
such possibilities that Wittgenstein refers to as Reality in the wide 
sense. The actual state of affairs that renders P true or false is the 
sign's meaning (Bedeutung). Because a propositional sign has both a 
sense and a meaning, it cannot be a kind of name. Suppose that a is 
what makes P true. Although the person who utters P asserts (i.e., 
means) that a is the case, the sense of P would have to be expressed by 
saying that ueither a orb is the case" (although this will have to be 
qualified below, as the sense of Pis shown rather than said). The ex-
pression of the sense of a propositional sign is essentially disjunc-
tive. Indeed, inasmuch as b's being the case entails -P, the sense of 
74 This marks a divergence from the symbolism ordinarily used in this 
dissertation. Ordinarily, a, b. c, etc. denote singular terms1 here 
Wittgenstein uses them to denote states of affairs. Under no condition 
should this be taken to mean that Wittgenstein thinks states of affairs 
can be named. To avoid confusion I have taken the liberty of placing 
Wittgenstein's symbols in bold characters. It must be remembered that 
a and bare possible states of affairs (belonging to Reality in the 
wide sense), and that only one will be the actual state of affairs which 
is P's meaning. 
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P (as well as -P) may be expressed by saying that either a or not-a is 
the case; consequently, the expression of the sense of a proposition is 
essentially disjunctive and negative (1913, pp. 99-100). Because a 
propositional sign has a Sinn, it will, as stated earlier, always be 
about more than what is actual; because a propositional sign possesses a 
Bedeutung, it will always at least be about what is actual. This is not 
true of names, even though some names have referents and others do not. 
If a name--such as usherlock Bolmes,"--lacks a referent, then in a 
manner of speaking it is about what is not. In that case, however, it 
will fail to have a Bedeutung. Since all sentences must have a 
Bedeutung but some names lack a Bedeutung, it follows that sentences 
cannot be names. Of course, it might be argued that it is false that 
all sentences have a Bedeutung, since sentences occurring within litera-
ture (e.g., sentences about Sherlock Holmes) may not be made true by 
anything. Be that as it may, such sentences do possess a Bedeutung; 
they may not be made true by anything, but they are made false by the 
facts that do happen to obtain. The Bedeutung of the sentence neolmes 
walked the streets of London in February of 1875" is the circumstance 
which makes that sentence false. In Wittgenstein's pre-Tractarian ter-
minology, that sentence is made false by the negative fact consisting of 
Holmes not walking the streets of London in February of 1875. 
If a name has a referent, then it is only about (that is, it 
refers to) what is actual; there is no sense in which it can be about 
what is possible but not actual. A name, therefore, may have Bedeutung, 
but it cannot have Sinn (a thesis retained in the Tractatus, cf. 1922b, 
3.3). For this reason, Wittgenstein says, u[n]ames are points, proposi-
tions arrows--they have sense" (1913, p. 101; cf. 1922b 3.144). He 
means by this that names isolate some thing that is existent. 
Propositions, or propositional signs, on the other hand, divide the on-
tological terrain into what is and what is not. Since what a proposi-
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tional sign P asserts (or says) is a, rather than b, it divides Reality 
(in the wide sense) into two parts: what is presumed to be actual and 
what is presumed to be merely possible but not actual. With the excep-
tion of McGuiness (1974), the nature of this matter has gone unappreci-
ated by Wittgenstein's commentators. For example, Black (1964, p. 106), 
commenting upon Tractatus 3.144 where the analogy between a proposition-
al sign and an arrow reoccurs, maintains simply that propositions are 
like arrows in that they are aimed at facts. Nevertheless while it is 
true that a proposition has a direction in that P says a but not b, the 
purpose of the analogy is lost if one equates the sense of a proposi-
tional sign with a target, that is to say, a point. That interpretation 
misses the point of the analogy by assimilating propositions to names. 
What is important in the analogy is that the path of the arrow circum-
scribes an area of, what Wittgenstein would later call, logical space. 
In the uNotes on Logic" he puts the matter by saying that the proposi-
tional sign effects a udiscrimination of facts" (1913, p. 105). It de-
lineates between positive and negative facts. Just how it does so is 
important and will be discussed below, as it is the mechanics of sense 
that form the true basis for the showing/saying distinction. What is of 
importance here is that a propositional sign accomplishes something that 
no name can accomplish. So, it follows (again) that sentences cannot be 
names. 
When Wittgenstein says in his 16 January 1913 letter to Russell 
that uthere cannot be different Types of things" (1912, p. 122) and in 
his uNotes on Logic" that [n)either the sense nor the meaning of a 
proposition is a thing" (1913, p. 102), he is expressing this very con-
clusion. If by a thing we understand (as Wittgenstein did) something 
that can be named, then facts are not things. This is not to say that 
Wittgenstein fails to countenance facts within his ontology~ as noted 
earlier the Bedeutung of a propositional sign is the fact that makes it 
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true or false (1913, p. 94); they are not, however, nameable things 
(1913, pp. 96 and 107). A fact can only be represented by another fact 
(a propositional sign) that has a structure isomorphic to it (1913, p. 
97; 1922b, 2.141 and 3.14). 
We finally arrive at Wittgenstein's real solution to Russell's 
Paradox. Earlier it was maintained that both Brockhaus (1991) and 
Ishiguro (1981) misconstrue Wittgenstein's solution. Ishiguro's misin-
terpretation construes the problematic function--which, following 
Wittgenstein's own misstatement of the issue at Tractatus 3.333, he 
takes to be F(Fx)--as being as ill-formed as Mis green is green.w 
Consequently, the issue is viewed as concerning whether a function can 
be its own argument and whether the predicate of a sentence can also be 
its subject. This way of viewing matters does not do justice to the 
fact that what is being considered as argument at least purports to be a 
singular term. Brockhaus, on the other hand, does justice to that fact 
by construing the problematic expression as analogous to "That which is 
green is green." Yet he does not do justice to the fact that 
Wittgenstein is not merely worried about a certain redundancy. Indeed, 
redundant statements do have a sense. Wittgenstein, in contrast, will 
want to say that the problematic expression--which is really F(FAx)--
lacks a sense entirely. 
Given that Wittgenstein maintains that sense is given to signs by 
means of arbitrary conventions (1913, p. 101), the problem of how to ex-
plain Wittgenstein's dismissal of the problem as anything other than an 
arbitrary stipulation arose. The question became: how could 
Wittgenstein's approach be any less ad hoc than Russell's own introduc-
tion of the Vicious Circle Principle? The answer is: facts cannot be 
named; they cannot be represented simply with a name. The expression 
A 
F x attempts to name a fact, but because it cannot do so it cannot serve 
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A 
as an argument for F(x). Consequently, F(F x) cannot be a propositional 
sign. 
All sentences of the form F(FAx)--e.g., MThe fact that something 
is green is green"--are nonsensical. That is to say, they fail to .ef-
fect a discrimination of facts, and, consequently, they lack sense. 
Consider, per impossibile, what this would be like. Since FAX is to be 
a name, it presumably must instantiate the formula (Bx) Fx. The sense 
of this expression may be expressed by means of a disjunction formed of 
it and its negation: [(Bx) Fx) v [-(Bx) Fx]. Even though (Bx) Fx does 
not assert the disjunction (indeed what it asserts is [(Bx) Fx] & 
(--(Bx) Fx]) it does divide reality into these possibilities. Perhaps 
a way to express this (a way that remains neutral with respect to the 
evolution of Wittgenstein's ontology from negative facts to 
Schverhalten) is by employing modal quantifiers. Thus (Bx) Fx has a 
sense if and only if it is possible for there to be something that is F 
and it is possible that there not be anything that is F: [O(Bx) Fx) & 
(◊-(Ex) Fx]. The formula obtained by instantiating the variable with a 
name, Fa, will have a sense if and only if ◊Fa & ◊-Fa. The question is 
whether FAx can instantiate the variable in the same way. The expres-
sion F(FAx) can have a sense if and only if [◊F(FAx)J & [◊-F(FAx)]. 
However, this condition cannot be satisfied. If FAx is to function as a 
name at all, then it must have a referent~ its referent must exist. 
Presumably this referent would have to be the fact that xis F~ it could 
not be the negative fact that xis not F, since in that case FAX would 
not refer at alls FAX does not refer to a negative fact. The only 
thing to which it can refer (if we allow that it does refer) is the pos-
itive fact that xis F. But if it must refer to such a fact, then it 
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refers to something that is necessarily so. That means that the propo-
sition F(FAx) is necessarily true. But that entails that ◊-F(FAx) can-
not possibly be true. As that is required for F(FAx) to have sense, ex-
pressions of the form F(FAx) can have no sense. 
A 
Here, I think, an objection must be entertained. If F(F x) is the 
name of something complex (cf. 1922b, 3.322), so that x and F designate 
A 
its components, might not F(F x) serve as a name even if there is no 
fact that x is F? After all, the propositional sign Fx can refer to x 
A 
even if "xis F" is false. It follows that F(F x) need not be necessar-
ily true. With its contingency thus intact, it may be said to have a 
sense. 
Wittgenstein appears to be aware of the possibility of this objec-
tion. In the "Notes on Logic" he writes, 
Frege said "propositions are names"; Russell said "prop-
ositions correspond to complexes". Both are false; and es-
pecially false is the statement "propositions are names of 
complexes" (1913, p. 97). 75 
Ultimately the Tractatus would offer a defense of the claim that propo-
sitional signs cannot be names of complexes on the grounds that names 
must always name simple objects which are the immutable substance of the 
world. This requirement is said to be necessary in order for sense to 
be determinate (1922b, 3.23) and for the complete analysis of proposi-
tional signs (including sentences of ordinary language) to be possible 
(1922b, 3.201 and 4.221)." Both the ontology of simple objects and the 
75 Wittgenstein might well have added Moore to this list. In the 
early months of 1912 Wittgenstein had attended numerous lectures by 
Moore (McGuiness, 1988, p. 117). These lectures, collected in what is 
now Moore (1953), describe sentences and noun clauses as names of propo-
sitions, i.e., facts. See particularly Moore (1911, pp. 263-265). 
76 Wittgenstein's argument will be given considerable attention in the 
next chapter. 
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concept of analysis underlying this argument are motivated by a desire 
to create a semantic theory that is more than a mere theory of infer-
ence. Even though that desire is expressed very early in Wittgenstein's 
career (e.g., 1914a, p. 117), we are unable to avail ourselves of the 
ensuing argument, precisely because the positing of simple objects con-
stitutes an elaboration of the picture theory and of the way a proposi-
tion shows its sense; whereas we are trying to provide the justification 
for those very doctrines. At the very least we need an argument whose 
conclusion is that names must be semantically simple. 
The argument in the uNotes on Logic u is obscured by the fact that 
it appears to require the abandonment of negative facts, yet that work 
makes abundant reference to such facts. The argument is quite sketchy, 
but it appears to be as follows. To begin with, an expression can serve 
as a name if and only if it names something determinate. we have al-
ready seen that Wittgenstein rejects Russell's account of quantified ex-
pressions as possessing indeterminate reference. In this respect 
Wittgenstein is like Frege, since that philosopher does not treat quan-
tified expressions as first-order assertions about objects and concepts. 
(Wittgenstein, though, would not view them as second-order assertions 
either but as meaningless prototypes for first-order assertions.) It 
follows that (FAx) can be an argument for Fx only if it names something 
determinate; but this it cannot do. This follows from the fact that it 
itself has sense. In its propositional form, its ability to assert xis 
F depends upon the possibility of x being Pas well as the possibility 
of x not being P. If the situation is represented using the ab-nota-
tion, using a--Fx--b, then Fx refers to (bedeutet) either a orb; 
hence, (FAx) must have indeterminate reference. In the case where Fx is 
false the problem is compounded, since there is more than one way for 
it to be false: there may be some object x that happens not to be P 
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(in which case (Bx) -Fx would be true), or there may not be an z at all 
that happens to be F (thereby rendering -[(Bx) Fx] true). The point is 
that when Fx is false, even if we grant that FAx refers to something, 
A 
since it is not clear what makes Fx false, the reference of F x cannot 
be determinate. 
It is this last point that Wittgenstein is trying to express when 
he says that no sense can be attached to the negation of a name (1913, 
p. 97). If Fx can function as a name, then we should be able to substi-
tute "Socrates" for it. And since propositional signs can be negated, 
it should be possible to form the construction "-Socrates," but such 
cannot be done. What would "-Socrates" mean? The point is not just 
that "-Socrates" sounds like nonsense. Indeed the objector might main-
tain that it refers to the negative fact that makes Fx false. But what 
fact is that? Is it the fact represented by (Bx) -Fx, or the fact rep-
resented by -[(Bx) Fx]? Again we arrive at an indeterminacy of refer-
ence. (I believe this is ultimately the basis for Wittgenstein's rejec-
tion of negative facts~ the expression "negative fact" cannot refer to 
anything determinate.) In the next chapter we will consider his claim 
that "[t]he false assumption that propositions are names leads us to be-
lieve that there must be logical objects" (1913, p. 107). In that chap-
ter, too, the fact that negative existentials (like -[(Ex) Fx]) fail to 
effect a discrimination within reality will turn out to be crucial to 
his argument that there must be simple objects that constitute the sub-
stance of the world. 
A last attempt on the part of the objector might be this: since 
Wittgenstein requires genuine propositional signs to contain no vari-
ables (1913, p. 100), might the indeterminacy be eliminated by instanti-
ating the variable and insisting that reference to a given object is es-
tablished? could it not be maintained that Wittgenstein's attack upon 
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" the possibility of F x being a name is an attack upon a straw man? If 
instead we consider whether F"b can be a name, the same indeterminacy 
cannot arise, since F(Fb) cannot be made false by b not existing. 
on Wittgenstein's behalf it may be argued that the indeterminacy 
cannot be avoided in this way. The expression F(Fb) can be made false 
in two different ways. If Fb is true, then F(F,..b) can be made false by 
PAb not being P. This would be the case, for example, if one to assert 
"The fact that the Empire State Building is tall is tall." One may say 
that the fact.that the Empire State Building is tall (or of the tall-
ness of the Empire State Building) is overwhelming, unimpressive, or a 
long time in the making, but one cannot say it is tall: it is the 
Empire State building, not the fact that the Empire State building is 
tall, which is tall. The second way F(F,..b) could be made false is by b 
" not being P (which would constitute a kind of reference failure for F b 
even if it does not fail to refer to b). If the Empire State Building 
were not tall, then regardless of whether or not its tallness can be 
tall, the statement corresponding to F(F,..b) would be false. A better 
example, one that comes closer to the class paradox itself, would be the 
following. Consider two objects designated as a and b. Let Rab stand 
for "a is not to the left of b," and let Rab function as the name of the 
fact that a is not to the left of b. Also let sx correspond to the 
one-place predicate "is not to the left of b." We could then form a 
propositional sign, S(R"ab), which would be synonymous with •The fact 
that a is not to the left of b is not to the left of b." Now 
suppose what is designated by a is to the left of what is designated by 
b. In that case the sentence is false, not because the fact that it ac-
tually denotes fails to bes, but because it is false that Rab. As I 
167 
said before, this is a kind of reference failure. The fact that a ia 
not to tbe left of b does not exist. The point is that indetermina-
cy cannot be avoided simply by instantiating the variables, since ex-
pressions like F(FAb) and S(RAab) retain the possibility of being false 
in more than one way. So long as the formula contains (what purports to 
be) a singular term that is itself complex, no discrimination of facts 
is effected. 
This is apparently what Wittgenstein has in mind when he says, 
u(t]he question whether a proposition has sense (Sinn) can never depend 
on the truth of another proposition about a constituent of the firstn 
(1914a, p. 117). If whether F(FAb) has sense depends on the truth of 
the proposition uF"'b names the fact that b is P," then its having sense 
will depend upon whether Fb is true. But it is precisely that contin-
gency which precludes F(FAb) from having a sense, for our earlier dis-
cussion of the bipolarity of the proposition demonstrates that in order 
to understand the sense of a propositional sign, one must know both what 
would be the case if the sign is true and what would be the case if the 
sign is false. This should not be taken to mean that the propositional 
sign might have a sense but that language-users might not know what that 
sense is. Rather, the sign is incapable of projecting the possible 
states of affairs that are its sense. The reason why an illogical lan-
guage is impossible is that the very possibility of representation re-
quires determinancy of sense, and that insures inferences from P to --P 
or from u1t is false that the building is tall" to "The building is not 
tall," etc. 
The suppositions that lead to Russell's Paradox are specific in-
stances of the kind of formulae or sentences that Wittgenstein regards 
as lacking sense. These two suppositions are (i) that the class of all 
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classes that are not members of themselves is a member of itself, and 
(ii) that the class of all classes that are not members of itself is 
not a member of itself. In order to see how they are special instances 
of what Wittgenstein has in mind, it is necessary to construe the sub-
ject of both sentences as a name of a fact. What is named--the class of 
all classes that are not members of themselves--must be thought of as 
the fact consisting ot the class of all classes that are not members of 
themselves. Earlier we saw that Russell's Vicious Circle Principle 
seeks to prohibit C(CAx) from becoming a value for ex which we said cor-
responds to "xis a member of the class of all classes that are not mem-
bers of themselves." Now that we have seen that Wittgenstein's dictum 
that facts cannot be named entails, not just that a name alone is inca-
pable of saying how things are, but that propositional signs themselves 
cannot be names, we see why a theory of types is unnecessary. Since CAx 
attempts to name a fact, C(CAx) cannot possibly have a sense. 
I think there are two important ways in which Wittgenstein's view 
may be misunderstood, both stemming from an uncritical reading of the 
passage from the uNotes Dictated to Moore" quoted earlier: 
The reason why "The property of not being green is not 
green" is nonsense, is because we have only given meaning to 
the fact "green" stands to the right of a name~ and "the 
property of not being green" is obviously not that. 
F cannot possibly stand to the left of (or in any rela-
tion to) the symbol of a property. For the symbol of a 
property, e.g., Gx is that G stands to the left of a name 
form, and another symbol F cannot possibly stand to the left 
of such a tacts if it could, we should have an illogical 
language, which is impossible (1914a, p. 116). 
one way is to misconstrue the character of the singular term which is in 
question. This was the problem we found with the interpretation of this 
passage and of Tractatus 3.333 offered by Ishiguro (1981) and Brockhaus 
(1991). The other way is to read the last line as somehow suggesting 
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that the reason why the suppositions underlying the class and semantic 
paradoxes are nonsensical is that they entail something that is impossi-
bly illogical: a contradiction among sentences that presumably have 
sense. But those suppositions are nonsensical, not for that reason (ac-
tually that would provide grounds merely for saying they are false), but 
for the reason they fail to effect a discrimination among facts. 
Contradictions and tautologies are without sense for the very same rea-
son, namely, that they do not respect the bipolarity of the proposition. 
To understand the sense of a proposition one must be able to know what 
would be the case if it is true and what would be the case if it is 
false (1913, p. 98 and 1922b, 4.024). This condition is not met by 
propositions traditionally regarded as necessarily true or false. 
Concerning tautologies Wittgenstein says, 
Signs of the form up v -pn are senseless, but not the 
proposition "(p) p v -p.n If I know that this rose is 
either red or not red, I know nothing. The same holds for 
all ab-functions (1913, p. 104). 
Naming is like pointing. A function is like a line 
dividing points of a plane into right and left ones~ then 
"p or not-pn has no meaning because it does not divide 
a plane (1913, p. 94)." 
The expression (P) P v -P quantifies over propositional signs that have 
a sense. In effect it tells us that one may say p or one may say -P, 
but one cannot say P v -P. All propositional signs may either affirm 
something (and be made false by whatever makes its denial true), or deny 
something (and be made false by whatever makes the affirmative sign 
true). Such does not hold. for P v -P or for its presumed denial -(P v 
-P). There is nothing that makes, or that could make, the denial of P v 
-P true. The short way to say this is to say that only contingent 
77 Here again Wittgenstein's use of lower case letters as proposition-
al variables has not been modified to conform to the conventions used in 
the body of this dissertation. His use of quotation marks has been re-
tained as well. 
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propositions may have a sense and be true or false." What are tradi-
tionally held to be logical truths and falsehoods are, strictly speak-
ing, neither true nor false. An illogical language is impossible, be-
cause contradictions lack sense and, therefore, are not a part of lan-
guage, the contradiction derivable from Russell's Paradox not withstand-
ing. 
What emerges from these considerations is the rudimentary distinc-
tion between showing and saying. The claim that what can be shown can-
not be said may be fleshed out in terms of the following theses. Some 
of these thes~s are the basis for the Picture Theory. 
First, a propositional sign is always about more than what it as-
serts. It has a sense as well as a meaning. This entails that the 
propositional sign will always stand in relation to some possible (but 
not actual) state of affairs that (were it actual) would have made false 
a true propositional sign or true a false propositional sign. 
Wittgenstein would later put this matter by saying that u[a] proposition 
shows its sensen (1922b, 4.022). 
Second, a non-molecular propositional sign is itself a fact whose 
constituents must be structurally isomorphic to what the sign repre-
sents. Although it is simply an arbitrary convention which symbols are 
used, that symbols of different syntactic types are used to represent 
function and argument (or predicate and singular term), that they differ 
syntactically from the propositional sign which is composite, and that 
they can stand in determinate relations to one another (so that M[a] 
78 Thus we have the 2 December 1916 Notebooks remark which would 
evolve into Tractatus 6.53: 
The correct method in philosophy would really be to 
say nothing except what can be said, i.e., what belongs 
to natural science, i.e., something that has nothing to do 
with philosophy, and then whenever someone else tried to 
say something metaphysical to shew him that he had not 
given any reference to certain signs in his sentences 
(1914b, p. 91). 
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proposition cannot occur in itself" (1913, p. 96)) is essential if rep-
resentation is to be possible. It is misleading, says Wittgenstein to 
describe how a propositional sign represents by saying, for example, 
that the complex sign aRb says that a stands in relation R to b; the 
fact of the matter is more accurately put by saying that a stands in a 
certain relation to b says that aRb (1913, p. 106; 1922b, 3.1432). It 
takes a fact with a certain kind of structure to say how things are. In 
the Tractatus Wittgenstein would express this by saying, u[a] proposi-
tion shows how things stand if is true. And it says that they do so 
stand" (1922b, 4.022). It is this that forms the basis of the Picture 
Theory, of the idea that names go proxy for objects. It thus pictures, 
provides a model for, the facts. 
The structure exhibited by the sign not only makes saying possi-
ble, it makes possible the expression of the propositional sign's sense. 
If the fact that my humidor is to the left of my desk can represent the 
fact that my brother is taller than me, then the full sense of the 
propositional sign is conveyed by that fact (that arrangement of furni-
ture) and by the possibility that the furniture could have been arranged 
otherwise. To perceive a set of signs as arranged in some way, one must 
be able to imagine or conceive of them as arrangeable in other possible 
ways. The contingency of the fact represented is thereby mirrored in 
the contingent arrangement of signs. In this way the sense of the 
proposition can be read off from the signs themselves. And if a set of 
symbols lacks a sense, then that too is exhibited by the arrangement of 
the symbols themselves. This is what makes it possible for logic to 
take care of itself (1914b, p. 2; 1922b, 5.473). 
A third important thesis, entailed by the others, is that sense 
and meaning require a representational medium. Here Wittgenstein's view 
achieves nearly complete opposition to the view of G. E. Moore outlined 
at the beginning of this chapter. Propositional signs as well as the 
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thoughts that they express (1922b, 3) must be models or pictures of the 
facts: they are not acts of consciousness or judgment. Consequently, 
for Wittgenstein, truth is a kind of correspondence, a sharing of logi-
cal or pictorial form. It is the point at which he recognizes the need 
to posit a distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung which constitutes the 
point at which he clearly breaks away from Moore's relational theory of 
judgment. Alluding to his ab-notation he says, in the #Notes on Logic," 
u(t]he epistemological questions concerning the nature of judgment and 
belief cannot be solved without a correct apprehension of the form of 
the propositi~n" (1913, p. 106). It would be accurate to say that 
Moore's theory of judgment allows for the possibility of Bedeutung but 
not Sinn, in spite of its own distinction between what is real but not 
actual. on that view the only difference between the properties of an 
existent versus a non-existent object is that in the former all the 
properties coalesce in a certain time and place (which gives the exis-
tent object a unique relational property). But what properties a uni-
corn has are as real as those possessed by an actual horse. Such objec-
tive falsehoods (which should not be confused with Wittgenstein's nega-
tive facts) we saw to be extremely problematic. Wittgenstein's own dis-
tinction between what is possible but not actual and what is both possi-
ble and actual is offered as an antidote to Moore's ontology. What is 
possible but not actual remains a mere possibility of what is actual. 
To say the world is more than what is actual, that it in some sense con-
tains what is possible, is not to postulate the existence of a Platonic 
realm of universals. Nevertheless, for Wittgenstein, both the sense and 
the meaning of an expression are something objective. 
Frege, it is true, recognized that the structure of a sign is sig-
nificant. Regardless of where one stands with respect to the ontologi-
cal status of Fregean senses, one finds in Frege's work the thesis that 
meaning is only possible if different logical roles are assigned to syn-
173 
tactically distinguishable components of formulae or sentences. For 
Frege, as for Wittgenstein, syntactic differences are indicative of on-
tological differences. Frege•s predicates, or concept-words, or func-
tion expressions refer to concepts or functions~ names name objects. 
Wittgenstein's remark that different kinds of things are symbolized by 
different kinds of symbols reflects an indebtedness to Frege, although 
there is little indication that he accepted the underlying Fregean on-
tology. we have said little about Wittgenstein's own ontology except 
that the determinancy of sense requires there to be simple objects which 
are the substance of the world. More will be said on that subject in 
the following chapter. The point here is that for Frege meaning is only 
possible given the existence of something--language itself (i.e., a sys-
tem of physical signs) or senses (if these are to be construed 
Platonistically)--in possession of an ontologically significant struc-
ture. For Frege and Wittgenstein, but not for Moore, meaning requires 
some intermediary between the act of consciousness or judgment and its 
object. 
The claim that the existence of meaning requires some medium that 
has meaning should not be confused with the claim that there are mental 
contents. Nothing in Wittgenstein's view either entails or precludes 
that mental contents exist. What his view does entail is that the exis-
tence of meaning requires there to be bearers of meaning (mental or 
otherwise). Although the Tractatus would continue to add greater con-
straints upon what could count as a propositional sign, it would remain 
largely neutral with respect to what these meaning-bearers (and sense-
bearers) are. What is essential to being a meaning-bearer, as shall be 
explained in greater detail in the next chapter, is the capacity to 
stand in a projective relation to the world, and this the propositional 
sign can do only if it shares the pictorial or logical form of the 
Sachverhalte it depicts. Wittgenstein's view is incompatible with 
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Moore's and his own earlier view, because the relational theory of judg-
ments posits no meaning-bearers with such properties. It would, of 
course, be misleading to say on behalf of Moore that the mental act of 
judging has a meaning (in the sense required by Wittgenstein); 
Wittgenstein has demonstrated that whatever possesses a meaning must 
also possess a sense, and this is something, given the direct realism of 
Moore's relational theory of judgment, no mental act can have. And 
while it may be true that, for Moore, one may form a judgment about what 
is real but non-existent as well as about what is real and existent, one 
cannot do so ~imultaneously. That a judgment is always simultaneously 
about two possible states of affairs that differ in their ontological 
status (one being possible but not actual, the other being possible and 
actual) is the moral of the bipolarity of the proposition. 
As stated thus far, Wittgenstein's semantic theory seems compati-
ble with a variety of accounts concerning the nature of meaning-bearers: 
it remains neutral as to whether these should be construed as mental 
contents, or as sounds, inscriptions, gestures, etc. produced by lan-
guage-users, or even as physical facts within the language-user's envi-
ronment (as when Wittgenstein mentions that the fact uthat this inkpot 
is on the table may express that I sit in this chair," 1913, p. 97). 
The bearers of meaning must be facts of some sort or another. However 
what we want to ask at this stage is whether Wittgenstein's view is com-
patible with semantic Platonism. 
It would be tempting to dismiss their compatibility straightaway 
on the grounds that abstract entities could not provide the requisite 
structured medium. The very idea of a medium is that of some substance 
(presumably physical but we are allowing for non-physical, upsychical" 
substances as countenanced by Dualists as well) that can be arranged in 
one way or another according to convention. The elements so arranged 
constitute facts. Abstract entities, being neither physical nor psycho-
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logical, can have no parts or elements that can be arranged into facts. 
Platonists like Katz (1990) do speak of sense structures and of 
relations among senses. The sense structure of a sentence is aaid to be 
composed of the senses of its constituent expressions. Relations among 
senses (for example, the relation of antonymy that holds between the 
senses of uopened" and uclosed") constitute semantic facts according to 
Katz. Indeed Katz argues that semantic structures so conceived are not 
reducible to syntactic structures, not even to the syntactic structures 
of a logically perspicuous language such as envisaged by Frege (1879a), 
Russell (1918) or Wittgenstein (1922b). In a later chapter his specific 
argument will be examined in some detail. Here the only point is that a 
Platonist could very well maintain that abstract entities have structure 
and are capable of entering into facts. 
It does seem, however, that Wittgenstein's semantic theory is in-
compatible with Platonism for another reason. In order for a proposi-
tional sign to show its sense (as Wittgenstein uses that word), the ele-
ments of the sign must stand in relations to one another that are con-
tingent~ the contingency of the state of affairs which is the sign's 
Bedeutung is reflected in the contingency of their own relations to one 
another. Even if there were Platonic senses that mediate reference, 
could their elements be contingently related? Apparently not. For that 
to be the case sentences like uThe sense of 'opened' is antonymous to 
the sense of 'closed'" or uThe word 'bachelor' is synonymous with the 
expression 'unmarried adult human male'" would have to be contingently 
true. Yet these and their material mode counter-parts are typically 
held to be analytic and thus necessarily true. Perhaps these sentences 
can be regarded as contingently true, but that would require giving up 
the analytic/synthetic distinction--something no self-respecting 
Platonist would be willing to do. It follows that Platonic senses can-
not be the bearers of meaning (Bedeutung) in the manner required by 
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Wittgenstein, thus rendering the two views incompatible. 
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CHAPTER III 
REFERENCE FAILURE, DECOMPOSITIONALITY AND THE PICTURE THEORY 
1. Structure and IQm. 
In the last chapter we followed Wittgenstein's argument up to the 
point at which he concluded that language and thought may represent 
facts only if the former are structurally isomorphic to the latter. It 
is in virtue of their pictorial properties that language and thought are 
said to be able to represent. Such a claim is not unproblematic. 
Consider the nature of pictorial representation. It is not necessary to 
imagine a painting or a photograph; one may as well imagine actors on a 
stage or children playing with toys. (Indeed, the idea, central to the 
Picture Theory, that names go proxy for objects, is said to have oc-
curred to Wittgenstein upon reading about the way in which an automobile 
accident was represented in a courtroom by means of model cars and dolls 
(1914b, p. 7; cf. Wright, 1955, p. 532).) Or recall the example taken 
from the "Notes on Logic" "that this inkpot is on this table may express 
that I sit in this chair" (1913, p. 97). 
At a bare minimum a picture or model (Bild) must contain as many 
elements as there are objects in the scene to be depicted. If an auto 
accident involving two cars and a pedestrian is to be represented, the 
courtroom model must contain three elements. It is not essential that 
these elements resemble the objects they represent (as do hieroglyph-
ics), but it is essential that the elements and the objects be identical 
in number so that a one-to-one correspondence exists between the members 
of the two sets (1922b, 2.13). 
Next, the picture or model must be capable of representing the re-
lations among the objects. 
What constitutes a picture is that its elements are re-
lated to one another in a determinate way (1922b, 2.14). 
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The fact that the elements of a picture are related to 
one another in a determinate way represents that things are 
related to one another in the same way. 
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure 
of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this 
structure the pictorial form of the picture (1922b, 2.15). 
If the pedestrian was crushed between two cars, then the elements of the 
courtroom model must be able to stand in relation to one another in an 
analogous fashion. This does not mean that the element which represents 
the pedestrian must actually be positioned between the elements which 
which represent the two cars. Rather they must simply stand in some re-
lation so as to represent the relation among the objects. For example, 
that the pedestrian was crushed between two cars might be represented by 
stacking the two model cars on top of the doll representing the pedes-
trian~ here the relation of being beneath (the other two elements) would 
represent the relation of being between (the objects represented by 
those elements). 
It is crucial here to distinguish, as Wittgenstein does in the 
passage above, between a picture's structure and its form. (The two can 
be easily confused, since the words Mstructure" and -form• are often 
used synonymously.) The structure of a picture is the actual arrange-
ment of its elements. Pictorial form, on the other hand, consists in 
the set of possible arrangements which may occur among the elements. 
For example, let the two cars be depicted by the symbols Oand 6, and 
let the pedestrian be depicted by¥. For the sake of convenience, let 
the fact that an object is between two others be represented by the ap-
propriate element being between the other two elements. Let a similar 
convention hold for the relations of to the left ot and to the right ot. 
And let these exhaust the conventions governing the arrangement of ele-
ments, so that elements can only occur beside or between one another but 
never, for example, above or below one another. In order to depict the 
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pedestrian as being between the two cars (struck on the left by the car 
represented by n and on the right by the car represented by 6), the 
picture would have to be structured thus I n ¥ 6. But the pictorial 
form consists in a set of possible configurations: {0¥6, 06¥, ¥n6, 
¥6n, 6¥n, 6n¥}. To speak of the pictorial form of n¥6 just is to 
speak of its being one possible configuration of elements among many; 
the form of a picture is identical with the combinatorial possibilities 
of its elements. 
The distinction between structure and form is semantically signif-
icant. It is the structure of the picture (i.e., how it depicts things) 
which determines, along with how things actually stand, whether it is 
accurate or inaccurate, true or false (1922b, 2.21). Just as the struc-
ture of a picture consists in elements urelated to one another in a de-
terminate wayn (2.14), so too 
The determinate way in which objects are connected in a 
state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs 
(1922b, 2.032). 
A picture will be accurate or true, if and only if its structure corre-
sponds (1922b, 2.13) to the structure of the state of affairs. 
The form of a picture, however, corresponds to the possible ways 
the objects depicted may be related to one another. This is why 
Wittgenstein says, 
Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related 
to one another in the same way as the elements of the pic-
ture (1922b, 2.151, emphasis added). 
What a picture must have in common with reality, in order 
to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in the 
way it does, is its pictorial form (1922b, 2.17, emphasis 
added). 
The possible states of affairs corresponding to the form of 0¥6 (i.e., 
to the set of structures to which n¥6 belongs), minus that which corre-
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sponds to 0¥6 itself, are the conditions which would make 0¥6 false. 
Thus the picture exhibits bi-polarity in the manner discussed in the 
previous chapter. This means the picture contains the possibility both 
of being accurate or true and of being inaccurate or false." 
Consequently, 
In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we 
must compare it with reality (1922b, 2.223). 
It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether 
it is true or false (1922b, 2.224). 
There are no pictures that are true a priori (1922b, 
2.225). 
There cannot be tautologous or contradictory pictures, that is, pictures 
which are necessarily true or false on a priori grounds. This is so, 
not for the question-begging reason that there cannot be tautologous or 
contradictory states of affairs, but because the nature of picturing 
precludes any such possibility. A contradictory picture (so to speak) 
would need to represent the same object at two places at once. That 
would require a picture with one and the same element in two places at 
once; but that is impossible, since elements occupying two distinct lo-
cations would just be distinct elements. If the elements of a contra-
dictory picture would be in two places at once, those of a tautologous 
picture would be nowhere in particular. How would one picture the pos-
sibility of an object either occupying or not occupying a particular po-
sition? One could perhaps place a faint resemblance of the element 
which represents the object in various locations. But in that event an 
79 A reminder: the terms "bipolar" and •bivalent" are not equivalent. 
A picture or propositional sign is bipolar if and only if it is possibly 
true and possibly false; a picture or propositional sign is bivalent if 
and only if it is either true or false. Bipolarity requires contingen-
cy; bivalence does not. Thus contradictions and tautologies (as tradi-
tionally understood) are bivalent but not bipolar. Since, for 
Wittgenstein, all meaningful propositions must be bipolar, contradic-
tions and tautologies must be regarded by him as senseless pseudo-propo-
sitions. 
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element would be placed nowhere. (The alternative is to think of the 
faint images of elements as genuine elements, in which case we would 
have a contradictory picture.) 
Because a picture has both a form and a structure and exhibits bi-
polarity, it may be said to have both a sense and a meaning. The .mean-
ing of a picture is the state of affairs (consisting of objects in SOiie 
determinate relation) which renders the picture accurate or inaccurate. 
If OV4 is accurate, then its meaning consists in the state of affairs 
which shares that very structure; if it is inaccurate, its meaning is a 
state of affai~s with some other structure. If one knows what objects 
the elements of a picture stand for, then one can simply read off from 
the structure of the picture what would make it true.•• 
The possible states of affairs which correspond to the form of a 
picture constitute its sense. It is this which Wittgenstein has in mind 
when he says, 
What a picture represents [darste11t] is its sense 
(1922b, 2.221). 
Perhaps it would be less ambiguous to say that a picture displays 
(aufweist) or shows (zeigt) its sense (cf. 1922b, 4.022), since the pic-
ture depicts but one of various possible states of affairs. But how can 
a picture show its sense, if it depicts but one possible state of af-
fairs? Ultimately, the contingent truth of a picture is grounded in the 
contingent arrangement of objects depicted by the picture's elements. 
The contingent arrangement of objects upon which the accuracy of the 
80 Wittgenstein rarely speaks of the meaning of a picture or proposi-
tional sign as a whole; usually he speaks of the meanings (referents) of 
names (and so, presumably, of a picture's elements). This is not prob-
lematic. Names only have reference within the context of a proposition-
al sign (1922b, 3.3), and it is an essential trait of the objects which 
are denoted by names that they be able to enter into relations with one 
another. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, it is inconceivable that there be 
objects independent of states of affairs. Thus to speak of the meaning 
of a picture or propositional sign is to speak of the objects as so re-
lated. That just is what a state of affairs is. 
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picture depends is matched by (reflected in) the contingent arrangement 
of the picture's elements; and anyone who recognizes the picture for 
anything other than an empty label (that is, anyone who recognizes it as 
something which depicts how things are) will recognize this potential in 
its elements. Of objects Wittgenstein says, 
If I know an object I also know all its possible occur-
rences in states of affairs • 
••• Every one of these possibilities must be part of the 
nature of the object ••• (1922b, 2.0123). 
Similarly, if one knows what object an element stands for and that its 
possibilities tor combination in various states of affairs is written 
into its very nature, then presumably being able to construe the element 
as an element of a picture entails being able to construe the element 
as capable of entering into various relations with the other elements 
which comprise the picture. 
It should be noted that not every passage in the Tractatus com-
ports neatly with this account of the sense of a picture. At 2.222 we 
read: 
The agreement [UbereinstimmungJ or disagreement 
[NichtubereinstimmungJ of [a picture's) sense with reality 
constitutes its truth or falsity (1922b, 2.222). 
This passage suggests that the sense of a picture is not a set of possi-
ble states of affairs, but some kind of entity which occupies an inter-
mediary position between the picture (which is a human construct) and 
the fact which makes the picture true or false. The passage, for this 
reason, appears to support a Fregean interpretation of Wittgensteinian 
senses (this regardless of one's interpretation of Frege). Such a view, 
endorsed by Carruthers (1989), was attacked in the previous chapter. 
The fact is that 2.222 is atypical and makes little sense in the context 
in which it occurs. That context, 2.15-2.225, examines the relationship 
between the form of a picture and the form of a state of affairs, such 
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that a picture nreaches right out to" reality without the aid of any in-
termediary (1922b, 2.1551). (Actually the picture just is such an in-
termediary, so positing a further entity would be pointless.) It is 
difficult not to conclude that Wittgenstein's wording at 2.222 is care-
less. In a later passage, 4.2, after having shown that propositional 
signs are logical pictures (a point to be discussed below), Wittgenstein 
asserts, 
[t]he sense of a proposition is its agreement and dis-
agreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence 
of states of affairs (1922b, 4.2). 
Here it is clear that sense consists in the relation which obtains be-
tween a proposition (or propositional sign) and reality in the wide 
sense, i.e., with possibilities of existence and non-existence of states 
of affairs. Presumably the same holds for ordinary (non-discursive) 
pictures as well. 
A final word about pictorial representation is in order: a pic-
ture cannot depict its own pictorial form (1922b, 2.172). Above it was 
noted that a picture depicts its meaning, and that it displays or shows 
its sense. The actual structure of the picture accomplishes the former; 
the possibility of the picture's elements occurring in other structures, 
i.e., its form, accomplishes the latter. It is physically impossible 
for the picture to depict its sense. If anything, the attempt to do so 
would produce what was earlier referred to as a tautologous picture. 
Just as a sentence with the structure of P v -P or ◊P & ◊-P asserts 
neither P nor -P, any attempt to depict all the possible states of af-
fairs into which a set of objects may enter will result in nothing being 
depicted whatsoever. For depiction to be possible at all an actual 
structure must be presented rather than a mere array of possible struc-
tures. 
Now the question before us is: to what extent are the sentences 
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of ordinary language like pictures? The answer isz not much. There 
are some similarities. For example, what is said or depicted may often 
be said or depicted in various media. The particular vehicle of truth 
or falsehood may be irrelevant. But beyond that the differences are 
enormous. In ordinary pictures, for example, spatial relations among 
objects are represented by spatial relations among the elements of the 
picture. Clearly, it is not necessary for spatial relations to be rep-
resented in this way. In point of fact, the decision to represent spa-
tial relations among objects by means of similar spatial relations among 
the elements of a picture--as when we represented the pedestrian between 
the two cars by means of n ¥ A--is itself a decision to adopt a particu-
lar convention, namely to represent the relation of being between by 
placing the appropriate element between other elements. Even if we re-
tain the convention that spatial relations among objects are to be rep-
resented by spatial relations among elements, this can be done in a va-
riety of ways: being between could be represented by putting the appro-
priate element to the left of, to the right of, above, below, or any-
where else in the proximity of the other elements. But the relation of 
being between need not be represented by any spatial relations among the 
elements at all. We might adopt the rule that the symbol* after an 
element indicates that the object so represented is between the other 
objects regardless of the order in which they are listed. Using this 
convention and the symbols described earlier, the fact consisting of a 
person being between two cars could be represented by means of a variety 
of strings: 0¥•A, DA¥*, ¥ •DA, ¥ •An, A ¥+0, AO¥*. If we also re-
tained the earlier convention pertaining to to the left of and to the 
right of for all elements not followed by*, then any of the first 
three in this list would be capable of conveying that the pedestrian was 
caught between (what is represented by) Don the left and (what is rep-
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resented by) 6 on the right. Of course, even this convention could be 
laid aside. We could easily adopt the rule that any element not fol-
lowed by*, but which is followed by a, is to the left of the others. 
In that case, the very same state of affairs could be represented by any 
The conventions adopted could even vary depending upon the contexti one 
convention might be appropriate in formal contexts, another in informal 
contexts. 
Ordinary language does not even remotely approximate a picture 
that represent~ spatial relations among objects in virtue of the spatial 
relations among its elements. Nor are temporal relations among events 
represented by analogous temporal relations among the elements of a nar-
rative: the fact that the phrase "He murdered her" occurs before the 
phrase "she finished her dissertationn in the sentence "Be murdered her 
after she finished her dissertationn does not mean he murdered her be-
fore she finished her dissertation. The spatio-temporal relations that 
occur among the elements of a sentence need in no way correspond to the 
spatio-temporal relations that obtain among the referents of a sen-
tence's elements. Generally speaking, reference and predication is not 
accomplished by the resemblance the representational medium bears to 
possible states of affairs it represents. 
To accommodate this fact, the Tractatus displaces the idea of pic-
torial form with that of logical form. Indeed, pictures are said to 
represent by virtue of their logical form: 
What any picture, of whatever form, must have in 
common with reality, in order to be able to depict it--cor-
rectly or incorrectly--in any way at all, is logical form, 
i.e. the form of reality (1922b, 2.18). 
A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is 
called a logical picture (1922b, 2.181). 
Every picture is at the same ti.me a logical one. 
(On the other hand, not every picture is, for example, a 
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spatial one) (1922b, 2.182). 
Logical form is to be cashed out in terms of mathematical multiplicity. 
This means that there must be at least a one to one correspondence be-
tween possible combinations of symbols and possible combinations of ob-
jects. Since ordinary objects, like chairs, happen to be complex facts 
(Tatsachen) contingent for their existence upon relations that hold 
among their constituents, it must be possible to refer to these con-
stituents. In principle, then, any statement about a complex object 
must be capable of an analysis in which reference to the complex object 
is replaced by statements that refer to simpler objects. This at least 
is the case for sentences in which singular reference occurs. 11 A sen-
tence like uThe chair is brown" would be analyzed in such a way as to 
eliminate reference to the chair in favor of a series of descriptions of 
its constituents, i.e., of its arms, legs and seat or of its wood, metal 
and cloth, etc. In this regard the semantics of the Tractatus is decom-
positional in nature. The meanings of singular terms that refer to com-
plex objects are composed of (or decompose into) the meanings of state-
ments containing terms for simpler objects (1922b, 2.0201). 
2. The Argument for Logical Atomism. 
The specific form of decompositional semantics to which 
Wittgenstein adheres is logical atomism. This is the view that analysis 
terminates in sets of sentences that refer to simple objects that are in 
no way composite. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein describes these simple 
objects as the uaubstance of the world" (1922b, 2.021)~ they are uunal-
terable" (1922b, 2.023, 2.026, 2.027) and -subsistent" (1922b, 2.024, 
2.027, 2.0271), whereas "their configuration is what is changing and un-
stable" (1922b, 2.0271). It is their configuration that produces states 
of affairs (Sachverha1ten)(l922b, 2.0272). States of affairs are what 
correspond to (are the Bedeutungen of) elementary propositions 
81 Sentences lacking singular reference will be dealt with below. 
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(Elementarsatz) that describe configurations of simple objects when such 
propositions are true (1912, p. 130). 
The question now becomes: why is it necessary to posit simple ob-
jects? Why must they be required for representation to be possible? 
Off hand, it seems the Picture Theory only requires there to be names 
for the constituents or parts of complex objects provided one wants to 
speak of the complexity of those objects. Yet one might want to speak 
of tables and chairs and never have any inclination to speak of their 
complexity or the events upon which their existence is contingent. 
Tables and chairs might well be among the basic objects of which one 
speaks. Perhaps speaking of a fact of which the chair is a constituent 
e.g., the fact that the chair is to the left of the table) requires a 
word for something simpler than the fact itself. But unless one wants 
to speak of the fact that is the chair, nothing simpler, not even in 
principle, seems to be required. 
Against the logical atomism of the Tractatus one wants to argue, 
as did the author of the Philosophical Investigations several decades 
later, 
But what are the simple constituent parts of which real-
ity is composed?--What are the simple constituents of a 
chair?--The bits of wood of which it is made? or the 
molecules, or the atoms?--"Simple" means: not composite. 
And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes 
no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts of 
a chair' (1958, 47).u 
The point here is not that physical atoms or their components are in-
finitely divisible, even though that may very well be true. It is 
rather that human concern, what counts as simple and complex, is rela-
tive to a context in which humans act and communicate. If humans have a 
need to speak of ultimate simples, then fine~ but the question for the 
82 References to Part One of the Philosophical Investigations will be 
to section rather than page. As is customary, references to Part Two 
will cite page numbers. 
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later Wittgenstein would bez in what context, if any, does (or would) 
the need to talk this way arise? 
Wittgenstein does, however, provide an argument in the Tractatus: 
If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition 
had sense would depend on whether another proposition was 
true. 
In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world 
(true or false) (1922b, 2.0211-2.0212). 
That there is a link between the possibility of sense and the existence 
of simple objects (i.e., the referents of simple signs) is repeated: 
The requirement that simple signs be possible is the re-
qu'irement that sense be determinate (1922b, 3.23). 
These passages provide no easy task for interpretation. we have 
already encountered one case in which it is problematic for the truth of 
one proposition to be dependent upon that of another: Moore's problem 
with -P containing (and thus entailing) P. But that cannot be the 
problem here, since for Wittgenstein P and-Pare about the same thing 
to the extent that they share the same Sinn. Moore had failed to make 
that distinction and, was consequently beset by the troubles described 
in Chapter I. However, Wittgenstein's semantic theory avoids those dif-
ficulties. 
Most commentators interpret Wittgenstein's argument as one in 
which one or another infinite regress is to be avoided. I am in agree-
ment with this strategy, however I think neither the nature of the 
regress, nor the way in which it is avoided, has been appreciated. 
Black (1964, pp. 58ff) suggests that Wittgenstein maintains there 
must be a terminus for analysis if anyone is to know the meaning of a 
proposition. unless there were such a terminus, a person would have to 
know the meaning of an infinite number of propositions in order to know 
the meaning of even one. This interpretation, however, does not seem to 
be motivated by the text. To the contrary, a Notebooks entry dated 16 
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June 1915 devoted to the question of whether the names of ordinary ob-
jects might serve as logical simples concludes, u ••• a proposition may 
indeed be an incomplete picture of a certain fact, but it is ALWAYS a 
complete- picture" (1914b, p. 61)." The moral here, which goes substan-
tially unchallenged throughout the Notebooks' discussion of the issue, 
is that the propositions of ordinary language can possess sense (and so 
can be understood by speakers as having a sense) without being complete, 
i.e., without being fully analyzed. This is what Wittgenstein is after 
when he says: 
Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable 
of. expressing every sense, without having any idea how each 
word has a meaning or what its meaning is--just as people 
speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced 
(1922b, 4.002: emphasis added). 
A second way a regress can be run is suggested by Weinberg (1935). 
Here it is supposed that unless simple objects serve as the terminus for 
analysis, propositions would never refer to an extra-linguistic reality 
(1935, p. 80). Propositions would be related to one another and to 
nothing else. This construal of his argument at least does do justice 
to Wittgenstein's dissatisfaction with Frege's minimalist semantics 
which reduces semantic theory to the theory of inference. However, the 
argument, as described, is wholly unconvincing.•• What could justify the 
assumption that reference is impossible unless reference to ultimate 
simples is possible--as if one stands in need of a complete physics in 
order to refer to chairs and tables? That is precisely the question 
that stands in need of an answer. 
A third possibility would be the following. This, at least, does 
do some justice to the fact that determinateness of sense requires the 
existence of simple objects and to the importance we know Wittgenstein 
83 This passage is retained in the Tractatus at 5.156 where it occurs 
within a discussion of probability and generality. 
84 As Weinberg notes. 
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ascribed to the bipolarity of the proposition." Recall that a proposi-
tion must effect a discrimination within reality. It must distinguish 
what, if it is true, is actual from what is merely possible but not ac-
tual. This is made possible by the fact that a propositional sign 
shares with a fact both a form and a structure. The sense of a proposi-
tional sign is said to be determinate inasmuch as it represents precise-
ly what would make it true (by virtue of its structure) or false (which 
it represents by virtue of its form). There is, furthermore, an onto-
logical side to the determinate nature of sense as well. The world must 
be such that, given objects {a, b, c, ••• n} and their relations {R, s, 
T, ••• N}, a proposition about those objects must be rendered determinate-
ly true or false. In other words, the bipolarity of the proposition en-
tails the world must be such as to make bivalence possible ... A sentence 
must be rendered true or false, and nothing else, by the objects and re-
lations (or possible relations) to which it refers. 
Now let us suppose there are no simple objects. Consider what 
this would entail, given Wittgenstein's assumption that all propositions 
possessing sense are contingent. A sentence that makes reference to a 
complex entity--as does "You are to give the hemlock only to Socrates"--
will effect a discrimination within reality (and thus have a determinate 
sense) if and only if "Socrates" actually refers to some complex entity. 
If Socrates is a complex entity, then it is the kind of thing whose con-
stituents can be described by means of sets of sentences. Since these 
sentences, in order to have a sense, must be contingent, it follows that 
whether usocrates" refers is contingent. (The assumption here is that 
M Few scholars explicate Wittgenstein's argument in terms of sup-
pressed premises concerning bipolarity. one notable exception is White 
(1974). 
88 The bipolarity of the proposition, we now see, incorporates four 
distinct ideass the law of excluded middle, the law of contradiction, 
the thesis that all propositions with sense are contingent, and the the-
sis that all sentences with a sense are bivalent, i.e., exclusively 
true or false. 
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the truth conditions of the sentences that describe Socrates' con-
stituents are identical to the referential conditions for the word 
"Socrates".) 07 If the set of sentences describing the constituents were 
to be false, then "Socrates., would not refer~ in which case the sentence 
MYou are to give the hemlock only to Socrates• would fail to effect the 
requisite discrimination to possess a sense. This is because no partic-
ular object (Socrates) would have been singled out among objects as the 
term of the dyadic relation expressed by Mare to give the hemlock only 
to". one is left asking: give the hemlock to this object as opposed to 
that object, or to that object as opposed to this object? The sense of 
the proposition would be indeterminate. 
The point is that if there were no simple objects, objects that 
necessarily exist, then it would be possible for all the sentences of 
our everyday language to lack any determinate sense. In other words, it 
would be possible for the sentences of our everyday language not to be a 
representational medium at all, for the contingency would go on and onl 
But as we noted earlier in course of rejecting Weinberg's interpretation 
of the argument, this is not a possibility Wittgenstein is prepared to 
accept. on the contrary, "{m]an possesses the ability to construct lan-
guages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how 
each word has a meaning or what its meaning is,, (1922b, 4.002). 
If representation is possible, then a propositional sign (or those 
sentences into which it is analyzed when the names of complex objects 
are eliminated) must have as many referring expressions as there are ob-
jects in the state of affairs represented. Since representation does 
occur, there must be at some level of analysis just this sort of isomor-
phism. If there were no simple objects, then it would be possible for 
there never to be any such level, since for any level of analysis the 
87 One can already get a feel for the problematic character of this 
argument. we immediately want to ask, which descriptions of Socrates 
are essential here? 
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objects would remain contingent. Since there must be some such level, 
there must be simple objects that necessarily exist. 
I think this comes very close to being Wittgenstein's argument, 
although I believe it is possible to exploit the text and our under-
standing of Russell's influence upon Wittgenstein to produce a stronger 
one. As it stands the argument described above is invalid. I have 
tried to give expression to this to an extent in the last couple sen-
tences of the previous paragraph. Clearly a modal fallacy occurs in the 
inference from: 
( 1) Each of the referring terms of a given propositional 
sign or its analysand must refer to what exists. 
to: 
(2) Each of the referring terms of a given propositional 
sign or its analysand refers to what must exist. 
The two claims differ greatly. The first assigns a necessary semantic 
property to the vehicle of representation, whereas the second amounts to 
a countenancing of de re necessity. If the argument is valid, we have a 
case in which a significant metaphysical thesis is derived from a claim 
solely about language. Clearly, as it stands, (2) does not derive from 
(1) without further ado~ intermediary premises are required. Here is an 
analogous case: Let the class of F's be the class of terms that refer 
to what exists. It is definitive of F that its terms refer to some-
thing. In other words, it is a necessary condition for membership in F 
that there exists (or there has existed or there will exist) some object 
to which the member refers. The singular term usocrates" satisfies the 
necessary condition for membership in F without, however, Socrates nec-
essarily existing. Now what case can be made for thinking that 
"Socrates• can be analyzed into a string of sentences concerning 
Socrates-components--indeed, subsistent and eternal Socrates-components? 
It is at this juncture that we would do well to consider the in-
fluence of Russell upon Wittgenstein. The true strength of 
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Wittgenstein's position can only be appreciated when viewed against the 
backdrop of Russell's own argument for logical atomism. we begin by 
considering why, for Russell, #Socrates" is to be regarded as a special 
kind of predicate rather than a genuine name. 
In The Philosophy of Logical Atomlsm (1918) Russell asserts: 
The names we conunonly use, like 'Socrates', are really 
abbreviations for descriptions; not only that, but what they 
describe are not particulars, but complicated systems of 
classes or series. A name, in the narrow logical sense of a 
word whose meaning is a particular, can only be applied to a 
particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because 
you cannot name anything you are not acquainted with •••• we 
are not acquainted with Socrates, and therefore cannot name 
h~m. When we use the word 'Socrates,' we are really using a 
description. Our thought may be rendered by some such 
phrase as, 'The Master of Plato', or 'The philosopher who 
drank the hemlock', or 'The person whom logicians assert to 
be mortal', but we certainly do not use the name as a name 
in the proper sense of the word. 
That makes it very difficult to get any instance of a 
name at all in the proper logical sense of the word. The 
only words one does use as names in the logical sense are 
words like 'this' or 'that' ( 1918, p. 62)."' 
Russell's argument may be sketched as follows: (i) an expression, n, is 
a proper name, if and only if n refers to a particular with which one is 
acquainted; (ii) many common expressions {"Socrates," "Plato,• 
"Aristotle," ••• "Hegel"} that seem to be names do not in fact refer to 
particulars with which one may be acquainted; therefore, (iii) many com-
mon expressions that seem to be names are not genuine names at all (let 
us refer to this class of expressions as R); (iv) if the members of R 
are do not denote particulars with which one may be acquainted, then 
they denote objects (i.e., "complicated systems of classes or series•) 
that are known by description; so, (v) the members of R denote objects 
known by description; (vi) if the members of R denote objects known by 
description, then R's members function essentially as predicative ex-
88 The argument here is consistent with that offered in The Problems 
of Philosophy (1912), pp. 52-58. 
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pressions, i.e., as disguised definite descriptions1 thus, (vii) the 
members of R function essentially as predicative expressions, i.e., as 
disguised definite descriptions. 
Let us begin in the middle of the argument with premise (iv) as it 
is one of the more substantive claims. Premise (iv) gives expression to 
Russell's famous distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by 
description. These are two ways subjects may be related to the objects 
of awareness and judgment. uwe shall say that we have acquaintance with 
anything," Russell explains, uof which we are directly aware, without 
the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths" 
(1912, p. 46). In The Problems of Philosophy Russell countenances vari-
ous modes of acquaintance, each involving it own peculiar kind of ob-
ject. Perception allows one to be acquainted with sense data (1912, p. 
46). Introspection has as its objects one's own acquaintances and the 
self that is acquainted (1912, pp. 50-51). Memory allows one to. be ac-
quainted with past objects of perception and introspection (1912, p. 
48). And, finally, conception is the mode of acquaintance by virtue of 
which one is aware of universals (1912, p. 52)." 
Knowledge of an object by description occurs uwhen we know that it 
is 'the so-and-so', i.e. when we know that there is one object, and no 
more, having a certain property~ and it will generally be implied that 
we do not have the same knowledge by acquaintance" (1912, p. 53). It is 
tempting to think of the distinction as one that obtains between mere 
awareness or consciousness of an object and judgment or knowledge that 
such and such is true of an object. The latter will not, however, suf-
fice as a definition of knowledge by description. Knowledge by descrip-
tion should not be identified with propositional knowledge1 one would 
not possess knowledge by description, for example, if one knows that 
ei His willingness to countenance universals continues in (1918), pp. 
36 and 128-129 and (1924) p. 166. 
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Socrates was under six feet tall, even if being under six feet tall is 
(somehow) a necessary condition for being Socrates. Knowledge by de-
scription requires the subject to be aware that a particular object, and 
only that object, possesses a given property.•0 As Russell suggests in 
the passage from the Lectures on Logical Atomism, the description 
uniquely satisfied might well be very complicated in the event that it 
is necessary to advert to Mcomplicated systems of classes or series# 
(1918, p. 62). It may well be that knowledge by description of Socrates 
involves knowing that Socrates is identical to the object consisting of 
k-type sense data occurring at times t 1 ••• tn, 1-type sense data occur-
ring at times tn ... t 0 , etc. For the sake of simplicity we will follow 
Russell in saying that one has knowledge by description of Socrates when 
one knows, for example, that Socrates was the Master of Plato. 
we will save specific criticisms of Russell's theory of judgment 
until later when further details will be spelled out. Although there 
are several passages within the world War I Notebooks (dating from May 
1915) where Wittgenstein shares Russell's terminology (1914b, pp. 50 and 
52), there is no question that Wittgenstein rejected Russell's episte-
mology. There can also be no question concerning Wittgenstein's unwill-
ingness to proceed in these matters on the basis of epistemological 
90 This is the definition given in (1912) and suggested by the exam-
ples in (1918), both cited above. A less restrictive definition appears 
to be operating in (1913)~ cf. pp. 57 and 69. 
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premises.ti However, Wittgenstein would accept that not every expression 
that appears to be a name is one in fact (i.e., premise (iii))~ and he 
would accept that these expressions (which Russell would refer to as 
relative names) are really disguised definite descriptions to be ana-
lyzed in accordance with Russell's Theory of Incomplete Symbols (i.e., 
the conclusion at (vii)). For Wittgenstein the class of expressions to 
be analyzed this way is the class of expressions that appear to denote 
complex entities rather than the class that appears to denote objects 
other than particulars with which one may be acquaintedi consequently, 
he would not accept the stipulation in premise (i) that genuine names 
refer to, and only to, particulars with which one may be acquainted. 
Nor would he regard (ii) as relevant, since it discounts an expression's 
status as a name on the basis of membership in the class of objects 
other than particulars with which one may be acquainted. Presumably, 
Wittgenstein would reject (v) and (vi), too, since they are founded upon 
the same epistemological considerations. Fortunately, the Theory of 
Descriptions and the Theory of Incomplete Symbols can be defended on 
grounds independent of Russell's epistemological views. 
According to Russell's Theory of Descriptions, the relative name 
"Socrates" can be said to denote the very same individual as that denot-
91 The rejection of any such strategy occurs very early in 
Wittgenstein's writings1 for examples 
The "self-evidence" of which Russell has talked so much 
can only be dispensed with in logic if language itself pre-
vents any logical mistake. And it is clear that uself-evi-
denceH is and always was wholly deceptive (1914b, p. 4). 
This early (8 September 1914) passage from the Notebooks forms the 
basis of Tractatus 5.4731). 
It is somewhat a historical curiosity that Russell's epistemological 
theses concerning acquaintance and description would play such a heavy 
hand in the 1918 Lectures on Logical Atomism, given the way work on his 
1913 Theory of Knowledge ground to a halt in the face of Wittgenstein's 
criticism that the theory left room for the possibility of judging non-
sense. This possibility, as the passage just cited indicates, is to be 
ruled out by the nature of the symbolism itself. uwhat makes logic a 
priori is the impossibility of illogical thought" (1922b, 5.4731). 
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ed by a definite description such as uThe Master of Plato•. Although 
Wittgenstein would never consider basing a semantic thesis (such as that 
objects can only be named) upon an epistemological premise, he could ap-
preciate Russell's belief that "(a] logical theory may be tested by its 
capacity for dealing with puzzles" (1905, p. 110). One cluster of prob-
lems revolves around the puzzle, to use Russell's words, of uhow ••• a 
non-entity [can] be the subject of a proposition" (1905, p. 110). 
Whereas Wittgenstein had found a foil in Moore (1899) and the early 
Russell (1903), it was not until Russell began wrestling with Meinong's 
(1899) philosophy that the paradoxes associated with (apparent) refer-
ence to non-existents occurred to him. However, as time passed both be-
came concerned with these issues, that is, with how there could be false 
judgments, negative existential propositions, and true belief ascrip-
tions concerning persons with false beliefs. Russell's Theory of 
Descriptions provides answers to some of these problems consistent with 
his epistemological views and his Theory of Types. For Wittgenstein, in 
contrast, the search for answers to these problems leads to the bipolar-
ity of the proposition and to the Picture Theory's thesis of structural 
isomorphism. For him the Theory of Descriptions offers a solution to 
some of the cases in which it appears that a propositional sign is not 
structurally isomorphic to the world. 
Consider "Pegasus has wings" and "The present King of France is 
bald". Are these sentences true or false? In either event on 
Wittgenstein's view it would be necessary for each sentence to contain 
as many elements in it as there are objects represented by it. But nei-
ther "Pegasus" nor "The present King of France" have any referent. How 
could these sentences possess name-object isomorphism? And yet these 
sentences do not seem to stand outside the bounds of sense in the manner 
in which the problematic sentences that give rise to the class and se-
mantic paradoxes do. 
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Russell's proposal, accepted by Wittgenstein (1922b, 3.24), is to 
treat "Pegasus," "Socrates," etc. as disguised descriptions, and to 
treat definite descriptions like "The winged horse," uThe Master of 
Plato," and "The present King of France" as affirming that "there is one 
object, and no more, having a certain property" (1912, p.53). Definite 
descriptions, Russell maintains, are to be understood as incomplete 
symbols~ that is to say, when viewed in isolation apart from a series of 
claims, they have no meaning whatsoever. Their use in a sentence must 
be seen as entailing (and being entailed by) a series of claims. 
The sentence "The present King of France is bald" is then analyzed 
as a conjunction of the following: 
(1) There is at least one present King of France. 
(2) There is at most one present King of France. 
(3) Whoever is the present King of France is bald. 
Symbolically (allowing K to stand for uis a present King of France" and 
B to stand for "is bald") the original sentence may be represented: 
(Bx) [Kx & (Y) (Ky - y = x) & Bx]. Rather than being nonsensical or of 
some indeterminate truth-value, the original sentence turns out to be 
false, due to the falsity of the first conjunct. There are no values of 
x such that xis a present King of France. Thus the semantics of the 
sentence can be explained without either introducing a new semantic cat-
egory or positing a nonexistent object as referent. 
Russell's Theory of Descriptions has been the subject of consider-
able controversy. The principal criticism of it pertains to what are 
perceived as its undesirable logical consequences. These come about in 
the following way. Consider the sentence ,,Socrates is the Master of 
Plato" which expresses a contingent truth. Since "Socrates" is synony-
mous with "the Master of Plato," this sentence is equivalent to .,The 
Master of Plato is the Master of Plato" and may be represented: (Bx) 
[Mx & (y) (My - y = x) & x = x). But this claim may be deduced from 
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(Bx) (Mx & (Y) (My - y = x)J, which asserts that Socrates (i.e., the 
Master of Plato) exists, as the conjunction of it and the law of identi-
ty. It, therefore, follows from the fact that Socrates exists that 
Socrates is the Master of Plato. The former strictly implies the lat-
ter~ thus: { (BX) [Mx & (Y) (My - y ,.. X)]} ... { (Bx) [Mx & (Y) (My - y = 
x) & x = x]} is true. That is to say, if Socrates exists, then Socrates 
is necessarily the Master of Plato. The possibility of Socrates exist-
ing but not being the Master of Plato is ruled out. 
Russell, we should note, believed these problems could be avoided. 
The fact of the matter is that Russell expressed grave reservations over 
treating names as synonymous with definite descriptions. These reserva-
tions are expressed as early as uon Denoting" (1905, p. 113) where he 
quips that we can hardly credit George IV with an interest in the law of 
identity when he desired to know if Scott was the author of Waverly. 
Indeed, in the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, written within a 
year of the passage quoted above, he asserts "'Scott is the author of 
Waverly' is not the same proposition as results from substituting a name 
for 'the author of Waverly'" (1919, p. 172). In that work, too, he sug-
gests that the substitution that creates the unwanted analyticity runs 
afoul of the Theory of Types (1919, p. 171). This can be seen from the 
fact that if usocrates" is synonymous with "the Master of Plato" or 
"Scott" is synonymous with "the author of Waverly", then the names and 
the definite descriptions would be of the same type. Consequently, 
•Socrates is the Master of Plato# becomes an illegitimate construction, 
and, so, the substitution that generates the unwanted analyticity is 
blocked. While this gets Russell off the hook with respect to the prob-
lem described here, he appears to be impaled upon the horn of a dilemma, 
since, after all, •socrates is the Master of Plato" is true. 
Wittgenstein, we will see, circumvents this problem by construing 
the elementary propositions into which •Socrates is the Master of Plato" 
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decomposes as logically independent~ this has the consequence of ma.king 
the sentence contingent, as the Picture Theory requires if the sentence 
is to have a sense. 
Having noted the potential problem associated with Russell's con-
clusion (at (vii)), several comments concerning the argument in general 
are in order before we turn to Wittgenstein's argument. First, note 
that the argument does not establish in any way that there are simple 
objects. All of the ontology enters via the first premise where it is 
stipulated that names name objects of acquaintance. In the Lectures 
Russell appears simply to assume the existence of simple objects. Be 
clearly acknowledges the lack of support he has given the claim: 
I think it is perfectly possible to suppose that complex 
things are capable of analysis ad infinitum, and that you 
never reach the simple. I do not think it is true, but it 
is a thing one might argue, certainly. I do myself think 
that complexes--I do not like to think of complexes--are 
composed of simples, but I admit that is a difficult argu-
ment, and it might be that analysis could go on forever 
(1918, p. 64). 
The fact is that Russell's ontological commitment to simple objects was 
never great. It is perhaps its greatest in the Lectures. There he com-
ments upon the fact that all names are eliminated within the notation of 
Principia Mathematica (1910) saying: u ••• in the logical language set 
forth in Principia Mathematica there are not any names, because there we 
are not interested in particular particulars but only in general partic-
ulars, if I may be allowed such a phrase" (1918, p. 63). (Russell means 
by the last phrase that in Principia Mathematica he was interested in 
particulars only to the extent that they are subject to quantification.) 
Nevertheless, although Russell would continue to find it desirable to 
posit simple objects, he would remain cautious in his commitment. The 
1924 article, uLogical Atomism," put the matter this way: 
When I speak of 'simples', I ought to explain that I am 
speaking of something not experienced as such, but known 
only inferentially as the limit of analysis. It is quite 
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possible that, by greater logical skill, the need for as 
suming them could be avoided. A logical language will not 
lead to error if its simple symbols (i.e. those not having 
any parts that are symbols, or any significant structure) 
all stand for objects of some one type, even if these ob-
jects are not simple. The only drawback to such a 
language is that it is incapable of dealing with anything 
simpler than the objects which it represents by simple sym-
bols. But I confess it seems obvious to me (as it did to 
Leibniz) that what is complex must be composed of simples, 
though the number of constituents may be infinite (1924, p. 
173; emphasis added). 
It is interesting that the tradition has largely remembered 
Russell's belief in ineliminability as a criterion for ontological com-
mitment but not his reluctance to view names as elim.inable. Quine, for 
example, maintains that uthe singular noun ••• can always be expanded into 
a singular description, trivially or otherwise, and then analyzed out a 
la Russell" (1948, p. 8). This belief becomes the basis of Quine's own 
position on ontological commitment, namely, that a theory is committed 
to the kinds of entities over which it quantifies, since (on his view) 
quantifiers but not names are ineliminable. It would be more accurate 
to describe Russell as believing that all relative names are eliminable, 
and that it is possible but not likely for analysis to terminate with 
names of objects that are not simple. Be that as it may, the tradition 
has come to identify the Russell view with the view that it is possible 
to eliminate all names by means of analysis (Haack (1978), pp. 62-63; 
Coffa (1993), pp. 111-112). And, indeed, he did take the elimination of 
names to be possible. 
Wittgenstein's view may be sharply contrasted with Russell's, 
since for him it is not even possible to eliminate reference to simple 
objects if analysis is to be complete and representation is to be possi-
ble. 
Given what we know about Russell's influence upon Wittgenstein, we 
can reconstruct his argument as follows: (i) if the name of a complex 
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entity, n, occurring within a propositional signs which has a determi-
nate sense can be eliminated upon analysis, then n possesses complex 
logical structure (or a decompositional semantic structure); (ii) If n 
possesses a complex logical structure, then this structure will be re-
vealed by either a two-stage analysis (in which the first stage replaces 
the name with a definite description and the second stage replaces the 
definite description with a series of quantified expressions) or by a 
three-stage analysis (in which the variables of the second stage are re-
placed by names); (iii) if a two-stage analysis were complete, then it 
would be possible to analyze propositions with determinate sense as 
functions of propositions whose sense is indeterminate; (iv) it is im-
possible for a propositional sign that has determinate sense to be ana-
lyzed into components whose senses are indeterminate; therefore, (vi) a 
propositional signs that contains the name of a complex to be eliminat-
ed upon analysis must be given a three-stage analysis; and, therefore, 
(vii) the sense of a propositional signs is determined by the referents 
of those names into which it decomposes. What makes this conclusion so 
important is the fact that, following Frege, Wittgenstein holds that any 
propositional sign that has a sense must contain both argument and func-
tion, that is, they must contain both singular and predicative expres-
sions; hence, (viii) there must be names. But what analysis demonstrates 
is that (ix) nothing which purports to be the name of a complex is a 
name. so, if there are names (and (viii) affirms that there are), then 
(x) names must name simples. In other words, there must be simple ob-
jects. 
The first premise is a truism implicit within the project of logi-
cal analysis. Wittgenstein credits Russell with ushowing that the ap-
parent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one" (1922b, 
4.0031). The early analysts sought to free themselves from what they 
viewed as the metaphysical excesses of their predecessors and, indeed, 
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the commitments imposed on them by their own early theories of judgment. 
They believed an uncritical attitude toward ordinary language with its 
various forms to be at the source of these excesses. Consequently they 
regarded a mistrust of ordinary forms as a prerequisite for doing phi-
losophy. There was thus initiated--primarily in the writings of Frege 
(1879a), Russell (1903) and Russell and Whitehead (1910)--the search for 
a logically perspicuous language. But as we saw earlier, for 
Wittgenstein, "the propositions of our everyday language, just as they 
stand, are in perfect logical order" (1922b, 5.5563), because an illog-
ical representational medium is impossible. Thus: 
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the 
outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the 
form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of 
the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, 
but for entirely different purposes. 
The tacit conventions on which the understanding of 
everyday language depends are enormously complicated (1922b, 
4.002) • 
••• Most of the propositions and questions of philoso-
phers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our 
language (1922b, 4.003). 
The task would not be simply to construct an ideal language and then to 
begin conducting business within it. Rather, the task would be to cut 
through the numerous conventions that govern the use of language in or-
dinary contexts to discover the underlying logical form. Beneath the 
conventional forms there lies the "logical syntax" of our language 
(1922b, 3.325, 3.33, 3.334). 
The process of analysis involves, at the very least, the clarifi-
cation of propositions, that is, the clarification of what makes them 
true. When a proposition names an object that is complex, then certain 
facts about that object will contribute to the conditions that make the 
proposition truei at the very least it does this by determining the ref-
erential conditions for the name of the object. The first premise sim-
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ply takes stock of this fact. If facts about the referent contribute to 
the truth or falsehood of a proposition, then it will upon analysis have 
to be eliminated in favor of descriptions of those facts. Thus analysis 
yields more complex syntactic forms. 
The second premise asserts that there are two principal candidates 
for what counts as a complete analysis. The first alternative, at-
tributed to Russell (by Wittgenstein among others), has it that analysis 
is complete once all proper names are eliminated in favor of one or more 
definite descriptions that are, in turn, eliminated in favor of quanti-
ifiers, predicates and variables. 
On Wittgenstein's view such an analysis is incomplete. To be com-
plete the analysis must be carried out so as to replace the quantifiers 
and variables with names of actual existents. This involves replacing 
the existential quantifier with the logical sum, and the universal quan-
tifier with the logical product, of those names for which the predicate 
is possibly a function. It is to this possibility that the second dis-
junct in premise (ii) points. 
This might seem like a trivial distinction to draw, since today it 
is generally accepted that a formula containing quantifiers is made true 
either by the fact that its predicates are satisfied for some values of 
the variables it contains (on an objectual reading of the variables), or 
by the fact that one of its substituends is true (on a substitutional 
interpretation of variables). 02 In either event it turns out that ex-
pressions containing names or other singular terms are truth-bearers. 
The view that sentences containing quantifiers are true (or false) de-
pending upon their relation to sentences containing names or other sin-
gular terms is commonplace, however, as a consequence of Wittgenstein's 
82 I take Wittgenstein to adhere to a substitutional interpretation of 
variables, since, for him, variables function as prototypes or exemplars 
of symbol types rather than as referring expressions of either an object 
language or a meta-language. 
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and Russell's work. Its actual significance can only be appreciated 
when viewed against a historical background dominated by the logic and 
metaphysics of British Idealism. Frege, Wittgenstein, and eventually 
Russell had, as we discussed in a previous chapter, abandoned subject-
predicate analyses of sentences in favor of analyses based upon function 
and argument. The Wittgensteinian idea that sentences containing quan-
tifiers, not only are made true, but have a sense in virtue of their re-
lations to sentences containing names of objects entails the falsehood 
of the doctrine of internal relations so integral to Idealism. This be-
comes apparent if the reason why the analysis must be extended is con-
sidered. 
Unless sentences containing quantifiers are treated as sums or 
products of sentences containing names, no discrimination will beef-
fected within reality and no sentence containing quantifiers will have a 
sense. Considered in themselves, apart from any such relation, sen-
tences containing quantifiers remain indeterminate, as do the sentences 
that contain names of complex entities for which they provide an analy-
sis: 
When a propositional element signifies a complex, this 
can be seen from an indeterminateness in the propositions in 
which it occurs. In such cases we know that the proposition 
leaves something undetermined. (In fact the notation for 
generality contains a prototype) (1922b, 3.24). 
What is left undetermined is any discrimination within reality of what 
would be the case if the formula or sentence were true and what would be 
the case if it were false. This can be done by saying that, for a given 
domain {a, b, c, ••• , n}, (Bx) Fx is made true by Fa v Fb v Fc ••• Fn, and 
it is made false by -Fa & -Fb & -Fc ••• -Fn. The reason it does not suf-
fice to say simply that (Bx) Fx is made false by -{(Bx) Fx] is that 
what makes the latter true just is the fact that, for a given object a, 
Gav Ba v Ja v Na is true. The possibilities referred to by these dis-
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juncts belong to the sense of Fa~ and should any of them obtain, Fa 
would be false. For example, the sentence uNothing is blue" would be 
made true by every object within a given domain being red or yellow or 
green or some other color incompatible with the object being blue.•• 
Ultimately it is the determinate nature of objects that secures for 
quantified expressions a determinate sense. 
we can see how this thesis runs contrary to any sort of doctrine 
of internal relations that holds all relational properties of objects to 
be essential. Although this is not the place to go into details on such 
matters, that view has it that an object's identity conditions are de-
termined by all of the object's actual relations at a given time. Given 
any change in actual relation, the object would fail to persist. To re-
turn to our earlier example of the pedestrian between the two cars, a 
doctrine of internal relations would maintain that the pedestrian--if it 
makes sense at all to talk about the pedestrian per se--ceases to be the 
object it once was once it stands in a different relation to the two 
cars. on Wittgenstein's view, in contrast, what an object is cannot be 
determined by the relations into which it actually enters. Rather an 
object's possibility of being related thus-and-so is written into the 
very nature of the object itself. Thus: 
If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibil-
ity must be in them from the beginning. 
(Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. 
Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are 
its facts.) 
Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects 
outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there 
is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibil-
ity of combining with others. 
If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I 
93 In later years Wittgenstein (1929a) would regard what has been de-
scribed here as posing a problem concerning the logical independence of 
elementary propositions. Concerning the so-called color exclusion prob-
lem more will be said below. 
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cannot imagine them excluded from the possibility of such 
combinations (1922b, 2.0121). 
If I know an object I also know all its possible occur-
rences in states of affairs. 
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the 
nature of the object) (1922b, 2.0123). 
Ultimately, the ontological primacy given to objects and their possibil-
ities rests upon the need for propositions with sense to effect a dis-
crimination within reality in such a way as to make their own truth or 
falsehood contingent. There must be objects of a determinate nature, 
and in some way reference must be made to these objects if quantified 
expressions are to have a sense. In this way we arrive at the truth of 
premise (iii): if a two-stage analysis were complete, then it would be 
possible to analyze propositions with determinate sense as functions of 
propositions whose sense is indeterminate. 
Premise (iv), how.ever, asserts that it is impossible for a propo-
sitional sign that has determinate sense to be analyzed into components 
whose senses are indeterminate. This follows from the fact that a sen-
tence containing a quantifier only has a sense in virtue of its logical 
relation to a sentence containing names that do refer to actual objects. 
If the former has a determinate sense, the latter must. One might ask 
whether this claim is generally true and not merely true of propositions 
containing quantified expressions. But, in fact, this question does not 
arise for Wittgenstein, since, for him, any proposition about anything 
complex can be analyzed by means of sums or products of propositional 
signs containing only quantifiers, names and predicates. At the bottom 
of premise (iv), then, lies the appropriateness or inappropriateness of 
the two Russellian assumptions that names of complexes are disguised 
definite descriptions and that definite descriptions are to be under-
stood primarily as playing a predicative role. The latter assumption 
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has been questioned on more than one occasion (Strawson, 1950; Donellan, 
1966). These criticisms are particularly relevant in that they reach to 
the very heart of the syntacticist tradition by raising the possibility 
that a linguistic token's use within a context, rather than its logical 
or syntactic form, determines its semantic properties. Since 
Wittgenstein (1953), too, eventually shared these concerns, a full 
treatment of the issue is best left until later when we consider 
Wittgenstein's own abandonment of syntacticism. 
Russell, as we know, accepted these theses in order to eliminate 
the need to posit non-existent beings. They also permit him to accommo-
date falsehood without making falsehood contingent upon truth; and, when 
conjoined with his theory of judgment, they enable him to accommodate 
true ascriptions of false beliefs to others. For Wittgenstein, on the 
other hand, the two theses serve to augment the Picture Theory's re-
quirement of logical isomorphism. So the question that should really be 
raised here is that of whether the Picture Theory does indeed require 
this kind of augmentation. I would suggest that it does. The alterna-
tive would entail that a propositional sign contain either more or less 
elements than there are objects to be represented. In the case of too 
few elements, ambiguity enters the proposition due to the fact that an 
element must represent more than one object. (Consider: under this 
interpretation a is to the left of b, but under that interpretation bis 
to the left of a.) In the limiting case no discrimination within reali-
ty is effected. But, and more germane to the present issue, the same 
holds when there are too many elements, as is the case when •the present 
King of France" is taken as a singular term. Given that there is no 
such object, a sentence containing such a phrase would leave undeter-
mined what object possesses a given property or is the term of a given 
relation. That is to say, if •the present King of Francew is construed 
merely as a singular term within the sentences in which occurs, then it 
209 
will remain unclear just how to interpret such sentences: of what shall 
a given property or relation be predicated? It is as if one would not 
know where to look for a state of affairs that would render the sentence 
true or false. One could, as it were, survey all objects and determine 
that the denoting phrase refers to none of them, thereby determining the 
falsehood of the sentence~ but that sort of procedure involves treating 
the denoting phrase as a predicate that goes unsatisfied. And that is 
precisely what the theory of descriptions calls for. 
That sense must be determinate thus requires (vi), namely, that a 
propositional sign containing the name of a complex must be given a 
three-stage analysis. Consequently, we get the following progression: 
LL "Socrates exists" or (Bx) (x = s). 
L2. uThe Master of Plato exists" or (Bx) (Mx & (Y) (My - y = 
x)). 
L3. uEither a is the Master of Plato, orb is the Master of 
Plato, or c is the Master of Plato ••• " or [Ma & (y) (My - y 
= a) J V [Mb & (Y) (My - y - b)] V [Mc & (Y) (My - y = 
C) ••• v [Mn & (Y) (My - y = n)J. 
The first level consists of the original unanalyzed sentence. At the 
second level the name of the complex is eliminated in favor of the defi-
nite description, and the the resulting sentence is analyzed according 
to Russell's theory. The third level initiates the sort of analysis 
countenanced by Wittgenstein. In L3 the existential quantifier has been 
replaced by its logical sum. The analysis would proceed with the elimi-
nation of the universal quantifier in favor of its logical product. so, 
for example, the first disjunct in L3 would become: [Ma) & [(Mb - b = 
a) ] & [ ( Mc - c = a) J & [ ( Md - d = a) ] ••• [ ( Mn - n = a) ] • 
The third level of analysis is not yet complete however. The log-
ical sums and products that appear upon analysis of L2 disappear, along 
with the identity sign (1914b, p. 19), if the convention is observed 
that each object has one and only one name and no two objects have the 
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same name (1914b, p. 34; 1922b, 5.53). Consequently, we get: 
L3' Ma & -Mb & -Mc ••• -Mn. 
Let me point out that in the actual presentation in the 
Tractatus the existential quantifier is retained. That is because this 
portion of the text, 5.53-5.534, is intended only to show how the iden-
tity sign is eliminated and no more. Thus he provides various examples 
and retains the existential quantifier for the sake of simplicity. For 
example, he says, uthe proposition, 'Only one x satisfies f()', will 
read '(3x).fx: -(3x,y) .fx.fy•n (1922b, 5.5321). But the existential 
quantifier is dispensable too, because all names are taken to refer to 
existents, since symbols that purport to be names of entities possessing 
Being but not existence are eliminated upon analysis. In this way the 
use of names and the differences between names show what is usually 
said by means of quantifiers." Wittgenstein, like Quine, can be under-
stood to be taking logical ineliminability as a criterion for ontologi-
cal comm.itment1 but, in contrast to Quine, he holds quantifiers rather 
than names to be unnecessary. 
Is it an arbitrary matter which convention is accepted? I think 
not. For Wittgenstein, at any rate, the need to eliminate the identity 
sign results from the demand that sentences with sense not decompose 
into sentences that lack sense. That such would occur given the con-
vention concerning naming is obvious enough, since a= a and a= b would 
be tautologous and contradictory respectfully; and because they would 
fail to be contingent, they would fail to have a sense. But 
Wittgenstein does provide an independent, and less question begging, ar-
gument. Roughly, it is this: (i) either a= a and a= b can be inter-
preted formally as being merely about symbols, or they can be interpret-
ed materially as being about extra-linguistic objects and their rela-
94 Difficulties arising from the elimination of the identity sign are 
discussed in Black (1964), pp. 290-295. A strong defense of the tech-
nique may be found in Hintikka (1957). 
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tions; (ii) assume for the sake of argument that they are to be inter-
preted materially; (iii) "to say of two things that they are identical 
is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is 
to say nothing at all" (1922b, 5.5303; cf. 1914b, p. 4); therefore, (iv) 
neither a= a nor a= b may possess sense; for which reason, (v) they 
cannot be interpreted materially; and therefore, (vi) they must be in-
terpreted as merely formal devices (1922b, 4.241-4.242). The only claim 
here that stands in need of explanation is the first clause of (iii). 
The reason it would be nonsense to say of two things that they are iden-
tical is that no relation (i.e., no object, as u(r]elations and proper-
ties, etc. are objects too" (1914b, p. 61)•' has been designated as the 
referent of "the relation of identity between two different objects. 
or, at least, none shall be designated as such so long as words like 
"identity" and "difference" are used as they are, i.e., in ways consis-
tent with Leibniz' Laws. (Here one wants to say: "But the identity re-
lation is a logical one." But what does that mean in this context? 
That it is merely a formal one? In that case no state of affairs will 
have been asserted as existing. If it is a formal concept, then it ex-
presses a relation between signs.) 
We now have a complete picture of how the final stage of analysis 
is to be conducted according to Wittgenstein; and we can now make sense 
of premise (vii), i.e., that the sense of a propositional sign is deter-
mined by the referents of those names into which it decomposes. The 
form (as distinguished from the structure) of a propositional sign cor-
responds to a range of possible facts which constitute its sense. These 
possible facts are possibilities of the objects that are their con-
stituents. Names are required to refer to these. 
Therefore, (ix) there must be names. The Notebooks are illuminat-
95 The extent to which this passage is useful in clarifying the rela-
tion between Wittgenstein's and Frege's conception of an object will be 
discussed below. 
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ing on this points 
one cannot achieve any more by using names in describing 
the world than by means of the general description of the 
worldl 11 
Could one then manage without names? Surely not. 
Names are necessary for an assertion that this thing pos-
sesses that property and so on. 
They link the propositional form with quite definite ob-
jects. 
And if the general description of the world is like a 
stencil of the world, the names pin it to the world so that 
the world is wholly covered by it (1914b, p. 53). 
One day later he observes: 
The great problem round which everything that I write 
turns is: Is there an order in the world a priori, and if 
so what does it consist in (1914b, p.53)? 
What makes Wittgenstein's philosophy a priori is that it proceeds from 
an examination of the necessary conditions for the possibility of repre-
sentation. The sentences that make up the Tractatus are not, at least 
according to its author, a priori true in the same way as, say, "All 
bachelors are unmarried" is true, given the meaning of the word -bache-
lor", even if being unmarried is a necessary condition for being a bach-
elor. For it is not from the meanings of any particular words that the 
claims that make up the Tractatus issue. They stem, rather, from argu-
ments concerning what must be necessary if language and thought are able 
to represent (that is, to be able to refer to and be true of) a world 
external to itself. 96 
These conditions include bipolarity and logico-pictorial form. 
The latter requires a form/structure distinction and names of objects as 
~ That the statements of the Tractatus can be reconstructed as a set 
of arguments, as I have attempted to do in this dissertation, is itself 
an important fact to consider when evaluating whether those claims are 
nonsensical as its author maintains. Bow can entailment relations ob-
tain among sentences that are alleged to be nonsense? In a later sec-
tion I will describe a fallacy to which Wittgenstein has fallen suscep-
tible in thinking that a statement P describing a necessary condition 
for O cannot be contingent. 
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pictorial elements. Furthermore, the world must be such as to contain 
objects, and these objects must have a determinate nature. This entails 
that their possibilities for being related to one another must be deter-
mined by their very nature. 
In the final stage of the argument the a priori order of the world 
is extended to include simple objects. The fact is there must be names, 
yet analysis shows that (ix) nothing which purports to be the name of a 
complex is a name. The 'names' of complex objects are really disguised 
descriptions (1914b, p. 52). Yet if there must be names, but 'names' of 
complexes do not function as such, then names must be names of non-com-
plex or simple objects. Therefore, (x) there must be simple objects."' 
What are simple objects? On this the author of the Tractatus re-
mained notoriously reticent. Be does tell us what simple objects must 
be like: but he does not believe himself able to name and ostensively 
define such an object. This reticence follows considerable soliloquy on 
the subject during the composition of the Notebooks. At one point he 
waxes Russellian: "[t]the simple thing for us IS1 the simplest thing 
that we are acquainted with" (1914b, p. 47).'" The simplest thing with 
which we are acquainted, he goes on to suggest, "need appear only as a 
prototype, as a variable in our propositions" (1914b, p. 47). The argu-
ment for the Grundgedanke of the Tractatus, discussed in the next sec-
tion of this chapter, constitutes his rejection of that idea. For 
Wittgenstein there can be no logical objects. In the Notebooks he also 
considers and rejects the identification of simple objects with sense 
data, as there is no "minima sensibiliaH (1914b, p. 451 see also p. 51). 
97 Wittgenstein suggests at one point that it is not appropriate to 
label as names both symbols that refer to complexes as well as to sim-
ples. The word "name" should be reserved for the latter.(1914b, p. 52). 
98 Compare Russell: " ••• any entity with which something is acquainted 
will be called an 'object' ••• An entity with which nothing is acquaint-
ed will not be called an object" (1914a, p. 162). Objects, on this 
view, are construed de dicto, i.e., as objects of awareness. 
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Furthermore, he rejects (presumably for the same reason) the identifica-
tion of simple objects with uparts of space" (1914b, p. 47), though he 
notes how "instinctive# (1914b, p. 48) it is to regard them as objects.•• 
Perhaps most telling is his consideration and rejection of a 
Fregean position: 
But if there are simple objects, is it correct to call 
both the signs for them and those other signs [i.e., signs 
for complexes) •names"? 
Or is "name" so to speak a logical concept? 
Names signalise what is common to a single form and a 
single content ••• (1914b, pp. 52-53). 
The question being raised in the second paragraph pertains to whether 
names must be characterized merely in terms of their logical role as ar-
gument, or whether it is possible to go further by explaining their po-
tential for reference. we have seen in a previous chapter that Frege is 
skeptical about the latter possibility. He believed that at most the 
relations between symbols and their referents could be the subject of 
eludidations or metaphors such as "satisfaction," "falling under," and 
the like. From Frege Wittgenstein would inherit a sense for the prob-
lematic nature of a theory of reference, but from Russell and Moore he 
inherited a realism that requires reference and the referents of names 
98 Interestingly, the very next entry into the Notebooks, one day 
later on 14 May 1915, finds its way into the Tractatus at 4.002: 
"Language is a part of our organism, and no less complicated than it" 
(1914b, p. 48). As I mentioned earlier, I believe Wittgenstein's natu-
ralism emerges very early in his career. This entry constitutes one of 
its earliest and most forcible expressions.--Slightly more contentious 
is Wittgenstein's remark in the "Notes on Logic," which found its way 
into the Tractatus at 4.1121 that "[e)pistemology is the philosophy of 
psychology (1913, p. 106). Be that as it may, naturalism--as discussed 
in the Introduction to this work--is implicit in the methodology em-
ployed by adherents of relational theories of awareness and judgment. 
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to be characterized. 10• When Wittgenstein says, u[n]ames signalise what 
is common to a single form and a single content ••• " (1914b, p. 53), he 
takes his stand against Frege and with Russell and Moore. 1• 1 What is 
common to "a single form and a single content" are the objects whose 
various possibilities for combination correspond to the form of the 
proposition (thereby constituting its sense) and whose actual combina-
tion constitute the proposition's content or meaning. 102 The fact of the 
matter is that Wittgenstein's distinction between sense and meaning 
(which is first and foremost a metaphysical distinction between possible 
and actual states of affairs) along with the ontology of the Picture 
Theory required to sustain it are the outcome of philosophical investi-
gations initially undertaken to secure, among other things, inferences 
from --P to P. Securing the possibility of an adequate theory of infer-
ence without falling prey to Russell's Paradox was the task with which 
Wittgenstein began his philosophical career. The point is that the dif-
ference between Frege and Wittgenstein is not merely a difference in 
program or research goal. Wittgenstein began with very much the same 
goal as Frege, but found that the theory of inference needs to be 
grounded in the theory of reference. Thus, "if the general description 
of the world is like a stencil of the world, the names pin it to the 
100 In the 1903 Principles of Mathematics, a work with which 
Wittgenstein was very familiar, Russell says: 
That the meaning of an assertion about all men or any man 
is different from the meaning of an equivalent assertion 
about the concept man, appears to me, I must confess, to be 
a self-evident truth--as evident as the fact that proposi-
tions about John are not about the name John (1903, p.90). 
For further discussion see Coffa (1993), pp. 100-107. 
101 Of course his Fregean inheritance would become manifest in his un-
willingness to regard sentences like this one as straightforwardly 
truth-functional. 
102 The word "content" ( Inhal ts) is here used as a synonym for the 
"meaning" of a sentence. It is what corresponds to (or fails to corre-
spond to) a propositional sign's structure; the term is used in the 
Tractatus at 2.025, 3.13, and 3.31. The sense of a proposition are the 
array of possibilities that correspond to its form. 
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world so that the world is wholly covered by it (1914b, p.53). 
But what are the simple objects that make up the substance of the 
world? No answer is given. Looking back upon his work years later, he 
would remark to Malcolm, 
••• that at that time his thought had been that he was a 
logician~ and that it was not his business, as a logician, 
to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple 
thing or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical mat-
terl (Malcolm, 1972, p. 86). 
In spite of the fairly obvious objection that any nameable object could 
turn out to be complex, Wittgenstein would maintain that "the infinite-
ly complex si~uation seems to be a chimera" (1914b, p.50), and that em-
pirical science could prove it to be such. 
Wittgenstein's view is not so ludicrous as common sense might 
think. The common sense idea that objects are located in a space that 
is infinitely divisible and of infinite extent is a Newtonian idea~ it 
is one that was as contentious in Newton's time as it was in Russell's 
and Wittgenstein's time. Wittgenstein's own view is similar to 
Leibniz's in that both regard space as an emergent property of objects 
(monads in Leibniz's case) that make up the substance of the world. 
This appears to be what Wittgenstein has in mind when he says, uspace, 
time and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects" (1922b, 
2. 0251). ' 0 ' Needless to say, if relativity theory or the theory of quan-
103 This does not constitute a major divergence from the use of "form" 
described earlier in this dissertation. The form of a proposition just 
is its truth-conditions. The truth-conditions are none other than the 
possible ways in which objects named may be related to one another. So 
to speak of the form of an object just is to speak of its possibilities 
for combination: 
Objects contain the possibility of all situations. 
The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is 
the form of an object (1922b, 2.014-2.0141). 
Black describes the form of an object as ua power or capacity to com-
bine with other objects in atomic facts: objects have different logical 
forms when they have different liberties of association" (1964, p. 55). 
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ta are true, then the Newtonian picture is incorrect. 10• 
My principal concern with the argument up to this point is not 
that countenancing simple objects requires one to abandon the idea of 
space as infinitely divisible. At least, I am not concerned with the 
intelligibility of that idea. What is difficult to understand is how to 
reconcile that possibility with Wittgenstein's contention that: 
the propositions of our everyday language, just as they 
stand, are in perfect logical order.--That utterly simple 
thing, which we have to formulate here, is not a likeness of 
the truth, but the truth in its entirety (1922b, 5.5563). 
For if the substance of the world is without the kinds of attributes at-
tributed to it by Newtonian physics and by and large by common sense, 
then everyday language (Umgangssprache) cannot be in perfect logical 
order, since the propositions which comprise it would all be false! The 
point is.that one cannot give up the idea of infinite divisibility with-
out modifying one's conception of ordinary, composite objects. What 
sense can be made out of the idea of a composite object composed of non-
spatial and non-temporal objects? If the objects to which we ascribe 
extension as well as the extensionless objects that supposedly make up 
the substance of the world are of equal ontological standing, then the 
manner of their relating constitutes a metaphysical mystery on a par 
with how Aquinas' God could cause Aquinas' universe or how Descartes' 
,~ Even though Wittgenstein's later discussions with members of the 
Vienna Circle suggest he is willing for elementary proposition to be 
very unlike the propositions of ordinary language (cf. Waismann, 1979, 
p. 42), it might appear we are getting Wittgenstein out of the pot and 
into the fire by invoking the possibility of non-Newtonian physics. The 
so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is now 
accepted by most physicists, appears to entail subjectivism (which would 
be contrary to the realism of the Tractatus), primarily in its interpre-
tation of the law of excluded middle as not holding for objects within 
its domain. Clearly, that would make quanta ineligible as 
Wittgensteinian simple objects, since bipolarity requires the exclusion 
of the middle in order for sense to be determinate. Recently, however, 
Albert (1993) has argued that Bohm's alternative interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics can avoid these un-Wittgensteinian consequences. 
Russell (1925) was concerned to dispel similar fears concerning 
Einstein's research. 
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mind could cause motion in Descartes' body. The alternative is to not 
think of ordinary objects as sharing an equal ontological footing. For 
example, they might be construed along phenomenalistic lines, that is, 
as having a kind of existence in virtue of their relation(s) to perceiv-
ing subjects. But this just does not square with the realism that ani-
mates the Tractatus, and certainly it is not consistent with the claim 
that "the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are 
in perfect logical order" (1922b, 5.5563). 
Here an interesting objection can be raised against the exposition 
of the Tractatus thus far offered in this dissertation. This disserta-
tion has gone 'to great lengths to argue that the Tractatus is a realist 
work; and that, indeed, Wittgenstein is to be regarded as more of a re-
alist than Frege, who, we have argued, is to be understood as advocating 
a minimalist conception of semantics. Perhaps the principal criticism 
facing this line of interpretation stems from Wittgenstein's remarks 
about solipsism in the Tractatus. Such claims as that "[t)he world is 
my world" (1922b, 5.62) seem hard to reconcile with realism. The burden 
of meeting this objection will have to be postponed until Section Three 
below. There reasons shall be given for why the remarks on solipsism 
should be regarded as semantic rather than metaphysical theses. The 
trick to this is to explain how this is possible without lapsing into 
Fregean minimalism. 
Although the problem of how composite objects are related to non-
composite ones is not articulated in the Tractatus, a solution does seem 
to be posed within the work. The solution is to draw an ontological 
distinction between molecular facts (Tatsachen) and atomic facts or 
states of affairs (Sachverhalten) such that the former are not reducible 
to the latter. For this to be the case the Grundgedanke of the 
Tractatus must be true. The distinction between Tatsachen and 
Sachverhalten, and the thesis that the logical constants are not refer-
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ring terms, together constitute a theory of how the composite can con-
sist of the non-composite. Although all Wittgenstein scholars admit 
that an adequate account of Tractarian semantics requires a discussion 
of the logical constants (particularly since the sentences of ordinary 
language are to be analyzed into sets of sentences or formulae contain-
ing them), few if any appear to recognize that the compositionality of 
the Picture Theory hangs on such an account. Nevertheless that there is 
a connection between the two seems clear: 
The possibility of propositions is based on the principle 
that objects have signs as their representatives. 
My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are 
not representatives; that there can be no representatives of 
the logic of facts (1922b, 4.0312). 
It is quite relevant that the Grundgedanke follows, within the same num-
bered passage, a claim fundamental to the Picture Theory concerning the 
necessity of names. Typically when Wittgenstein does this it means he 
regards the two sentences either as different elucidations of the very 
same point or as being such that the former entails (i.e., presupposes) 
the latter. It is to the Grundgedanke that we turn in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE GRUNDGEDANKE OF THE TRACTATUS 
1. Introductory Remarks. 
Wittgenstein's fundamental idea is that the logical constants--
i.e., the sentence-forming operators of the propositional or sentential 
logic, the quantifiers of the predicate logic, as well as the identity 
sign--play no referential role. Unlike names they do not refer to any 
sort of thing. Elsewhere in the Tractatus he would state the point by 
saying "that -t;here are no logical objects" (1922b, 5.4). 
Concern over the status of the logical constants occurs very early 
in Wittgenstein's career. Its earliest expression, and indeed the first 
statement of the Grundgedanke, is found in a 22 June 1912 letter to 
Russell: 
Logic is still in the melting pot but one thing gets more 
and more obvious to me: The propositions of Logic contain 
ONLY apparent variables and whatever may turn out to be the 
proper explanation of apparent variables, its consequences 
must be that there are NO logical constants. 
Logic must turn out to be a totally different kind than 
any other science (1912, p. 120). 
Here we see Wittgenstein's concern with the variables of the predicate 
logic. His concern with the sentence-forming operators of the proposi-
tional logic would remain primarily (though not always 10") focused upon 
the negation sign. We have already seen that the problem of negation 
(and related problems) forced Wittgenstein to reject Moore's relational 
theory of judgment. A 25 November 1914 entry in the Notebooks states: 
It is the dualism, positive and negative facts, that 
gives me no peace. For such a dualism can't exist. But how 
to get away from it? 
All this would get solved of itself if we understood the 
105 A letter to Russell, dated some time during 1912, mentions the 
disjunction sign and the predicate logic variables together (1912, p. 
121). 
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nature of the proposition (1914b, p. 33). 
The identity sign would also be acknowledged early on as problematic: 
Identity is the very Devil and immensely important~ very 
much more so than I thought. It hangs--like everything 
else--directly together with the most fundamental questions, 
especially with the questions concerning the occurrence of 
the same argument in different places of a function (1912, 
P.123). 
we have already introduced the principal considerations bearing 
upon the status of both the quantifiers and the identity sign, and for 
that reason they shall only receive cursory treatment here. Reasons for 
thinking (1) that quantified expressions contribute to the sense of a 
propositional sign only by virtue of being abbreviations for logical 
products and logical sums in which singular terms occur, and (2) that 
the identity sign does not contribute to the sense of a propositional 
sign at all were evinced in the course of the argument for logical atom-
ism. If I am correct, the final component of the Grundgedanke--namely, 
(3) that the sentence-forming operators of the propositional or senten-
tial logic are not referring expressions--is a claim crucial to estab-
lishing Wittgenstein's particular brand of atomism. To be sure, the 4's 
of the Tractatus do initiate a lengthy discussion of possible counter-
examples to the Picture Theory that include molecular propositions, sci-
entific laws, normative claims and propositional attitude ascriptions. 
However important it is to establish that molecular propositions do not 
constitute a counter-example to the Picture Theory, the greater impor-
tance of the third clause of the Grundgedanke consists in its role in 
establishing a metaphysical distinction between facts (Tatsachen) and 
states of affairs (Sachverhalten). 
2. Problems with Molecular Propositions. 
It should be fairly clear why molecular propositions pose a prob-
lem for the Picture Theory. The presence of sentence-forming operators 
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within a propositional sign poses a dilemma: either there are more ele-
ments within the propositional sign than there are objects to be depict-
ed, in which case we have a failure of isomorphism, or isomorphism does 
obtain, in which case negative, disjunctive, conjunctive, and condition-
al facts must be admitted into the ontology. Wittgenstein resolves the 
dilemma by passing through its horns: he denies that a propositional 
sign containing sentence-forming operators possesses more referring ex-
pressions than there are objects to be depicted, and he denies that 
there are negative and other kinds of molecular facts and offers instead 
an ontology o~ Tatsachen and Sachverhalten. The operators, in turn, ex-
press various attitudes towards propositional signs. Affirmation and 
denial are two such attitudes~ and, though not discussed by Wittgenstein 
in the Tractatus, analogous attitudes are expressed by disjunction, con-
junction and material implication signs. Rather than having to intro-
duce negative, disjunctive (etc.) facts to account for the semantic 
properties of these symbols, truth tables may be used to define them 
functionally. Thus the truth-values of molecular propositions may be 
represented as truth-functions of elementary propositions. For example, 
sentences with the same structure as "Either Carnap wrote the Aufbau, or 
Wittgenstein did, but not both" could be represented by the final column 
in the following chart: 
p Q p V Q -(P & Q) (P V Q) & -(P & Q) 
T T T F F 
T F T T T 
F T T T T 
F F F T ~" 
The column represents the sense of the proposition, i.e., its possibili-
1~ Wittgenstein does not employ the standard table used here. Be 
typically employs rows where today we use columns. Thus, (FTTF) (P,Q) 
would represent the final column in the table above (1922b, 5.101). At 
places he also employs his ab-notation (1922b, 6.1203). 
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ties for truth or falsehood under different conditions; the row that 
corresponds to what is actually the case with respect to P and Q repre-
sents the meaning of the proposition. 101 Nothing contributes to the 
truth-value of the molecular proposition other than that which con-
tributes to the truth-values of the elementary propositions. 
The question we now face is: what argument can be given in sup-
port of the Grundgedanke for sentence-forming operators? We today have 
become so accustomed to the truth table definitions for connectives that 
the matter hardly seems one for which an argument is even necessary. 
This dogmatic attitude is not justified. It is hardly a self-evident 
truth that negation, disjunction, and the rest are, as it were, con-
tributed by the subject who judges or speaks rather than a part of the 
objective content of the judgment. Sartre (1975), for example, argues 
that in a certain respect negativity is objective. His most famous ex-
ample consists of a description of what one experiences when one dis-
covers the absence of a friend from a particular setting: one expects 
to meet Pierre at the cafe, but instead one finds he is not there. 
According to Sartre, one is encountering the negative fact (negatite) 
that Pierre is not in the cafe. "It is an objective fact at present 
that I have discovered this absence, and it presents itself as a syn-
thetic relation between Pierre and the setting in which I am looking for 
him" (1975, p. 42). The point is that phenomenologically at least it 
seems as if the negativity belongs to the content of the judgment--i.e., 
101 One interesting consequence of Wittgenstein's view is that propo-
sitions that differ in terms of sense may have the very same meaning. 
This is a harmless consequence, given what Wittgenstein means by usense" 
and "meaning". Notice that the same may be said for Fregean semantics. 
Sentences with very diverse senses (such as "Snow is white" and uGrass 
is green") may both mean (bedeuten) the very same thing, namely, the 
True. This is a very undesirable consequence for Frege if that philoso-
pher is understood as advancing metaphysical distinctions in distin-
guishing between the Bedeutung of a name and that of a concept-word. 
The previous chapter argues for a more charitable interpretation of 
Frege's work. 
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to what one believes, not to how one believes it. Sartre, it should be 
noted, is well aware of, and argues against, the obvious criticism that 
what one is encountering is a positive fact other than the fact one ex-
pected to encounter and that the negativity seemingly encountered is to 
be explained by the fact that one's expectations were denied. Other 
persons who do not share one's expectations would not encounter the neg-
ative fact at all; and that shows that what one is experiencing is not 
objective in nature. But against this Sartre maintains that the very 
possibility of forming expectations (or of asking questions or engaging 
in projects) presupposes what he refers to as "a prejudicative compre-
hension of non-being" (1975, p. 39). Before one even forms the judgment 
that Pierre is not in the cafe one may be aware of the possibility of 
Pierre not being in the cafe. Hence, "non-being does not come to things 
by a negative judgment; it is the negative judgment, on the contrary, 
which is conditioned and supported by non-being" ( 1975, p. 42) •101 
Quite apart from phenomenological considerations, other reasons 
can be advanced in support of negative facts. Interestingly, Russell 
(1918) was willing to countenance such facts precisely at the time in 
his career when he was perhaps most influenced by Wittgenstein. That 
Russell would hold this view as late as he did is particularly surpris-
ing in light of what he says concerning disjunction: 
There are, of course, two propositions corresponding to 
every fact, one true and one false. There are no false 
facts, so you cannot get one fact for every proposition but 
only for every pair of propositions. All that applies to 
atomic propositions. But when you take such a proposition a 
'P or g', 'Socrates is mortal or Socrates is living still', 
,~ Sartre's views are considerably more complicated than this, espe-
cially given his willingness to say that there is a certain respect in 
which negativity is conferred upon states of affairs by consciousness. 
Negativity is "made to be" by a consciousness that always transcends it-
self and takes as its object something other than itself. As he puts 
it, " ••• transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; 
that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not 
itself" (1975, p. 23). A fuller discussion of Sartre's so-called onto-
logical argument may be found in Levvis (1980). 
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there you will have two different facts involved in the 
truth or falsehood of your proposition 'P or g'. I do not 
suppose there is in the world a single disjunctive fact cor-
responding to 'P or g'. It does not look plausible that in 
the actual objective world there are facts going about which 
you could describe as 'P or g' ••• You must not look for an 
object you can call 'or', and say 'Now, look at this. This 
is "or"'(1918, pp. 71-72). 
Here Russell is in full agreement with Wittgenstein: the truth-value of 
the disjunction is wholly determined by the truth-values of its dis-
juncts, there are no disjunctive facts, and there is no object corre-
sponding to the word "or" which may be the constituent of any fact. 
Even the claim that two propositions correspond to each fact is one with 
which Wittgenstein would agree, provided "proposition" is interpreted as 
synonymous with "propositional sign. " 100 
Russell does not provide an argument for his view, so it is hard 
to tell how far he is willing to travel with Wittgenstein in these mat-
ters. He does say that one will "get into trouble" (1918, p. 72), if 
one attempts to analyze "P or Q" in any way other than that described 
here. It is quite likely that troubles that would arise for the theory 
of inference weigh upon Russell. If one thinks "P or Q" is made true by 
something other than what makes P true, or by what makes Q true, or (as-
suming inclusivity) both by what makes P true and by what makes Q true, 
then one is committed to the thesis that: 
(A) It is possible that P or Q is true, but that "P or Q" 
is not true. 
109 For Wittgenstein tokens of the propositional signs P and -P have 
the same sense as well as the same meaning, even though--in a sense to 
be described below--they are used to express or assert different propo-
sitions. This will become clearer below when we consider Wittgenstein's 
definition of a proposition as a propositional sign in its projective 
relation to the world. In an important respect there may be, for 
Wittgenstein, innumerable propositions "corresponding" to a given fact, 
depending upon the type of projective relation or propositional attitude 
tokened in a particular thought or utterance. Wittgenstein's attempt to 
find the sole logical constant is part of a strategy to whittle down the 
number of necessary projective relations. That strategy rests upon 
questionable assumptions concerning the relation between parsimony and 
ontology. 
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This already sounds somewhat paradoxical; however, acceptance of (A) re-
quires the truth predicate within the noun clause in the first disjunct 
to be taken distributively; consequently, one cannot generate a paradox 
simply by placing "P or Q" in that conjunct in the formal mode. It 
would only be permissible to restate (A) as: 
(B) It is possible that Pis true or Q is true, but that "P 
or Q" is not true. 
The point is that the truth of P or of Q (or even of both Pas well as 
Q) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the truth of "P or 
Q." Obviously, if this is so, then distributive laws in mathematics and 
logic must be regarded as illegitimate; that alone would suffice to 
bring despair to the author of Principia Mathematica. But consider, 
too, the consequences of taking (B) seriously. Assume to be actual what 
(B) maintains is possible, namely: 
(C) Pis true or Q is true, but "P or Q" is not true. 
What makes the second conjunct of (C) true? One wants to say that it is 
made true by neither P nor Q being the case, however it follows from the 
fact that P's and Q's truth is necessary but not sufficient for the 
truth of "P or Q" that their falsehood may be sufficient yet not neces-
sary for the falsehood of "P or Q." It is not necessary for P to be 
false or for Q to be false or even for both to be false in order for "P 
or Q" to be false. 110 Russell's (and Wittgenstein's) adversary is there-
by committed to the thesis that: 
(D) It is possible both that Pis true and Q is true, and 
that "P or Q" is not true. 
How this is possible need not detain us; presumably it requires P and Q 
somehow to be true in the "absence" of the object designated by "or." 
Here what is interesting is that since it is not necessary for P or for 
,,o I am assuming bivalence throughout this discussion, so that "is 
not true" and "is false" are synonymous. This is a safe assumption so 
long as we are dealing with Russell's views on the subject. 
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Q to be false in order for 11 P or on to be false, one cannot infer from 
the second (embedded) conjunct of (D)--via one of De Morgan's Laws--both 
that Pis false and Q is false, thereby achieving a contradiction in 
conjunction with the first (embedded) conjunct of (D). 111 The commit-
ments of Russell's adversary (for example, to (A)) appear on the surface 
to be paradoxical. But then upon examination we find they are not even 
that, because they undermine the forms of inference necessary for demon-
strating their paradoxical nature. This bears further explanation. 
The above considerations suffice to show that, according, to the 
view which rei~ies disjunction, none of the following sequents would be 
valid: P ]- (P v Q); Q ]- (P v Q); (P & 0) ]- (P v Q); -(P v Q) ]- (-P & 
-Q); -(P v Q) ]- (-P v -Q). Proponents of that view must hold that it 
is possible for the formulae corresponding to all five of five sequents 
to be simultaneously false (or that their negations form a consistent 
set). Yet, using a standard truth table, the conjunction of their nega-
tions can be shown to be inconsistent; and by using fairly standard 
rules of inference that very formula can be shown to produce a contra-
diction. 112 Needless to say, such procedures (employing a standard 
truth table or engendering a reductio via rules like modus ponens or 
modus tollens) would be regarded as wholly question-begging, since on 
the view under consideration operations upon formulae do not preserve 
the propositions expressed by the formulae upon which such operations 
(or transformations) are performed. That is to say, the view under con-
sideration has it that propositions are individuated purely in terms of 
111 De Morgan's Law applied to the second conjunct--i.e., -(P v Q)--
would yield -P & -Q. Using the first conjunct of (D) we may derive: 
◊[(P & Q) & (-P & -Q)] and consequently ◊(P & -P) and ◊(0 & -Q). Here 
the claim is not that P and Qare bivalent, but that each and its con-
tradictory can be true simultaneously. These contradictions cannot be 
derived, if it is not necessary for P or Q to be false for "P or Q" to 
be false. 
112 In fact, a standard truth table will show that the negations of 
any of the formulae corresponding to these sequents are contradictions 
(if material implication is used in place of the derivation sign). 
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the formal features of formulae used to express them. 113 So, for exam-
ple, the conjunction of the five conditionals (corresponding to these-
quents referred to above) into a single formula would result in a string 
that contains more content than that contained in the list of non-con-
joined sequents. The conjunction sign, in this instance, introduces ad-
ditional reference than that contained merely in the list. 
The fact is that if one holds that the disjunction sign is a re-
ferring term but retains the (now) standard conception of the other op-
erators, then the view in question leads to contradiction and paradox. 
If, on the oth~r hand, one treats all operators as referring terms, then 
the view being considered becomes immune to such criticism, but only be-
cause that view then entails that inference itself is impossible, since 
no operations upon (or transformations of) formulae could lay claim to 
being truth-preserving. Taxonomies of propositions in purely formal 
terms appear to be too fine-grained to support what seem quite naturally 
to be valid inferences. If one is inclined to think there are such 
things as valid inferences, then one is likely to see in the above con-
siderations grounds for drawing a semantically relevant distinction be-
tween sentences and formulae and the statements made by them. And if 
one is inclined to make that distinction, one is likely to regard any 
thesis that runs so far in the opposite direction--such as the thesis 
that the disjunction sign is a referring term--as having received its 
113 This view has had its defenders even outside what is traditional-
ly regarded as the formalist camp. We saw in an earlier chapter that 
even Frege at one point was willing to say that the difference in order 
between formulae such as P v Q and Q v P sufficed for them to have dif-
ferent senses. More recently the view has found expression in Fodor's 
(1980) formality condition, according to which differences in content 
correspond to structural differences among tokens within a language of 
thought. The structures of these tokens should not be confused with the 
surface structures of natural language strings; there are, if anything, 
to be identified with something akin to a Chomskian deep structure. 
(However, see arguments by Barman (1973) in support of the claim that 
structures in a language of thought must be isomorphic to those within 
natural language.) Fodor (1994) has tempered his view by abandoning the 
methodological solipsism central to his computational semantics. 
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due reductio. But it is perfectly possible for the would-be opponent to 
bite the bullet here, and to say there is indeed no such thing as valid 
inference. There is nothing that precludes wedding the referential ac-
count of operators to a conventionalist account of inference. We need 
not stop to consider the prospects of such a marriage here. That valid-
ity and invalidity might be a matter of convention would have been an 
idea repugnant to Russell, but it is not a view that is unintelligible. 
What is surprising is that Russell would discharge the idea that 
the disjunction sign refers, but accept (albeit with hesitation) that 
the negation sign is a referring term. surely Russell was aware of the 
problems this view holds for the theory of inference. These very con-
cerns had led Wittgenstein to insist upon the bipolarity of the proposi-
tion and a distinction between showing and saying. Russell resisted 
these moves preferring instead to bolster his relational theory of 
judgment. 
In the lectures published as The Philosophy of Logical Atomism 
Russell considers the opinion of a student, Demos, who holds that "when 
we assert 'not-p' we are really asserting that there is some proposition 
g which is true and is incompatible with p ••• "(1918, p. 76). So, for 
example, the sentence "This chalk is not red" is used to assert that 
there is some proposition (namely, "This chalk is white") with which it 
is inconsistent and which happens to be true. One uses the negative 
form, because one is ignorant of the actual proposition that is true, or 
because one is interested in the falsehood of a given proposition (1918, 
p. 76). 
Russell's objection is that "it makes incompatibility [a) funda-
mental and objective fact, which is not so much simpler than allowing 
negative facts" (1918, p. 76). Russell provides two arguments. First, 
to analyze negative propositions in this way simply reintroduces molecu-
lar propositions. To say "This chalk is not red" is just to say "There 
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is some proposition which is true and is incompatible with 'This chalk 
is red"' (1918, p. 76). The result is a conjunctive fact, and presum-
ably conjunctive facts are as problematic as disjunctive ones. 114 
Second, incompatibility cannot be a fundamental and objective 
fact, as the theory appears to entail, since incompatibility is a rela-
tion that holds between propositions not facts. "It is clear that no 
two facts are incompatiblew (1918, p. 77). And, thus, Russell resigns 
himself to the existence of negative facts. 
Wittgenstein would not have found these arguments convincing. 
Concerning the second argument: Russell may be right that no two facts 
are incompatible: however, the same cannot be said of possible facts. 
Russell's own contention is a bit like comparing apples and oranges. If 
it is a fact that a given ball is round and it is fact that it is red, 
then those two facts cannot be incompatible, since they cannot both 
occur. However the occurrence of some possible facts precludes the oc-
currence of other possible facts. So the fact that a ball is red pre-
cludes its being green. It is to the objectivity of mutually exclusive 
possibilities that one becomes committed upon accepting Wittgenstein's 
distinction between sense and meaning. The sense of "The ball is red" 
consists of a set of possible facts differing in terms of the coloration 
of the ball. The sentence "The ball is red" means that the ball is red 
(provided it is true) or that it is some other color (if it is false). 
If we bear in mind that for Wittgenstein meanings are actual facts and 
states of affairs, we can see that Russell fails do justice to the sense 
side of the sense/meaning distinction. Why he would do so is not clear, 
especially since his willingness to countenance abstract and potentially 
uninstantiated entities like properties counts against an over-concern 
with postulating intensional entities. Here though the possibilities 
114 For example, sentences taking the form, respectively, of P and P & 
P would have to treated as having different truth-conditions, as not en-
tailing one another, etc. 
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belong to actual existent objects; we are not discussing "free floating" 
real but non-existent objects. Possible facts are not, for example, 
Platonic entities of any sort. Anyhow, if Russell's second argument is 
intended as a reductio, it fails, since it is not absurd to countenance 
there being objective incompatibilities in this sense. 
Regarding the first argument: Russell maintains that positing ob-
jective incompatibilities leaves one with molecular facts; however if 
the sense/meaning distinction is born in mind, then at most one is com-
mitted to the objectivity of possibility (i.e., to objects that actually 
exist possessing possibilities for combination).m Possible facts and 
states of affairs are objective in that they are not mind-dependent, 
however that does not in any way entail that what is merely possible is 
actual or existent. Russell seems to elevate what is merely possible to 
the same level as what is possible and actual. By collapsing the dis-
tinctions between sense and meaning, on the one hand, and between what 
is merely possible and what is actual, on the other hand, Russell is 
left in the sort of quandary that left Moore positing entities with 
being but not existence. Like Moore, he is left asserting there is both 
what is and what is not. The truth however is that the affirmative and 
negative propositional signs share the same sense and (following the 
Notebooks use of the word) the same meaning, and it is their meaning 
(i.e., what actually occurs) that determines their truth-value. 
Wittgensteinian semantics thus offers an alternative to this morass. 
115 One point of interest is the inconsistency of Russell's two argu-
ments. If the second argument were to be sound, then the conjunctive 
fact to which we referred in the first argument would be a fact whose 
constituents are propositions. Recall that the conjunctive fact was 
represented by "There is some proposition which is true and [it] is in-
compatible with 'This chalk is red'" (1918, p. 76). But for Russell 
propositions cannot be facts (1918, p. 77); a fortiori there cannot be 
conjunctive facts. Russell would have done better to unpack the word 
"incompatible" in modal terms--perhaps as " ••• and it is necessarily not 
'This chalk is red'". This would have permitted him to show that the 
negation had not been eliminated at all. 
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we have considered some of the arguments that might be offered in 
support of negative facts and have noted both the difficulties of the 
view as well as the reasons why Wittgenstein would have thought positing 
negative facts unnecessary. we have yet to see any sort of positive ar-
gument in support of the thesis that the sentence-forming operators do 
not function as referring terms. We have also yet to see any positive 
characterization of their semantic role. 
Commentary on the argument for the Grundgedanke is varied. 
McDonough (1986) devotes an entire chapter to the subject, but nowhere 
is the Grundgedanke presented as anything other than a basic 
assumption. 110 Black (1964) suggests two sources for Wittgenstein's fun-
damental idea. One is his view on the interdefinability of logical con-
nectives; the other, deeper, source is related to uthe impossibility of 
116 See McDonough ( 1986) pp. 35 and 39. McDonough presents the 
Grundgedanke for sentence-forming operators as a premise in an argument 
designed to show that P and -P have the same sense. Given the greater 
generality of the Grundgedanke, such an argument would beg the question. 
The historical evidence cited in Chapter One suggests that Wittgenstein 
worked out his answer to the problem of negation (i.e., the bipolarity 
of the proposition) prior to the Grundgedanke. Indeed, we have demon-
strated that conclusions concerning the sense and meaning of P and -P 
can be reached without using the Grundgedanke as a premise. McDonough's 
views will not receive much attention in this work, as they fail to ac-
commodate the sense/meaning distinction so important to Wittgenstein. 
Instead McDonough draws a distinction between what he refers to as the 
sense1 and sense2 of a proposition. The former he defines as a proposi-
tion's "projection, or representation of that which is relevant to its 
truth value" (1986, p. 39). Obviously this is vague enough to refer to 
either the sense or the meaning of a propositional sign. (His use of 
"projection" is questionable too, as will become clearer in the next 
section.) The "sense2" of a proposition he defines as an attitude to-
ward a proposition (1986, p. 28), so that P and -P have identical 
sense1 •s but opposite sense2 •s. There is little evidence in the text to 
support such a reading of usense," except when Wittgenstein speaks of 
the negation sign as reversing the sense of a propositional sign (1922b, 
5.2341). That and the surrounding passages of the text, however, are 
concerned with the nature of logical operations generally, and in that 
context it is clear that reversing the sense of a proposition means 
something like adopting a different attitude towards a given subset of 
possible facts or states of affairs; specifically it involves: taking 
a given member of the subset of the complement of P to be true. 
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depicting the form of representation" (1964, p. 174). McGuiness (1974) 
traces the Grundgedanke historically back to Wittgenstein's ideas con-
cerning the bipolarity of the proposition and to the need for genuine 
propositions to make a discrimination among facts. 111 There is much 
truth to Black's and McGuiness's suggestions, but the treatment each 
gives the subject is largely incomplete. What is the relationship be-
tween interdefinability, the impossibility of representing logical form, 
and bipolarity? 
we will begin with what seems to be the most explicit argument for 
something like the Grundgedanke (for sentence-forming operators) occur-
ring within the Tractatus. The argument occurs in the series of com-
ments following Tractatus 4.06, and it appears primarily to be concerned 
with the negation sign: 
A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of 
being a picture of reality. 
It must not be overlooked that a proposition has a sense 
that is independent of the facts: otherwise one can easily 
suppose that true and false are relations of equal status 
between signs and what they signify. 
In that case one could say, for example, that 'P' signi-
fied in a true way what '-p' signified in a false way, etc. 
Can we not make ourselves understood with false proposi-
tions just as we have done up to now with true ones?--So 
long as it is known that they are meant to be false.--Nol 
For a proposition is true if we use it to say that things 
stand in a certain way, and they do; and if by 'P' we mean 
-p and things stand as we mean that they do, then, construed 
in the new way, 'P' is true and not false. 
But it is important that the signs 'P' and •-p' can say 
the same thing. For it shows that nothing in reality corre-
sponds to the sign'-' (1922b, 4.06-4.0621). 
First note that 4.06 (the first paragraph) is a remark about the 
nature of truth. A proposition is true if it pictures or depicts or 
shares a structure isomorphic to actual facts or states of affairs. The 
111 See also McGuiness ( 1988), pp. 307ff. 
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point is reiterated in 4.062 (the fourth paragraph), in which Wittgen-
stein says, "a proposition is true if we use it to say that things stand 
in a certain way, and they don (1922b, 4.062). In 4.061 (the second 
paragraph) we hear Wittgenstein's rejection of of the sort of relational 
theory of judgment attributed earlier to Moore. To usuppose that true 
and false are relations of equal status between signs and what they sig-
nify" involves the countenancing of false facts. To eliminate the need 
to do so Wittgenstein draws a distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, 
and it is to this that he is referring in the first sentence of that 
paragraph. "[A] proposition has a sense that is independent of the 
facts" (1922b, 4.061) just means that the sense of a proposition con-
sists in a set of possible facts not all of which can be actual. It 
does not mean that senses are to be identified with Platonic entities or 
mental contents. 
Corresponding to the sense/meaning and form/structure distinc-
tions, there is, needless to say, the distinction between showing and 
saying. All this provides the backdrop to the remainder of 4.062 which 
supposedly provides grounds for believing that "nothing in reality cor-
responds to the sign'-'" (1922b, 4.0621). Purportedly 4.062 does this 
by demonstrating that "the signs 'P' and '-p' can say the same thing" 
(1922b, 4.0621). Whether it does establish that the two signs can say 
the same thing, and whether that entails that the negation sign does not 
function as a referring term remains to be seen. 
In 4.062 the question arises whether it is possible to "make our-
selves understood with false propositions just as we have done up till 
now with true ones ••• [s]o long as it is understood that they are meant 
to be false" (1922b, 4.062). This question Wittgenstein assimilates to 
that of whether it would be possible for information to be conveyed 
using the negative propositional sign in much the same way as it is con-
veyed when the positive one is used. Wittgenstein's view is that since 
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the negative propositional sign can function to convey truth, the very 
idea of -P representing in a false way (or of it representing false 
facts) is to be rejected. Although Wittgenstein does not expressly say 
so, it is likely he would view the negation sign under these circum-
stances as analogous to Frege's assertion sign (a sign for which 
Wittgenstein could see no use; cf. 1922b, 4.442). The absence of the 
"-" symbol would then be what indicates negation. The sort of case 
Wittgenstein asks us to imagine is comparable to the sort of thing that 
occurs on April Fool's Day in the United States: on that day it is the 
custom to treat sentences like "Your shoe is untied" as meaning nothing 
other than what "Your shoe is tied" means on the other days of the year. 
(Sarcastic remarks provide another example; consider a parent's remark 
to a teenager: " ••• so, you're going to drive the Mercedes to Spring 
Break ••• ". 118 That the very same state of affairs can be represented by 
the negation sign or its absence suffices, according to Wittgenstein, to 
show that the semantic role of the negation sign is determined solely by 
the use or interpretation given to it by language-users. If it were an 
element containing reference, then its presence or absence would make a 
difference. 
The argument is not convincing. First, convention is always in-
volved in the selection of names for objects; that I can call John "Jim" 
does not mean "John" has no referent. The argument sidesteps the real 
issue entirely. The question, it seems, would simply become one of 
whether the absence of"-" from a propositional sign--now interpreted as 
the operation of negation--is to be interpreted as a referring term. If 
the sarcastic tone or silence of a parent can be used to express nega-
tion, why cannot such silence or sarcasm be interpreted as pertaining to 
the fact that the teenager is not to take the Mercedes to Spring Break? 
(In a similar vein Pierre's absence from a cafe might be depicted by 
118 These two examples were suggested to me by Margaret Ayotte Levvis. 
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leaving a blank space in the shape of Pierre's silhouette somewhere 
within a painting of the cafe.) It almost seems as if Wittgenstein is 
leaning too heavily upon the narrower notion of pictorial structure as 
opposed to the broader notion of logical structure, so that sameness of 
content in spite of difference of structure counts as evidence of the 
sort needed. It is as though an actual physical element were needed. 
But clearly the absence of u_u does not necessarily constitute an ab-
sence of any symbol: blank spaces on a page or canvas, moments of si-
lence, etc. can function as symbols. 
Second, the whole idea that the negative proposition can replace 
the affirmative one without loss of function stems from the claim that 
any attempt to communicate by means of false propositions results in 
true ones. The false proposition is then assimilated to the negative 
one receiving an alternate interpretation. However it is quite ques-
tionable whether one could communicate the very same thing by means of 
false or negative propositions, even if they are reinterpreted. 
Typically there are many ways a proposition may be false, but only one 
way that it may be true. Consequently, the reinterpreted false or nega-
tive proposition would suffer from what might best be called an under-
determination of content. For example, uMy desk is made entirely of ma-
hogany" is made true by only one thing, namely, the fact that my desk 
is made entirely of mahogany. But it can be made false by any number of 
things: by its being made (partially or entirely) of oak, or cherry, or 
pine, etc. Suppose now that one belongs to a linguistic community that 
treats all utterances as false. If someone were to utter uMy desk is 
made of oak," the listener would understand by that what English speak-
ers understand by "It is false that my desk is oak.n But the listener 
would not know what material the desk is made of. The target meaning 
remains undetermined. 
This problem cannot be overcome by constructing an elaborate con-
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junction such as uMy desk is made of oak, and it is made of cherry, and 
it is made of pine, ••• ". What would the final conjunct of this sentence 
be? There are two possibilities. First, after listing all the possible 
materials out of which a desk may be constructed, one might add the 
clause " ••• and those are all the possible materials out of which desks 
are made." But if this is true, then it will not be interpreted as such 
by the members of our imaginary linguistic community. They will not be 
in a position to infer by a process of elimination that the speaker 
means what English speakers mean when they utter uMy desk is made en-
tirely of mahogany. " 110 A second possibility would be to add the clause 
" ••• and those are not all the possible materials out of which desks are 
made." This appears at first sight to be a better suggestion, since it 
would be interpreted as false, yielding what English speakers express by 
" ••• it is false that those are not all the possible materials out of 
which desks are made." The problem is that negation is expressed in our 
hypothetical language by the absence of a negation sign. Consequently, 
the presence of "not" in " ••• and those are not all the possible materi-
als out of which desks are made" cannot negate that from which the nega-
tion sign is absent. If Pin the hypothetical language is equivalent to 
-Pin English, then-Pin the hypothetical language is equivalent to -P 
in English as well. As Black (1964) points out, "repeated applications 
of [negation in the hypothetical language] reduce to a single applica-
tion of it (1964, p. 180). So, the second attempt to complete the elab-
119 The sort of practice described hear is actually customary among 
speakers of Malagasy in Madagascar. Speakers typically provide less in-
formation than is requested of them. For example, it would be typical 
for someone wanting to know whether there are fresh mangoes at the mar-
ket to be told "If you go to the market, you won't find bananas." The 
relevant sociolinguistic research may be found in Keenan (1977); a dis-
cussion of its philosophical relevance is to be found in Levvis (1987). 
Malagasy provides numerous counter-examples to the sort of view of con-
versational implicature advanced by Grice (1975). Such counter-examples 
are relevant to semantic theory, because a purely formal semantics (such 
as Frege's or Davidson's) must be supplemented by a Gricean account of 
implicature. 
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orate conjunction fares no better than the first. 120 It follows that the 
principal assumption underlying Wittgenstein's argument is false. 
The two lines of criticism introduced above pose a dilemma for 
Wittgenstein. Either the absence of the negation sign serves as a sym-
bol (as we might treat a blank space on a page), or it does not. If it 
does serve as a symbol, then the fact that as a matter of convention 
negation can be expressed in that manner does not permit us to conclude 
that the negation sign fails to refer (rendering the argument invalid). 
If it does not serve as a symbol (if it really is the absence of any 
symbol), then it is false that the same content may be communicated by a 
language that is entirely affirmative as opposed to one that is both af-
firmative and negative (thus rendering the argument unsound). 
In spite of its shortcomings, the argument of Tractatus 4.0621 is 
driven by an assumption that may well be relevant to the semantics of 
molecular propositions. And it is this assumption that plays a crucial 
role in a second and stronger argument for the Grundgedanke. If the 
number of constants could be viewed as variable without loss of content, 
given the way determinancy of sense requires element/object isomorphism, 
it would follow that their presence or absence neither adds to nor de-
tracts from the empirical content of a sentence. The problem with the 
argument at 4.0621 is that it attempts to eliminate a single connective. 
The argument from the interdefinability of the connectives, however, 
seeks not to eliminate single connectives but a whole group of connec-
tives at once. It is quite evident that this can be done. The first 
two columns of the following table represents the possible combinations 
of truth and falsehood with respect to two propositions P and Q. The 
sixteen columns represented in Table I show the possible values that may 
be assigned to molecular propositions containing P and Q. 
120 Matters go unchanged if a distinct symbol is introduced rather 
than the absence of a symbol; cf. Black (1964), pp. 179-180. 
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Column b, for example, represents the semantic properties of inclusive 
disjunction. Column e represents those of material implication when P 
is the antecendent and Q is the consequent. Column h represents those 
of conjunction. Columns a and p, respectively, represent molecular 
propositions that are tautologous and contradictory. 121 
Now it so happens that each of the columns can be expressed by 
formulae containing only the connectives"-" and,,_,, (thereby eliminat-
ing disjunction and conjunction), or the connectives ,,_,, and "v" ( elimi-
nating material implication and conjunction), or"-" and"&" (eliminat-
ing material implication and disjunction). For example, using just"-" 
and,,_,, column b (the column for disjunction) may be expressed by -P -
Q. One could use this formula to assert the very same thing as is as-
serted by P v Q. Similarly, that column could be expressed using only 
"-"and"&": - (-P & - Q). The point is that at least certain logical 
connectives may be defined in terms of other logical connectives. 
The second of Wittgenstein's arguments, which begins at Tractatus 
5.4, exploits this fact about the sentence-forming operators. There he 
says, 
At this point it becomes manifest that there are no 'log-
ical objects' or 'logical constants' (in Frege's or 
Russell's sense). 
The reason is that the results of truth-operations on 
truth-functions are always identical whenever they are one 
and the same truth-function of elementary propositions. 
121 Wittgenstein's table appears in slightly different form at 
Tractatus 5.101. The table I have used is closer to that used by 
Lemmon (1965), p. 70 and Haack (1978), p. 28. 
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It is self-evident that v, - are not relations in the 
sense that right and left etc. are relations. 
The interdefinability of Frege's and Russell's 'primitive 
signs' of logic is enough to show that they are not primi-
tive signs, still less signs for relations. 
And it is obvious that the•-• defined by means of '-' 
and 'v' is identical with the one that figures with'-' in 
the definition of 'v'i and the second 'v' is identical with 
the first one1 and so on. 
Even at first sight it seems scarcely credible that there 
should follow from one fact p infinitely many others, namely 
--p, ----p, etc. And it is no less remarkable that the in-
finite number of propositions of logic (mathematics) follow 
from a half dozen 'primitive propositions'. 
But in fact all the propositions of logic say the same 
t~ing, to wit nothing (1922b, 5.4-5.43). 
The key remark here is that "[t]he interdefinability of ••• 'primitive 
signs' of logic is enough to show that they are not primitive signs, 
still less signs for relations" (1922b, 5.42). The reason the question 
concerning indefinables (or primitive signs) is important is that, as 
indicated earlier, ineliminability is taken to be a criterion of onto-
logical commitment. That assumption is clearly at play within the argu-
ment. On Wittgenstein's view, it is purely an arbitrary or pragmatic 
matter which operations are treated as basic: 
The number of fundamental operations that are necessary 
depends solely on our notation. 
All that is required is that we should construct a system 
of signs with a particular number of dimensions--with a par-
ticular mathematical multiplicity (1922b, 5.474-5.475). 
And it is the interdefinability of the connectives--i.e., their poten-
tial for elimination--that demonstrates their arbitrary or pragmatic na-
ture. Indeed, Wittgenstein believes it is possible to derive all opera-
tions from a single logical operation. At 5.5 he introduces this opera-
tion saying, 
Every truth-function is a result of successive applica-
tions to elementary propositions of the operation 
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'(---T) (~, ••• )'. 
This operation negates all the propositions in the right-
hand pair of brackets, and I call it the negation of those 
propositions (1922b, 5.5). 
Here the contents of the left-hand set of brackets corresponds to a col-
umn within a truth table; the blank spaces correspond to F's. 
Specifically, it corresponds to column o of the the table provided 
above. The brackets to the right contain a set of propositional signs. 
The operation in question involves the simultaneous negation of all the 
members of that set. so if the set consists of P and O, then the matrix 
represents what in English is expressed by uNeither P, nor o." Thus the 
operation corresponds to what is usually referred to as the Sheffer 
stroke: P•O. 122 This formula, one can quickly see by using a truth 
table, is logically equivalent to -P & -0, -(P v 0), or -(-P - 0). 
That Pio is logically equivalent to formulae containing the other opera-
tors does not suffice to show, however, that the other operations may be 
defined in terms of it. To do that it is necessary to show that the ma-
trices corresponding to each of the connectives may be generated by re-
peated applications of 11 i 11 alone. In other words, it is necessary to 
show logical equivalences hold between those matrices and formulae con-
122 Wittgenstein introduces a variant symbolism almost immediately at 
5.502. That symbolism facilitates his introduction of the general form 
of proposition at Tractatus 6 and his discussion of numbers in para-
graphs 6.01-6.03. For the sake of simplicity the discussion here shall 
be formulated in terms of the stroke notation. 
On a historical note, Wittgenstein's selection of the stroke notation 
occurs as early as the 1913 Notes on Logic where he maintains "[t]he 
function pig is merely a mechanical instrument for constructing all pos-
sible symbols of ab-functions" (1913b, p. 103). Although the search for 
the sole logical constant is largely motivated by Wittgenstein's concern 
with what he regarded as Russell's and Whitehead's piecemeal introduc-
tion of the constants in Principia Mathematica, the fact that the stroke 
notation is explicitly linked to the ab-functions and, so, to concerns 
over bipolarity helps shed considerable light upon the argument for the 
Grundgedanke. What I intend to show below is that the Grundgedanke for 
sentence-forming operators follows from the thesis that all propositions 
are contingent. It is only in that context that the role of the sole 
logical constant can truly be appreciated. 
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taining only propositional variables and the symbol for joint negation. 
This can be done. PlP is equivalent to -P. (PlO)l(PlO) is equivalent 
to P v Q. (PlP)l (OlO) is the logical equivalent of P & Q. The matrix 
for material implication is shared by [(PlP)lOll[(PlP)lQ]. Finally, the 
formula corresponding to the matrix, found in column g, for logical 
equivalence or biconditionality may be treated in the following way. 
Bear in mind that that matrix is equivalent to (P - Q) & (0 - P). The 
first conjunct of this formula is [(PlP)lOll[(PlP)lQ]. The second con-
junct is [(OlO)lP]l[(OlO)lP]. Now we have noted above that (PlP)l (OlO) 
represents the conjunction of P and Q. Treating the conjuncts of the 
biconditional as substitution instances of P and Q yields: 
{{I (P+P) +QJH (P+P) +QI} HI (P~P) +QJH (P+P) +QI}} 'HI (Q+Q) +PJ H (Q+Q) tPI} HI (Q ♦Q) +PJ H (Q ♦Q) +Pl}} 
which requires twenty-three operations using the stroke notation to pro-
duce that particular matrix. (The same matrix can be reached using 
thirty-four operations, if one translates the logically equivalent -[(P 
- Q) - -(Q - P)] from which the conjunction sign has been eliminated.) 
We do not have to accept Wittgenstein's (and Russell's and 
Quine's) assumption that primitive terms convey ontological commitment 
in order to reach the desired conclusion. In fact, at this point in the 
argument it is no longer clear that Wittgenstein does accept this crite-
rion, since, if consistently applied, "l" would have to be treated as a 
referring term; but certainly Wittgenstein does not regard it as that. 
The assumption that should--and apparently does--operate within the ar-
gument is that which hails from the Picture Theory's thesis that deter-
minancy of sense is to be guaranteed by the isomorphism between the ele-
ments (or referring terms) within a propositional sign and the objects 
that are the referents of the propositional sign. Clearly, if the num-
ber of operators can be varied, even though the number of referring 
terms must remain invariant, then it follows that the operators are not 
referring terms. 
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This argument is much stronger than the first one. To begin with, 
its conclusion is the Grundgedanke for logical operators, not the more 
specific claim concerning negation alone. Obviously that conclusion can 
be deduced from this one. Next, the argument is valid: if all of a 
language's referring terms must be invariable, but none of a language's 
connectives are invariable, then none of a language's connectives are 
r~ferring terms. 
The problem with this argument is that it is a petitio principii. 
The argument is designed to show that the logical operators are not re-
ferring terms. That task is not so different from determining the for-
mal interpretation--i.e., the matrix corresponding to--each operator. 
Yet the argument presupposes the very matrices that stand in need of 
justification. For the simplest example of how this occurs consider the 
fact that every stroke operation subsequent to the first involves (at 
the very least) the operation of double negation. For example, we said 
that (P~P)~ (Q~Q) is logically equivalent to P & Q Informally (P~P)~ 
(Q~Q) may be translated: ult is not the case not-P and not-P, and it is 
not the case not-Q and not-0" (or uNeither neither P nor P, nor neither 
Q nor Q"). To regard the formula involving the stroke notation as 
equivalent to P & Q, it is necessary to do two things: (a) the two 
negations in each of the subordinate clauses (not-P and not-P and not-Q 
and not-Q) must be regarded as redundant, i.e., so that the conjunctions 
in which they occur are interpreted as equivalent to -P and -Q respec-
tively, and (b) the stroke with the widest scope must be regarded as 
negating both -P and -Q, and the negations of these (--P and --Q) must 
be regarded as equivalent to P and Q. This begs the question in two 
ways. In (a) treating the two negations as redundant requires that the 
conjunction sign already be regarded as adding nothing to the referen-
tial conditions of the subordinate clause(s) as a whole. The assumption 
that -P & -Pis made true by the very same thing as makes -P true (or 
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that P & Pis made true by the very same thing makes P true) is an as-
sumption Wittgenstein's opponent would reject. The formulae containing 
the conjunction sign do not share the same referential conditions, let 
alone the same truth conditions, with the formulae from which the con-
junction sign is absent. It would be false, on this account, to regard 
-P & -P (etc.) as having the same matrix as -P (etc.). 
Next, in (b) the negations of --P and --Qare held to be equiva-
lent to P and Q. In each case the negation sign with the widest scope 
reverses the truth-value of the formula it negates~ consequently, the 
two negation signs doubly negate, canceling one another out. But 
Wittgenstein's adversary would hardly treat --P and Pas equivalent, 
since if the sign"-" refers, then --P would contain (at least) one more 
referent than P. Again, formulae (or sentences) that differ in referen-
tial conditions must differ in truth conditions. So, again the question 
is begged by treating the matrices for P and --P and Q and --Q, respec-
tively, as equivalent. 
There are, no doubt, many ways to draw the petitio, given the var-
ious equivalences that are deemed possible. One in particular is worth 
citing, however. On Wittgenstein's view the matrices for P and -P con-
tradict one another. But if one regards the negation symbol as having 
reference, then it is possible to regard, as Moore once did, Pas a con-
stituent of -P. In that case, the truth of -P would not preclude the 
truth of P. Here again the question is begged, since the matrices for P 
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and -P would not be deemed contradictory. 121 
There must be a better argument against this sort of view! 
Regardless of what one thinks of the semantic theory of the Tractatus, 
it cannot be that it hangs on such terrible arguments. (As I suggested 
at the end of the previous section, even the semantics for atomic propo-
sitions rests upon the account that can be given for those propositions 
that are molecular, so there is considerably more at stake here than the 
the semantic theory for logical operators.) It is frustrating that a 
view so bad cannot be knocked down straightaway. And the view serving 
as foil is bad: one does not want to sanction inferences from -P to P, 
nor does one want objects designated by "v" "running around" as Russell 
puts it. (Imagine the grant applicant: "But I'm studying the Morning 
123 This circularity has not gone unnoticed. Although he does not ex-
plicate it quite as I have above, Black alludes to it and maintains that 
if Wittgenstein's "metaphysical preconceptions forced this view of lan-
guage upon him, so much the worse ••• for the metaphysics" (1964), p. 17. 
Black thinks that the necessary but apparently impossible elimination of 
the connectives is a reductio of certain metaphysical assumptions. If 
anything, the present chapter of this dissertation attempts to show that 
the metaphysical claims of the Tractatus are derived as conclusions of 
arguments. The argument runs from semantic premises (re the bipolarity 
of the proposition, the distinction between showing and saying, the 
Picture Theory) to metaphysical conclusions (re modality, simple ob-
jects, a distinction between Tatsache and Sachverhalten, logical ob-
jects, etc.), and from these to further semantic conclusions concerning 
the analysis of statements of scientific laws, propositional attitude 
ascriptions and statements with normative or evaluative content. 
Others, working within Idealist and phenomenological traditions have 
cited such circularity as evidence to the effect that the use of opera-
tors carries ontological import and are expressive of the contents of 
experience (cf. Price (1953), p. 124, Dufrenne (1963), pp. 37ff, and 
Kaminsky (1969), p. 142ff). Since a non-circular argument for the 
Grundgedanke is to be discussed below, these philosophers' objections 
will be side-stepped here. Since the evidence for the opposing view is 
largely phenomenological (as we saw earlier in discussing Sartre's 
views), it is not surprising to find that most of its advocates hail 
from those traditions. My impression of these philosophers' views 
(aside from the fact that they seem unaware of his non-circular and 
strongest argument, to be discussed below) is that they do not do jus-
tice to Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying, and thus 
to the extent to which Wittgenstein can account for how experience can 
be about negativity, conditionality, etc. What is shown can be consid-
ered as a component of experience. This will become clearer below. 
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Star and the Evening Star; surely the study of such relations warrants 
more funding.") we should remember that the best Russell could offer 
against the view is that it is counter-intuitive. Against Russell's in-
tuitions, however, there is poised the sort of phenomenological data 
cited earlier: one may very well want to describe the content of one's 
awareness as consisting in, for example, Pierre's not being in the cafe. 
Similarly the semantic content of sentences such as NYou will practice, 
and you will practice!" and "You will practice!" may seem to differ even 
though the former is logically equivalent to the latter. It is tempting 
to try to min~mize the ontological import of the phenomenological data 
by assigning de dicto interpretations to the sentences in terms of which 
it is expressed. That is to say, one wants to treat such sentences as 
expressions of a subject's internal representation of mind-independent 
facts. Thus two persons--one expecting to find Pierre at the cafe and 
the other not--have before them the same object or fact (namely, the 
cafe), but their internal representations of that object differ. But 
even if one were then able to go on and explicate the relevant differ-
ences in internal representations, Wittgenstein would be left with an 
insurmountable problem. Any dichotomy between de re and de dicto that 
adds the sorts of elements that are traditionally treated under the 
headings of force or connotation to what the mental representation is 
about will be incompatible with the Picture Theory's requirement of iso-
morphism. The structure or content of the propositional sign or mental 
representation cannot differ in any way other than that required to ac-
count for the possibility of false judgments. To introduce some matter 
of force (e.g., by treating "You will practice and you will practice!" 
as synonymous with "It is (doubly) asserted that you will practice" or 
"I assert (twice} that you will practice") certainly goes beyond this. 
The same is true of connotation (e.g., by treating it as synonymous with 
"You will practice--that is, do something I find desirable."). 
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Introducing any subjective element will have the same consequences. 
After all, whether one practices and practices is made true (or false) 
by factors quite independent of whether a particular speaker happens to 
assert that or find valuable that one should practice. 
Wittgenstein needs a better argument, and he has one. As Black 
(1964, p. 174) points out, the deeper grounds for the Grundgedanke lie 
with the impossibility of depicting the form of representation. 124 We 
should take care to remember precisely what this means. The form of a 
picture or propositional sign must not be confused with its structure. 
It is not that which numerous philosophers have sought to demonstrate as 
formalizable in terms of a metalanguage (e.g., Carnap (1937), Tarski 
(1937)), sometimes in what they mistakenly believe to be direct opposi-
tion to Wittgenstein's view. The form of a propositional sign (as op-
posed to its structure) is what conveys its sense (rather than its mean-
ing). The relevant passages follow Tractatus 4.12: 
Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they 
cannot represent what they must have in common with reality 
in order to be able to represent it--logical form [logische 
Form]. 
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should 
have to be able to station ourselves with propositions some 
where outside logic, that is to say outside the world. 
Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mir 
rored in them. 
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot 
represent. 
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by 
means of language. 
124 Although Black asserts this to be the basis of the Grundgedanke, 
and even though he does discuss the impossibility of depicting the form 
of representation, he does not demonstrate how the one is a premise in 
an argument for the other. (As noted earlier, Black is willing to say 
the whole metaphysics of the Tractatus founders on the problem of circu-
larity.) The fact is that I have not run across any commentaries that 
have demonstrated this, even though a link between the two subjects is 
often hinted. Most commentators treat the Grundgedanke as justified on 
the basis of the economy with which it dispatches ontological worries. 
This is certainly question-begging in a show-down between non-Idealistic 
realists, like Russell and Wittgenstein, on the one hand and Idealists 
and phenomenalists on the other. 
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Propositions show the logical form of reality. 
They display it (1922b, 4.12-4.121). 
The form of an elementary proposition, we saw earlier, consists in the 
combinatorial possibilities of its components. This set of possible 
configurations corresponds to the set of possible relations that may ob-
tain among the objects so depicted. This set constitutes the sense of 
the propositional sign. The relation between form and sense is ex-
pressed by Wittgenstein at 4.12 by saying language and reality share a 
common logical form. 120 We have already seen why the sense or form of a 
non-molecular propositional sign cannot be depicted: in order for P to 
assert P, it cannot simultaneously assert the various conditions that 
would make P false (conditions which belong to its sense). 
We saw earlier that the set of formulae constituting the form of a 
non-molecular proposition is determined by the number of elements it 
possesses as well as the formation rules governing those elements. 
Recall our earlier discussion of how the sign 11 ¥ 6 possesses a form 
consisting of the set of possible configurations: {11¥6, 116¥, ¥116, 
¥ 611, 6 ¥ 11, 611 ¥}. These configurations represent the possible states 
of affairs that constitute the sign's sense. Now when we turn to a 
molecular proposition, we find that the possible states of affairs com-
prising its sense grows exponentially. Ignoring the sub-sentential ele-
ments momentarily, the possible combinations of states of affairs equals 
2n (n = the number of atomic formulae within the molecular proposition). 
In the case of Table I, for example, the fact that there are only two 
such formulae is reflected in there being four rows in the table. We 
say that the possible states of affairs comprising the sense of a molec-
ular proposition grows at least exponentially, because in each case the 
125 As mentioned earlier, the extension of the word uform" to refer to 
the sense of a sentence seems harmless; if anything, it underscores the 
isomorphism of the Picture Theory. 
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propositional variables have as their substituends atomic formulae with 
compositional complexity. Each of the F's in Table I represents a vari-
ety of possible states of affairs. If the propositional variable Prep-
resents Q¥A, then P's being false may consist in any of the following: 
{QA¥, ¥QA, ¥An, A¥Q, AQ¥}. Consequently, each row containing an F 
could be expanded; for example, the entries in the first two columns of 
the fourth row in Table I, which correspond to P and Q both being false, 








In order for a table to perspicuously represent the sense of a proposi-
tional sign, it would need to contain lines for each of the proposi-
tion's falsifying conditions. So, in order to perspicuously represent 
the sense of a molecular proposition containing P and Q, it would be 
necessary to replace each row in Table II with a series of rows repre-
senting the falsifying conditions of Q. Suppose Q is made false by any 
states of affairs represented by the propositional signs in the follow-
ing set: {<l>rH, <l>lll', r<1>H, rH<I>, Hr<I>}. It would take five rows to repre-
sent what appears in an abbreviated form on the first line of Table II. 









Thus for any molecular proposition containing n atomic formulae (P, 0, 
R, etc.) for which there exist a number of falsifying conditions (pf1 , 
pf2 , pf3, ••• , pfn; qf1, qf2 , qf3 , ••• , qfn; etc.), a table containing 
[2n x (Pfn x qfn, etc.)] would be needed to display the sense of the 
proposition. 12• Let us call this the minimal truth table, since it con-
tains the fewest number of coordinates capable of expressing the combi-
natorial possibilities of atomic propositions. If such a table were to 
contain a column for each atomic proposition, then each line would con-
stitute a complete description of a possible world (1922b, 4.26). The 
lines of a minimal truth table for a finite set of atomic propositions 
will provide a complete description of the possible facts (Tatsachen) 
for which the atomic states of affairs (Sachverhalten) are constituents. 
Let me be quite clear about the fact that Wittgenstein nowhere 
uses the phrase "minimal truth table" within the text, and in fact 
nowhere does he employ truth tables that exhibit the components of ele-
mentary propositional signs. He seems to explicitly deny the possibili-
ty of doing so at 5.55: "Elementary propositions consist of names. 
Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with different 
meanings, we are also unable to give the composition of elementary 
propositions" (1922b, 5.55; cf. 5.555). I interpret this and subsequent 
remarks (cf. 5.551) as expressing Wittgenstein's belief that the discov-
ery of simple objects and the determination of elementary forms is an 
empirical matter, whereas his own concerns are with matters a priori. 
His comments should not be taken to mean that it is impossible in prin-
ciple to come up with elementary forms. In the 1929 "Remarks on Logical 
Form" he goes so far as to say: 
1~ This should not be taken to mean that Wittgenstein thinks one can 
say or depict what is shown by the truth table. Saying or depicting al-
ways involves a discrimination within reality, but outside of a truth 
table containing variables for each atomic proposition there is noth-
ing. It is presumably for this reason that Wittgenstein does not avail 
himself of a metalanguage containing modal operators. 
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[W)e can only substitute a clear symbolism for (an) un-
precise one by inspecting the phenomena we want to describe, 
thus trying to understand their logical multiplicity. That 
is to say, we can only arrive at a correct analysis by, what 
might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena 
themselves, i.e. in a certain sense a posteriori, and not by 
conjecturing about a priori possibilities (1929a, p. 32). 
My reason for introducing the minimal truth table is that it alone 
is capable of exhibiting the structure/form distinction to which elemen-
tary propositions owe their bipolarity, and it is the thesis of bipolar-
ity, as I shall explain shortly, that serves as the major premise in 
Wittgenstein's argument for the Grundgedanke. 
The question now becomes one of how the columns following the 
original atomic propositions or propositional variables are to be inter-
preted. Wittgenstein's view, now the standard view, is that a subset of 
the columns express the manner in which certain connectives are to be 
understood~ column bin Table I, for example, is taken to express dis-
junction thereby defining the truth-functionality of "v" within the 
propositional calculus. If one were not concerned with how the columns 
of the table are to be interpreted vis a vis natural language (e.g., "v" 
as the inclusive "or" of English), then one could simply stipulate, for 
example, that column b shall be labeled "v" and that "P v Q" constitutes 
a well-formed formula that simply has the semantic properties exhibited 
by that column. Since the column is determined solely by the "truth 
possibilities" (1922b, 4.28) of elementary propositions, and by nothing 
more, it follows that the stipulated operator in no way affects the 
truth conditions of the formula in which it is contained--something it 
presumably would do, if it were to have reference. 
The only question the argument leaves unanswered pertains to the 
relationship between the stipulated operators and the connectives of 
natural language. There is a problem here. If one simply stipulates 
that the semantic properties of P and Qin column b shall be designated 
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by "v" or that those of column m and k (the negations of P and O respec-
tively) shall be designated by ,,_,, , then certainly nothing other than 
P's and Q's own truth possibilities determine the function of "v", "-", 
etc. But it is open to the opponent to claim that these symbols have 
nothing whatsoever to do with the expressions of natural language that 
supposedly are their analogs. The reason why this is important at all, 
the objector might argue, is that it is in natural language that one ex-
presses the contents of one's experience, and the contents of one's ex-
perience is of Pierre's not being in the cafe, of practicing and prac-
ticing, of being either a knight of faith or a knight of infinite resig-
nation, etc. The objection, then, is that the words which we use to ex-
press what we experience are not the cauterized connectives of a logical 
calculus. 
It is an interesting fact that Wittgenstein does not discuss this 
objection anywhere. we would expect Wittgenstein to dismiss this issue 
if his attitude toward natural language were that of a Frege or a 
Tarski, both of whom believed natural language to be inferior to a logi-
cal calculus with a formal semantics. But Wittgenstein's attitude is 
different. As we saw in an earlier chapter, his view is that natural 
languages are in perfect logical order: they contain propositions that 
have a determinate sense, they preserve truth through valid inferences, 
etc. The purpose of logical analysis is to reveal the deep logical 
structure of most ordinary language. 121 The objector wants to drive a 
wedge between natural language and that for which the Tractatus offers a 
semantic theory~ but no such wedge can be admissible for Wittgenstein, 
since, for him, Tractarian semantics is supposed to be applicable to any 
language--any representational system--at all. 
121 Or, to qualify this somewhat, it reveals the deep logical struc-
ture of sentences whose currency is not counterfeit due to the presence 
of philosophical--that is, metaphysical--nonsense (e.g., sentences like 
"Everything must have being"). 
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Although Wittgenstein does not pursue the matter explicitly, the 
Tractatus does have the resources needed to handle the problem. These 
resources consist in the sole logical constant (described above) and 
what he would eventually refer to as the general form of the proposi-
tion. The strategy involves using the sole logical constant to show 
that all propositions with a sense share this general form: if this can 
be done, then the Grundgedanke must be true. 
What is the general form of the proposition? Wittgenstein intro-
duces the notion at Tractatus 4.5, it is pursued in the remarks follow-
ing 5.46, and.we get an impression of the importance Wittgenstein as-
signs to it when it reappears at Tractatus 6 (one of the seven central 
passages that form the spine of that work). Tractatus 4.5 runs: 
It now seems possible to give the most general proposi-
tional form: that is, to give a description of the proposi-
tions of any sign-language whatsoever in such a way that 
every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying 
the description, and every symbol satisfying the description 
can express a sense, provided the meanings of the names are 
suitably chosen. 
It is clear that only what is essential to the most gen-
eral propositional form may be included in its description--
for otherwise it would not be the most general form. 
The existence of a general propositional form is proved 
by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form 
could not have been foreseen (i.e., constructed). The gen-
eral form of the proposition is: This is how things stand 
(1922b, 4.5). 121 
To say that the general propositional form consists in a proposition's 
ability to say how things stand is not particularly enlightening. If 
the general propositional form is supposed to supply us with an account 
of the essence of a proposition (as the second paragraph above suggests: 
cf. also 1922b, 5.471), but all we are told about it is that proposi-
tions tell us how things are, then we are no further than we would be 
128 "Es verhalt sich so und so"--C. K. Ogden translates this "Such and 
such is the case" (1922a, 4.5). 
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were we to be told simply that propositions state what is true. 12' 
Wittgenstein himself would be critical of the passage later: H[a]t bot-
tom, giving 'This is how things are' as the general form of propositions 
is the same as giving the definition: a proposition is whatever can be 
true or false" (1958, 136). 130 Wittgenstein's case is not helped, be-
cause this is not a point of contention in the debate over the 
Grundgedanke; someone who holds that the constants do refer would main-
tain that sentences in which they are contained are made true by some-
thing. 
Tractatus 4.5 does, however, point the way beyond. In the last 
paragraph we are told that "there cannot be a proposition whose form 
could not have been foreseen" (1922b, 4.5). Tractatus 4.51-4.53 pro-
vides us with somewhat further explication of the point: 
Suppose I am given all elementary propositions: then I 
can simply ask as what propositions I can construct out of 
them. And there I have all propositions, and that fixes 
their limits. 
Propositions comprise all that follows from the totality 
of all elementary propositions (and, of course, from its 
being the totality of them all). (Thus, in a certain sense, 
it could be said that all were generalizations of elementary 
propositions.) 
The general propositional form is a variable (1922b, 
4.51-4.53). 
What is crucial here is the idea that what can be expressed by a lan-
guage is determined wholly by its elementary propositions--that somehow 
the full expressive powers of a language are contained in sentences free 
of any operators. All propositions with a sense can be #constructed" 
129 To be accurate Wittgenstein should have said that propositions 
state what could be true. 
130 The later Wittgenstein is concerned with more than the fact that 
it is uninformative to proclaim "This is how things are" as the general 
propositional form. The crux of his criticism is that even this is a 
sentence of ordinary language, and it gets its meaning from its use in 
ordinary contexts; cf. (1958, 134-137). 
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out of elementary propositions. Now how is this made possible? Clues 
are to be had in an earlier portion of the Tractatus. The passages im-
mediately proceeding Tractatus 4 seem to have a direct bearing upon 
those immediately proceeding Tractatus 5 (i.e., 4.5-4.53, quoted above); 
3.4-3.42 tell us: 
A proposition determines a place in logical space. The 
existence of this logical place is guaranteed by the mere 
existence of the constituents--by the existence of a propo-
sition with a sense. 
The propositional sign with logical co-ordinates--that is 
the logical place. 
In geometry and logic alike a place is a possibility: 
something can exist in it. 
A proposition can determine only one place in logical 
space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must al-
ready be given by it. 
(Otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc., 
would introduce more and more new elements--in coordination 
(1922b, 3.4-3.42; emphasis added)). 
Here we are told that there is a relation between the fact that the sub-
sentential elements of an atomic proposition determine its sense (4.5, 
the first paragraph) and the fact that "negation, logical sum, logical 
product, etc." do not introduce new elements (i.e., referring terms) 
into the propositional signs in which they figure. When Wittgenstein 
says that a proposition determines a place in logical space, he means 
that it corresponds to a particular set of possible states of affairs. 
That set of possible states of affairs is the propositional sign's 
sense. But now what does it mean to say that although a proposition de-
termines only one place in logical space, it "nevertheless the whole of 
logical space must already be given by it" (1922b, 3.42)? The whole of 
logical space would be what is represented by the minimal truth table 
introduced above! 
Every elementary proposition belongs to the minimal truth table. 
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Thus the truth-possibilities expressed by it are something all elemen-
tary propositions share in common. Thus the matrices are inherent in 
the elementary propositions themselves by virtue of their mathematical 
multiplicity. we might say that it belongs to the very nature of a 
given elementary proposition that it be capable of occurring within com-
pound propositions that are correlated with the various matrices. Thus 
we may speak not only of the forms of elementary propositions per se 
(with reference to the possible combinations among the sub-sentential 
elements), but of the general form of all elementary propositions, that 
is, of their potential to be elements within compound propositions. The 
minimal truth table, therefore, is an expression of the general proposi-
tional form. On the ontological side, just as the form of an elementary 
proposition per se corresponds to a set of possible states of affairs 
that constitute the proposition's sense, there corresponds to the gener-
al form of the proposition the set of all possible combinations of 
states of affairs or what Wittgenstein often refers to as the limits of 
the world (1922b, 5.6-5.61). 
One way to construe the debate over the logical constants is by 
considering whether the minimal truth table is complete. Do the matri-
ces presented there contain all of the possible truth possibilities for 
elementary propositions. Wittgenstein's opponent would have to deny 
that this is the case, maintaining instead that the minimal truth table 
does not suffice in terms of the requisite multiplicity. To achieve the 
requisite multiplicity it would be necessary to introduce additional ma-
trices for what are presumed to be additional elements. In effect, the 
opponent would object that the expansion of Table I that results in the 
minimal truth table fails to provide for the constants at all. The 
problem, the objector might argue, can be traced down to treating-Pas 
a sign that merely goes proxy for some yet to be determined affirmation~ 
if Pis identical to Q¥~, then-Pis not identical to some member of 
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{OA¥, ¥0A, ¥AO, A¥0, AO¥}, but rather to O¥A-. 1 ' 1 Here negation 
is represented as an element among elements. Since none of the matrices 
of the minimal truth table are based upon signs containing the requisite 
number of elements, the minimal truth table must be dubbed incomplete. 
It will not do for Wittgenstein to simply rehearse the arguments 
directed against Moore's relational theory of judgment that were cited 
earlier, even though the view described here bears considerable similar-
ity to it. For one thing, the current problem is a larger one than sim-
ply the problem of negation, since all types of molecular proposition 
are at issue. 1." Nevertheless, if Wittgenstein's argument against this 
view is to be understood properly, the conclusion of his argument 
against Moore--namely, the thesis of the bipolarity of the proposition 
which entails that a proposition must effect a discrimination within re-
ality--must be taken as a basic premise in the argument for the 
Grundgedanke. We must assume that all propositions are contingent, that 
is, that any proposition with a sense is possibly true and possibly 
false. Now one necessary condition for a truth table being complete is 
that it, as symbols go, is senseless. This should not be regarded as a 
form of criticism. A complete table is senseless, because it does not 
effect a discrimination within reality, due to the fact that such a 
table contains matrices for all possible truth-functional compounds, 
leaving no proposition with sense outside of it In order for the argu-
131 How 0¥A- is to be interpreted is unclear. Phenomenologically it 
seems, at least to this writer, that negation affects the entire propo-
sition and that it does not "interact" merely with the elements of the 
proposition. The opposing position seems to be committed to the idea 
that negation "bears upon" objects in some way. What remains vague is 
how - is related to the other elements in 0¥A-. The reader is invited 
to make up his or her own mind as to the syntactical rules governing the 
new formula. 
132 Of course, the problem of what makes molecular propositions false 
is not unrelated to the problem of negation, since one wants to express 
the falsifying conditions for molecular propositions by using the nega-
tion sign. One part of the criticism presented below is that Wittgen-
stein's foil simply cannot have it this way. 
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ment for the Grundgedanke to go through, it will suffice to show that 
Wittgenstein's truth table is complete, but that his opponent's fails to 
satisfy this necessary condition. 
That the opponent's view cannot generate a complete truth table 
results from the fact that the introduction of subsequent operations, 
like negation, introduces ever more elements (1922b, 5.44). In order 
for a propositional sign to effect a discrimination within reality, it 
must be possible to say what has the potential to falsify it as well as 
what has the potential to make it true. If new elements are introduced 
for each operation, then this condition cannot be satisfied. Consider 
what makes P false: presumably something expressed by means of -P. But 
this cannot be so, since -P contains P. What makes -P false? It cannot 
be what makes --P true, since (again) the former is contained in the 
latter. Nor can it be whatever makes P true; since P, on the contrary, 
is a necessary condition for the truth of -P (since, on this view, P is 
contained in - P) • 133 If P is consistent with both --P and -P, then some 
further account of what makes -P false is needed. But surely 
Wittgenstein's opponents are hanged by their own ropes if they attempt 
to do so by means of what seems to be the one remaining possibility, 
namely by saying it is made false by P but not - being the case. 134 
or, consider the disjunction P v Q. What makes it false? 
Presumably, it is made false by what makes -(P v Q) true. But this can-
not be so, since the truth of the former is contained in that of the 
133 That these criticisms do not constitute any sort of attack upon a 
straw man can be appreciated on the basis of the phenomenological data. 
Wittgenstein's opponent could not say, for example, that "Pierre is not 
absent from the cafe" and "Pierre is in the cafe" express the same con-
tent. 
134 Technically speaking, the foregoing discussion contains a mistake. 
If we grant Wittgenstein's tenet that different objects are to be sym-
bolized by different names (the strategy that allows him to dispense 
with quantifiers in favor of logical products and sums), then the formu-
la --P would have to be considered ill-formed. If the negation sign 
furthest to the left introduces a new object, then some alternative sym-
bolism--e.g., ~-P--would need to be used. 
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latter. What makes -(P v O) false? As above, it cannot be what makes 
--(P v O) true, since --(P v O) contains the truth of -(P v Q). Can it 
be whatever makes P v O true? Again, P v O is as much a component of 
the formula -(P v Q) as it is of the formula --(P v Q), so some further 
account of its falsehood is necessary. To say it is made false by P v 
O but not - simply generates more problems. 
The problem should now be quite apparent: any attempt to specify 
falsifying conditions requires introducing new elements and, so, new el-
ementary propositions whose own falsifying conditions are not specifi-
able in any vocabulary thus far introduced. It is not at all clear how 
falsifying conditions could ever be stated given such a view; however 
if it were possible to provide the falsifying conditions by introducing 
a formula containing a new element, then an infinite regress would re-
sult. That would suffice to render the table incomplete, since there 
would always be some formula that presumably has sense but is incapable 
of being presented on the table. This is not simply a pragmatic diffi-
culty. For Wittgenstein's adversary a table containing n elements will 
always need n + 1 elements to be complete. 135 
Lest it be maintained that the argument applies solely to the 
negation sign, so that its referential nature might be renounced while 
that of the other connectives be retained, it should be born in mind 
that similar arguments pertain to all the connectives. If one accepts 
the interdefinability of the logical constants, it follows straightaway 
that what holds for negation will hold for the other connectives. One 
need only translate the formulae into the necessary vocabulary. 
However, as noted earlier, such a strategy would be regarded as ques-
135 we can now see just how much truth there is in Black's (1964, p. 
180) criticism mentioned earlier. The problem is not simply that every 
operation of negation subsequent to the first is simply redundant (al-
though that is an appropriate remark to make within the context in which 
it was introduced earlier. The problem here is that there is no possi-
bility of redundancy whatsoever: Neither ---P nor --P can be synonymous 
to -P, since both introduces additional elements. 
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tion-begging by Wittgenstein's opponent. Nevertheless it is still pos-
sible to introduce problematic examples. What makes (P v O) false? 136 
Presumably it is made false by whatever makes -P & -O true. But, on the 
view being considered, that fact contains P and Q as constituents, and 
they are necessary (if not sufficient) conditions for the truth of P v 
Q. or, suppose it is maintained that what makes P v O false is that P 
obtains and Q obtains but v does not. This desperate move can hardly 
be considered a solution, since it introduces additional entities (cor-
responding to and, but, and not), and it fails to eliminate the apparent 
reference to v. Any attempt to state falsifying conditions simply pro-
duces another sentence or formula consistent with the original. 
These considerations allow us to dispense with any need to accom-
modate additional matrices that would arise from treating the constants 
as referring terms. Such a table will fail to be complete due to its 
inability to represent the senses of propositions. But is the truth 
table, as envisioned by Wittgenstein, complete? Is it capable of ex-
pressing all sense. To see Wittgenstein's reason for thinking that it 
does, we must come to terms with his claim that u[a) proposition can de-
termine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of log-
ical space must already be given by it" (1922b, 3.42). 
Here is where the earlier discussion of Wittgenstein's concerns 
with the sole logical constant become relevant. The key to 
Wittgenstein's remark concerning the whole of logical space being "given 
by" individual propositions lies in his belief that "[a)n elementary 
proposition really contains all logical operations in itself" (1922b, 
5.47). This remark, and a related remark to the effect that "[a) posi-
1~ As with the case of negation, using the disjunction sign more than 
once is misleading. If we accept Wittgenstein's claim that different 
objects are to be represented by different names, then a different sym-
bol will need to be introduced for subsequent uses of what corresponds 
to disjunction. I take it that Wittgenstein's opponent has no answer to 
the question of what makes an individual v a member of the class of 
V'S. 
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tive proposition necessarily presupposes the existence of the negative 
proposition and vice versa" (1922b, 5.5151), are most fruitfully inter-
preted in light of the thesis of bipolarity and the distinction between 
sense and meaning consequent upon it. What we know from our earlier 
discussions of bipolarity is that for something to count as a proposi-
tional sign at all, it must hold within it the possibility of being 
negated: and what we have just seen is that propositional signs must be 
capable of being negated in such a way as to make it possible for both a 
proposition and its denial to effect a discrimination within reality. 
The latter possibility is secured by the fact that an elementary propo-
sition has both structure and form, meaning and sense. Consider, then, 
a set of atomic propositions containing just two members, P and Q. It 
must be possible to negate both members of this set. But this is none 
other than the operation performed by the Sheffer stroke. As we have 
already seen that its application suffices to produce each of the matri-
ces in Table I associated with the usual connectives, and it can be 
proven that its application to various sets of formulae can produce each 
of the matrices making up the table. 137 Consequently, it is capable of 
generating the minimal truth table. This is what Wittgenstein has in 
mind when he tells us that "(a]n elementary proposition really contains 
all logical operations in itself" (1922b, 5.47). As one commentator 
aptly puts it, "it is implicit in the affirmative proposition 'P' that 
'P' can be negated, conjoined with others and so on" (McDonough, 1986, 
p. 76). 138 Bipolarity is essential to proposition, and so it is in the 
essence of the proposition itself that the minimal truth table is 
grounded. 
137 The reader will be spared this. 
m McDonough's (1986) exposition of the Tractatus contends that the 
Grundgedanke is a premise in an argument designed to show that all gen-
uine propositions are contingent. Here is another point at which we are 
at odds: if anything, we have demonstrated that matters are the other 
way around. 
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So what would suffice to show that the minimal truth table is com-
plete? What would suffice, for example, to show that a table with six-
teen matrices exhausts the truth possibilities of two elementary propo-
sitions? In the case of the competing view incompleteness was hailed by 
the inconsistencies arising from the attempt to state falsifying condi-
tions for propositions. we saw that the attempt to provide falsifying 
conditions for -P produces the undesirable consequence of P being con-
sistent with both -P and --P. Inconsistency is a mark of incomplete-
ness, because it leaves us unable to provide a definite matrix for a 
given formula: we just do not know under these circumstances when to 
say a proposition is true or false. consequently, any propositional 
sign that might occur within such a table will lack a determinate sense. 
For this reason the table countenanced by Wittgenstein's would-be oppo-
nent is incapable of expressing the senses of the formulae it contains; 
a fortiori, it is incapable of expressing all senses of propositions. 
I understand Wittgenstein to be arguing that the fact that deter-
minate matrices can be produced by the application of the Sheffer stroke 
(the use of which is sanctioned by the very nature of propositions) to 
sets of elementary propositions demonstrates (somehow) that his table is 
complete. However, it does not follow from the fact that if a table is 
inconsistent (or incapable of providing determinate matrices), then it 
is incomplete that if a table is consistent (or capable of providing 
determinate matrices), then it is complete. 13• Yet Wittgenstein seems 
to think that it follows straightaway--a priori (1922b, 5.47 and 5.551)-
-from the fact that determinate matrices can be generated in this way, 
that what is expressed by the general form of the proposition (i.e., 
1~ Bear in mind that the canons of argumentation employed in this 
dissertation are precisely what are at issue here. That these are can-
nons is due largely to the acceptance of Wittgenstein's views in the 
philosophy of logic. Bence, the fact that the above inference is in-
valid by Wittgenstein's own lights is significant. No questions are 
begged above; rather the consistency of Wittgenstein's own view is the 
issue. 
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what we have identified with the general form of the proposition) is 
complete. 
Wittgenstein's argument is invalid, but it is nevertheless a 
strong argument. In the interest of charity I would suggest the follow-
ing. In spite of Wittgenstein's claim that the whole of logic (which he 
assimilates to the whole of the philosophy of logic"0 ) is a priori, his 
argument should be considered an abductive one and should be evaluated 
accordingly. 
The word "abductive" was originally coined by Peirce (1931), of 
course, to denote a form of non-deductive inference common to arguments 
offered in science in favor of theoretical claims, that is, claims that 
appear to refer to unobservable entities to which one must advert in 
order to explain observable phenomena. A good abductive argument takes 
the form of affirming the consequent (which is deductively invalid). 
But it is sanctioned nonetheless by the fact that the consequent af-
firmed constitutes good probabilistic grounds in support of the theory. 
Rather than dismissing Wittgenstein's argument as an invalid deductive 
argument, let us consider the possibility of it being a strong abductive 
argument of the form: 
therefore, 
(1) If the minimal truth table is complete, then it will ex-
hibit consistency in such a way as to make the construction 
of determinate matrices possible. 
(2) The minimal truth table does exhibit consistency in 
such a way as to make the construction of determinate matri-
ces posible. 
(3) The minimal truth table is complete. 
Whether the argument is strong or not depends on whether the evi-
140 This assimilation is forced upon him by his treatment of Russell's 
Paradox. Recall his criticism that Russell and Whitehead (1910) use ex-
pressions of natural language. There is the root of Wittgenstein's con-
ception of incompleteness. 
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dence appealed to in the consequent of (1) makes probable what is ex-
pressed in the antecedent of (l) and makes improbable whatever theories 
compete with the antecedent of (1). our sample of competing theories 
consists only so far in one theory for which internal consistency is 
problematic. Yet we are considering this strategy only because 
Wittgenstein's view and that of his would-be opponent are not being as-
sumed to be jointly exhaustive. (If they are jointly exhaustive--a 
claim I am not sure how to defend--then Wittgenstein's conclusion would 
follow on deductive grounds.) Since it is hard to imagine competing 
theories, the.sample size should not be considered particularly problem-
atic. That consistency is a property of Wittgenstein's table but not a 
property of his opponent's does seem relevant. It seems to this writer 
that the burden falls upon Wittgenstein's critics to come up with alter-
native accounts for which we would not find inconsistency surprising. 
If we grant Wittgenstein his assumption that sense must be determinate, 
this does not seem likely. 
If we combine the conclusions of the two legs of the argument, we 
have, I believe, Wittgenstein's argument for the Grundgedanke. The con-
clusion of the first half is that if the logical operators are refer-
ring terms, then any truth table in which they figure will be incom-
plete. The conclusion of the second half just is that if the logical 
operators are not referring terms, then the resultant truth table 
(i.e., the minimal truth table) is complete. Because an incomplete 
truth table is one in which formulae or sentences lack sense, the matter 
of completeness speaks to the very essence of the proposition. Thus it 
stems from the very nature of representation itself that "there are no 
'logical objects'" (1922b, 4.441 and 5.4). 
I should like to conclude this discussion of the Grundgedanke by 
touching upon three issues. The first concerns a possible objection 
that might be raised against the account provided above. The second 
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concerns the semantic status of tautologies and contradictions: and the 
third pertains to the ontological problem raised at the end of the pre-
vious section over the relationship between Sachverhalten and 
Tatsachen. 
To begin with an objection might be introduced that the account 
provided here of the general propositional form in terms of the minimal 
truth table is not consistent with Tractatus 6. There we are told: 
The general form of a truth-function is [p,~N(~)J. 
This is the general form of a proposition (1922b, 6). 141 
This passage initiates a discussion of the thesis that all propositions, 
of whatever complexity, are truth-functions of repeated applications of 
the basic logical function (the Sheffer stroke) to sets of elementary 
propositions. The symbol in Tractatus 6 is to be understood, as Russell 
indicates, as representing "whatever can be obtained by taking any se-
lection of atomic propositions, negating them all, then taking any se-
lection of the set ••• now obtained, together with the originals--and so 
on indefinitely (1922, p. xv). So it sounds as if the general form of a 
proposition is to be identified with this function or with the totality 
of its values (which would be identical to the totality of proposi-
tions). In either event it would not seem to be identical to the mini-
mal truth table. If we think of the general form of the proposition in 
terms of the latter, then the minimal truth table expresses but a subset 
of the general form. 142 
,., I have deleted the bars Wittgenstein places above the variables, 
due to the technical problems in replicating them. 
1• 2 Determining what is and is not consistent with Wittgenstein's view 
is not facilitated by the different things he happens to say about the 
general propositional form. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the 
interpreter is the fact that he refers to the general form in one place 
as a variable (1922b, 4.53), elsewhere as a constant (1922b, 5.47), and 
finally as function (1922b, 6): and Russell all but says the general 
form consists in the values yielded by the expression at Tractatus 6 (a 
point consistent with Tractatus 3.312ff.). one senses in the difficulty 
Wittgenstein has in articulating the nature of the general form that his 
thoughts on the subject were incomplete. 
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I do not think this objection is problematic. First, it should be 
remembered that the formulae that we associate with the matrices, with 
the exception of those associated with an atomic proposition's negation, 
require for their production numerous applications of the fundamental 
operation. The production of formulae corresponding to the matrices 
requires a procedure such as that described here. Second, it is a mis-
take to think that operations beyond those necessary for producing the 
minimal table produce new truths. What they produce are new formulae or 
sentences whose matrices match one or another of the original sixteen 
that make up the minimal table. The continued use of the fundamental 
operation beyond the number required to produce formulae whose truth 
possibilities are reflected by the minimal truth table does not intro-
duce additional semantic distinctions, only additional syntactic ones. 
This fact is largely born out by the treatment given to the logical 
propositions. 
One of the major implications of Wittgenstein's view is that tau-
tologies and contradictions lack sense. That they are senseless (sinn-
los) stems from their lack of contingency. Lacking contingency, they 
are incapable of effecting the discrimination requisite of any picture 
(Bild) of reality: 
Thus, 
A tautology leaves open to reality the whole--the infi-
nite whole--of logical space: a contradiction fills the 
whole of logical space leaving no point of it for reality. 
Thus neither of them can determine reality in any way 
(1922b, 4.463). 
Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of re-
ality. They do not represent any possible situations 
(1922b, 4.462). 
That there are such sentences is unavoidable: they are two of the 
matrices produced by the fundamental operation. That they exist thus 
belongs to the very nature of the proposition. Since they are a part of 
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language (1922b, 4.4611), but because they lack sense (1922b, 4.461), it 
is necessary provide some sort of account of their nature. In an earli-
er chapter we briefly considered Wittgenstein's account of them in terms 
of prototypes which function to show how particular expressions are 
used. we can now see how this new conception of showing is forced upon 
Wittgenstein. This is an important extension of the semantics of the 
Tractatus, and it is easily misunderstood. It is tempting, for example, 
to assimilate it to the other forms of showing referred to in the 
Tractatus; as a consequence one is left with the impression that the na-
ture of showing is entirely vague. However, as I mentioned earlier, 
there are three quite distinct, concepts of showing at work in the 
Tractatus. Because they share certain features in common, they are eas-
ily confused. 
The first concept of showing was introduced to explain how a 
propositional sign conveys its sense. In this instance what is shown is 
dependent upon the relations among the sub-sentential components of the 
propositional sign. This new concept of showing, which arises in con-
sideration of the role of the logical propositions, pertains more to 
inter-sentential relations. That P & -Pis always false shows that both 
conjuncts cannot be asserted at the same time so as to produce any 
proposition with sense. That P v -Pis always true shows that either 
disjunctcan be asserted at any time so as to produce a proposition with 
sense. More importantly for the theory of inference, the fact that a 
tautology is achieved by such conditionals as, for example, -(P & Q) -
(-P v -Q) shows that if the antecedent is true, then the assertion of 
the consequent is sanctioned--indeed that what is contained in the con-
sequent is implied by what is contained in the antecedent. The fact 
that (-P v -Q) - -(P & Q) is tautologous too, making the two formulae 
interderivable, shows that either or both may be asserted at the same 
time without loss of truth; the conjunction of the two formulae is nei-
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ther a contradiction, nor a tautology. Although important questions re-
main to be considered, the significance of this treatment of logical 
rules and logical laws is significant. 143 
Commentators (Coffa, 1993, pp 160-167~ McDonough, 1986, pp. 89-95) 
have been quick to point out that this treatment of rules and laws un-
dermines Carroll's (1896) Paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. The 
paradox consists in the fact that if one wants to infer via, say, modus 
ponens, one must tacitly assume {[P & (P - Q)] - Q} is true before one 
is entitled to infer Q from P and P -a. But then one would also have 
to assume {{ [P & (P - Q)] - Q} & {[P & (P - Q)]}} - Q, and so on ad 
infinitum. Those who take the paradox seriously hold that the rules and 
laws of logic stand in need of epistemological justification. Against 
this view Wittgenstein maintains "[l]ogic must look after itself" 
(1922b, 5.473) ."• This should not be taken to mean Wittgenstein advo-
cated Russell's (1912, pp. 70-73) view that logic provides us with 
self-evident truths. To the contrary, Wittgenstein says, 
Self-evidence, which Russell talked about so much, can 
become dispensable in logic, only because language itself 
prevents every logical mistake.--What makes logic a priori 
is the impossibility of illogical thought (1922b, 5.4731). 
The rules and laws of logic neither need justification, nor need to be 
regarded as self-evident (to intuition or acquaintance), because they 
are implicit within the very nature of propositions themselves. 
we had a chance to consider Wittgenstein's claim that an illogical 
143 A point concerning terminology: a logical rule is a tautologous 
formula whose main operator is the material implication sign~ a logical 
law is a tautologous formula whose main operator is the biconditional 
sign. Modus ponens, { [P & (P - Q)] - Q}, is an example of the former~ 
the particular DeMorgan's Law cited above, -(P & Q) - (-P v -Q), is an 
example of the latter. 
144 To give you some idea how early this idea occurred to him, this 
comment is the very first to occur in the world war I Notebooks (1914b, 
p. 2). At this point in time the Grundgedanke had occurred to him but 
needed working out. The 1914 "Notes Dictated to Moore in Norway" begin 
with a consideration of the the same topic 
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language is an impossibility earlier in connection with his rejection of 
Russell's Paradox. We now know that that claim actually involves two 
distinct theses: (1) a function cannot be its own argument, and (2) 
logical rules and laws are implicit within the nature of propositions 
themselves. (If one were not prepared to distinguish these claims, the 
overall argument described in this dissertation would appear guestion-
begging.) But, by way of criticism, it seems quite ludicrous to assert 
that valid inferences are ours merely by virtue of the language we 
speakl As desirable as it might be to think that there are a priori 
grounds for not testing students or holding dissertation defenses, no 
one can deny that invalid inferences do occur. Lucky is the logic 
teacher who never has a student for whom modus ponens or modus tollens 
seems unnatural. If Wittgenstein's view entails that logical mistakes 
are impossible, then in the end it fares no better than Moore's theory 
of judgment. And even if his view implies that the only good argumenta-
tion is deductive argumentation (that is, that there are not good forms 
of non-deductive reasoning), it is faced with difficulties, since such a 
claim does not ring true. Clearly there are good non-deductive forms of 
inference; witness the various inductive and abductive forms of infer-
ence that contribute to the success of science. 
The objection we have been considering, however, is an attack upon 
a straw man, as it misconstrues the role the logical propositions play 
within the context of inferences. Wittgenstein's view is not that in-
valid inferences are impossible. 145 Surely his view comes to this: tau-
tologies are no more nor less a possibility of our language than contra-
145 He does, however, seem to suggest that the theory of probability 
is founded upon the possibility of deduction (cf. 1922b, 5.15-5.156). 
As this is not a claim to the effect that non-deductive reasoning does 
not occur, but is rather a claim about the relation between deductive 
and non-deductive forms of reasoning, it need not be considered objec-
tionable here. Whether contentious or not, the claim that the probabil-
ity calculus is founded upon the propositional calculus plays a role in 
numerous texts (for example, Skyrms, 1975, pp. 130 ff.). 
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dictions or sentences subsumable under the other matrices. Valid rea-
soning is no more nor less a possibility for language users than invalid 
reasoning. These possibilities are what are implicit in language. 
Language does not provide us with the impossibility of error but with 
the possibility of proving that an error has occurred (if one has oc-
curred) by means of a mechanical test--namely, by constructing a truth 
table (1922b, 6.126-6.1265). Wittgenstein does not make the point abun-
dantly clear, nor is his contention that an illogical language is impos-
sible free of ambiguity. But, I believe, his principal point is that 
even if one were to utter something tautologous or contradictory (or 
were to perform an invalid inference), the possibility of one doing so 
arises from the fact that such sentences are related essentially to 
other sentences for which sense is determinate. The very language one 
speaks exposes the contradiction as contradiction. In the Tractatus a 
counterweight to the logical atomism may be found in a certain holism of 
sense that is expressed by means of the minimal truth table. 
At bottom, the idea that logical laws and rules are statements for 
which evidence should be provided rests upon a misconception of their 
subject matter. To think they require evidence involves assimilating 
their subject matter to that of factual (hence contingent) propositions, 
because it involves countenancing the possibility of their falsehood. 
But it is misleading to say that, for Wittgenstein, these sentences or 
formulae express necessary truths. Strictly speaking, their 'assertion' 
cannot be regarded as the assertion of a proposition or statement at 
all, since all statements or propositions must be contingent, and these 
are clearly not that. This much is demonstrated by the truth table. 
What then are they? Wittgenstein's conception of the logical 
propositions bears at least a cursory resemblance to the type of analy-
sis later offered by positivist writers. Hahn, for example, contrasts 
"[t]he old conception of logic" according to which "logic is the account 
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of the most universal properties of things, the account of those proper-
ties which are common to all things" (1933, p. 45) with the newer con-
ception of logic according to which: 
logic does not by any means treat of the totality of 
things, it does not treat of objects at all but only of our 
way of speaking about objects~ logic is first generated by 
language. The certainty and universal validity, or better, 
the irrefutability of a proposition of logic derives just 
from the fact that it says nothing about objects of any kind 
(1933, PP• 45-46). 149 
While Wittgenstein would agree with the claim that tautologous and con-
tradictory propositions do not "treat of objects," as well as with 
Hahn's and other positivists' construal of logical propositions as being 
about (in at least some respect) "our way of speaking of objects," he 
would disagree that it is possible to speak about language--or at least 
about what is essential to language--in the same way as it is possible 
to speak of extra-linguistic objects and states of affairs. we will 
postpone a discussion of Wittgenstein's reasons for rejecting the possi-
bility of a meta-language such as proposed by Carnap (1936) and Tarski 
(1936) until the next chapter where we will be in a position to describe 
his distinction between senselessness and nonsense and his view concern-
ing statements about the essence of propositions. Let it suffice for 
now to say that senseless sentences have a use (though that use is not 
assertion), but nonsensical sentences do not. Tautologies and contra-
dictions (or rather utterances and inscriptions of them) fare better 
than sentences that are nonsensical, inasmuch as they show (1922b, 6.12) 
or demonstrate (1922b, 6.121) how expressions may be used. In particu-
lar, they show which propositional signs may be used to assert the truth 
given that certain other propositional signs may be used to assert the 
truth. So, for example, the fact that the matrix for P - Pis tautolo-
gous shows that if one is entitled to assert Pat t 1, then (other things 
,,e The same view is expressed almost verbatim by Carnap ( 1930, p. 
143) and Ayer (1936, p. 79). 
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being equal1"), one is entitled to assert P at t 1 • 
What distinguishes Wittgenstein's view from that of the posi-
tivists is that his view of the logical propositions (and the rules and 
laws that are formulated in terms of them) is much less rationalistic--
much less cognitivistic--than theirs. One does not find in Wittgenstein 
any of the adoration typically assigned to the so-called truths of logic 
and mathematics. Rather than pronouncing analyticity (and the a priori 
in general) as the domain of pure knowledge, we find even the early 
Wittgenstein laying great stress upon the practical use of sentences. 
It is worth recalling some of the passages cited earlier that found 
their way into the Tractatus: 
[I]n, real life a mathematical proposition is never what 
we want. Rather, we make use of mathematical propositions 
only in inferences from propositions that do not belong to 
mathematics to others that do not belong to mathematics. 
(In philosophy the question, 'What do we actually use 
this word or proposition for?' repeatedly leads to valuable 
insights) (1922b, 6.211). 
In order to recognize a symbol by its sign we must ob-
serve how it is used with a sense (1922b, 3.326). 
A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is 
taken together with its logic-syntactical employment (1922b, 
3.327). 
If a sign is useless, it is meaningless. That is the 
point of Occam's maxim. 
(If everything behaves as if a sign had meaning, then it 
does have meaning (1922b, 3.328)). 
These passages do not equate meaning and use, but it is clear that 
Wittgenstein wants to place great stress upon the use or employment of 
signs. As we will see in the next section, only when we understand what 
is made manifest in the employment of signs--namely, the way the will 
effects a projective relation between signs and world--do we have an un-
derstanding of the essence of the proposition. 
147 Obviously P cannot contain indexical elements that make the time 
of the utterance relevant to its truth value. 
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Although the tautologies and contradictions are incapable of es-
tablishing any projective relation (due to their inability to effect a 
discrimination among facts), they do have a use: they provide a device 
that determines when other (sensical) propositional signs can be used. 
Construed as devices or instruments the logical propositions need not be 
viewed as expressing abstract propositional knowledge. They are tools. 
As with tools generally, one need not think about the tool one is using 
in order to use it. An understanding of the logical propositions and 
the rules and laws stemming from them is implicit in the use of proposi-
tions that do have sense. Against the idea that the logical proposi-
tions provide any sort of pure or abstract knowledge, there stands 
Wittgenstein's view that it is not even necessary for the rules of syn-
tax or grammar to ever be explicitly stated or consciously entertained 
by language users (1922b, 3.334 and 6.122). 141 As one commentator aptly 
puts it, "what is gained here is a kind of practical knowledge, the 
knowledge of how to do something ••• knowledge of how to operate with cer-
tain symbols" (Edwards, 1985, p. 55) ."' Rather than calling tautologies 
and contradictions propositions at all, it would have been more accurate 
for Wittgenstein to say that utterances of them give expression to a 
certain ability one has with respect to signs. To understand that a 
given combination of signs is a tautology or a contradiction is to pos-
sess a kind of know-how rather than any form of propositional knowledge 
(i.e., knowledge that such-and-such is the case). 
As mentioned earlier, Wittgenstein's discussion of these matters 
is not always consistent. The very reference to tautologies and contra-
dictions as propositions, and the ascription to them of truth and 
,~ A logically perspicuous language is supposed to facilitate this. 
At Tractatus 6.122 we are told "we can actually do without logical 
propositions; for in a suitable notation we can in fact recognize the 
formal properties of propositions by mere inspection of the propositions 
themselves." 
149 This claim is supported by Tractatus 6 .12. 
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falsehood, is misleading. To speak of them as prototypes (Urbilder) 
(1922b, 3.315, 5.5351) involves viewing them as salient examples or ex-
emplars of the use of expressions. The appeal to prototypes or exem-
plars is implicit in (and explains) Wittgenstein's otherwise obscure re-
mark at Tractatus 5.454 that u[i]n logic there can be no distinction be-
tween the general and the specific." variables, typically held (as in 
Russell's case) to be very general terms, are dummy or proxy terms whose 
usage is to be imitated. The utterance of a tautology constitutes the 
setting up of a certain sort of convention for the use of signs. 
Upon returning to philosophy in 1929 Wittgenstein struggled to ar-
ticulate his thoughts on this subject. According to Lee (1982), 
Wittgenstein asserted during his 1931 lectures at Cambridge that a tau-
tology 
••• is a rule of grammar dealing with symbols alone, it is 
a rule of a game. Its importance lies in its application; 
we use it in our language. When we talk about propositions 
following from each other we are talking of a game. 
Propositions do not follow from one another as such; they 
simply are what they are. We can only prepare language for 
its usage; we can only describe it as long as we do not 
regard it as language. The rules prepare for the game which 
may afterwards be used as a language. Only when the rules 
are fixed can I use the game as a language. 
To a necessity in the world there corresponds an arbi-
trary rule in language (1982, p. 57). 
This passage provides a crucial insight into the relation between the 
philosophies of the early and later Wittgenstein. It might reasonably 
have occurred either within the Tractatus or in the Philosophical 
Investigations. Wittgenstein's Cambridge lectures from 1930 through 
1932 aimed primarily at explicating, with slight modification, the prin-
cipal tenets of the Tractatus.,.. That he would employ the game 
metaphor in doing so gives some indication of the continuity between his 
150 This particular passage from the lectures seeks to clarify 
Tractatus 5.557 where Wittgenstein vacillates on the relation between 
logic and its application. 
275 
earlier and later philosophy: eventually the rule-like function of tau-
tologies and contradictions in the early philosophy would be supplanted 
by that of the grammatical propositions of the later philosophy. In 
both the early and later philosophy rules are conceived of as being 
something other than bits of information or as parts of a rational sys-
tem of propositions. The chief difference between the early and later 
philosophy consists in the fact that the former construes the tautolo-
gies and contradictions as rules for a rational system of propositional 
signs whose use answers to the form of objects and states of affairs in 
the world; the grammatical propositions of the later philosophy provide 
the rules for language games, and if they answer to anything, it is to 
what Wittgenstein later calls a form of life. 
This final point about the Tractatus conception of logical propo-
sitions bears emphasis. It is not being claimed that the rules and laws 
that stem from them are mere conventions one may or may not adopt. 
Certainly the particular symbolism used (i.e., the vocabulary) is large-
ly an arbitrary or pragmatic matter. But which inferences one is enti-
tled to draw depends upon the relations that exist among the senses of 
propositional signs (1922b, 5.122), which means that it depends upon the 
relations that obtain among possible states of affairs in the world 
(1922b, 6.12). If one is to represent the world in thought or speech, 
how one thinks or speaks is constrained by the world itself. 
we are now in a position to return to the metaphysical issue with 
which we closed the previous section. Earlier I suggested that the very 
intelligibility of Wittgenstein's logical atomism depends upon finding 
an answer to the question of how something composite may be related to 
something non-composite. The relevance of the question resides in the 
necessity to square an ontology of simple objects with the common sense 
and Newtonian conception of objects as infinitely divisible that appears 
to find expression in ordinary language. we noted earlier that unless 
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this question could be answered, Wittgenstein's claim that ordinary lan-
guage is in perfect logical order would have to be abandoned. The most 
important consequence of this would be that Tractarian semantics could 
in no way be considered the semantics of ordinary language. While that 
consequence would not be disagreeable to someone like Frege or Tarski, 
it would be regarded as unfortunate by Wittgenstein, since he saw his 
task as one of explaining how representation in general is possible. 
The solution resides in the ontological distinction between molec-
ular facts (Tatsachen) and atomic facts or states of affairs 
(Sachverhalten), and the fact that the former are not reducible to the 
latter. Our talk about complex objects, on Wittgenstein's view, may be 
analyzed into sets of statements about Tatsachen, because the existence 
of a complex object just is the occurrence of a certain kind of fact. 
The first stage of analysis, we saw earlier, deploys Russell's Theory of 
Descriptions at precisely this juncture. If the facts adverted to at 
this stage contain objects that are complex, the assumption is they too 
shall be analyzed in an analogous fashion. This process continues until 
one adverts only to simple objects by means of elementary propositions. 
If we imagine a pyramid (as we are given, for example, at Tractatus 
4.1252 and 4.1273 151 ) with a complex object's name at the top (e.g., 
"Scott"), then the bottom of such a pyramid would consist of numerous 
(perhaps infinitely long) sets of atomic propositions in conjunction. 
Since elementary propositions are contingent, presumably their truth 
151 Wittgenstein uses the image of a pyramid to express what he refers 
to as the internal relations that exist among a series of forms (1922b, 
5.125-5.1252). That passage provides at least a partial clue as to how 
analysis is to be conducted. I do not believe Wittgenstein's thoughts 
on this were complete. Certainly my own use of the pyramid analogy in 
the paragraph above goes beyond what he says (though not beyond what he 
would say). 
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would be indexed to times. m 
The problem can be understood, then, as one of how Tatsachen can 
consist of Sachverhalten, without the latter consisting of further 
sachverhalten. The answer lies in the fact that the spatio-temporal 
properties of Sachverhalten are emergent, as contemporary physics sug-
gests, and the relation obtaining between them and the Tatsachen from 
which they are emergent is logical rather than spatio-temporal in char-
acter. This could not be the case if there were logical uobjectsn cor-
responding to the sentence forming operators or the identity sign. Let 
P, Q, and R represent Sachverhalten. The truth of their conjunction im-
plies the truth of s which represents a given Tatsache. If one views 
the constants as referring terms, it is likely one views the conjoining 
of P, Q, and Rand the implying of s by them as processes culminating in 
s. (Notice the equivocation this requires: conjunction and implica-
tion are treated both as relations among propositions as well as facts.) 
If this were the case, it would imply spatio-temporal continuity between 
P, Q, R, ands. Under these conditions, conceiving of the constituents 
of P, Q, and Ras having, for example, extension in space appears in-
evitable. But if the Grundgedanke is true, the temptation to proceed 
along this line of thinking is removed. If one is also willing to find 
at least the possibility of truth in the basic tenets of relativity the-
ory and quantum mechanics, one should not find Wittgenstein's appeal to 
simple, unanalyzable objects unintelligible. Thus the Grundgedanke, not 
only is central to the analysis of molecular propositions, but rescues 
the account of elementary propositions from the criticism raised earli-
er. 
Although the logical atomism of the Tractatus is shielded from 
,~ This makes the translation of Sachverhalten as states of affairs 
particularly appropriate. That a Sachverhalt is the obtaining of a sit-
uation underscores the fact that it is one of a set of possible states 
of affairs. 
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what seems to be a major criticism, a new criticism arises that might 
make one wonder whether the cure is worse than the illness. The logical 
relation that holds between different levels of analysis would seem to 
be that of strict implication: [(P & Q & R) ... s). This is because P, 
Q, and Rare in some sense constituents of s (individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient for S). In effect the above formula expresses 
an identity statement or what is sometimes referred to as a bridge law. 
However if it is necessarily the case that (P & Q & R) imply s, then the 
sentence or formula that expresses such cannot be contingent and thus 
must be considered without sense. They must be treated as Mmere repre-
sentational devices" (1922b, 4.242). But in fact such statements do 
seem to express important--necessary--empirical truths. What 
Wittgenstein calls the logical form of the world appears to contain, not 
only the possible combinations of objects into states of affairs and the 
possible consistencies among Tatsachen that make Sachverhalten possible, 
but necessary relations between Tatsachen and Sachverhalten. The meta-
physics of the Tractatus has a modal structure through and through! 
Here we have the germ of the positivist rejection of metaphysics. 
Our concern is not so much with that, though, as with the possibility of 
a vicious inconsistency entering into Wittgenstein's semantic theory. 
That there are statements about the world that are necessarily true--in-
deed, that there are statements about the facts that make language (and 
representation generally) possible that are necessarily true (i.e., 
those that make up the Tractatus itself)--is inconsistent with the prin-
cipal semantic theses considered of the Tractatus considered thus far. 
Russell notes this apparent inconsistency in his "Introduction" to the 
Tractatus saying, "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about 
what cannot be said" (1922, xxi). Wittgenstein's solution consists in 
introducing a further semantic category over and above what has sense 
(contingent empirical propositions) and what is senseless (tautologies 
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and contradictions). This further category consists in what is nonsen-
sical (but not nonsensical in the way that strings failing to meet arbi-
trary syntactical rules are nonsensical). This topic will be dealt with 
below. Although the Tractarian account of sense is assisted by the ac-
count of senselessness, it does not seem to be the case that the weak-
ness in the account of senselessness can be reconciled by an appeal to 
what is nonsensical. This, I believe, exposes the central flaw of 
Tractarian semantics. The stumbling point turns out to be none other 
than its most important feature: the essence of the proposition as con-
sisting in a propositional sign's projective relation to the world. 
What points the way beyond Tractarian semantics is the inadequacy of the 
account of this projective relation and the problem this inadequacy 




PROJECTIVE RELATIONS AND PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE ASCRIPTIONS 
1. Introductory Remarks. 
Up until this point we have been concerned with the semantics for 
sentences that either have sense or are senseless. Chapter III allowed 
us to bring to a close our consideration of the nature of sense by see-
ing how the Picture Theory must be expanded so as to include logical 
atomism. That chapter concluded by noting that atomism can be made in-
telligible only if we can make sense out of the idea that composite ob-
jects may consist of non-composite elements. That possibility is se-
cured by a metaphysical distinction between Sachverhalten and Tatsachen. 
Such a distinction can only be drawn if the Grundgedanke of the 
Tractatus is true. Thus we saw that the Tractarian account of elemen-
tary propositions depends largely on the analysis that can be given of 
molecular and negative propositions. In Chapter IV we studied the argu-
ment for the Grundgedanke. Since the logical atomism depends on the 
Grundgedanke, and the Grundgedanke entails that there must be matrices 
for tautologies and contradictions which lack bipolarity, the account of 
sense must make room for what is senseless but no less a part of lan-
guage. In this chapter we turn our attention to nonsense. The need to 
expand the semantics of the Tractatus arises once the essence of the 
proposition is laid bear. The essence of the proposition consists in 
the projective relation between propositional sign and the world that is 
effected by the will. In Section Two we attempt to clarify 
Wittgenstein's position concerning this topic. In Section Three our 
findings are applied to the analysis of propositional attitude ascrip-
tions. There we see the sharp contrast that exists between 
Wittgenstein's view and Russell's theory of judgment. Once this has 
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been done we will be in a position in Section Four to explain 
Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism. I had said in an earlier chapter 
that those remarks pose a significant challenge to the realist interpre-
tation of the Tractatus throughout this dissertation. This problem dis-
sipates once the semantic theory of the Tractatus is seen to quantify 
over assertions and other linguistic tokens. The remarks on solipsism, 
I shall argue, are but expression of what today we might call semantic 
individualism. In Section Five we turn to the real problems with 
Tractarian semantics. The usual criticism of the Tractatus centering 
around the Color Exclusion Problem is dismissed on the grounds that it 
fails to do justice to Wittgenstein's distinction between sense and 
meaning. More important criticisms await us concerning the Tractarian 
account of propositional attitude ascriptions and the nature of non-
sense. 
2. Projective Relations. 
Tractatus 3.1-3.12 reads as follows: 
In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can 
be perceived by the senses. 
we use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or 
written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation. 
The method of projection is to think of the sense of the 
proposition. 
I call a sign with which we express a thought a proposi-
tional sign.--And a proposition is a propositional sign in 
its projective relation to the world (1922b, 3.1-3.12). 
Just what is this projective relation, and how does it come about? Is 
the same or a different relation involved in both elementary and molecu-
lar propositions? 
The principal clue we are offered is the claim at 3.11 that the 
method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition. If 
one regards sense as some sort of abstract or Platonic entity, one will 
completely misunderstand the way in which the projective relation aris-
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es. Let us begin by considering the case of elementary propositions. 
The sense of an elementary proposition consists in a set of possi-
ble states of affairs. Somehow this range of possibilities must become 
the object of one's thought. But this immediately seems to be problem-
atic, since one can only say ( and so presumably think1" ) that one mem-
ber of this set is true. To return to the symbolism employed in 
Chapters II I and IV, let the sense of ll ¥ A consist in the set: { ll ¥A, 
DA¥, ¥DA, ¥All, A¥1l, All¥}. One does not, in saying or thinking 
ll¥A, say or think that all the members of this set are possible. 
Their possibility is rather exhibited by one's employment of the syntac-
tical rules governing the construction of ll¥A; or, more accurately, 
the employment of those rules shows or exhibits the form of ll¥A, and 
it is this form that corresponds to the sense of the proposition. We 
said in an earlier chapter that the form/structure distinction allows 
Wittgenstein to hold a position according to which a sentence may be re-
garded as about more than what is actual. We now need to retrieve that 
idea in order to explain what is involved in thinking about the sense of 
a sentence. we know that it does not consist in forming an explicit 
idea of it; the attempt to think explicitly about the full array of pos-
sibilities results in a disjunction with a different sense (correspond-
ing to its form). That which is explicitly thought about (thought about 
thematically, to borrow a word from Heidegger, 1926, pp. 414-415) is 
that which is expressed by the structure of the propositional sign, 
i.e., what Wittgenstein sometimes refers to as a sign's content. 
Thinking about the sense of a sentence cannot be that sort of thing. 
The question boils down to the way subjects are aware of what is 
153 Wittgenstein draws no distinction between the way language and 
thought represent. In the Notebooks he maintains, "Thinking is a kind 
of language. For a thought to is, of course, a logical picture ••• and 
therefore it just is a kind of proposition (1914b, p. 82). A similar 
point is made in a 19 August 1929 letter written to Russell while a 
prisoner of war in Cassino, Italy; cf. Wittgenstein (1912), p. 131. 
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shown by a proposition possessing sense. Whatever kind of awareness it 
is, it presumably arises at the same time as the more or less self-con-
scious awareness one possesses of what one is saying (or of what one is 
having an occurent thought). Perhaps the explanation lies in what oc-
curs at that moment. What occurs is the construction of a structure 
according to the rules of syntax. Applying the rules of syntax is some-
thing we do: it is a form of action. To be sure, the active nature of 
the representation process is stressed a various points in the 
Tractatus. Thus: 
we make to ourselves pictures of facts (1922a, 2.1, em 
phas is added) • 
"A state of affairs is thinkable": what this means is 
that we can make for ourselves a picture of it (my transla-
tion of the German in 1922a, 3.001) •1'• 
So perhaps the type of account to be given is akin to the sort of ac-
count appropriate to explaining the kind of awareness one has of one's 
own actions. m It is beyond the scope of this dissertation, however, to 
give any sort of thorough phenomenological analysis of action--specifi-
cally, of linguistic action. That task has been shared by members of 
the analytic tradition (e.g., by the so-called speech act philosophers: 
Austin (1962), Searle (1969), etc.) as well as the phenomenological-
154 I have reverted to the Ogden translation for Tractatus 2 .1: the 
Pears and McGuiness translation runs "We picture facts to ourselves." 
This loses sight of the active nature of picturing made evident in the 
German by the verb "machen." Neither translation does justice to it in 
3.001. Ogden translates the phrase after the colon ("Wir konnen uns 
ein Bild von ihm machen") merely as "we can imagine it." This hardly 
does justice to the fact that this activity brings about a relation to 
reality. 
155 And, one might add, " ••• appropriate to the specific action of ap-
plying the rules of syntax." However, doing so invites one to misplace 
what is important: one looks to the rules rather than to the action. I 
would suggest this is precisely what happened to Moore when the topic 
came up in Wittgenstein's Cambridge lectures between 1930 and 1933. 
After asking "is not 'projecting with the common method of projection' 
merely a metaphorical way of saying 'using in accordance with standard 
rules of grammar'?" (1954, p 247), Moore dismisses the issue as at heart 
one of knowing how to interpret a rule, a very cognitive affair. 
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hermeneutic tradition (cf. Gier (1981) for a list of references to the 
works of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Schutz and others). And, 
indeed, a great deal of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is 
devoted to the subject. The early Wittgenstein appears to devote very 
little time to the subject. The most extensive passages, which we shall 
examine momentarily, dealing with the nature of action are contained in 
the world war I Notebooks where the topic quickly gives way to a discus-
sion of the will and of the subject who wills. The notes taken by Moore 
(1954), and Lee (1982) show little indication of this topic being taken 
up. The one exception is where Moore records Wittgenstein's comments 
that the method of projection can be likened to being guided in one's 
playing of an instrument by a musical score (1958, pp. 242-243). 
(Interestingly, the experience of being guided is given considerable at-
tention in the Philosophical Investigations (170-177) where it is re-
vealed as a number of related phenomena and as not always characteristic 
of language use.) What is interesting about the occurrence of any ref-
erence to being guided in the Cambridge lectures of 193-1933 is that it 
betrays an attitude toward language use (shared by the Notebooks and the 
Tractatus, but abandoned by the time of The Blue and Brown Books), name-
ly, that using language is a form of compliance to what must be the case 
if representation is to occur in thought or language at all. The very 
acts of thinking and speaking, so essential to our nature, are forms of 
compliance. We have already seen that Wittgenstein thinks an illogical 
language is impossible; his comment at 3.031, cited earlier, can now be 
understood fully: 
It used to be said that God could create anything except 
what would be contrary to the laws of logic.--The truth is 
that we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look 
like (1922b, 3.031). 
One is powerless to say what an illogical world would be like precisely 
because saying requires what is said to share with the world a common 
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logical form (1922b 4.12). It is the logical form imposed upon language 
by reality which constrains in every event what one may say. It is no 
wonder that the Notebooks enters into lengthy soliloquy over the effec-
tiveness of the will and its relation to reality. On the one hand, the 
subject who acts seems to accomplish representation by means of a propo-
sitional sign that has both a structure and form~ on the other hand, 
things could not be otherwise, since the forms of our sentences are de-
termined by their senses, i.e, from the possible facts and states of af-
fairs of which reality itself consists. 
Unfortunately for our purposes the discussion of the nature of the 
will in the Notebooks pertains to the senses of propositions in toto. 
That is to say, it is concerned with how the will affects and is affect-
ed by the the senses of the class of all possible propositions (what we 
described as expressed by the minimal truth table), what Wittgenstein 
refers to as the limits of the world. It is in this context that the 
willing of the subject (or, rather, the good or bad willing of the sub-
ject (1922b, 6.43)) is identified as "a condition of the world, like 
logic" (1914b, p. 77). Some of these considerations will become impor-
tant in Section Four, below, where we consider the remarks on solipsism. 
On the face of things, it does not seem they bear directly upon the 
question of the manner in which we are said to be able to think of the 
sense of a particular sentence. Indeed, the sort of compliance imposed 
upon one by the logical form of the world--the sort of compliance that 
has led some scholars to say such things as that "[i)n the Tractatus 
language is conceived from the perspective of a spectator, not that of 
an agent" (Edwards, 1985, p. 79) • 150--seems out of place when considering 
what is done with individual propositions. For surely at the level of 
,~ Edwards (1985, Chapter III) is concerned to show that 
Wittgenstein's "A Lecture on Ethics" (1929b) moves away from such a pas-
sive account of human language and thought. Clearly the active role of 
the language user looms large in the writings and lecture notes from 
1929 onwards. 
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the individual proposition choices do occur as to what to assert or not 
assert. A propositional sign has a form and a structure, and the struc-
ture one selects to utter indicates what one thinks is actually true. 
One does not--cannot--assert all of the structures of a given form si-
multaneously. 
There is of course the holism of sense that was outlined in the 
previous chapter. The set of all elementary propositions contains with-
in it the possibility of all propositions whatsoever, including presum-
ably the propositions of ordinary language. When one utters a sentence 
with a given structure (here let it be noted that we are speaking of 
sentences of ordinary language far removed from the elementary proposi-
tions into which they are analyzed) one is uttering a sentence that has 
a sense internally related the senses of the sentences into which it de-
composes (by analysis) as well as the senses of those sentences into 
which it may figure compositionally (by operations). As we noted in the 
last chapter, we can speak of the sense of the sentence per se, but the 
array of possible facts or states of affairs of which this sense con-
sists belongs to a wider array of possibilities which Wittgenstein 
refers to as reality itself (1922b, 2.06). 
Is there anything in this that might help us? Perhaps so. What 
constrains what one may say is the sum total of possible (realized and 
unrealized) facts and states of affairs. Whereas the realization of any 
particular fact or state of affairs is a contingent matter, the full 
array of possibilities is not. They determine the totality of linguis-
tic forms, which in turn determine the set of all possible utterances. 
According to Wittgenstein, since one cannot affirm or deny what is not 
contingent, the appropriate attitude to take toward reality as a whole 
is one of amazement or awe before the fact that it is. Thus the 6's of 
the Tractatus arrive at the dramatic conclusion: 
It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, 
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but that it exists (1922b, 6.44). 
To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a 
whole--a limited whole. 
Feeling the world as a limited whole--it is this that is 
mystical (1922b, 6.45). 
He had made the point earlier in more mundane terms: 
The 'experience' we need in order to understand logic is 
not that something or other is the state of things, but that 
something is: that, however, is not an experience. 
Logic is prior to every experience--that something is 
so. 
It is prior to the question 'Bow?', not prior to the 
question 'What?' (1922b, 5.552). 157 
While I do not want completely to discuss what is involved in viewing 
the world sub specie aeterni here, this much is relevant to our present 
concerns: it involves seeing oneself as importantly free from the con-
tingencies of empirical reality. (We will examine Wittgenstein's reason 
for believing this to be so in the next two sections.) This is the idea 
behind his claim that: 
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I 
should have to include a report on my body, and should have 
to say which parts are subordinate to my will, and which 
were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the sub-
ject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there 
is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that 
book (1922b, 5.631). 
The subject does not belong to the world; rather, it is a 
limit of the world (1922b, 5.632). 
These passages, written at the peak of some of the worst fighting of 
world war I, express Wittgenstein's indifference to how things are in 
the world. Like many persons who undergo severe suffering, Wittgenstein 
coped with the experiences he underwent while manning a spotlight amidst 
heavy artillery shelling by psychologically 'removing' himself from the 
situation. (of course this bit of biographical information is not in-
157 Presumably the "How" of the last line is equivalent to the ques-
tion of how things are among what is contingent; the "What" pertains to 
what is possible. 
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tended to replace an argument for a 'metaphysical' subject, something we 
will consider later.) Being able to stare into the face of death fear-
lessly (which Monk, 1990, p. 138 describes as being of the utmost impor-
tance to him) could not have been accomplished without the world being 
viewed as having limitations, i.e., as not being able to exercise power 
over one's self or soul. 
This attitude towards possible facts is correlated with an atti-
tude towards propositional signs. Tractatus 6.4 asserts, u(a]ll propo-
sitions are of equal value." Just as one may be indifferent to which 
facts obtain, so may one be indifferent to which propositions are true. 
This possibility does not in any way preclude entertaining various atti-
tudes towards propositions. One could continue to believe, remember, 
expect, etc., the truth of given propositions. What one could not do is 
entertain such attitudes as hoping, desiring, wishing, craving, dislik-
ing, etc., that a given proposition is true. (These are the so-called 
pro-attitudes that confer or express value.) When one subtracts the 
pro-attitudes from the propositional attitudes generally, one is left 
with a set of attitudes that are, we might say, topic-neutral with re-
spect to their contents. They simply view one or another propositional 
sign as true or false (in the past, present or future). They come as 
close as possible to being states in which a propositional sign is con-
sidered simply as a propositional sign with a potential tor truth and 
falsehood. That is to say, they come as close as anything can to being 
states in which one is aware that something or other is a proposition--
that the structure asserted or believed is but one among a range of pos-
sible structures comprising the same form. 
I suggest that to "think of the sense" of a propositional sign in-
volves viewing the structure one is using as one possibility among many. 
It is to be aware that it is but a member of a class to which it is in-
ternally related. (This idea that the members of the set are internally 
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related appears to run contrary to what is deemed the Color Exclusion 
Problem, but really it does not, since each possible state of affairs is 
a possibility of the simple objects that are their constituents~ Section 
Five, below, deals with this more explicitly.) Here the point is that 
the use of one structure in accordance with rules of syntax involves an 
awareness, no matter how marginal, that other structures subject to the 
same rules are possible. Of course one does use one of the structures 
of the set, since it corresponds to what one presumes is true, but it is 
the fact that its use occurs against the backdrop of these other possi-
bities that accounts for its potential to draw a distinction between 
what is (presumed) actual and what is (presumed) possible but not actu-
al. This may seem like a small point, but in fact what we have been de-
scribing just is how the discrimination within reality, of which we have 
spoken, is accomplished. Here it is useful to retrieve Wittgenstein's 
earlier metaphor: a proposition is like an arrow (1922b, 3.144), they 
divide the landscape of possibility. But because one actually uses one 
structure among the many, one's utterance has a certain direction: it 
points to this side of the landscape as being (what is presumed to be) 
actua1.~• 
The projective relation thus involves action within constraint. 
The application of the rules of syntax are constrained by the logical 
possibilities being what they are (possibilities at which one can but 
marvel, since over them one has no control), but these logical possibil-
,~ Wittgenstein's metaphor at 3.144 has caused a great deal of confu-
sion among commentators, especially when the commentator is tempted to 
unpack the metaphor in terms of what is usually called Wittgenstein's 
directionality thesis (1922b, 5.2341). One is tempted to unpack it by 
thinking of the arrow as moving toward what the speaker thinks is true. 
That is not correct~ rather what the speaker thinks is true would have 
to be represented by an arrow that intersects the arrow of 3.144 respon-
sible for effecting the discrimination within reality. For all the 
criticism directed against Carruthers (1989) in an earlier chapter con-
cerning his quasi-Fregean conception of Wittgenstein's senses, he is 
correct on this point (cf. 1989, p. 31). 
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ities afford one the possibility of action, i.e., of uttering (for what-
ever purpose) a structure of a certain sort. 
To counsel despair over the passivity and impotence of the will, 
when the will is afforded the possibility of action by the logical form 
of language and world, is unjustifiable. 151 So is the other extreme po-
sition which sees all logical possibility as stemming from an activity 
of the will (more will be said concerning this when be discuss the re-
marks on solipsism). Surely either extreme misinterprets Wittgenstein's 
point. If anything, Wittgenstein's view bears a cursory similarity to 
the view of Heidegger (1927) where Dasein's being-in-the-world is char-
acterized as a "thrown-thrownness" or a "projected projection."110 
(Sartre (1943) would latter use the terms "facticity" and "transcen-
dence" in a similar vein.) Here the idea is that human action is always 
situated within a concrete context which affords the possibility of ac-
tion. For example, in a discussion concerning the nature of signs (in-
cluding signs in nature, e.g., that a storm is coming) Heidegger says, 
The sign is not only ready-to-hand with other equipment, 
but in its readiness-to-hand the environment becomes in each 
case explicitly accessible for circumspection. A sign is 
something ontically ready-to hand, which functions both as 
this definite equipment and as something indicative of the 
ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential 
totalities, and of worldhood (1926, pp. 113-114, emphasis 
contained in the original text). 
What Wittgenstein refers to as the structure of a propositional sign 
would certainly be regarded by Heidegger as something ready-to-hand, 
that is as something which has a use. on this Wittgenstein would agree 
(recall Tractatus 3.326-3.328 and related passages). What Heidegger 
refers to as the ontological structure of the ready-to-hand is consti-
159 As Ryle would later say, "we feel no inclination to lament that 
Gibbon's pen ran a fatal groove" (1949, p. 79). 
,~ we know that Wittgenstein expressed considerable approval of this 
work in his conversations with members of the Vienna Circle. Just how 
much of it he read, and precisely what he agreed with we do not know. 
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tuted by a series of relations that holds between a tool in use and 
other entities--specifically, the relations between a tool in use and 
that out of which the tool is made (its constituents), that towards 
which its use is directed (its purpose), and that for the sake of which 
it is used (the person or creature for whom the purpose serves a pur-
pose). The point is that the use of a tool takes place against a hori-
zon in which other entities become Naccessible for circumspection." 
Ultimately, for Heidegger, this system of significations includes what 
he here refers to as referential totalities and the worldhood [of the 
world], i.e., the fact that there is a world at all. For Heidegger the 
same very much holds true for linguistic signs that function essentially 
as tools. Linguistic expressions signify referential totalities and the 
world, but they do so not because a particular sign contains all this as 
part of its content; rather it does so by virtue of its application as 
something ready-to-hand. One suspects Heidegger would find little to 
disagree with in Wittgenstein's contention that "[w)hat signs fail to 
express their application shows" (1922b, 3.262). It is the application 
of the sign that relates the sign's structure to a context that includes 
its sense. 
I believe we have put the nature of projection in the proper 
light. It involves discriminating within reality between what one 
thinks is actual and what one thinks is possible but not actual. This 
is accomplished by means of a concrete (hence uttered or inscribed or 
imagined) propositional sign that serves as a model (Bild) of a possible 
fact that is presumed actual by the speaker. The mechanics involved in 
letting a sign serve as a model are, as we know, two-fold: (i) names 
must go proxy for objects, and (ii) syntactic rules for combining names 
(in ways that reflect the possible relations among objects) must be de-
vised or (since an illogical language is impossible) simply learned. It 
is important to stress here that the structure of the model serves as a 
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tool (its components being mechanisms"1 ) by means of which reference and 
truth is accomplished. Otherwise, one is tempted to attribute to 
Wittgenstein the view that the structure or content of thought is an 
immediate object of awareness while the fact or state of affairs of 
which that structure is true or false (its Bedeutung) serves as a sort 
of transcendent object of awareness. This mistake is presumably what 
lies at the heart of Carruthers' (1989) misconstrual of Wittgensteinian 
Sinne as guasi-Fregean entities. Such an interpretation fails to do 
justice to the realist influence of Moore and Russell upon Wittgenstein, 
and in effect would render the Tractatus susceptible to the sorts of 
epistemological worries Moore directed against Bradley. For 
Wittgenstein, though, the structure--whether uttered or thought--has no 
sense or meaning in itself, but only as it is used by some subject. The 
structure is a stepping-stone to the world: 
The fact that the elements of a picture are related to 
one another in a determinate way represents that things are 
related to one another in the same way. 
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure 
of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this 
structure the pictorial form of the picture (1922b, 2.15). 
That is how a picture is attached to reality~ it reaches 
right out to it (1922b, 2.1511, emphasis added). 
It is laid against reality like a measure (1922b, 
2.1512). 
Although the structure of the propositional sign is in itself a fact, it 
is not that which one's awareness or discourse is about, as one would 
expect, given Wittgenstein's views concerning a theory of types: be-
cause a structure cannot contain itself (that being a physical impossi-
161 In his Lent Term lecture of 19 30 he is recorded as saying, uthe 
proposition, having multiplicity, is therefore a complex. Its con-
stituents are words. Have words meaning apart from their occurrence in 
propositions? words function only in propositions, like the levers of a 
machine. Apart from propositions they have no function, no meaning" 
(Lee, 1982, p. 2). The passage is transitional, given its last sen-
tence, but clearly the rest of is consistent with the way Frege's con-
text principle reemerges in the Tractatus. 
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bility), a propositional sign cannot be about itself. 162 Because the 
structure serves as a mechanism only, it must be sharply contrasted with 
views which countenance the sort of mental content under attack by 
Moore. Bradley's ideas (1883), Frege's Sinne (1892a, 1918) (on either 
interpretation), Husserl's noema (1913) (if I understand that term cor-
rectly~ cf. Aguila (1977, p. 115), while all playing a similar rOle, 
must be distinguished from Wittgenstein's thought-structures by virtue 
of the latter's not being some sort of intentional object. 
Let us turn to the question of whether the projective relation is 
essentially the same for both atomic and molecular propositions. In one 
respect it would have to be. In the preceding paragraphs we basically 
treated the unanalyzed sentences of ordinary language as analogous to 
elementary propositions. (The fact that the nature of elementary propo-
sitions is usually explicated by commentators by means of ordinary sen-
tences like "The cat is on the mat" is the flip side of the coin.) Our 
comments really pertained to any sentences subject to syntactic rules 
whatsoever. Let us just assume that the foregoing discussion holds for 
all linguistic tokens, whether elementary or ordinary and unanalyzed) 
that contain no sentence forming operators. But now what of sentences 
containing operators? The fact is that these sentences pose less diffi-
culty than those from which operators are absent, since they even more 
obviously possess the holism of sense expressed by the minimal truth 
table. This just means that in the case of sentences containing opera-
tors it is not neccessary to prove that the component sentences--which 
in the elementary proposition's case is the elementary propositional 
sign itself (1922b, 5)--contain the potential of having all operations 
performed upon them. The existence of molecular propositions, on the 
182 This is undoubtedly what Wittgenstein is trying to express, some-
what unclearly, at 3.13 when he says, "(a] proposition includes all that 
the projection includes, but not what is projected ••• " It would have 
been clearer to say that the structure by means of which representation 
occurs cannot be what is represented. 
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other hand, presupposes the possibility of operations and their continu-
al application. 
For molecular propositions the sense per se is represented by the 
entire column containing the matrix for the operator with the widest 
scope. Since all propositions with sense are contingent, this column 
will contain both T's and F's. For example, the matrix for conjunction 
is TFFF. When one asserts P & Q, however, one is not asserting that P & 
Q is false under those conditions where one or more of the conjuncts is 
false; obviously, one is asserting that P & Q is true. The right thing 
to say is that one is asserting something that would be false under 
those conditions. These conditions belong to the sense of the proposi-
tional sign and not to what the speaker believes or asserts as being the 
Bedeutung.w Anyhow, there corresponds to any matrix a modeling of the 
facts. The particular connective (hence structure) one employs express-
es, not only what one holds true, but the other logical possibilities 
one must countenance if one understands what one is saying. 104 The fact 
that one asserts P & Q rather than, say, P v Q shows that one counte-
nances one range of possibilities (TFFF) rather than another (TTTF). 
Consequently, not only does the choice of structure effect a discrimina-
tion within reality (as reflected within the matrix), it brings about 
one modeling of the facts among many (as reflected by its being one ma-
trix among many). In this direction lies the holism of sense exhibited 
183 Needless to say, should P & Q turn out false, whatever the 
Bedeutung is will be represented by whichever F corresponds to the 
facts. we need to remember that the meaning of a propositional sign is 
independent of a speaker's intentions. The speaker's intentions to as-
sert a particular fact is reflected in the structure she chooses. 
Strictly speaking, the view of the Tractatus is that what one means and 
what one intends to mean need not coincide. This is not paradoxical so 
long as we do not interpret Bedeutung psychologistically. 
184 This account of what is involved in thinking about the sense of a 
propositional sign is indistinguishable from an account of what it is to 
understand a sign and serves as an explication of the primacy of under-
standing over knowledge (introduced in the argument for the bipolarity 
of the proposition). 
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by the minimal truth table. The sole logical constant and the inter-de-
finability of logical operations secures this status for the matrix. 
Thus, if anything, the u•experience' we need in order to understand 
logic" (1922b, 5.552) becomes more prominent in the case of molecular 
propositions. The fact that the selection of structure constitutes a 
selection of one model among many will become important below in our 
consideration of the remarks on solipsism. 
The essence of the proposition, then, consists in the proposition-
al sign taken together with its projective relation to the world (i.e., 
to reality in the wide sense). The projective relation is something 
accomplished by thinking of the sense of a sentence. That requires see-
ing the structure of one's utterance (or thought) as one structure among 
many. Thus a discrimination within reality is effected between what the 
speaker believes is actual and what she thinks is not actual but merely 
possible. No significant difference exists between atomic and molecular 
propositions on this count. At bottom, we have an account of the 
essence of the proposition that assigns a great role to human volition--
to the selection of structures and models. This is something it shares 
with the anti-empiricism of the earlier relational theories of judgment. 
Unlike those relational theories, however, it countenances a representa-
tional medium. Yet, in contrast to other theories that countenance men-
tal 'contents,' this medium cannot be said to be the immediate object of 
awareness or judgment. Furthermore, unlike the the earlier relational 
theories, what one can think or say is constrained by the logical possi-
bilities, i.e., the logical form shared by language, thought, and world. 
Here we are as far as possible from Meinong's jungle and Moore's enti-
ties that have Being but not existence. 
With the essence of the proposition on the table, a new difficulty 
arises for the semantics of the Tractatus. What is to be made of the 
sentences that comprise the theory itself? (This is the topic that ani-
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mated the Vienna Circle discussions in 1930-1931, up until the presenta-
tion of Godel's paper in 1931.) The theory purports to provide an ac-
count of the very essence of the proposition. The properties attributed 
to propositions (bipolarity, meaning and sense, the projective relation) 
are necessary properties, and the statements used to describe them would 
need to be regarded as necessarily true. Consider the sentence uAll 
propositions consist in a propositional sign along with its projective 
relation to the world" which states the essence of the proposition. Let 
us call this P*. P* cannot be considered contingently true, since it 
seems to follow from the very nature of language itself. If one can 
utter P* (as Wittgenstein has) P* must be true. This fact is behind 
Wittgenstein's contention that "[l]ogic is transcendental" (1922b, 6.13) 
and unlike any of the natural sciences ( 1922b, 4 .111) •1•• But this puts 
the propositions of the Tractatus in a dubious light, since only propo-
sitions that are contingent have sense. And while there are senseless 
tautologies and contradictions within our language, P* cannot be regard-
ed as one of them. P* simply lacks the structure of a tautology or con-
tradiction, and presumably it cannot be analyzed into a string that is 
tautologous or contradictory. 166 
Yet statements like P* convey important truths. To accommodate 
this fact, Wittgenstein's semantics are expanded so as to include non-
sensical (unsinnig) sentences. The sort of nonsense of which the 
Tractatus consists should not be confused that with the kind of nonsense 
that consists, say, of a jumble of words: "Blue John taller smelly if." 
185 Here too we have the source of his claim that u [ i] n philosophy 
there are no deductions: it is purely descriptive" (1913b, 106). It 
cannot contain deductions, because deduction occurs among sentences that 
have sense. 
188 Baker ( 1987) attempts to show that using a sentence to deny sen-
tences have certain essential semantic properties amounts to uttering 
something that is pragmatically incoherent. If the Picture Theory were 
true, affirming P*, on her view, would come close to being an empty tau-
tology. For criticism of her view from the perspective of the later 
Wittgenstein, see Levvis (1992). 
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They are, he tells us, rungs of a ladder one must throw away after it 
has been climbed (1922b, 6.54). 
In order to arrive at a greater understanding of Wittgenstein's 
conception of nonsense, we should look more closely at what he says 
about other kinds of statements (besides those found in the Traatatus) 
that purport to be necessarily true. It seems strange on the one hand 
that the Tractatus would contain an account of necessity in terms of the 
logical necessity contained in tautologies and contradictions, while on 
the other hand characterize its own statements as in some sense neces-
sary or a priori. we need to unpack what this sense is. The other 
major 'non-contingent' forms of statement that he considers are state-
ments of scientific laws and moral maxims. Both turn out to be nonsen-
sical too. 
Moral maxims, taking the form of categorical imperatives, he dis-
misses out of hand. As he puts it, "[w]hen an ethical law of the form, 
'Thou shalt •.• ', is laid down, one's first thought is, 'And what if I do 
not do it?"' (1922b, 6.422). There is a great deal that could be said 
about the meta-ethics of the Tractatus and Notebooks, indeed the bulk of 
the passage just cited has to do with the concepts of punishment and re-
ward (which he claims cannot be consequences of an action but must some-
how reside in the action itself) •1• 1 Here let it suffice to say that it 
appears he dismisses the possibility of such maxims on the grounds that 
such 'laws' are incompatible with existence of human freedom, that is, 
with the exercise of the will. Readers familiar with Kant's 
Foundations (1784) will no doubt be suspicious of this claim, and will 
want to argue that Wittgenstein conflates two different types of state-
ment that might be expressed by "S must do x." The claim can be inter-
preted as descriptive (that is, one that expresses a psychological law 
167 My opinions concerning the meta-ethics in these two works is con-
tained in Levvis (1994). 
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pertaining to the production of human behavior), or as prescriptive 
(i.e., one that states how one ought to act when faced with a choice of 
actions). Clearly, if it is a statement about how one will act, it is 
contingent and susceptible to counter-example, but what if it is a pre-
scriptive claim? A lengthy discussion of Wittgenstein's ethics (indis-
tinguishable from his views on religion, art and culture) is out of the 
question here. Suffice it to say that for Wittgenstein even if us must 
do x" is a prescriptive claim, it is in some way contingent. Ifs must 
do x, then doing x must, he says, carry some kind of reward. But given 
his view that the subject of the will is not a part of empirical reali-
ty, "ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual 
sense of the terms" (1922b, 6.422). Reward and punishment, happiness 
and unhappiness, cannot be events that occur in the world; they must 
"reside in the action itself" (1922b, 6.422). 168 Wittgenstein goes even 
further to say that goodness and badness cannot reside in the physical 
action itself but in the good or bad exercise of the will (1914b, p. 
87). (Basically he argues that to will is to act; 1914b, p. 87). The 
will, which we have already seen is the source of projection, is not a 
part of the world but a necessary condition for talking or thinking 
about it. What is good or bad in the world, the hardness of the "must" 
in "S must do x" depends on the will. And whether the exercise of the 
will is good or bad depends--on the will. Wittgenstein's account of 
moral statements assimilates them either to (i} statements of psycholog-
ical law, in which case they are either (a) subject to counter-example 
or (b) if truly law-like, subject to the criticism directed against sci-
entific laws (that we are about to consider), or (ii) statements con-
cerning the will from which the contingency of the good and bad flows. 
Clearly it is the second of these alternatives that Wittgenstein takes 
188 Wittgenstein is like a deontologist who tries to describe his view 
in consequentialist terms, while at the same time renouncing ethical ra-
tionalism. 
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most seriously (1922b, 6.423). Given the status of the will, this just 
means "[i]t is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the 
subject of ethical attributes (1922b, 6.423, emphasis added). 
Wittgenstein's views regarding what appear to be scientific laws 
are found primarily in Tractatus 6.3-6.372. That set of passages ends 
with the remarkable claim that: 
[t]he whole modern conception of the world is founded on 
the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the ex-
planations of natural phenomea (1022b, 6.371). 
For Wittgenstein there can be no scientific laws--no categorical state-
ments about facts or events in the physical world that are exception-
less--because "outside logic everything is accidental" (1922b, 6.3). All 
the facts that occur in the world are accidental (1922b, 6.41). The 
generality attributable to categorical statements "means no more than to 
be accidentally valid for all things" (1922b, 6.231). 
Believing this to be the case, some sort of account of the nature 
of sentences like "Water boils at lOOc" must be given. Without going 
into arguments concerning essentialism, rigid designation or matters 
concerning trans-world identity, let us assume this is a candidate for a 
scientific law and that it (might) express a necessary a posteriori 
truth. What sort of account of it would Wittgenstein give? As it turns 
out, in these matters Wittgenstein is a disciple of Hertz. (It is from 
Hertz's conception of a dynamical model in Principles of Mechanics 
(1899) that Wittgenstein draws his thesis concerning the need for there 
to be an isomorphism between pictorial elements and objects represented: 
cf. Tractatus 4.04.) With respect to scientific laws, Wittgenstein de-
rives from Hertz the idea that statements of such laws function primari-
ly as either formation rules for other statements that are about partic-
ular objects, or as statements about the forming of such rules. In one 
of the most sustained discussions concerning any single topic in the 
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Tractatus, he says, 
••• Newtonian mechanics ••• imposes a unified form on the 
description of the world. Let us imagine a white surface 
with irregular black spots on it. We then say that whatever 
kind of picture these make, I can always approximate as 
closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the 
surface with a sufficiently fine square mesh, and then say-
ing of every square whether it is black or white. In this 
way I shall have imposed a unified form on the description 
of the surface. The form is optional, since I could have 
achieved the same result using a net with a triangular or 
hexagonal mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would 
have made the description simpler: that is to say, it might 
be that we could describe the surface more accurately with a 
coarse triangular mesh than with a fine square mesh (or con-
versely), and so on. The different nets correspond to dif-
ferent systems for describing the world. Mechanics deter-
mines one form of description of the world by saying that 
all propositions used in the description of the world must 
be obtained in a given way from a given set of propositions-
the axioms of mechanics. It thus supplies the bricks for 
building the edifice of science, and it says, nAny building 
that you want to erect, whatever it may be, must somehow be 
constructed with these bricks, and with these alone (1922b, 
6.341). 
Interpreting Wittgenstein's passage is not easy. The claim that 
the axioms of mechanics introduce a form of description that is in some 
way optional might strike a chord with our earlier discussion of molecu-
lar propositions as providing one model among many. It is tempting, 
using Quinean hindsight, to say that theories are groups of molecular 
sentences, and that there is nothing except the size of the linguistic 
unit that distinguishes our earlier considerations from the present one. 
Just as the smaller unit might effect a discrimination within reality, 
so might the larger unit. That, however, is not Wittgenstein's view. 
His is that a theory--specifically, the statement of a law--has the same 
sort of standing as the arbitrary conventions underlying language use. 
Since syntactic conventions reflect nothing more than speakers' choices 
(preferences, tastes, etc.), they are appropriately thought of as ex-
pressions of the will~ consequently they fall within the domain of the 
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nonsensica1. 1•• In criticism, it can be argued that it is difficult to 
see how Wittgenstein can sustain this claim, since surely the structure 
of any proposition whatsoever reflects a choice on the part of the 
speaker, and these are not nonsensical. 
Furthermore, how could "Water boils at l00c" be the mere expres-
sion of an arbitrary convention? Surely we could change our conven-
tions, and the facts would stay the same. Suppose, for example, we are 
a people who only count to 90. we do not measure lengths over 90 me-
ters, weights over 90 grams, temperatures over 90c, etc. The word 
"boiling" is npwhere in our vocabulary; instead we have a word "choil-
ing" which denotes--for people who use "boiling"--almost boiling. This 
difference in the 'mesh' clearly cannot entail there is no such thing as 
water boiling at 100c; that cannot be the result of an arbitrary conven-
tion. So, on the face of it, Wittgenstein's view seems highly implausi-
ble. 
Matters seem to worsen when we consider that Wittgenstein admits 
he regards these different possible frameworks as referring to real ob-
jects in the world. This is why he says, "[t]he laws of physics, with 
all their logical apparatus, still speak, however indirectly, about ob-
jects of the world" (1922b, 6.3431). Objects in the world contain vari-
ous possibilities for combination, and a diverse number of facts (in-
cluding such facts as being water or being hot) are produced by their 
189 Janik and Toulmin ( 197 3) provide an excellent discussion of 
Wittgenstein's concerns with style, taste, and culture. Wittgenstein's 
own aesthetic sensibilities moved in the direction of austerity and lack 
of unnecessary adornment, a fact not unrelated to his distinction be-
tween showing and saying. In a 4 September 1917 letter to Paul 
Engelmann concerning a poem by Uhland of which he approved, he had writ-
ten: "And this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is 
unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be--unut-
terably--contained in what has been uttered" (quoted in Monk, 1990, p. 
151). 
Many of Wittgenstein's comments, ranging from 1914 to 1951, concern-
ing style and culture have been collected under the title Culture and 
Value ( 1984). 
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combinations. What the net allows, if the metaphor may be pursued, is 
for some rather than other facts to be caught in its mesh. The proper 
way to state Wittgenstein's view would be by saying the conventions one 
adopts allow one to speak about certain aspects of the world as opposed 
to others. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to ascribe to him 
some sort of radical Idealist position according to which the contents 
of a theory are wholly conventional. That being so, how are we to make 
sense out of Wittgenstein's thesis that scientific laws are a kind of 
nonsense? Let us try to unpack the imagery of 6.341 a bit. 
Let us refer to the different 'meshes' or schemata in the follow-
ing way. The schema employing a fine square mesh will be schemas, 
whereas that employing a triangular mesh will be schema T. Schema S 
will employ a grid containing two axes whose coordinates are a1 ••• an and 
b 1 ••• bn. The language of schema S users will contain the predicates "is 
black" and "is white." One may then say, "{a1, b1} is black" and so 
forth. (I do not think Wittgenstein's example is very well constructed, 
since it allows for the possibility of indeterminacy in those case where 
a square is only partly black. Perhaps the difficulty could be avoided 
by replacing the predicates with "contains some blackness" and "contains 
some whiteness.") Schema Twill less fine grained. Where there are 
four distinguishable units within schema S's {a1-a2 , b1-b2}, Schema T 
will contain only two. Let us name each of the squares in this quadrant 
of S: w, x, y, and z. The language of Swill then allow one to assert 
(deny, conjoin, disjoin, etc.) such sentences as "w is (or contains) 
black(ness)." The language of T, on the other hand, will contain fewer 
possible sentences, because it will employ only two names wheres em-
ploys four. 
We can now raise the problem anew. Why is it not possible to 
treat scientific laws as ranging over sets of entities, such that sen-
tences like "w is (or contains) black(ness)" are contingently true? 
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Unless evidence to the contrary can be evinced, it would seem 
Wittgenstein's thesis that scientific laws do not have sense should be 
rejected. That would leave us in a precarious position in trying to 
make intelligible his conception of nonsense. 
It seems to me that Wittgenstein would argue that there is some-
thing misleading about the way the example unfolded above. The 'conjur-
ing trick' (as he might later say) occurs at the stage at which we sup-
posedly name the different quadrants w, x, y, and z. The fact is that 
these are not names of objects. we can see that this is the case, if we 
consider what _the real objects are that are referred to by the sentences 
of sand T. The real objects are the black spots on the white surface. 
If anything, reference to them is contained in the predicates of sen-
tences like "w is (or contains) black(ness)." (Of course the predicate, 
which refers to the fact or property of being black, would have to be 
analyzed in some fashion to arrive at singular terms referring to ob-
jects.) we might say that a sentence like "w is (or contains) 
black(ness)" is systematically misleading, inasmuch as the grammatical 
subject appears to refer to some kind of object, but in fact no such ob-
ject exists. The terms w, x, y, and z are really a part of the coordi-
nate system. If they refer to anything, they refer to quadrants of the 
grid itself. But the quadrants of the grid are not the objects to which 
we are allowed to refer by means of the grid. 
This account helps us to make sense out of Wittgenstein's imagery. 
Applying his view to actual statements of (purported) scientific laws is 
not so easy however. The grammatical subject of "Water boils at 100c" 
does not appear to be comparable to the terms w, x, y, and z. Water is 
something. If Wittgenstein's view is defensible, it will have to bear-
gued that sentences like the above are somehow equivalent to sentences 
that express syntactic rules or that they attempt to state something 
about the setting up of these rules (that is, about the projective rela-
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tion) that makes the modeling of facts by means of structures possible. 
This is possible. Perhaps anticipating an objection, Wittgenstein 
reminds his readers "that any description of the world by means of me-
chanics will be of the completely general kind. For example, it will 
never mention particular point-masses: it will only talk about any 
point-masses whatsoever (1922b, 6.3432). we will not be able to see why 
this is relevant without a better example of a scientific law than 
"Water boils at lOOc." Strictly speaking, this is not a statement of a 
law at all. we see this if we translate it into the predicate logic. 
Allowing w to _denote "is water" and B to denote "boils at lOOc," it may 
be translated as (x) (Wx==> Bx). Here the strict implication symbol is 
used to capture the idea implicit in regarding the original sentence as 
a law that being water necessarily implies being able to boil at 100c. 
If being water does necessarily imply being able to boil at 100c (which 
we will assume for the sake of argument), then for Wittgenstei~ it must 
be possible to define water in terms of the later property or in terms 
of combinations of objects (e.g., e 2o) that make such a property possi-
ble. The strict implication disappears upon analysis, as it must since 
the relations among the objects referred to in the analysis must be 
purely contingent. 
What is missing from "Water boils at 100c" is any reference to the 
forces acting upon water in virtue of which it boils at 100c. 
Scientific laws relate one series of facts or events to another series 
of facts or events; they do not simply consist of definitions. While 
still overly simplistic (though not too simplistic for our purposes), a 
better example would be "If a2o molecules are subjected to k force, 
their molecular bonds will break." This sentence has the requisite 
qualities of being general, predictive and it ranges over fact or events 
that are not identical to one another: being an a2o molecule is not the 
same fact that being kinetic energy happens to be. If we allow H to de-
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note "is e 2o," K to denote "is subjected to k force," M to denote "is a 
molecular bond of," and B to denote "will break," then our law can be 
translated: (x) (y) {[(Bx & Kx) & Mxy) ~ By}. As with our earlier 
sentence, reference to water is made in the antecedent and the conse-
quent since y presumably is a constituent of x~ and, as with the origi-
nal, the consequent makes reference to boiling, i.e., the breaking of 
molecular bonds. However a more explicit definition of K would reveal 
that the antecedent refers to objects that the consequent does not. 
(Here it is helpful to remember that the ontology was carried by the 
predicate "is _black" in the original example.) To be subjected to k 
force is to be acted upon by some 'entity• that exerts such force. (For 
our purpose we do not need to consider the nature of this entity~ doing 
so would require going into detail concerning the phenomena that define 
mean kinetic energy.) we may say that K ranges over objects k1 , k2 , 
k 3 , ••• , kn, and that none of these are values of x. 
The problem with which Wittgenstein is concerned now begins to 
emerge. 170 The scientific law asserts a necessary connection between two 
types of facts (or events or objects): the objects that are K necessar-
ily affect the objects that are Hin a certain way. Indeed, they affect 
them in such a way that the existence of objects that are H depend upon 
those that are K, since once its molecular bond is broken an object that 
is H will cease to exist. This is problematic, because different types 
of facts (Tatsachen containing non-coextensive sets of objects as con-
stituents) must be contingent for their existence upon nothing other 
than the contingent relations that obtain among their constituents. 
This situation would be reflected in language by the fact that the truth 
of a proposition about one type of fact would cease to be independent of 
the truth of a proposition about the other kind of fact. But since ele-
110 The reader is asked to remember that the following comments are 
part of an attempt to explicate, not defend, Wittgenstein's view. 
Criticism will be offered in Section Five below. 
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mentary propositions must be logically independent of one another, so 
must the molecular propositions which decompose into them. 
Now the question concerning how the imagery of Tractatus 6.341 is 
to be applied to genuine statements of scientific law can be posed by 
asking what in the scientific law corresponds to the terms that refer to 
the quadrants of the grid in Wittgenstein's passage. Our job might be 
facilitated by formulating a sentence with the structure of a law using 
that imagery. Following the same general pattern, we know that to the 
left of the strict implication symbol there must be reference both to 
the schema anq to the objects to which the schema refers, while to the 
right of it there must be reference to the the objects themselves or to 
parts of the objects themselves. As a rough approximation, we might say 
"Given any white surface with black spots (objects) and schemas, then 
necessarily a certain quantity of blackness (0%-100%) will be found in 
w, x, y, z, etc." The point, I think, is that the schema determines the 
kind of property ascribed tow and the other quadrants. Having an ex-
panse of blackness of a certain percentage is determined by the size and 
shape of the quadrant (which admittedly belongs to the schema itself). 
The predicate "is 80% black" is (partly at least) a reflection of the 
schema that is employed in describing the surface. The qualification 
here concerns the fact that "black" within the predicate does pick out 
an object or an aspect of an object. The system that permits predic-
tion, however, employs predicates of a more specific nature (as "is 80% 
black" is more specific than "is black"). As I understand Wittgenstein, 
he may be regarded as a kind of instrumentalist with respect to these 
predicates: they make calculation and prediction (concerning some do-
main of objects), but they do not in themselves carry any ontological 
commitment. Such a view does not seem implausible; predicates inter-
pretable along instrumentalist lines are a working part of the natural 
sciences (Friedman, 1981). And Wittgenstein's version of it is vague 
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enough to escape specific criticisms directed against more worked out 
forms of instrumentalism (for example, against Reichenbach's (1938) 
views on the relation between abstracta and concreta). Our own criti-
cisms will be saved until Section Five below. Even though we have tried 
to cast Wittgenstein's views in as favorable light as possible, there is 
considerable confusion contained within them to which we shall turn 
later. 
we are now in a position to explain the nature of nonsense. The 
nature of nonsense can be elusive, because in order to figure out what 
it is we need to rely upon Wittgenstein's analysis of sentences that 
state scientific laws, yet on countless occasions he asserts the utter 
dissimilarity of science and philosophy. As we will see, a certain 
asymmetry does exist in the way each contains nonsense, but it is negli-
gible. 
Nonsense arises when one attempts to say the unsayable. 
Specifically, it arises when one attempts to convey a necessary truth 
that is not tautologous. More specifically yet, it results from an at-
tempt to express in an inappropriate way the necessary conditions for 
language use and for thinking. While the Tractatus consists from start 
to finish of nonsensical sentences, the central most important is per-
haps that which occurs at 3.12 where the essence of the proposition is 
given as a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world. 
When we unpack the concept of projection, we find at the heart of lan-
guage and thought the willing subject. We find choices concerning which 
structure among a proposition's form is to be uttered. Such choices 
must be made, inasmuch as representation requires a concrete structure. 
The production of utterances, inscriptions, thoughts and other proposi-
tional signs is not merely a part of the phonetic, syntactic or pragmat-
ic features of language; rather it belongs to the very essence of lan-
guage, to the very possibility of representation. A child incapable of 
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using some structured medium for the purpose of representation is not 
otherwise able to represent to itself the facts or states of affairs of 
this world. (This is a fact that will become even more relevant below 
when we consider Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism.) Representation 
presupposes the human will. 171 
If we were to conjoin all the theses that constitute Tractarian 
semantics and represent the theory as a whole by w, we might say that 
the occurrence of any propositional sign with sense necessarily implies 
W; hence, to maintain the correctness of Tractarian semantics is to hold 
true: (P) (P .=> W). Here P ranges over propositional signs (i.e., lin-
guistic tokens) that possess sense. w contains all that must be true, 
particularly those claims about the role of the will, if a given propo-
sition is to have a sense. Of course, this formula is itself nonsensi-
cal (which corresponds to the fact that the Tractatus not only contains 
nonsense but also nonsensical sentences about nonsense, e.g., 4.124), 
and is thus contained in w. We might call this Wittgenstein's (as op-
posed to Russell's) Paradox. If the sentences of the Tractatus say any-
thing at all, they say (of themselves) that they are nonsensical. If 
they are nonsensical, they do not say anything at all. Hence, if the 
sentences of the Tractatus say anything at all, they do not say anything 
at all. The self-referential nature of w precludes its inclusion in the 
logical use of language. This is why Wittgenstein says u[a] philosophi-
cal work consists essentially of elucidations (Erlauterungen)" (1922b, 
4.112), and it goes a long way toward explaining the non-argumentative 
style of the book. Since inferences can only hold among sentences with 
a sense, it would be misleading at best to argue for Tractarian seman-
tics. we will have an opportunity to consider the implications of all 
171 Of historical significance is the influence upon Wittgenstein of 
Schopenhauer's On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason and on the Will in Nature (1881). See Janik and Toulmin (1973), 
pp. 120ff for discussion. 
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this in Section Five. 
We may now ask, just what distinguishes the nonsensical expres-
sions of the Tractatus from such nonsense strings as "red up down white 
only only?n The nonsensical expressions of the Tractatus are about 
something; indeed, they are about something very important. Like the 
nonsense string written here, though, they have no use within the domain 
of rational discourse. This distinguishes them from sentences that ei-
ther have a sense or are senseless. Yet unlike the gibberish above, 
which we might term bad nonsense, the possibility of good nonsense re-
sides in the nature of language itself. 112 If Tractarian semantics is 
true, the attempt to put the necessary conditions for the possibility of 
any representation whatsoever into words will inevitably produce some-
thing that has neither sense, nor is senseless, nor is bad nonsense like 
that mentioned above. Such utterances are, quite literally, expres-
sions--they spring from one's desire or (better) willingness to say what 
cannot be said. To the extent that these utterances look like ordinary 
sentences that do have sense, they are misleading. we saw this from the 
very beginning when we were examining the imagery found in Tractatus 
6.341. Recall how the description of the white surface with black spots 
incorporated what appear to be singular terms (w, x, y, and z); later it 
was determined that these are not genuine referring expressions at all. 
Similarly, in the case of actual scientific laws we find predicates 
172 This sort of distinction is commonplace among Wittgenstein's com-
mentators. Hacker divides the pie even further, distinguishing overt 
(bad) from covert (good) nonsense and then subdividing the latter into 
misleading and illuminating nonsense (1972, p. 18). As Hacker puts it, 
"[i]lluminating nonsense will guide the attentive hearer or reader to 
apprehend what is shown by other propositions which do not purport to be 
philosophical; moreover it will intimate, to those who grasp what is 
meant, its own illegitimacy" (1972, p. 18). This is what distinguishes 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (with its own ontology) from the great meta-
physical works of philosophers such as Hegel. Viewed in this light we 
might say--in contradistinction to Whitehead's famous claim about Plato-
-that all of western metaphysics is but a preliminary note to Wittgen-
stein. 
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which must be interpreted instrumentally. These expressions cannot be 
analyzed out by means of Russell's Theory of Descriptions or by any 
other technique, for at bottom there is nothing contingent into which 
they may be analyzed. To the extent that these expressions are about 
anything whatsoever, they are about the activity of the willing subject. 
That is to say, they are about the projective relation itself. 
3. Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes. 
One of the most intriguing passages in the Tractatus is that 
occurring at 5.542: 
It is clear ••• that 'A believes p', 'A has the thought p', 
arid 'A says p' are of the form "' p" says p' : and this does 
not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but 
rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation 
of their objects (1922b, 5.542). 
The most striking feature of this passage is the way any reference to 
the subject who thinks, believes or says Pis removed. Given all we 
have said about the role played by will in establishing a projective re-
lation between propositional sign and world, the removal of any refer-
ence to the subject is rather startling. The passage does not become 
any less puzzling in light of what now seems to be its standard inter-
pretation by commentators. Typical is the following: 
[T)o say that a person believes that pis to say (or, 
rather, to show) that the propositional sign 'P' (which is a 
fact) represents or mirrors the fact that p (see 5.542). 
The original form of words which prima facie is about the 
person A in this way turns out to be about a proposition 
which is somehow connected with A. This proposition is 
taken by Wittgenstein to be a part of the "subjectn 
A ••• (Hintikka, 1958, p. 159). 
The usual response to Tractatus 5.542 is to treat it as expressing a 
view similar to a Humean bundle or cluster theory of the self. It is 
interpreted as similar in spirit to the view expressed by Russell and 
Whitehead (1910), according to which the uttering of a sentence is 
" ••• part of the series of events that constitutes the person" (1910, p. 
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661; as quoted in Copi, 1958, p. 164). But of course a propositional 
sign by itself is not a proposition; so even if the uttered sign is a 
constituent of the language user, it is hardly possible to reduce our 
talk about propositions and propositional attitude ascriptions to talk 
about propositional signs. Even if the cluster theory is correct, there 
must be some story to tell in answer to the question, uTo whom are 
propositional attitudes ascribed?" We would want some kind of account 
of how the utterance-producing portion of a person is related to the 
other cognitive and conative portions of a person. 173 So it would seem 
to be necessary to refer to a subject A in some manner or other, even if 
we replace talk of A as a unity with talk of A-parts. Is it not the 
case that it is simply false that the sign P says P, but rather that a 
speaker says P by means of P? 
Let us get clear on precisely what sort of view Wittgenstein is 
attacking. The context of the passage makes clear that he is attacking 
the kind of theory of judgment advocated by Moore and Russell (see 
1922b, 5.541). These are relational theories of judgment. we have ex-
amined Moore's theory at some length in Chapter I. Russell's views have 
come up on numerous occasions. Some further description of his theory 
of judgment is in order here, as it is primarily Russell (1912) with 
whom Wittgenstein arguing. 
Like Moore (1899), Russell believes that there can be an unmediat-
ed relation to the objects of awareness and judgment; this is accom-
plished by way of the special psychological relation of acquaintance 
which we described back in Chapter III. On this view the propositional 
attitude ascription uothello believes Desdemona loves Cassio" is to be 
analyzed as asserting a relation (believing) with four terms (Othello, 
173 This challenge is readily acknowledged by Fodor ( 1983) who, by 
virtue of the mental sententialism he has so adamantly defended, de-
serves to be regarded as the foremost proponent of Tractatus-like seman-
tics. His and Lepore's (1992) recent defense of atomism (or, rather, 
attack on the arguments for holism) confirms this. 
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Desdemona, the loving of ••• by ••• , and Cassio. Othello is related by the 
believing relation to these three other things.,,. Russell's view can be 
contrasted with Moore's in that several objects, rather than a unitary 
proposition (fact) serve as the object of belief. This permits Russell 
to account for falsehood without recourse to "objective falsehoods" 
(1912, p. 125). 
Believing that Desdemona loves Cassio cannot merely consist in a 
series of relations to Desdemona, Cassio and the relation of loving, 
since those are related in a certain kind of way. The sentence ucassio 
loves Desdemona" contains the same three constituents, but fails to ex-
press what it is that Othello believes. How are the constituents of 
what is to believed to be related (by Othello) in the proper sort of 
way? And how are they related so as to distinguish what Othello be-
lieves from what is contained in such gibberish (bad nonsense) as "loves 
Cassio Desdemona?" 
The Russell of 1912 maintains (somewhat metaphorically) that the 
objects of Othello's belief (and objects of our belief about Othello's 
belief) are "knit together" in the appropriate way by the subject who 
judges (1912, p, 126). Any judgment involving a two (or more) place 
predicate requires an ordering of the terms by the judging subject. 
Thus, for Othello, Desdemona stands in the loving relation to Cassio, 
and not vice versa. Othello orders the terms of his belief thus: Ldc 
This permits Russell to accommodate falsehood by positing contingent re-
lations among objects that really exist. (Apparent references to unreal 
objects are, as mentioned earlier, analyzed away using the Theory of 
Descriptions.) So if Othello's belief is false, there is no need to 
174 Actually these are not all known by acquaintance, as Desdemona and 
Cassio are not objects of acquaintance at all. References to persons 
are to be analyzed as involving knowledge by description, but for sim-
plicity's sake this will be ignored since knowledge by description de-
pens upon knowledge by acquaintance. Our reference to the relation of 
Othello to Desdemona and Cassio should be understood in this way. 
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construe his belief as involving a relation to the objective falsehood 
or false fact of Desdemona loving Cassio (which on Moore's account would 
have Being but not existence). 
Similarly, our judgment of Othello as believing that Desdemona 
loves Cassio involves the ordering of four terms. we affirm of Othello 
(o) that he stands in the believing relation (B) to Desdemona (d) loving 
(L) and Cassio (c) ~ hence: B(oLdc) • 175 The analysis stands in stark 
contrast to Wittgenstein's view, since it includes reference to the sub-
ject of belief (Othello) • 
As is well known, Russell was working diligently on the unpub-
lished manuscript Theory of Knowledge in 1913. Over a period of weeks 
he had sustained an average of twelve pages per day. The work was in-
tended to develop the principal lines of The Problems of Philosophy. 
Wittgenstein was extremely critical of Problems (which he denounced as a 
shilling-shocker, i.e., something designed merely to line Russell's 
pockets). Of the new work Wittgenstein was no less critical. In June 
of 1913 Russell had received a letter from him outlining a criticism 
which Russell later remarked in a letter to Ottoline Morell as being "an 
event of first-rate importance in my life" (as quoted in Eames, 1984, p. 
xvi). It was, in fact, to cripple Russell's work. It had such an ef-
fect that "I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work 
in philosophy. My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed to pieces 
against a breakwater" (Eames, p. xxvi). 176 While we do not have a full 
account of the exchanges between Russell and Wittgenstein, we do have a 
letter postmarked to Russell in June of 1913 in which Wittgenstein as-
175 The power of this view comes into focus when quantification is in-
troduced, since the scope of the quantifiers enables Russell to accommo-
date some of our true ascriptions of false beliefs to others (something 
Moore was unable to do). Since we are dealing with ascriptions where it 
is assumed all the terms exist, we need not pursue the matter here. As 
we will see, though, Russell cannot account for true ascriptions of 
false beliefs in which all the terms do exist. 
176 This letter is dated 4 March 1914. 
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serts 
••• I can now express my objection to your theory of judg-
ment exactly: I believe it is obvious that, from the 
proposition uA judges that (say) a is in relation R to 
b", if correctly analyzed, the proposition "a R b.v. 
-a Rb" must follow directly without the use of any 
other premiss. This condition is not fulfilled by 
your the~ry (in 1912, p. 122). 
Since the letter is dated two months after Russell's letter to Ottoline 
Morrell, we can infer that this is not quite the way Wittgenstein had 
expressed his criticism originally. Russell must not have expressed to 
Wittgenstein how significant he felt the latter's criticism to be until 
later. A 22 July 1913 letter from Wittgenstein to Russell responds to 
the news: 
••• I am very sorry to hear that my objection to your the-
ory of judgment paralyses you. I think it can only be re-
moved by a correct theory of propositions (in 1912, p. 122, 
emphasis added). 
What was the original objection? Most of what we know about what tran-
spired between Wittgenstein and Russell during this time can be garnered 
from Wittgenstein's (1913b) "Notes on Logic." These "Notes" are actual-
ly a series of manuscripts, prepared by Russell, based upon conversa-
tions with Wittgenstein. (Russell had intended to use them as an aide 
in conveying Wittgenstein's ideas to audiences at Harvard during his 
Lowell Lectures.) One significant passage stands out: 
Every right theory of judgment must make it impossible 
for me to judge that this table penholders the book. 
Russell's theory does not satisfy this condition (1913b, p. 
103). 
The passage would eventually evolve into Tractatus: 5.5422: 
The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, 
"A makes the judgement p", must show that it is impossible 
for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell's 
theory does not satisfy this requirement (1922b, 5.5422). 
Together these passages give us a pretty clear picture of the na-
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ture of Wittgenstein's objections Wittgenstein believes that whatever 
can be said, thought, believed, etc. must be capable of having a sense. 
That is the import of the original comment in his letter to Russell that 
"from the proposition "A judges that (say) a is in relation R to b", if 
correctly analyzed, the proposition ua R b.v.-a Rb" must follow direct-
ly without the use of any other premiss" (1912, p. 122). While the tau-
tology does not say anything, it does express (in an abbreviated fash-
ion) the sense of the proposition~ The point is that the bipolarity of 
the proposition must be a precondition that must be met by anything that 
is a candidat~ for judgment. In order to demarcate what is and what is 
not a propositional attitude ascription, it is therefore necessary to 
have "a correct theory of propositions" (1912, p. 122). Russell's the-
ory is inadequate precisely because it allows nonsense to be judged, as-
serted, and so forth. 
Now in what manner of speaking does Russell's theory permit judg-
ments regarding nonsense? Is Wittgenstein talking about good or bad 
nonsense? The answer, it seems to me, is that Wittgenstein's view in 
this matter evolved. In the early goings he seems to be concerned with 
bad nonsense, that is, with strings that may be considered bits of gib-
berish. Such, for example, is "this table penholders the book" (1913b, 
p. 103). 
we see this to be the case, if we examine the way in which 
"Othello believes Desdemona loves Cassio" is formalized, viz., as 
B(oLdc). We said earlier that what Othello believes involves an order-
ing of terms thus: Ldc. What happens to this ordering once Ldc is em-
bedded within B(oLdc)? It no longer appears as evident. Othello does 
not merely stand in the believing relation to Land d and c. Othello 
believes that Ldc. How is the unity that characterizes what Othello be-
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lieves to be preserved?177 
Russell has no answer to this question, although in 1913 he toyed 
with the idea that the logical form of what is believed (what 
Wittgenstein refers to as structure) might well be added to the objects 
of belief. we are, Russell maintains, able to have "acquaintance with 
the form of the complex" (1913, p. 99). Indeed, at this time Russell is 
willing to countenance acquaintance with numerous kinds of "logical ob-
jects" (1913, p. 99), including such objects as are referred to by "such 
words as 'predicate' , 'relation' , ••• 'or' , 'not' , 'all' and 'some'" 
( 1913, p. 101). 
These particular passages date from 15 May 1913. 178 They mark the 
sharpest contrast between Wittgenstein's and Russell's views. We know 
from the opening remarks in Chapter IV above that elements of the 
Grundgedanke occurred to Wittgenstein at various times: the identity 
sign, variable names, and sentence-forming operators fell under his gaze 
at different times. By the third week of May the significance of the 
Grundgedanke had occurred to him. From the twentieth until the twenty-
sixth of May Russell met regularly with Wittgenstein, and the showdown 
was underway. From then until the 19 June 1913 (when he posted the let-
ter to Ottoline Morrell quoted above) the sad recognition spread upon 
him that his previous fundamental work in philosophy had been demol-
ished. 
There is little question that there were various prongs to 
Wittgenstein's attack. By May 1913 he had made known his arguments con-
cerning the impossibility of an adequate theory of types to Russell~ he 
had also explained why such a theory is not even necessary. Next, the 
various aspects of the Grundgedanke had been presented to Russell, as is 
177 For a slightly different description of Russell's troubles, see 
Aquila (1977), p. 81. 
118 This is based upon the chronology provided with the text (1913, p. 
lii). The chronology is based upon Russell's daily letters to Ottolone 
Morrell. 
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evidenced by the way the topic peppers their correspondence. Here 
though would be the final straw: Russell's theory of judgment suffers 
problems even if there are logical objects, because the theory does not 
exclude the possibility of judging nonsense. The recourse ma.de to ac-
quaintance with logical objects (what Russell calls logical intuition) 
does not resolve his difficulties in the least bit. Let us say that 
among the objects of Othello's belief there arez Desdemona, Cassio, the 
relation of loving, and, now, the form Ldc. Bow are these objects re-
lated (i.e., to be related) to this form? The new analysis is compati-
ble with the possibility of ascribing to Othello the belief that Loves 
Ldc Cassio Desdemona (which is bad (l) nonsense). Russell has simply 
added another object for which the original problem recurs. Shall we 
also add to the objects of Othello's belief the fact that L refers to 
loving, d refers to Desdemona, and so forth; shall we add facts concern-
ing the way ordering occurs? It hardly seems that Othello is thinking 
about semantic theory. But by introducing formal concepts into the 
analysis of Othello's belief that Desdemona loves Cassio, it is diffi-
cult to see how this slippery slope is to be avoided. Not insignifi-
cantly, the inclusion of this sort of material would amount to the in-
clusion of good nonsense. 
I said above that, with respect to the question of whether it was 
good nonsense or bad nonsense that was being attributed to Russell, that 
Wittgenstein's views evolved. It seems clear from the context in which 
the final criticism of Russell (Tractatus 5.5422, cited above) that it 
is the more serious nonsense that concerns Wittgenstein in the end. 
That remark is the second of three comments upon Tractatus 5.542 with 
which we opened this section of this chapter. However after 
Wittgenstein asserts that u,A believes that p' ••• [is] of the form 'P' 
says p 91922b, 5.542), but beLore making his comment about Russell's 
theory of judgment at 5.5422, he writes: 
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This shows ••• that there is no such thing as the soul--the 
subject, etc. as it is conceived in the superficial psychol-
ogy of the present day. 
Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul (1922b, 
5.421). 
The "superficial psychology of the day" would be the naturalistic phi-
losophy of mind gaining prominence with the advent of Social Darwinism. 
In spite of their willingness to posit the existence (or subsistence) of 
abstract entities, Russell's and Moore's relational theories of judgment 
share with this naturalism the idea that the subject is situated in the 
world in such a way as to be able to enter into contingent relations 
with the objects, facts, and states of affairs of which it may be 
aware. 170 It and the relations into which it may enter (believing, ex-
pecting, desiring, etc.) may, accordingly, be subjected to the very same 
treatment appropriate to any scientific investigation. Thus it is pos-
sible to analyze propositional attitude ascriptions thoroughly in terms 
of relations among objects. 
However we saw in the previous section that, for Wittgenstein, 
discourse about the willing subject must be regarded as nonsensical, 
since it is the willing of the subject that makes representation itself 
possible. There can be no sensical or significant discourse about it 
whatsoever. One cannot say anything significant about any of the neces-
sary conditions for representation. 110 
Let us distinguish between the ascriptive clause ("S believes ••• " 
m The term "naturalism" should be taken here to denote a commitment 
to the methodology of science rather than to a materialistic meta-
physics. Clearly Russell, like Moore, was willing to countenance uni-
versals and other abstract objects that would not fit within a straight-
forwardly materialistic ontology. Except for a brief flirtation with 
Idealism, resulting from McTaggart•s influence at Cambridge, Russell 
would remain committed to the philosophical relevance of the scientific 
method. Concerning his flirtation with Idealism, cf. Moorehead (1992) 
pp. 51-54. 
180 The idea is reminiscent of Sartre's claim that any attempt to cap-
ture the subject of consciousness by means ot another act of awareness 
will be futile (1937, p. 41). 
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and the content clause (u ••• P") in "S believes that P" What is 
startling about Wittgenstein's treatment of the ascriptive clause is the 
way any reference to the subject of belief disappears. Given the fact 
that it is impossible for any of our discourse concerning the necessary 
conditions for representation to possess sense, Wittgenstein's move is 
not so surprising. If analysis seeks to elucidate a sentence's truth 
conditions by means of sentences with sense, any reference to the will-
ing subject must be out of the question. 111 If sentences of the form "S 
believes that P" contain any truth whatsoever, the misleading reference 
to s must be removed. This does not mean that there is nos, in spite 
of Wittgenstein's claim that •there is no such thing as the soul--the 
subject, etc. as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the 
present day" (1922b, 5.421)--a claim that must be interpreted in light 
of all he does (try to) say about the subject as such. What is mislead-
ing is the assimilation of s to an object that enters into contingent 
relations. Its relations--expressed by the formula (P) (P => ~)--to the 
contingent facts that are signs are necessary ones. 
The analysis cannot contain reference to the willing subject. 
What however of the rest of the ascriptive clause? What shall be made 
of the verbs "believing," "'thinking," "saying," and the like? Because 
each is an act or mental act that involves representation, each contains 
or presupposes the projective relation. While that common feature of 
the attitudes cannot be stated in the analysis, it would seem that an 
adequate analysis would have to do justice to what distinguishes believ-
ing that P from desiring that P, or remembering that P from expecting 
that P, and so forth. Surely it is a contingent matter whether one has 
a particular expectation at a particular time. 
181 To anticipate an objection: no, the willing subject does not do 
anything but will, so it is not possible to speak of it in other re-
spects. Phenomena associated with the will, e.g., the occurrence of a 
certain desire are "of interest only to psychology" (1922b, 6.423). 
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Wittgenstein does acknowledge that there are diverse psycho_logical 
phenomena, but he relegates them to a secondary position (1922b, 6.423). 
These phenomena are objects for empirical investigation, and as such are 
of little consequence to the author of the Tractatus. In the "Notes on 
Logic," for example, he says, "[j[udgment, question and command are all 
on the same level. What interests logic in them is only the unasserted 
proposition" (1913b, p. 96). we might say that what guides his analysis 
of propositional attitude ascriptions is a desire to delineate what is 
essential and necessary for representation from what is essential but 
not so necessary. The activity of the will is essential and necessary. 
so is the existence of a representational medium of one sort or another. 
The specific sign used is essential but not so necessary. That is to 
say, that a specific sign is used is essential, but what that sign is 
(so long as it contains the requisite isomorphism) is not. The specific 
propositional sign, we must recall, is a fact, a complex configuration 
of objects. It, like any other fact, can be described. Thus we have 
Wittgenstein's idea that it is possible to replace the misleading sen-
tence "S says that P" with a less misleading one about the complex that 
says P: "P" says P. 
At this stage it is worth asking whether Wittgenstein is being in-
consistent with his dictum that facts cannot be named. I would suggest 
that Tractatus 5.542 does not put matters quite as Wittgenstein would 
like. In an earlier passage he expresses his worry over the manner in 
which even "'P' says P" is misleading: 
Instead of, "The complex sign 'aRb' says that a stands to 
bin relation R," we ought to put: "That 'a' stands to 'b' 
in a certain relation says that aRb" ("Oass 'a' in einer 
gewissen Beziehung zu 'b' steht, sagt, dass aRb") (1922b, 
3 .1432). 
There is something very interesting going on here. Wittgenstein wants 
to say what can be said about the propositional attitudes of others. 
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However in the very attempt to do so he finds himself trying to say 
something about the projective relation itself. It is not insignificant 
that he tries to replace the original sentence (The complex sign ••• ") 
with one that begins with the demonstrative "Dass" (which is italicized 
in the original German). While his strategy is not all that successful 
(since one could preface the sentence that replaces the original with 
.,The fact that ••• "), it is clear what he is attempting to do. He is 
trying to present the symbol in its projective relation to a possible 
fact. ("[I]f only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then 
nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be--unutterably--contained 
in what has been uttered." 112 ) However, by Wittgenstein's lights a 
propositional sign with one structure cannot say what is said by propo-
sitional sign of another structure. That even his reformulation of the 
original sentence can be construed as containing what purports to be the 
name of a fact is symptomatic of the problem. The only way to capture 
in words the semantic properties of a propositional sign is by actually 
using the sign. It seems to me that Wittgenstein is acutely aware that 
he is trying to say what can only be shown. Indeed, Tractatus 3.1432 
can be traced to a passage in the "Notes on Logic" where it is surround-
ed by comments on Russell's Theory of Types and considerations pertain-
ing to why facts cannot be named (which, as we saw, is the decisive move 
in Wittgenstein's attack upon the thesis that a function can be its own 
argument) (1913b, pp. 96 and 98). The point--the crucial point--is that 
even the best attempt to analyze the ascriptive clause results in non-
sense. The ascriptive clause of any propositional attitude ascription 
is nonsensical. 
I am tempted to describe such a view as disquotational, but in a 
way that is dissimilar to Carnap (1947), Quine (1960), Davidson (1968) 
1~ This passage, noted earlier asquoted in Monk (1990) p. 151, seems 
apt here. 
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or Stich (1983). Wittgenstein's view differs from those of the other 
philosophers, precisely because his view entails that no adequate (i.e., 
sensical) analysis can be given for the ascriptive clause in belief and 
other PA attributions. Each of these philosophers, in contrast, hold 
out hope for saying what the propositional attitude ascription says--
that is, of adequately stating the truth conditions for "S believes that 
P.H For example, in Stich's case, when A utters us believes that P," A 
is to be understood as asserting thats is in a state similar to the one 
which would have played the central causal role were A were to have ut-
tered "P" with a typical causal history (1983, p. 81). This sort of 
analysis is supposed to state the truth conditions for A's utterance, 
and the reference made to the "central causal role" of the state that 
produces tokens of Pis supposed to be consonant with a thorough causal 
analysis of S's belief state. The possibility of providing a causal 
analysis of S's belief state that is in any way philosophically inter-
esting is precisely what Wittgenstein rules out by treating the ascrip-
tive clause as nonsensical. 
Nevertheless there is a striking similarity between Wittgenstein's 
view and certain of the views of the other philosophers. Again the com-
parison can be brought out by considering Stich's view. For Stich, the 
belief attribution serves as a kind of skit or demonstration. By saying 
"S believes that P" one in effect shows what one would say under certain 
circumstances. The idea is that if one is to convey something of what 
another believes or says, one must do something similar to what the be-
liever or speaker does, viz., produce a concrete token of a certain 
sort. Although they are futile in the end, we see in Wittgenstein's at-
tempts to reformulate the original propositional attitude ascription ("S 
believes that P") just this kind of approximation to what the speaker or 
thinker must do in order to say or think P. The propositional attitude 
ascription is an attempt at showing what another says or thinks. 
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Ironically, it manages to do so by being a misguided attempt at saying 
what can only be shown. m 
so far we have only been examining the ascriptive clause within 
the propositional attitude ascription. we see now the depth to which 
they must be regarded as nonsensical according to Tractarian semantics. 
we have not examined the content clause. This requires coming to terms 
with what is shown by the ascription. Since the ascriptive clause is 
nonsensical, it is tempting to regard as nonsensical whatever is embed-
ded within it. However, this will not do as an interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's view. At Tractatus 5.1362 we are told that N•A knows 
that pis the case• has no sense if pis a tautology." The context in 
which this passage occurs indicates that Wittgenstein is primarily con-
cerned with knowledge and its limitations, so there is a certain amount 
of strain involved in exploiting it for our present purposes. I do not 
think, for example, that it should be interpreted as denying the thesis 
that the ascriptive clause is nonsensical. What is relevant here is 
that something of the original semantic status of Pis preserved in 
spite of being embedded within the ascriptive clause. Indeed, there is 
textual evidence in the "Notes on Logic (1913b, p. 106) that the embed-
ded sentence retains its original status. Be says there, for example, 
that the P embedded within "S believes that P" cannot be a name of a 
proposition but must have sense like P itself (i.e., when Pis not em-
bedded) •1 " so, apparently the content clause, P, may be either sensi-
,~ Criticism shall be reserved for Section Five below. Let me point 
out here, though, that one undesirable consequence of this position is 
that unless we limit our notion of the attributor doing the same thing 
with a token of P, Pin "S believes that P" becomes truth-functional. 
This commits its proponents to analyzing the attribution as us believes 
something, and P" where the attributor is construed as asserting or be-
lieving P. One way to avoid this is by introducing the appropriate 
counterfactuals 
1~ Although we cannot pursue the issue here, the fact that the embed-
ded and unembedded P's are equivalent is related to his later treatment 
in On Certainty of Moore's Paradox, that is, of the paradoxical nature 
of such sentences as "I believe P, but Pis false." 
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cal, senseless, or nonsensensical, depending upon whatever status it 
happens to have when it occurs unembedded. 185 
That this is so actually constitutes fairly good abductive evi-
dence for interpreting the Tractatus as committed, as described above, 
to a disquotational analysis for the ascriptive clause. A disquotation-
al analysis can be true, only if the content clause shares the same se-
mantic status as it has when it is not embedded~ but if the content 
clause does not share the same semantic properties (i.e., sense and 
meaning), then a disquotational analysis must be false. Let me explain. 
Any disquotational analysis involves exhibiting a sentence token of the 
same semantic type as is to be attributed to some subject. The attribu-
tion is really a kind of prediction: to assert thats believes that P 
is to predict that under the appropriate circumstances swill utter or 
think tokens of P. (Think of the "that" in "S believes that P" as a 
demonstrative pronoun, so that the original ascription might be replaced 
by "S believes one of these: Pl") so, the fact that Wittgenstein 
shares this view tends to confirm our earlier interpretation. 111 On the 
185 We exclude bad nonsense or gibberish from the list, since presum-
ably we are dealing with sentences here. 
186 I want to emphasize that this is an abductive argument rather than 
a deductive one. Viewed deductively it would be an invalid argument in 
which the fallacy of affirming the consequent occurs. The argument has 
the form: (1) If Wittgenstein accepted a disquotational analysis for 
the ascriptive clause within a propositional attitude ascription, then 
he would have accepted the thesis that that clause has the same semantic 
status regardless of whether or not it is embedded; (2) he accepted the 
thesis that that clause has the same semantic status regardless of 
whether or not it is embedded; therefore, (J) Wittgenstein accepted a 
disquotational analysis for the ascriptive clause within a propositional 
attitude ascription. This is a good non-deductive argument, because the 
consequent of (1) predicts what we should expect to find, if our hypoth-
esis (what is asserted in the antecedent of (1)) is true. That this is 
a good test of the hypothesis depends upon showing that advocates of the 
disquotational theory would, whereas its attackers would not, be commit-
ted to the thesis that the content clause has the same semantic proper-
ties whether embedded or not. Fortunately, we need only prove the weak-
er claim that Wittgenstein would not have accepted the thesis, had he 
not accepted the disquotational analysis. 
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other hand, had Wittgenstein not accepted a disquotational analysis, he 
would hardly have maintained that the content clause shares the same se-
mantic properties whether or not it is embedded. In all probability he 
would have regarded it as nonsensical, since the content clause would 
need to be construed as a (presumably) non-truth-functional component 
embedded within a nonsensical clause. The semantic properties of the 
embedded clause would then be viewed as 'fused with' or 'parasitic upon' 
those of the clause within whose scope it falls. Being committed to 
that sort of claim comes with the territory when it stands opposed to 
disquotational analyses, since those analyses (and only those analyses) 
present the content clause as a token whose semantic properties are 
being exhibited. The alternative view would have to see the content 
clause as mentioning an item whose semantic properties may be instanti-
ated or exemplified by tokens that are not embedded. Be that as it may, 
if Wittgenstein were not committed to a disquotational analysis, he 
would be committed to the idea that we cannot ascribe to anyone any be-
lief (etc.) that is not nonsensical. Our attribution as a whole would 
be nonsensical, and what we attribute would be nonsensical. But this 
Wittgenstein cannot hold, since it would entail ascribing to s the pos-
sibility of believing or thinking or judging nonsense. Contrary to our 
intentions we would be ascribing to the subject nothing but nonsensical 
beliefs (etc.), since the analysis of our utterance of the ascription 
would again have to treat the clause as nonsensical. 117 But this, we 
know, is incompatible with Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's 
Multiple Object Theory of Judgment (and so with most everything else 
that Wittgenstein believes). The fact that Wittgenstein is willing to 
assign the same semantic properties to the content clause regardless of 
whether or not it is embedded is, therefore, a good indication that his 
187 We will see in section Five that second-order propositional atti-
tude ascriptions turn out to be very problematic for Wittgenstein. 
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is a disquotational analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions. 181 
Throughout this section we have been trying to make sense out of 
Wittgenstein's scanty remarks about propositional attitude ascriptions. 
we were able to note his opposition to the relational theories of judg-
ment of Moore and Russell, and were able to identify his criticism of 
Russell. This allowed us to move to a consideration of how proposition-
al attitude ascriptions are accommodated within the context of 
Tractarian semantics. we saw that their analysis is two-fold. The as-
criptive clause must be regarded as nonsensical, and the content clause 
must be deemed to share the same generic semantic properties as it would 
have were it not embedded within the ascription. This further afforded 
us abductive evidence to support the contention that Wittgenstein is 
committed to disquotational analyses for propositional attitudes. We 
turn now to an objection that can be raised against the interpretation 
of the Tractatus which has been provided in this and earlier chapters. 
4. Accommodating the Remarks on Solipsism. 
This dissertation has interpreted the Tractatus in a realist spir-
it. Even nonsensical sentences are said to have reference of some sort. 
Anyone who adopts this interpretation must square off against the re-
marks on solipsism. These remarks appear to cast the Tractatus in the 
dimmer light of an extreme tom of Idealism or phenomenalism. The re-
marks form the subject matter of the 5.6's. Representative are the fol-
lowing: 
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world 
(1922b, 5.6). 
Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are 
also its limits. 
So we cannot say in logic, 'The world bas this in it, and 
this, but not that.' 
For that would appear to presuppose that we were exclud-
1N We have, of course, throughout this discussion been concerned with 
generic semantic properties (to borrow a phrase from Fodor and Lepore 
(1992)) like having a sense or being senseless rather than referring to 
Socrates or being true of the fact that Scott is the author of ~averly. 
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ing certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, 
since it would require that logic should go beyond the lim-
its of the world; for only in that way could it view those 
limits from the other side as well. 
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot 
think we cannot say either (1922b, 5.61). 
This remark provides the key to the problem, how much 
truth there is in solipsism. 
For what the solipsist means [meint] is quite correct, 
only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. 
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that 
the limits of language (of that language which alone I un-
derstand) mean the limits of my world (1922b, 5.62). 
The world and life are one (1922b, 5.621). 
I am my world (The microcosm) (1922b, 5.63) • 
••• The subject does not belong to the world: rather it 
is a limit of the world (1922b, 5.632). 
Indeed the very dependence of the world upon the attitude of the subject 
seems to be underscored by the famous remark of Tractatus 6.43 that: 
••• [t]he world of the happy man is a different one from 
that of the unhappy man (1922b, 6.43). 
Nevertheless, any thoroughgoing optimism within Idealist or phenomenal-
ist camps concerning the possibility of easily assimilating the 
Tractatus must be tempered by such remarks as that: 
[t]he world is independent of my will (1922b, 6.373). 
and 
••• it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications 
are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The 
self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and 
there remains the reality co-ordinated with it (1922b, 
5.64). 
These sets of comments counsel caution in interpreting Wittgenstein. 
Clearly the first set gives prominence to the activity of the will, 
while the claim that the world is independent of one's will gives promi-
nence to the constraints under which the will operates. Not surprising-
ly, I want to argue that the two sets of remarks can only be accommodat-
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ed by the two-sided view of the will-under-constraint presented earlier. 
The difficult question, however, concerns how to reconcile the two. Is 
Wittgenstein's view coherent? The key lies in the final remark concern-
ing the self of solipsism shrinking to a point without extension. 
This passage is related to a 15 October 1916 passage of the 
Notebooks where Wittgenstein writes: 
This is the way I have traveled: Idealism singles men 
out from the world as unique, solipsism singles me alone 
out, and at last I see that I too belong with the rest of 
the world, and so on the one side nothing is left over, and 
on the other side, as unique, the world. In this way ideal-
ism leads to realism if it is strictly thought out (1914b, 
p.· 85).uo 
When one reads the entries for the days leading up to this passage, one 
gets a feel for what Wittgenstein is after. 11 June 1916 marks the be-
ginning of a lengthy soliloquy within the Notebooks concerning the na-
ture of the subject who thinks and speaks. By that time the principal 
ideas of the Tractatus pertaining to sense and its relation to sense-
lessness were in place. The last major topic to be worked out concerned 
the ontological status of objects and whether there could be simple ob-
jects. After considering both realist and phenomenalist characteriza-
tions of objects, he opts for an agnosticism that leaves the question of 
their nature to empirical science. 100 This has the effect of 'pushing' 
objects into the realm of what can be said. The issue of their status 
then becomes whether they are phenomena produced by the act of percep-
tion or whether they exist independently of the perceptual act. It is 
1• This entry occurs six days after the passage that becomes 
Tractatus 5.64: cf. 194b, p. 82 for the original version of 5.64. 
1~ The topic comes to a head on 22 June 1915 (1914b, pp. 68-71). 
After that there is a lapse in the notebook entries until 15 April 1916. 
Presumably there were one or more notebooks during this time, but they 
have been lost. Once the entries resume we find that Wittgenstein has 
settled for himself, not only the question of simple objects and atomic 
facts, but questions concerning the logical independence of elementary 
propositions. Then is when it occurs to him that u ••• the whole 
Weltanschauung of the moderns involves the illusion that the so-called 
laws of nature are explanations of natural phenomena" (1914b, p. 72 
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important to see that a certain framework has been established for the 
problem. Regardless of the answer, objects are to be counted among 
those things that may enter into contingent relations with one another. 
Regardless of whether objects are phenomena produced by perception (a 
bodily event that takes place among the contingent events of the world), 
they are objective in the sense that they exist independently of the 
will of the subject: "[t)he world is given me, i.e., my will enters 
into the world completely from outside as into something that is already 
there. (As for what my will is, I don't know yet.)" (1914b, p. 74). 
It is worth remembering that these passages were written during 
some of the worst shelling of the war. On the very same day (8 July 
1916) as the above comment, he writes: "[a] man who is happy must have 
no fear. Not even in the face of death. Only a man who lives not in 
time but in the present is happy" (1914b, 74). The development of his 
own character, a matter to which he gave the utmost importance, would 
coincide with identifying himself with something independent of the suf-
fering and contingencies surrounding him. Whatever the subject of the 
will is, it "is not an object" that enters into contingent relations 
with other objects (1914b, p. 80). As he would say, "I objectively con-
front every object. But not the I" (1914b, p. 80). 
To determine its nature he would attempt to isolate the will by a 
via negativa. This is the idea behind his remark that if he were to 
write a book, The World as I Found It, it would include reports on many 
things but not the subject. Among the things that the world contains 
are: objects and bodies, the observable behavior (including the verbal 
behavior) of others, one's own body, and one's own psychological proper-
ties (1914b, p. 82). Indeed among the final passages in the Notebooks 
we find him attempting to isolate the will from such conative phenomena 
as having a wish (1914b, p. 88). Even these belong to the world and are 
amenable to empirical investigation. 
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As a result of the via negativa Wittgenstein is able to isolate 
the willing subject--what he refers to as the metaphysical subject 
(1922b, 5.633)--as that which possesses one of two attitudes 
(Stellungnahmen) toward the world (1914b, p. 87). It is that which can 
experience the world sub specie aeterni (the correct way) or not. 
Experiencing the world this way involves, as was mentioned in an earlier 
section, experiencing oneself and the world as independent of one anoth-
er. The world viewed uas a limited whole" (1922b, 6.45) is a world 
viewed in the correct way as being unable to affect one. The having of 
this attitude does not simply come over a person, it is an act one en-
gages in (1914b, pp. 76-77). And, we should hasten to add, it is a par-
ticularly difficult act to perform in the face of an artillery barrage 
that may end one's life. 101 
In lieu of the method by which Wittgenstein seeks to isolate the 
metaphysical outcome as well as its particular outcome, it is ludicrous 
to interpret Wittgenstein as a solipsist in the classical sense. In the 
traditional sense of the word, solipsism holds that everything (includ-
ing any other mind if exists) depends for its existence on one's own 
mind. What the method and its desired outcome are designed to reveal is 
that the will and the world are utterly independent of one another: 
N[t]here are two godheads: the world and my independent I" (1914b, p. 
7 4). 
Neither of two extreme views would be regarded as justified for 
Wittgenstein. on the one hand, the view that construes everything as 
subjective and dependent for its existence upon the mind or will of the 
191 Wittgenstein distinguishes between willing and being able to ex-
ercise one's will (1914b, p. 76). One can will to move one's arm, but 
not be able to move it. Similarly, I suppose, one could will psycho-
logical phenomena but not be able to exercise one's will, for example, 
when one is unable to remember a phone number. This is pure specula-
tion, but perhaps Wittgenstein could have said even someone coming out 
of a coma, attempting to regain consciousness and not relapse into un-
consciousness, is willing in his sense. 
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subject is unjustified. But no less unjustified is the view (which 
Wittgenstein terms realism) that takes the contents of the world as ex-
hausting what there is, so that there is no willing subject distinct 
from the world as such. Although Wittgenstein often says such things as 
that there is no subject (1922b, 5.631), these must be treated merely as 
a way of speaking. The way in which he always qualifies this and simi-
lar statements shows that what he believes is that there is no subject 
of which we may say anything. In the words of the Wittgenstein of the 
Philosophical Investigations: u ••• a nothing would serve just as well as 
a something about which nothing could be said. we have only rejected 
the grammar which tries to force itself upon us here" (1958, 304). 
This just leaves one nagging problem. How are we to interpret the 
remarks constituting the last paragraph of Tractatus 5.62, 5.621, and 
5.63 which form the core of the remarks with which we opened this sec-
tion? I would suggest that the matter become resolved if (l) we treat 
statements like "The world and life are one" (1914b, p. 77: 1922b, 
5.621) which find there way from the Notebooks into the Tractatus as ex-
pressions of what Wittgenstein regards as problematic about the will and 
its relation to the world up until the solution (described above) is 
reached: and (2) we treat the claim at 5.62 concerning the fact that 
"the limits of language (of that language which I alone understand) mean 
the limits of my world" as an expression of what we shall call semantic 
individualism. 
Sentences like "The world and life are one" (1914b, p. 77: 1922b, 
5.621) and " ••• [t]he world of the happy man is a different one from that 
of the unhappy man" (1922b, 6.43: descended from 1914b, p. 78) should 
not be taken as expressions of Wittgenstein's final view on the relation 
of the will to the world. If one examines their position in the 
Notebooks, one finds that they occur prior to almost all of the rest of 
the entries on this subject. While this in itself does not provide 
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strong evidence that these do not constitute his final view, we would 
expect, if my hypothesis is correct, to find such comments located here 
and nothing like them located later in the Notebooks. An inspection of 
the text will bear this prediction out. This is not strong evidence, 
however, for the very reason that one can state a conclusion at the be-
ginning of an argument. Perhaps what follows the occurrence of these 
remarks is the argument for them. I think this is unlikely in a text 
that has the form of a notebook or journal (since one tends to move on 
from one insight to the next and allow one's ideas to unfold naturally 
in such a context), but I can appreciate the reader's desire for 
stronger evidence. 
Stronger evidence consists in the fact that later passages make 
clear that "life" (das Leben) refers to, neither the will nor the world, 
but to the relation of the one to the other. Nowhere is this more evi-
dent than when he is contemplating what he calls the happy lite. That 
life is described as happy (glUcklich) or unhappy (unglUcklich) The 
text makes sufficiently clear that happiness and unhappiness consist in 
the subject's particular attitude toward the world. One can either view 
the world as a limited whole or not: one can view oneself as independent 
from the world or not. To do the former is to be happy: to do the lat-
ter is to be unhappy. At 6.43 Wittgenstein says: 
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the 
world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the 
facts--not what can be expressed by means of language. 
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether 
different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a 
whole. 
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of 
the unhappy man (1922b, 6.43). 
The imagery of the world waxing and waning is particularly apt. we 
think of a distant object that can completely fill our gaze. The happy 
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person is able to attain a proper perspective. 102 This perspective does 
not change the facts (the sayable) but only brings their limits into 
view. It thereby brings into view the nonsensical. 
The point is that when Wittgenstein speaks of the world and life 
being one, he is giving expression to what he thinks is problematic in 
life. He is expressing the fact that individual subjects have some con-
trol over the way they represent the world to themselves. 
This brings us to our consideration of the claim at Tractatus 5.62 
that "the limits of language (of that language which I alone understand) 
mean the limits of my world." The original German within the parenthet-
ical remark (der Sprache, die allein ich verstehe) is ambiguous: should 
it be rendered as the only language that I understand or as the lan-
guage that only I understand? Most commentators (Stenius (1964), 
Hintikka (1958), Black (1964)) view it the first way, whereas Anscombe 
(1959) views it the second way. The second (so-called private language) 
interpretation casts Wittgenstein as a solipsist. It suggests that the 
sayable is to be identified with what is sayable by me. It suggests 
that outside of what I say there is nothing to be said. 
While Hintikka (1958, p. 157) does, I believe, sufficiently show 
the first translation to be the correct one (by demonstrating that 
allein always modifies the word it follows), there is a way that the two 
interpretations can be reconciled. It must be remembered that the pas-
sage within its context in the Notebooks arises in connection with the 
process of isolating the willing subject. That is to say, it arises as 
Wittgenstein tries to isolate his own will. The emphasis is upon his 
will and what it does. Now the fact of the matter is that Tractarian 
semantics quantifies over linguistic tokens--concrete structures--that 
are used by the individual subject for the purposes of representation. 
192 The use of visual imagery is played out at Tractatus 5.6331 (orig-
inally 1914b, p. 80). 
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This is what may be called semantic individualism. Representation is an 
individual will's accomplishment. This does not mean that each individ-
ual represents the world in a wholly different way. Rather it amounts 
to the more mundane claim that speaking and thinking is always done by 
individuals. Mundane it may be, but it underscores the fact that repre-
sentation always presupposes (contrary to the linguistic Platonist) an 
involvement in the world, and it contains a major implication: to wit, 
even it there were only one thinker or speaker in the world, represen-
tation would be possible. That is the key to the remarks on solipsism, 
and it is the final piece of the Tractarian puzzle. Furthermore, it 
serves to distinguish the naturalism of the Tractatus from that of the 
Philosophical Investigations where all of the uses of language are 
viewed as social phenomena. That, however, is a subject nwe must pass 
over in silence" (1922b, 7). 
5. Criticism. 
What are the main criticisms that can be raised against the 
Tractatus? The two most often discussed criticisms are (l) the unintel-
ligibility of the supposition that there could be simple objects, and 
(2) the so-called Color Exclusion Problem. we have already dispelled 
the first of these problems. Before proceeding to the real difficulties 
besetting the Tractatus I would like to explain why I believe the Color 
Exclusion Problem is not so problematic either. 
Some scholars take this problem quite seriously. For example, P. 
M. s. Hacker claims n[o]nce the intractability of this problem became 
clear, the main struts of the whole system collapsed" (1972, p. 86). 
Here is the typical description given of the problem: 
Consider an ordinary color attribution: one points to a 
(red) object and says, nThis is red." It is hard to imagine 
a proposition less likely to be a truth-functional construc-
tion from other propositions, so the color proposition is a 
prime candidate for being an elementary proposition of the 
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Tractarian sort. Yet it is not inferentially discrete, for 
if it is true (at t 1 ) that the object pointed to is red, 
then it is false (at t 1 ) that the same object is blue. 
Color words form a system: if a color is (truly) predicated 
of an object at a given time, then it can be inferred that 
none of the others can be predicated of that object at that 
time. From "This [object O] is red" it can be inferred that 
uThis (object O] is not blue": "This is not green": uThis is 
not yellow" and so forth. These inferences ••• undermine the 
Tractarian assurance that elementary propositions are logi-
cally independent of one another (Edwards, 1985, pp. 77-78). 
For our purposes it matters not whether color propositions are candi-
dates for elementary propositions: presumably color phenomena can be an-
alyzed in terms of wave lengths of light. The temptation to regard them 
as elementary probably stems from the fact that color vocabulary typi-
cally is learned ostensively in the context of one's childhood rather 
than in a physics lab. I would guess that the conditions under which 
one acquires a particular vocabulary item has little to do with whether 
it is simple or composite and with whether its name is analyzable, espe-
cially for the early Wittgenstein. 
What is important is why, and in what sense, elementary proposi-
tions must be logically independent of one another. Wittgenstein tells 
us at Tractatus 2.061 that "[s]tates of affairs are independent of one 
another," and at 2.062 that theme reemerges in the remarks on probabili-
ty where he asserts that two elementary propositions give one another 
the probability of .5 (1922b, 5.152). When one proposition entails an-
other, as when Q entails P, the truth-grounds for Pare contained within 
those of Q (1922b, 5.121). Indeed the sense of Pis contained in the 
sense of Q (1922b, 5.122). If elementary propositions were not logical-
ly independent there would be no terminus to logical analysis. That 
would be true, even if it would beg the question were it deployed as a 
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premise in the argument for logical atomism. 103 Should there be noter-
minus, however, it is difficult to see how any proposition could effect 
the requisite discrimination within reality that allows it to have a 
sense. Commenting on Tractatus 3.25-3.251, Black tells us " ••• only if a 
proposition has a unique and complete analysis can its sense be defi-
nite" (1964, p. 111). Unfortunately, in none of the literature on this 
subject is there to be found an account of the relation between the two 
conditions of uniqueness and completeness. Clearly it is that "[a] 
proposition has one and only one complete analysis (1922b, 3.25, empha-
sis added) that accounts for its effecting any discrimination within re-
ality. A proposition for which more than one analysis is possible would 
not have a determinate sense. What is missing from the literature is 
any account of why one should believe that an infinitely long analysis 
would lack the requisite uniqueness. On the face of it, being infinite-
ly long and being unique are not mutually exclusive. Perhaps one argu-
ment that could be offered is this: if analysis were infinitely long, 
then it would be an arbitrary matter at what point one "cuts off" the 
analysis~ in that case there could be more than one analysis for a given 
proposition, resulting in indeterminateness. The argument would be a 
weak one if we were talking about entailments among levels of analysis, 
for then the sense of a proposition belonging to the more general level 
would contain that of the proposition belonging to the more particular 
level, and no indeterminateness would result. Here, however, we are 
talking about relations among propositions all belonging to the same 
level. Alternative analyses, in this instance, provide us with poten-
tially very dissimilar cross-sections of one and the same stratum of 
193 As we saw in Chapter hree, extracting a non-circular argument from 
the Tractatus for the existence of simple objects is no small task. we 
must be careful not to conflate the metaphysical issue concerning simple 
objects with the purely logical issue that is about to be pursued--name-
ly, that entailments among elementary propositions must be ruled out if 
analysis is to be complete. 
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reality. In the end, if sense is to be determinate, the idea of en-
tailment must be restricted to relations between levels of analysis 
(these serve as definitions; cf. 1922b, 3.261), and to relations between 
molecular propositions belonging to the same level (as these sequents 
can be rewritten as tautologies). Where entailment cannot occur is 
among series of elementary propositions. So there must be an end to 
logical analysis. An infinity of propositions there may be, but they 
must be generated compositionally (through repeated operations) rather 
than decompositionally (through analysis). 
Let us then grant Wittgenstein's claim that if there are to be el-
ementary propositions, then they must not be able to entail one another. 
With that in mind let us return to the Color Exclusion Problem. The 
problem is one which Wittgenstein would raise in his 1929 essay usome 
Remarks on Logical Form." The difficulty arises in consideration of 
Tractatus 6.375-6.3751: 
Just as the only necessity that exists is logical neces-
sity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical 
impossibility. 
For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at 
the same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact, 
logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical 
structure of colour. 
Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics: 
more or less as follows--a particle cannot have two veloci-
ties at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be in two 
places at the same time; that is to say, particles that are 
in different places at the same time cannot be identical. 
(It is clear that the logical product of two elementary 
propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. 
The statement that a point in the visual field has two dif-
ferent colours at the same time is a contradiction) (1922b, 
6.375-6.3751). 
Notice how the problem arises. Assume that uThis is red" (or something 
like it) is an elementary proposition. It appears to entail uThis is 
not blue," But this, so it is maintained, involves entailment among el-
ementary propositions. The problem reaches its culmination in the final 
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paragraph of 6.3751; the two statements within that parenthetical remark 
appear to contradict one another. The product of two elementary propo-
sitions can neither be a contradiction nor entail a contradiction, yet 
"This is red, and this is blue" either is a sort of contradiction or at 
least entails one, viz., "This is blue, and this is not blue." 
The contradiction evident in that parenthetical remark is regarded 
by commentators, and indeed was regarded by Wittgenstein himself, as the 
worm at the core of the Tractatus. Scholars are consistent in attribut-
ing to Wittgenstein only two options: he may renounce the idea of there 
being simple objects, or he may modify the Tractarian account of the 
truth table in such a way as to make the product of (some) elementary 
propositions senseless (Allaire, 1959, p. 192; Hacker, 1972, p. 88). In 
1929 Wittgenstein opted for the second of these choices. He believed 
the problem could be circumvented by introducing numerals into elemen-
tary propositions concerning phenomena that admit of degrees (1929a, p. 
34), and by eliminating the line of the truth table (for the conjunction 
matrix column) that represents both conjuncts as true (1929a, p. 36). 
The column representing the conjunction would then represent such a 
proposition as false under all conditions--hence, senseless. 104 
The solution has been said to be susceptible to objection on the 
grounds that a presumably sensical expression such as "It is false that 
this is both red and blue" is the negation of, and is thus composed of, 
the senseless expression "This is both red and blue" (Allaire, 1959, p. 
194 At the end of "Some Remarks on Logical Form" Wittgenstein remarks 
that the construction of such sentences is nonsensical rather than 
senseless--a fact noted, and unassumingly taken for granted, by commen-
tators (e.g., Hacker, 1972, p. 91). This is most peculiar however. For 
if their construction were nonsensical, why should Wittgenstein be will-
ing to provide a matrix for them at all. The bulk of the article is de-
signed to show how they are senseless. Perhaps this has something to do 
with Wittgenstein's denunciation of the article. It was originally to 
be presented before the Aristotelian Society; when the time came to give 
the paper, he elected not to do so, but to give a more or less extempo-
raneous discussion on the nature of infinity. 
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192). The presumption upon which this criticism is based is unfounded, 
since the negation of a contradiction would be a tautology--hence sense-
less too. Another criticism focuses upon the fact that there is an "ab-
sence of any account of the nature of the constraints upon the combina-
torial possibilities of objects which are reflected in the syntax of 
language" (Backer, 1972, p. 90). This, however, is a criticism based 
upon taking seriously Wittgenstein's claim at the very end of the arti-
cle that such propositions are nonsensical. This, I have suggested, we 
need not do. But it is not my concern to analyze the pro's and con's of 
the solution offered in 1929, nor to evaluate the criticisms that have 
been offered. The fact is I do not believe there is a Color Exclusion 
Problem. 
The Tractatus has the resources for dealing with the problem, and 
these resources do not consist in what is usually touted as the 
"Tractarian solution" to the problem. What commentators have regarded 
as the Tractatus's solution stems from a misreading of 6.3751. Recall 
the claim that: 
the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same 
place in the visual field is impossible, in fact, logically 
impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure 
of colour (1922b, 6.3751: emphasis added). 
It has generally been accepted that the reference to the logical struc-
ture of color is intended to suggest that "red" and "blue" do not denote 
simple objects (Allaire, 1959, p. 190: Hacker, 1972, pp. 87-88). Like 
the problem of apparent references to non-existent objects, on this in-
terpretation the problem of the exclusivity of two colors disappears at 
the next level of analysis. Understandably, if one accepts this inter-
pretation, one will want to say (as does Hacker) that "the suggested so-
lution merely pushes the problem back one stage" (1972, pp. 87-88), 
since the question simply reemerges as one concerning the compatibility 
of two different degrees of the same color. 
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In all this the distinction between form and structure has been 
forgotten. While two true elementary propositions are logically inde-
pendent of one another, the same cannot be said of different potentially 
true elementary propositions that share the same sense! Return to the 
symbolism used in Chapters Three and Four. Let us suppose that 11¥A is 
an elementary proposition, and that the rules of syntax for the individ-
ual terms permit each of the members of the following set to be well-
formed: {11¥A, 11A¥, ¥11A, ¥All, A¥11, All¥}. The members of this set 
are not logically independent of one another1 if they were we would have 
to abandon th~ bipolarity of the proposition.us (And then we would be 
in no better position than we were in with Moore's relational theory of 
judgment with all of its problems.) There is an incompatibility among 
the members of this set, and it happens to be a pragmatic one: one can-
not assert 11¥A at the same time that one asserts 11A¥ (or any other 
member of the set that comprises the form of 11¥A). Both propositional 
signs are facts--different facts--that cannot occur at the same place at 
the same time. That incompatibility is what is secured by the logical 
structure and form of color. The Color Exclusion Problem disappears 
once we acknowledge that the semantic theory of the Tractatus ranges 
over linguistic tokens, i.e., concrete utterances, inscriptions, and the 
195 The Philosophical Remarks contain the following illuminating pas-
sage: 
Syntax prohibits a construction such as 'A is green and A 
is red' (one's first feeling is that it's almost as if this 
proposition had been done an injustice1 as though it had 
been cheated of its rights as a proposition), but for 'A is 
green', the proposition 'A is red' is not, so to speak, an 
other proposition--and that strictly is what the syntax 
fixes--but another (aspect of the] form of the same proposi-
tion • 
••• In this way syntax draws together the propositions that 
make one determination (1930, p. 86) • 
• It is important to see that, for Wittgenstein, the proposition is 
not to be identified with any particular structure. The proposition is 
really comprised of the whole set of possible structures (comprising the 
form) from which one may be selected to be uttered. 
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like. It is little wonder that Wittgenstein would later disown usome 
Remarks on Logical Form." 
Wittgenstein does of course say in the Tractatus that the truth of 
one elementary proposition cannot entail the falsehood of another ele-
mentary proposition. But surely this is not intended to hold true for 
the potential assertions that comprise the set of propositional signs 
comprising the form of 0¥6. Propositional signs that share the same 
form (hence, sense) but differ in terms of truth-conditions must be an 
exception, otherwise the Tractatus is just an uninterpretable mess. 
What sense can we make of the idea that the truth of a proposition must 
be contingent, unless the state of affairs which makes it true is one of 
a set of mutually exclusive states of affairs? What sense would be left 
of the idea that propositions contain the possibility having all opera-
tions, including negation, performed on them? What Wittgenstein should 
have said at 2.062 is that u[f]rom the existence or non-existence of one 
state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-exis-
tence of another [of different sense]." 
The point I am trying to make would later be articulated by 
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Remarks (1930)~ recall the passage 
cited in Chapter One: 
I once wrote: 'A proposition is laid like a yardstick 
against reality. Only the outermost tips of the graduation 
marks touch the object to be measured.' I should now prefer 
to say: a system of propositions is laid like a yardstick 
against reality. What I mean by this is: when I lay a 
yardstick against a spatial object, I apply all the gradua-
tion marks simultaneously. It's not the individual gradua 
tion marks that are applied, it's the whole scale. If I 
know that the object reaches up to the tenth graduation 
mark, I also know immediately that it doesn't reach the 
eleventh, twelfth, etc. The assertions telling me the 
length of an object form a system, a system of propositions. 
It's such a whole system which is compared with reality, not 
a single proposition. If, for instance, such and such a 
point in the visual field is blue, I not only know that the 
point isn't green, isn't red, isn't yellow etc. I have 
simultaneously applied the whole colour scale. This is also 
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the reason why a point can't have different colours 
simultaneously; why there is a syntactical rule against fx 
being true for more than one value of x. For if I apply a 
system of propositions to reality, that of itself already 
implies--as in the spatial case--that in every case only 
one state of affairs can obtain, never several. 
When I was working on my book I was still unaware of all 
this and thought then that every inference depended on the 
form of a tautology ( 1930, p. 317). 100 
In point of fact, what Wittgenstein was doing was to retrieve the con-
ception of form and structure (and of sense and meaning) that he had 
first articulated in his 1912-1913 letters to Russelll The description 
of a system of propositions being laid simultaneously, like a ruler with 
all its graduation marks, against reality is nothing other than the 
method of projection described in the first section of this chapterl 
Wittgenstein had not made the mistake in the Tractatus for which he 
later berates himself. What has happened, however, is that he has be-
come enmired in considerations concerning the inferential relations 
among the members of a propositional sign's form. He seems to have for-
gotten that the relation of a structure to the other members of its form 
is one of showing. The structure, subject to rules of syntax, shows its 
form. This is the first of the conceptions of showing, the one that 
pertains to all sentences possessing sense. Indeed, the negated propo-
sition used in posing the problem does not even belong to the set com-
prising the form; the presence of the negation sign means it is not ele-
mentary at all. That proposition is arrived at by applying the mechani-
cal operation of negation to an elementary proposition. It is only be-
cause-Pis defined over the complement of P within P's form that one is 
able to draw the problematic inference. To reach the "inference" from 
"This is red" to "This is not blue," one must do at least two things 
igs This passage comes specifically from notes of a discussion made by 
Waismann between Wittgenstein and members of the Vienna Circle on 25 
December 1929. (How fitting that the Vienna Circle would be discussing 
the Color Exclusion Problem on Christmas day.) A portion of the passage 
is cited in Edwards (1985), p. 78. 
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outside of the elementary level: define -P and perform the operation of 
negation on one of the members of the set so defined. None of this goes 
against the grain of the Tractatus. So, to a great extent, the Color 
Exclusion Problem is ill-formed. 101 
What then are the real problems with Tractarian semantics? Let us 
return to the analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions. we saw 
that Tractarian semantics is committed to a two-fold analysis for such 
sentences. The ascriptive clause must be regarded as nonsensical, 
whereas the content clause possesses whatever semantic properties it 
would have were it to occur as an unembedded linguistic token. So, the 
content clause can either have sense, be senseless or be nonsensical. 
But now let us consider second-order propositional attitude ascriptions. 
The sentence "John believes that Martha thinks that he is rich" would be 
an example. The ascriptive clause, "John believes ••• ," would have to be 
treated as nonsensical (although it contains reference to a psychologi-
cal state amenable to empirical investigation). The content clause, 
though, is problematic. Since it contains an ascriptive clause 
(" .•• Martha thinks •.• "), it should be regarded as nonsensical; but since 
that acriptive clause contains a content clause (" ••• he is rich") that 
possesses sense, we would need to regard the nonsensical ascriptive 
clause as in some way containing sense. This cannot be dismissed as un-
problematic in the way, say, that a big man can "contain" a small finger 
is unproblematic. The intensional character of the embedded clause(s) 
cannot be overlooked. Wittgenstein is faced here with a real dilemma. 
Disquotational analyses tend to have an extensionalizing effect upon the 
sentence under analysis. Their goal is to replace reference to appar-
ently non-truth-functional elements of a sentence with reference to ob-
jects or facts that are amenable to scientific investigation. On the 
m Wittgenstein's view remains remarkably consistent with this in 
The Blue and Brown Books (1934), p. 56--a point remarked upon by Allaire 
(1959), p. 193. 
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face of things it would appear that Tractarian semantics is perfectly 
compatible with the possibility of doing so, since propositional signs 
are facts whose tokening may be exhibited by the propositional attitude 
ascription as a whole. But on Wittgenstein's view all that can be ex-
hibited is the empty shell of the propositional sign itself. The 
proposition in its projective relation cannot be exhibited unless one 
says or asserts the proposition oneself. But in that case how is it 
ever possible to truly ascribe false beliefs to others? This is one of 
the difficulties that toppled Moore's theory of judgment. The analysis 
of "John believes that Martha thinks that he is rich" to which 
Wittgenstein is committed necessitates John believing of himself that he 
is rich, when in fact he may know that he is not rich and is ascribing 
to Martha a false belief. 
Here it won't do for Wittgenstein to point to the futility in-
volved in saying with one sign what another sign says. That is, he can-
not simply point to the fact that the content clause of the ascription 
only shows but does not say what the person to whom the belief is as-
cribed believes. For in that case it would be impossible to truly as-
cribe what one believes to be a true belief to another. Bow could one 
ever say, for example, "Martha knows that I am rich" and consequently 
how could a sentence like "John believes Martha knows that he his rich" 
ever be accommodated by Tractarian semantics? The dilemma is unavoid-
able. 
The source of the dilemma is the idea that one cannot say what is 
nonsensical. Wittgenstein had criticized Russell's theory of judgment 
on the grounds that it did not eliminate the possibility of judging non-
sense. But either one must be able to judge nonsense, or one will have 
to deal with the dilemma just posed. Something has to give here, and it 
has got to be the conception of nonsense that runs through the 
Tractatus, because the possibility of truly ascribing false beliefs to 
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others is a tact. 
The task of abandoning the Tractarian conception of nonsense is 
not so difficult when one considers just what is nonsensical. What are 
nonsensical are sentences about the necessary conditions for representa-
tion. Those conditions that must be satisfied for a linguistic token to 
have meaning or sense are themselves contingent. we said earlier that 
the advocate of Tractarian semantics is committed to accepting (P) (P ~ 
W) where P ranges over linguistic tokens and w ranges over the necessary 
conditions for the possibility of representation. Included under w, for 
example, would be one's own willing (i.e., one's own selection of a 
structure, etc.) when one utters a sentence. However, the members of 
W''s domain do not enjoy the sort of necessary existence enjoyed by the 
simple objects that (for Wittgenstein) make up the substance of the 
world. No necessity attaches to one's own existence, the existence of 
one's will, one's selection of a particular structure, and so forth! 
Even if (P) (P ~ W) is true of all linguistic tokens, it is only con-
tingently true. This fact allows us to pinpoint what can be regarded as 
the fundamental inconsistency within the Tractatus~ for the Tractarian 
conception of analysis--which entails "[t]o be general means no more 
than to be accidentally valid for all things" (1922b, 6.1231)--commits 
Wittgenstein to the contingency of (P) (P ~ W). One could, of course, 
instantiate the first variable with particular linguistic tokens and the 
second with specific necessary conditions, but the result will still be 
a set of contingent truths. The point is that once one acknowledges 
that sentences which ascribe a necessary relation to two things need not 
be necessarily true themselves, the problem of not being able to say 
what the Tractatus calls nonsensical disappears. 
But once this move has been made, nothing stands in the way of a 
thoroughgoing naturalistic account of the nature of language and its so-
called rules of projection. Finding the right naturalistic account 
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would be a task that would exercise Wittgenstein for the rest of his 
life. But we can already get an idea of how the dominoes begin to fall. 
The first to fall is one of the two "godheads," namely the metaphysical 
subject. Its existence is contingent, as indeed is what it wills (since 
it chooses to will one thing or another). This carries significant con-
sequences for the analysis of the ascriptive clause within the proposi-
tional attitude ascription. Stripped of its necessity there is no rea-
son to regard reference to the subject as nonsensical. The metaphysical 
subject is thereby assimilated to the psychological subject which 
Wittgenstein dismisses as unimportant to philosophy. This does not mean 
that the production of utterances needs to be viewed as issuing from a 
unified subject or self. Indeed it would become one of the tenets of 
the later Wittgenstein's philosophy that belief in such a self is mere 
superstition. As one writer puts it, any attempt to locate a causal 
source for meaning and sense 
••• are attempts to deny the true depth of philosophy, 
which is the true depth of life itself, namely, the pure 
contingency and independence of the conditions of all mean-
ing. The deep Pathos of philosophy and life is just that 
acknowledgment: that there is no single, central source and 
ground for the sense we happen to make to ourselves and one 
another~ that sense appears as a face does, constellated out 
of elements fortuitously dispersed in a field, with no-thing 
as its source and center and guarantor (Edwards, 1990, p. 
238). 
The "proof" of this would occupy the great body of his later writings on 
the philosophy of psychology where he attempts to exhibit the variation 
and play that characterizes our use of psychological predicates. A dis-
cussion of that and his remarks on the impossibility of a private lan-
guage fall beyond our present concerns. Suffice it to say that for the 
later Wittgenstein the appropriate study of language consists in examin-
ing its use within a social context--an idea foreshadowed by the 9 
September 1916 Notebooks passage that asserts "[t]he way in which lan-
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guage signifies is mirrored in its use" (1914b, p. 82). Thus it is the 
language user as social agent that is of importance to the later 
Wittgenstein. 
Since the ascriptive clause does not need to be regarded as non-
sensical, neither do content clauses that contain what were formerly 
considered nonsensical. A sentence like uJohn believes that Martha 
thinks he is rich" will say something about John. What it says will de-
pend upon the sort of analysis deemed appropriate for content clauses 
generally. Earlier it was said that the Tractatus construes the content 
clause disquotationally. There is little reason to forsake that claim 
in the face of the criticism leveled above. In fact, the later 
Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology resists regarding the content 
clause as referring to any sort of inner mental content (as when he says 
u[i]f God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see 
there whom we were speaking of" (1958, p. 117~ see also p. 231). This 
is not the place to discuss this matter at any length, but it appears 
that to the extent Wittgenstein is willing to allow for there to be men-
tal contents, images and so forth, they are reduced to the status of 
epiphenomena: it is never necessary that a particular content or image 
pass before the mind's eye (see, e.g., the discussion of reading in 
1958, 151ff.). The implication is that the content clause shows us 
something of what is to be expected of a subject's behavior. A full 
consideration of the criterial behaviorism of the later philosophy is 
beyond the scope of the present dissertation however. There is certain-
ly much room for consideration of its strengths and weaknesses. 
The other so-called godhead, the world correlated with the meta-
physical subject, must be viewed in a different manner as well. The 
later Wittgenstein would become quite critical of his earlier belief in 
a world possessing a crystalline logical form (1958, 97). Consider in 
what the de re necessity of the Tractatus consists. It consists in the 
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fact that simple objects are immutable and that they have certain possi-
bilities for being related to one another as constituents of 
Sachverhalten. Even though the obtaining of a given state of affairs is 
contingent, the possibility of its obtaining (given what simple objects 
there are) is not. so, if Pis an atomic proposition containing names 
of simple objects, then it is necessarily the case that possibly Pis 
true. To say that language and world share the same form (or that the 
form of a proposition corresponds to its sense) just is to give expres-
sion to the fact that what is necessary within language is determined by 
what is necessarily the case in the world. The tautologies that serve 
as rules within language (and contradiction which might be thought of as 
proscribing certain inferences or transformations) are grounded in the 
de re necessity of the world. At the bottom of all this is the necessi-
ty that attaches to the existence of simple objects. 
Although Wittgenstein would later attack the idea of there being 
simple objects on the grounds that simplicity is a relative notion, such 
an objection carries no weight against the sort of argument for logical 
atomism that we were able to excavate from the Tractatus. That argument 
requires simple objects to be "outside of" time and space in the 
Newtonian sense where, presumably, nothing relative (in the proper 
sense) is to be found. we would do well to ask, however, whether the 
existence of these immutable objects cannot be regarded in some manner 
or other as contingent. we can certainly imagine the possibility of an 
object that exists endlessly in time as possessing existence contingent-
ly. One need but imagine a particle passing through space fortuitously 
never colliding with any obstacle. Similarly, where is the contradic-
tion in saying that immutable objects responsible for spatial and tempo-
ral phenomena may be contingent? This seems to me to be the fundamental 
problem with the metaphysics of the Tractatus: it attributes de re ne-
cessity to objects whose nature, by its author's own admission, must be 
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left to the empirical sciences. But, by definition, how could the em-
pirical sciences ever disclose what is necessary. 
Once we see that the problems of necessity extend all the way to 
the substance of the world, we must renounce the idea that the objects 
of the world fix once and for all what can be said. If their own exis-
tence is contingent, then what could be said might be quite different 
than what can be said. Here the isomorphism between structure and mean-
ing, between form and sense--the basic structuralist assumption of the 
Tractatus--comes undone. 101 Thus we find the Wittgenstein of the 
Philosophical Investigations declaring: 
••• if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolute-
ly the correct ones ••• then let him imagine certain very gen-
eral facts of nature to be different from what we are used 
to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual 
ones will become intelligible to him (1958, p. 230). 
The point is that once shorn of its supposed metaphysical underpinnings, 
the rules and practices that comprise the use of language can be seen as 
more flexible, more pliable, more subject to human control. His working 
out of the nature of rules and rule-following would occupy him for the 
rest of his life and would serve as the unifying theme in his Remarks 
on the Foundations of Mathematics and Philosophical Investigations. The 
reader is directed to Levvis (1989) for a fuller treatment of the rule-
following considerations in the later philosophy and to Levvis (1992) 
for an examination of how the general points concerning rules pertain to 
our use of psychological predicates. 
What remains of Tractarian semantics once the two godheads are 
dismantled? This is what remains: linguistic tokens are the locus of 
meaning, semantic Platonism is false, an appeal to mental contents to 
198 It seems to me that if one wants to retain a structuralist or for-
malist semantics once its underlying metaphysics has been abandoned, 
that one must accept some version of Fregean minimalism. Such is how 
this writer would interpret Davidson's formal semantics with its commit-
ment to a coherence theory of truth and Jerry Fodor's computational the-
ory of mind with its commitment to methodological solipsism. 
350 
explain semantic properties and relations is unnecessary, and perhaps 
most importantly a distinction between what can be said and what can 
only be shown must be recognized. What can be said, what can be counted 
as possibly true or possibly false, stems from rules that are under the 
governance of human beings. The manner in which utterances of rules--
granunatical propositions--show what can be said (how they serve as re-
minders of correct usage and are antecedent to truth) is, however, a 
topic for another time. 
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Upon completing this dissertation I became convinced that its 
chapters contain an inaccurate account of Wittgenstein's conception of 
Sinn. This realization came to me through the indefatigable efforts of 
Professor John Nolt, to whom I am grateful. I would like to take this 
opportunity to append to my earlier discussion an account of the objec-
tion and its implications. 
In Chapter One the Sinn of a propositional sign is defined as a 
set of possible states of affairs, such that if an elementary proposi-
tion is false, then some other elementary proposition composed of the 
same singular terms must be true. This claim was based upon the premise 
that the bipolarity of the proposition could only be secured through 
positing falsification conditions for elementary propositions. 
Consider, however, a world in which there are three objects: a, p, and a 
circle. 100 Within this world there are four possible states of affairs: 
<1 and f3 may both be inside the circle, a but not p may be in the circle, 
f3 but not a may be in the circle, or neither a nor p may be in the cir-
cle. These possibilities are represented by the first column of Figure 
I. Let us now imagine two languages in which a, p, and the circle are 
denoted respectively by "a", "b", and by a small circle. The first of 
our languages is thoroughly pictorial, so that the various spatial rela-
tions among the objects are depicted by similar relations among the 
propositional sign's elements. The second column of Figure I contains 
the permissible propositional signs for Language 1, and correlates each 
with its truth condition in the first column. Language 2 is a linear 
script in which the small circle followed by "an indicates that a is in 
the circle, the small circle followed by "b" indicates that pis in the 
circle. The semantic rule governing the elementary propositions in 
Language 2 is: Ox is true, if and only if what x denotes is in the 
199 This example comes from John Nolt. 
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circle. The third column in Figure I presents the sentences of Language 
2 that would serve as translations of those contained in Language 1. 
WORLDS LANGUAGE 1 LANGUAGE 2 
1. 8 
2. 
3. a. 0· 
4. a fl 
Figure I 
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Consider what, with respect to Language 2, must be the case if an 
elementary proposition of the form Ox is false. I had asserted that 
some other elementary proposition would have to be true. But if Oa or 
ob is false, there is no other elementary proposition in Language 2 
that is thereby true. In Language 2 the only way to characterized the 
falsehood of Oa and ob is by means of line 41 the conjuncts of line 4 
are, however, molecular rather than elementary. There are no alterna-
tive elementary propositions in terms of which we may state what makes 
Oa and ob false. Here all we can do is speak of the nonobtaining of 
a's and b's being O or the negative fact(s) that a and bare not 0. 
Indeed what line 4 of Language 2 demonstrates is that it is possible 
within certain languages for some possible states of affairs to only be 
represented by molecular propositions. Nevertheless Language 2 and 
Language 1 are expressively equivalent: whatever one can say in the 
one, one may say in the other. so, it is not necessary for a language 
to contain true elementary propositions in order to represent actual el-
ementary states of affairs, and it is certainly not necessary for a lan-
guage to possess elementary propositions (or a disjunction of elementary 
propositions) that express the very same thing as a false or negated el-
ementary proposition. 
It occurs to me that one might want to respond to this objection 
by pointing to the fact that Language 2 contains predicative expressions 
in addition to singular terms. Clearly the small circle functions as a 
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predicate, so Oa and ob cannot be regarded as Tractarian elementary 
propositions. There are, obviously, expressions within a language that 
can function either singularly or predicatively. Such is the case with 
definite descriptions. But we know that Wittgenstein would not treat 
definite descriptions as elementary, but would subject them to further 
analysis. Thus one might want to respond to the objection by saying 
that a language need not use elementary propositions to state that some 
state of affairs obtains, and that it need not contain true elementary 
propositions that are equivalent to its false or negated propositions J 
nevertheless, it must be possible for such a language to be translatable 
into another language where such is the case. This is precisely how 
things stand with regard to Languages 1 and 2. 
There is a good reason, however, why we should not respond to the 
objection in this manner. To require that all languages must be trans-
latable in this way seems to be a fairly ad hoc determination. Whether 
a language stands in need of translation at all, depends, I suspect, 
upon whether it is capable of exhibiting determinancy of sense. ( "A 
proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no" 
(1922b, 4.023).) Language 2 would fail in this regard if, for example, 
Oa could be false in more than one way, i.e., by the non-existence of 
a, by the non-existence of the circle, or by the failure of a to be in 
the circle given that both exist. But Language 2 rules out the first 
two possibilities by requiring each of its terms to be referring terms. 
Determinancy of sense does not require anything more than what Language 
2 already possesses. 100 A language really need only possess the re-
200 This point is underscored at Tractatus 4.025 where it is asserted: 
When translating one language into another, we do not 
proceed by translating each proposition of the one into a 
proposition of the other, but merely by translating the 
constituents of propositions ( 1922b, 4. 025). 
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sources by means of which to negate its elementary propositions. As 
Chapter Four argues, this possibility is secured by the fact that any 
proposition contains the potential of having any operation whatsoever 
performed upon it. 
In an important way, my identification of the sense of a proposi-
tion with a set of possible states of affairs fails to do justice to the 
fact that sense itself effects the directed division within reality 
(that is to say, the sense of a proposition must itself exhibit bipolar-
ity). A set of possible states of affairs, however, is the reality 
within which the directed division must occur. Wittgenstein says: 
What a picture represents is its sense (1922b, 2.221). 
The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality 
constitutes its truth or falsity (1922b, 2.222). 
A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I under-
stand a proposition, I know the situation that it repre-
sents. And I understand the proposition without having had 
its sense explained to me (1922b, 4.021). 
A proposition shows its sense. 
A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And 
it says that they do so stand (1922b, 4.022). 
We may characterized the sense of Oa in Language 2 by saying that when 
it is uttered (etc.) it asserts Oa is true and that -Oa is not true. 
If Oa is true, then the Bedeutung of the proposition just is the fact 
that a is in the circle, in which case we have the agreement of the 
sense of the proposition with reality. If Oa is false, then the 
Bedeutung of the propositional sign is the fact that a is not in the 
circle, and in that case we have the disagreement of the sense of the 
proposition with reality. This is what Wittgenstein has in mind when he 
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asserts that propositional signs P and -P can have the same Bedeutungen 
but opposite Sinne (1922b, 4.0621). That is to say, if Pis true and -P 
is false, then it is the fact that P that is their Bedeutung1 if Pis 
false and-Pis true, then it is the fact that -P that is their 
Bedeutung (1914b, p. 112). If Oa is true and -Oa is false, then it 
is the fact that a is in the circle that is their Bedeutung1 if Oa is 
false and -Oa is true, then it is the fact that a is not in the circle 
that is their ·sedeutung. 20' 
Of course when one asserts Oa, one does not say Oa is true and 
-Oa is not true. That is shown by the fact that one employs a partic-
ular propositional sign with its own particular structure. One uses 
Oa to say that a is in the circle, and one's employment of that sign 
shows the rest. This fact is consonant with the central thesis in this 
dissertation, namely, that the use of signs makes possible the semantic 
properties of language. Before I would not have said that the use of 
signs makes sense possible, given the way that term had been defined. 
201 The claim that P (when true) and -P (when false) share a 
Bedeutung and that P (when false) and -P (when true) share a Bedeutung, 
but that P and -P do not share a Bedeutung regardless of their truth-
value, is supported by conjoining Tractatus 4.0621, in which 
Wittgenstein asserts "[t Jhe propositions 'p' and '-p' have opposite 
sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same reality" ( 1922b, 
4.0621) with the passage from the "Notes Dictated to Moore" which as-
serts: 
"The Bedeutung of a proposition is the fact that corre-
sponds to it, e.g., if our proposition be "aRb", it it's 
true, the corresponding fact would be the fact aRb, it 
false, the fact -aRb" (1914a, p.1121 emphasis added). 
Clearly this second passage indicates that the Bedeutung of a propo-
sitional sign depends upon the sign's truth or falsity. 
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Now, however, nothing precludes our saying that such is the case. 
one remaining issue concerns the nature of negative states of af-
fairs. I have maintained that a negative state of affairs cannot merely 
consist in the existence of simple objects that are in no way related to 
one another. This assumption is crucial to my proposed solution to the 
Color Exclusion Problem. For if it is true, then it is of no conse-
quence that being red precludes being blue: "Thie is redn and "This is 
blue,n like P and -P, could be said to have opposite Sinne but identical 
Bedeutungen. What makes it seem natural to impute to the author of the 
Tractatus those views held by the author of the Philosophical Remarks is 
the fact that at Tractatus 2.011-2.0131 Wittgenstein asserts (i) that 
objects are defined in terms of their potential for concatenation with 
one another (1922b, 2.011), and (ii) that objects cannot ever be 
regarded in isolation, i.e., as being unrelated or propertyless (1922b, 
2.0131). In that series of passages he tells his readers that "[t]hings 
are independent insofar as they can occur in all possible situations, 
but this form of independence is a form of conexxion with states of af-
fairs, a form of dependence" ( 1922b, 2. 0122). Even though it is incor-
rect to identify the range of possible states of affairs with a proposi-
tion's sense, and even though the state of affairs that happens to ob-
tain when an atomic proposition is false may not be expressible by an-
other atomic proposition, it still seems that there must be some such 
state of affairs that renders (or a set of possible states of affairs 
capable of rendering) the elementary proposition false. What is crucial 
to my proposed solution to the Color Exclusion Problem is not that an-
other elementary proposition "with the same sensen is made true by the 
falsehood of another elementary proposition, but rather that a language 
must have some means to convey what makes an elementary proposition 
false. In the Tractatus this requirement is satisfied through the fact 
that P and -P have the same meaning. That is why ~P can express what 
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makes P false. Of course the relation of P to-Pis not a relation be-
tween elementary propositions, and it is in that regard that my way of 
posing the solution is misleading. 
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